1 MAC No. 276 of 2022 2025:CGHC:39616 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 276 of 2022  Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited, First Floor Shanti Chhabi Tower Sirasar Chowk, Power House Road, Jagdalpur, District Bastar, (C.G.) Through - Authorized Singnatory, T.P. Hub, Divisional Office, National Insurance Company Limited, Vyapar Vihar Road, above Canara Bank, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1. Smt. Sonibai Sori Wd/o Late Sukman, aged about 64 years, Cast Gond, R/o Village Bedma P.S. Keshkal, District Kondagaon (C.G.). 2. Dinesh Markam S/o Ramsuram, aged about 30 years, R/o Undari Batrali, P.S. Keshkal, District Kondagaon (C.G.). 3. Daleshwar Sahu S/o Ganesh Ram, aged about 37 years, R/o Singanpur, Tehsil Keshkal, District Kondagaon (C.G.). ... Respondents For Appellant :- Mr. B.N. Nande, Advocate. For Respondents No. 2 & 3 :- Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, Advocate. ANKIT KUMAR SINGH Digitally signed by ANKIT KUMAR SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 14:32:18 +0530 2 MAC No. 276 of 2022 SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Judgment On Board 07.08.2025 1. The short question is involved in the instant appeal whether the Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimant(s) when the offending vehicle did not have a valid permit to ply the vehicle ? 2. Mr. B.N. Nande, learned counsel for the Insurance Company/appellant herein, would submit that though the owner of the offending vehicle has deposited the amount for grant of permit, but ultimately the permit could not be issued before the accident which was occurred by the offending vehicle bearing Registration No. CG-17-T-0315, therefore, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation to the claimant(s). In support of his submission he would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Amrit Paul Singh v. Tata AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. 1 . 1 (2018) 7 SCC 558 3 MAC No. 276 of 2022 3. Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, learned counsel for respondents No.2 & 3, would oppose the prayer made by learned counsel for the appellant. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records minutely. 5. The issue involved in the present appeal is no longer res integra as in the matter of Amrit Paul Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has clearly stated that use of vehicle in public place without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction and observed as under:- 24. In the case at hand, it is clearly demonstrable from the materials brought on record that the vehicle at the time of the accident did not have a permit. The appellants had taken the stand that the vehicle was not involved in the accident. That apart, they had not stated whether the vehicle had temporary permit or any other kind of permit. The exceptions that have been carved out under Section 66 of the Act, needless to emphasise, are to be pleaded and proved. The exceptions cannot be taken aid of in the course of an argument to seek absolution from liability. Use of a vehicle in a 4 MAC No. 276 of 2022 public place without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction. We are disposed to think so in view of the series of exceptions carved out in Section 66. The said situations cannot be equated with absence of licence or a fake licence or a licence for different kind of vehicle, or, for that matter, violation of a condition of carrying more number of passengers. Therefore, the principles laid down in Swaran Singh [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733] and Lakhmi Chand [Lakhmi Chand v. Reliance General Insurance, (2016) 3 SCC 100 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 45] in that regard would not be applicable to the case at hand. That apart, the insurer had taken the plea that the vehicle in question had no permit. It does not require the wisdom of the “Tripitaka”, that the existence of a permit of any nature is a matter of documentary evidence. Nothing has been brought on record by the insured to prove that he had a permit of the vehicle. In such a situation, the onus cannot be cast on the insurer. Therefore, the Tribunal as well as the High Court had directed that the insurer was required to pay the compensation amount to the claimants with interest with the stipulation that the insurer shall be entitled to recover the same from the owner and the driver. The said directions are in consonance with the principles stated in Swaran Singh [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran 5 MAC No. 276 of 2022 Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733] and other cases pertaining to pay and recover principle.” 6. Taking into consideration the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Amrit Paul Singh (supra), in the instant case, the Insurance Company is liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimant(s) and thereafter, entitle to recover the same from the owner and driver of the offending vehicle. It is further stated by learned counsel for the Insurance Company that the Insurance Company has deposited the 50% amount of compensation before the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, the Insurance Company is directed to deposit the remaining 50% amount of compensation within 1 month from today. 7. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge Ankit