JUDGMENT : RAVINDRA KUMAR AGRAWAL, J. 1. The present first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been filed by the defendants against the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.08.2015, passed by the learned 3 rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 144- A/2010, whereby the decree for specific performance of the contract has been passed in favour of the plaintiff. 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of the parties as shown in the civil suit is being referred to in the present appeal. 3. The plaintiff Durga Prasad Koiry filed a civil suit for specific performance of the contract of the suit land bearing khasra No. 325/2, area 0.07 acre situated at village Domuhani, P.H. No. 14, Tahsil and District Bilaspur. It is pleaded in the plaint that, the original defendant Santram Yadav had agreed to sell his land with the plaintiff for total consideration of Rs. 80,000/- and an agreement was executed between them on 23.04.2008 and the entire sale consideration was paid to the vendor at that time with the condition that, the sale-deed of the suit land was to be executed, whenever the plaintiff desired and in favour of the person, whose name would be suggested by the plaintiff. Despite asking for the execution of the sale-deed, the defendant has not executed the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff and then on 25.11.2009, he issued a legal notice to the defendant, but he neither replied to the notice nor showed his interest in registration of the sale-deed, and thereafter, the suit for specific performance of the contract was filed on 29.01.2010. 4. The original defendant, Santram Yadav, contested the claim of the plaintiff and filed his written statement, denied the execution of the agreement and receipt of the advance amount and pleaded that, since there was no agreement between the plaintiff and him, there is no question of execution of the sale-deed. During pendency of the suit, the original defendant Santram has died, and thereafter, his legal heirs have been substituted in his place on 06.02.2013 and the LRs of the original defendant Santram filed their written statement additionally with the pleading that Santram Yadav was a government employee and without prior permission from the department, he was not competent to sell his property and he has not entered into any agreement to sell of his land. The agreement produced by the plaintiff is a forged and fabricated document. It is also pleaded that Santram had no right to sell the property, because the suit property was purchased from the amount obtained from the parents of his wife, Smt. Dulauri Yadav, and at the time of its purchase, the sale deed was executed in the name of Santram, and therefore, Santram alone was not competent to sell the land. It is also pleaded that Santram was a habitual drinker, and if he executed any document, the same is being executed under the influence of liquor, and it is illegal and void. No advance amount has been paid to the vendor. The value of the land is more than 7-8 lakhs, but the agreement is said to have been executed for the total consideration of Rs. 80,000/-, which is highly disproportionate. Therefore, no decree for specific performance of the contract can be passed, and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court has framed the following issues:- 6. In support of his case, the plaintiff Durga Prasad Koiry has examined himself as PW-1, Shankarlal Sahu/PW-2, Mukesh Kumar Sahu/PW-3 and relied upon the documents, i.e. exhibit P-1, which is the agreement dated 23.04.2008, exhibit P-2 is the postal receipt, and exhibit P-3 is the acknowledgment. 7. The defendants have examined Smt. Dulauri Yadav/DW-1, Sanjay Yadav/DW-2, Jagdish Singh Chandel/DW-3 and Shammi Yadav/DW-4. The defendants have not relied upon any document. 8. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the respective parties, the learned trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff holding that, the original defendant Santram Yadav executed the agreement to sell his land on 23.04.2008 and received the entire amount of sale consideration of Rs. 80,000/- and the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and further that, the defendant Santram Yadav is bound to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff under the agreement. Against the said judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, the present first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC has been filed by the defendants, who are the legal heirs of the original defendant. 9. Mr. Against the said judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, the present first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC has been filed by the defendants, who are the legal heirs of the original defendant. 9. Mr. Hemant Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants, would submit that the learned trial Court has committed an error in law and facts, while granting a decree for specific performance of the contract. The proper pleading with respect to being ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short ‘the Act of 1963’), has not been pleaded and proved. Except for the self-serve statement of the plaintiff that he repeatedly requested the defendant for registration of the sale-deed, no other evidence has been produced as to what effort he has made from 23.04.2008 till 25.11.2009, which is the date on which the notice has been issued to the defendant. The notice itself has been issued after more than 1 ½ years, which is sufficient to hold that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He would also submit that it was the condition in the alleged agreement that the sale-deed was to be executed in the name suggested by the plaintiff, which clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff was not the purchaser of the land, but he was a middleman, and since the actual purchaser of the land could not be arranged, the sale deed could not be executed. In the present case, Santram Yadav was not competent to sell the land, as it was purchased in the name of Santram Yadav by the funds obtained from the parents of his wife, Smt. Dulauri Yadav. The said agreement, though, has not been executed by Santram Yadav, but even if it is assumed that it was executed by Santram Yadav, it was executed under the influence of liquor. It is further submitted that the decree for specific performance of a contract is a discretionary and equitable relief. The unexplained delay in filing the suit disentitles the plaintiff to get the equitable relief of specific performance of the contract, and as such, the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside. 10. Mr. It is further submitted that the decree for specific performance of a contract is a discretionary and equitable relief. The unexplained delay in filing the suit disentitles the plaintiff to get the equitable relief of specific performance of the contract, and as such, the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside. 10. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent/plaintiff, would submit that the defendant, from the very beginning, evaded the registration of the sale-deed by denying the execution of the agreement. The entire sale consideration was paid to the vendor at the time of execution of the agreement itself in the presence of the witnesses, which has been proved by the witnesses to the agreement, PW-2 and PW-3. When he felt that the defendant was avoiding the registration of the sale deed, he served a legal notice on 25.11.2009, and then the suit was filed. The plaintiff was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and has already paid the entire sale consideration. After appreciating the evidence, produced by the plaintiff, the learned trial Court has rightly passed the decree in his favour holding that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and it is the defendant, who has not performed his part of the contract and has decreed the suit, which is neither perverse nor illegal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and gone through the record of the trial Court. 12. The subject land of the suit is the land bearing khasra No. 325/2, total area 0.07 acre (3052 sq. ft.), situated at Village Domuhani, Tahsil and District Bilaspur. The agreement is said to have been executed on 23.04.2008, and the entire sale consideration of Rs. 80,000/- is said to have been paid to the vendor on the same day. There was no time limit in the agreement for registration of the sale- deed, and it was the condition that, whenever the purchaser desires, the sale-deed would be registered, and it was also the condition that the sale-deed would be registered in the name of the person, whose name is to be suggested by the purchaser. There was no time limit in the agreement for registration of the sale- deed, and it was the condition that, whenever the purchaser desires, the sale-deed would be registered, and it was also the condition that the sale-deed would be registered in the name of the person, whose name is to be suggested by the purchaser. The plaintiff has pleaded in his plaint that in the month of June 2008 and also thereafter, he asked the defendant to execute the sale deed, but he did not give any heed to his request and has not shown his willingness. Thereafter, on 25.11.2009, he issued a legal notice to the defendant, and despite that, he has not shown his interest in the registration of the sale deed. From the pleading of the plaint, it does not transpire that the plaintiff has pleaded that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and still he is willing to get the sale deed registered in his favour. Except for the vague pleading that he requested the defendant for registration of the sale deed, no specific averment has been made as to when he requested the defendant. The defendant denied the execution of the agreement and the receipt of the sale consideration. Though the plaintiff has pleaded that the entire sale consideration has been paid to the defendant, in para 9 of his evidence, he stated that he has not withdrawn the amount of Rs. 80,000/- from his bank account. He has also admitted that, as to what amount he obtained from his mother and brother-in-law, he has not produced any details. In para 13 of his cross-examination, he further stated that, in his income tax return, he had not mentioned the payment of Rs. 80,000/- to the defendant. He further admitted that the amount, which is paid by him to the defendant, was not with him in cash. 13. PW-3, Mukesh Kumar Sahu in para 16 of his cross-examination has stated that, what transaction was made between Santram and Durga Prasad, he did not know. He voluntarily stated that there was a sale transaction of the land between them. He further stated that, in his affidavit filed on 24.11.2012, there is no mention of the details of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant. 14. He voluntarily stated that there was a sale transaction of the land between them. He further stated that, in his affidavit filed on 24.11.2012, there is no mention of the details of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant. 14. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance of the contract, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, and the same has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff. 15. In the matter of “ Manjunath Anandappa @ Shivappa v. Tammanasa and others ” 2003 (10) SCC 390 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the plaintiffs should not only plead, but prove also their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract and held in para 27 that:- “27. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. Only in certain exceptional situation where although in letter and spirit, the exact words had not been used but readiness and willingness can be culled bout from reading all the averments made by the plaintiff as a whole coupled with the materials brought on record at the trial of the suit, to the said effect, the statutory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act may be held to have been complied with.” 16. In the matter of “ P. Ravindranath and Another v. Sasikala and Others ” 2024 SCC Online SC 1749, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 requires the readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiffs in the suit filed for specific performance of the contract and the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 are mandatory in nature. It has been held in para 22 of its judgment that:- “22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. It has been held in para 22 of its judgment that:- “22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A few of authorities on the point are referred hereunder: a) In the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, this Court held in paragraph 40 which is reproduced hereunder: “40………A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct………….” b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct………….” b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, following was held in paragraph 46: “46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, it was held under paragraph 2: “2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27-2-1975. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/ plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.” (ii) In the present case, we find from a perusal of the plaint that, at the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to plead specifically with details about the restriction said to have been imposed by the State on registration of sale deeds relating to similar survey numbers and revenue sites. No details of the Government Order are mentioned. Neither the Government Order is placed on record as evidence to connect that such restriction was actually applicable to the land in question. (iii) Defendant nos.1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the transfer. The plaintiffs do not seem to have ever approached the defendants to get this kind of a status change and, thereafter, get the sale deeds executed. It has not come either in pleadings or in evidence of the plaintiffs that the alleged ban imposed by the State Government had been lifted but still the sale deeds were executed in favour of the appellants and other purchasers in 1983. (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit. (v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed. (vi) The Courts below have proceeded to hold that there was readiness and willingness primarily relying upon the restriction imposed by the State. According to them, as the restriction had not been lifted, there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to have expressed any readiness or willingness. However, the Courts below failed to take into consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju. (vii) The Courts below also fell into error in recording a finding that the defendants 1 to 5 had committed breach of contract and had dishonestly proceeded to get the status of the land changed and, thereafter, execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant and other purchasers. (viii) It is clear from the record that the defendant no.1 had given a written notice in September, 1981, then legal notice in November, 1981 and also another communication in December, 1981 requesting for payment of balance sale consideration and, thereafter communicating that advance amount had been forfeited and the agreement to sell had come to an end as the plaintiffs failed to get the sale deed executed within three months. After December, 1981, the plaintiffs kept silent. After December, 1981, the plaintiffs kept silent. They neither responded to the last communication of the defendant no.1 of December, 1981, nor did they take any steps to file the suit for specific performance of contract for more than one and a half years after the defendant no.1 had communicated forfeiture of the earnest money and the cancellation of the agreement to sell. There is no communication from the plaintiffs after December, 1981 till July, 1983 when they filed the suit. There is not even a notice by the plaintiffs before filing the suit of showing their readiness and willingness by tendering the amount of balance sale consideration and sending a draft sale deed for approval and fixing a date for execution and registration of the sale deed. (xi) We are thus unable to agree with the findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and registered. As a matter of fact, the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout gives credence and strength to the contention of the defendant nos.1 to 5 that the plaintiffs never had the funds available with them to clear the balance sale consideration and that they were middlemen only interested in blocking the property and, thereafter, selling it on a higher price to third parties and make profit thereof. The plaintiffs were never the real purchasers interested in buying the land in suit for themselves. (x) Under such facts and circumstances as discussed above, we are of the confirmed view that the decree of specific performance was not warranted in the present case and ought to have been denied and the suit was liable to be dismissed. (xi) In view of the finding on the issue of readiness and willingness being decided against the plaintiffs in the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to enter into other arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties. (xii). However, in order to adjust equities between the parties, as the plaintiffs made a payment of Rs.12,000/- as advance money on 24.05.1981 or before, that being an admitted position, they need to be suitably compensated for the same. About 43 years have passed since the date of the agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in the written brief, the value of the property is about four crores. About 43 years have passed since the date of the agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in the written brief, the value of the property is about four crores. The respondents have not given any such figure of the approximate value of the property in question. Considering the facts and circumstances, we direct that the appellant compensate the plaintiffs by paying an amount of Rs.24 lakhs in lieu of the advance and further Rs.6 lakhs as cost of litigation. Total amount of Rs.30 lakhs to be paid within a period of three months from today and file proof of such payment before this Court within the next four months. In the event, such proof is not filed, the Registry will list the matter before the Court immediately after expiry of the aforesaid period for further orders.” 17. Further, in the matter of “ Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agrawal 2024 SCC Online SC 2937, the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 are again considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and held in para 8 and 9 that:- “I. Readiness and Willingness of the Plaintiffs to Perform the Contract. 8. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, mandates that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff are to be determined from their conduct prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, as well as from the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure that a party seeking equitable relief has acted equitably themselves. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. The Importance of readiness and willingness for enforcement of specific performance has been summarized by this Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, as follows: 23. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. The Importance of readiness and willingness for enforcement of specific performance has been summarized by this Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, as follows: 23. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (1) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, Explanation (II) says the plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time, In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money. xxx xxx xxx 45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the sult, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. xxx xxx xxx 45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the sult, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice." 9. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. The agreement dated 06.06.1993 explicitly required the plaintiffs to ensure that Defendant Nos, 6 to 8 would come to Baripada within three months to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs, however, did not take any concrete steps to secure the consent or presence of the sisters within the stipulated period. They relied solely on Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra to procure the sisters, despite knowing that the sisters were not signatories to the agreement and held a significant share in the property. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs did not issue any notices or correspondence to Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 during the three-month period, nor did they make any efforts to communicate with them directly to expedite the execution of the sale deed. This inaction on the part of the plaintiffs indicated a lack of diligence and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued to operate their petrol pump on the suit land without taking proactive steps to complete the purchase, suggesting complacency and a lack of urgency.” 18. In the case of “ Ramashankar Rao and Another v. Nandlal Ochhawani ” judgment dated 08.08.2025, passed in FA No. 88 of 2022, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has considered the distinction between readiness and willingness and in para 20 of its judgment, it has been held that:- “20. In light of principles of law flowing from the aforesaid judgments (supra) of the Supreme Court, there is distinction between the terms “readiness” and “willingness”. “Readiness” is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration, whereas, “willingness” is the conduct of the party. In light of principles of law flowing from the aforesaid judgments (supra) of the Supreme Court, there is distinction between the terms “readiness” and “willingness”. “Readiness” is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration, whereas, “willingness” is the conduct of the party. The plaintiff must plead and establish that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from the date of agreement to sale till the date of decision in the suit.” 19. In order to consider the readiness and willingness, when this Court examined the averments made in the plaint by the plaintiff, it appears that, in para 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff has pleaded that:- 20. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of “ Ramashankar Rao ” (supra) has held in para 10 to 20 that:- “10. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) of the Act of 1963, which bars the specific performance of a contract in favour of the plaintiff. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) prior to its amendment dated 01.10.2018, states as under:- “16. Personal bars to relief. – Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person – (a) and (b) (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation. – For the purpose of clause (c), – (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” 11. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) suffered amendment w.e.f. 01.10.2018. In the amendment word “aver” has been deleted. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) after amendment, states as under:- “16. Personal bars to relief. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) suffered amendment w.e.f. 01.10.2018. In the amendment word “aver” has been deleted. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) after amendment, states as under:- “16. Personal bars to relief. – Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person – (a) and (b) (c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation. – For the purpose of clause (c), – (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” 12. The amended Section 16(c) and Explanation (ii) of the Act of 1963 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu Vasudeva Kurup and Others, AIR 2023 SC (Civil) 949; AIR Online 2023 SC 64, in which it has been held that the deletion of words “who fails to aver” in Section 16 of the Act of 1963 does not bring about any real change in position of law as it stood prior to the amendment. 13. Thus, in terms of Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) as unamended in a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff should not only plead and prove the terms of the contract, but also plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract, in terms of the contract. 14. Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the CPC prescribe the manner in which the averments are required to be made by the plaintiff. For ready reference Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the CPC have been reproduced as under:- No. 47 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.1) A. B., the above–named plaintiff, states as follows:– 1. By an agreement dated the ……… day of …….. and signed by the defendant, he contracted to buy of [or sell to] the plaintiff certain immovable property therein described and referred to, for the sum of …… rupees. 2. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on is part, but the defendant has not done so. 3. and signed by the defendant, he contracted to buy of [or sell to] the plaintiff certain immovable property therein described and referred to, for the sum of …… rupees. 2. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on is part, but the defendant has not done so. 3. The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice. [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 6. The plaintiff claims that the Court will order the defendant specifically to perform the agreement and to do all acts necessary to put the plaintiff in full possession of the said property [or to accept a transfer and possession of the said property] and to pay the costs of the suit. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No. 48 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.2) A. B., the above – named plaintiff, states as follows :– 1. On the ……… day of ……. 19…../20……., the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, in writing, and the original document is hereto annexed. The defendant, was absolutely entitled to the immovable property described in the agreement. 2. On the …….. day of ……. 19…. /20……, the plaintiff tendered ……… rupees to the defendant, and demanded a transfer of the said property by a sufficient instrument. 3. On the …… day of …….. 19….. /20…., the plaintiff again demanded such transfer. [Or the defendant refused to transfer the same to the plaintiff.] 4. The defendant has not executed any instrument of transfer. 5. The plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay the purchase–money of the said property to the defendants [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 8. The plaintiff claims– (1) that the defendant transfers the said property to the plaintiff by a sufficient instrument [following the terms of the agreement]; (2) …… rupees compensation for withholding the same. 15. The mandatory provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley, (1969) 2 SCC 539 in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that a suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirement prescribed in Forms 47 & 48 of the 1st Schedule in the CPC and observed as under:- “9. ……...The plaintiff did not plead either in the plaint or at any subsequent stage that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement pleaded in the written statement of defendant. A suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. Neither in the plaint nor at any subsequent stage of the suit the plaintiff has taken those pleas. As observed by this Court in Prem Rai v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) (Ltd.) [1968 SCC OnLine SC 151] that it is well- settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable.” 16. Taking into consideration the principles of law laid down in Ouseph Varghese (supra) the Supreme Court in the matter of Manjunath Anandappa urf Shivappa v. Tammanasa and others, (2003) 10 SCC 390 has held that the plaintiff should not only plead that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from date of filing of the suit, but also prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract and held as under:- “27. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. Only in certain exceptional situation where although in letter and spirit, the exact words had not been used but readiness and willingness can be culled out from reading all the averments made by the plaintiff as a whole coupled with the materials brought on record at the trial of the suit, to the said effect, the statutory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act may be held to have been complied with.” 17. Recently, in the matter of P. Ravindranath and Another v. Sasikala and Others , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1749 the Supreme Court has held that the suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleading must necessarily be rejected. It was further held by their Lordships that Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract and said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. Relying upon the earlier decisions, it has been held that it is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract by adducing evidence and this crucial facet has to be determined by adducing all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in the plaint of readiness and willingness would not suffice, and held as under:- 22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(c) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. (a) xxx xxx xxx xxx (b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, 2022 SCC OnLine 840 following was held in paragraph 46:- “46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” (c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1196) 4 SCC 526 it was held under paragraph 2:- “2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. (ii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. (ii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit. (v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed. 18. Furthermore, in the matter of Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agrawal , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2937 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 have held as under:- “8. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, mandates that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff are to be determined from their conduct prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, as well as from the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure that a party seeking equitable relief has acted equitably themselves. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. The importance of readiness and willingness for enforcement of specific performance has been summarized by this Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, (2023) 11 SCC 775 as follows: “23. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (i) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, Explanation (ii) says the plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money. xxxxxxxxx 45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. xxxxxxxxx 45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” 9. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. The agreement dated 06.06.1993 explicitly required the plaintiffs to ensure that Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 would come to Baripada within three months to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs, however, did not take any concrete steps to secure the consent or presence of the sisters within the stipulated period. They relied solely on Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra to procure the sisters, despite knowing that the sisters were not signatories to the agreement and held a significant share in the property. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs did not issue any notices or correspondence to Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 during the three-month period, nor did they make any efforts to communicate with them directly to expedite the execution of the sale deed. This inaction on the part of the plaintiffs indicated a lack of diligence and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued to operate their petrol pump on the suit land without taking proactive steps to complete the purchase, suggesting complacency and a lack of urgency. 10. The High Court, in contrast, summarily concluded that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It stated that there was an abundance of evidence on record to establish the plaintiffs' financial capacity and willingness. However, the High Court did not delve into the specifics of the plaintiffs' conduct or address the Trial Court's findings regarding their inaction. The High Court's assessment on this crucial aspect was cursory and lacked a thorough examination of the evidence and circumstances that demonstrated the plaintiffs' lack of readiness and willingness.” 19. However, the High Court did not delve into the specifics of the plaintiffs' conduct or address the Trial Court's findings regarding their inaction. The High Court's assessment on this crucial aspect was cursory and lacked a thorough examination of the evidence and circumstances that demonstrated the plaintiffs' lack of readiness and willingness.” 19. In the matter of Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai, (1989) 4 SCC 313 the Supreme Court in paragraph No.11 has held as under:- “11. ….. His plaint does not contain the requisite pleadings necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. This equitable remedy recognised by the Specific Relief Act cannot be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence.” 20. In light of principles of law flowing from the aforesaid judgments (supra) of the Supreme Court, there is distinction between the terms “readiness” and “willingness”. “Readiness” is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration, whereas, “willingness” is the conduct of the party. The plaintiff must plead and establish that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from the date of agreement to sale till the date of decision in the suit.” 21. From perusal of the plaint averments, it would reveal that the pleading with regard to readiness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract is not in conformity with Section 16(c) read with Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix-A of the CPC. There is no pleading by the plaintiff that he is still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and is in possession to discharge his obligation under the contract. He has only pleaded that he was ready to perform his part of the contract, but did not aver and prove that he is still ready to perform his part of the contract and did not specify any date, on which he contacted the defendant for execution of the sale deed as promised in the sale agreement. As such, the plaintiff has miserably failed to specifically plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 22. As such, the plaintiff has miserably failed to specifically plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 22. The plaintiff Durga Prasad Koiry has stated in his evidence that he asked the defendant for registration of the sale deed in the month of June 2008 and also on subsequent dates, but he evaded the same and then on 25.11.2009, he issued a legal notice. From the evidence of the plaintiff as well as his witnesses, it transpires that they asked the defendant for registration of the sale-deed, but the sale-deed could not be registered, despite that till 25.11.2009, they did nothing. From 23.04.2008 to 25.11.2009, i.e. within 1 ½ years of the execution of the agreement, the plaintiff has not shown his readiness and willingness to get the sale deed registered. The plaintiff has not brought on record any evidence to establish that he contacted the defendant within the period of 1 ½ years from the date of the agreement till the issuance of notice to get the sale deed registered. 23. The defendant’s witnesses have denied the execution of the agreement and also stated that Santram was not competent to alienate the suit land. They also denied receiving the sale consideration of Rs. 80,000/- and stated that the sale agreement is forged and fabricated. 24. In the matter of “ Pydiramana @ Ramulu v. Devarasety Manmadha Rao ” 2024 (7) SCC 515 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, the continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant a decree for specific performance of the contract and held that the steps taken by the plaintiffs from the date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit will have to be explained in the plaint to prove in evidence. In para 17, 18 and 20, it has been held that:- “17. As rightly pointed out by the trial court, the respondent-plaintiff has not produced any satisfactory evidence to prove his readiness and willingness. As regards "willingness" of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, the conduct of the plaintiff warranting the performance has to be looked into. The following conduct of the plaintiff warrants consideration: (a) Plaintiff got issued legal notice nearly after two years after the expiry of one year period as prescribed in the agreement. As regards "willingness" of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, the conduct of the plaintiff warranting the performance has to be looked into. The following conduct of the plaintiff warrants consideration: (a) Plaintiff got issued legal notice nearly after two years after the expiry of one year period as prescribed in the agreement. (b) Plaintiff has not brought anything on record to prove that he contacted the defendant after the expiry of one year period and was interested in finalising the deed. (c) There was total inaction of the plaintiff from 6-6-1994 (expiry of one year period) to 30-5- 1996 (date of issuance of legal notice) (d) Suit was filed on 9-6-1997 i.e. after a period of more than one year from the date of issuing of legal notice. Said delay has not been sufficiently explained by the plaintiff. 18. The continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. The trial court has rightly held that the plaintiff has not sufficiently explained and proved that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As such the High Court and the first appellate court had erred in holding that the plaintiff had proved his readiness and willingness. 20. The long unexplained delay and silence on the part of the plaintiff in this regard while in the witness box would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree of specific performance and it is for this precise reason, the trial court as noticed supra has refused to grant the equitable relief which has been reversed by the appellate court without assigning proper and cogent reason and the one assigned are at tangent or in other words contrary to the facts. The resultant effect of filing the suit for specific performance on the verge of limitation coming to an end came to be examined by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the equitable relief (vide paras 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18).” 25. In the matter of “ Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and others ” 2024 (13) SCC 80 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 23 to 25 of its judgment has considered the effect of filing of the suit for specific performance at the fag end of the limitation period and held that:- “23. In the matter of “ Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and others ” 2024 (13) SCC 80 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 23 to 25 of its judgment has considered the effect of filing of the suit for specific performance at the fag end of the limitation period and held that:- “23. The effect of filing a suit for specific performance after long delay, may be at the fag end of period of limitation fell for consideration before this Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan 12 wherein this Court held thus in para 10: (SCC p. 7) "10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean f nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time- limit(s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani13: (SCC p. 528, para 25).…" 24. In Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani14, this Court held thus in para 28: (SCC p. 35) "28. The court, keeping in view the fact that it exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, would be entitled to take into consideration as to whether the suit had been filed within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast law can be laid down therefor. The court, keeping in view the fact that it exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, would be entitled to take into consideration as to whether the suit had been filed within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time would, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast law can be laid down therefor. The conduct of the parties in this behalf would also assume significance." 25. In Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, this Court held that every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring time-limits stipulated in the agreement. The courts will also frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for one or two years to file a suit and obtain specific performance.” 26. In the case of “ P. Ravindranath ” (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 22(i)(a) has held that:- “22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A few of authorities on the point are referred hereunder: a) In the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, this Court held in paragraph 40 which is reproduced hereunder: “40………A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct………….” 27. From the aforesaid consideration of the evidence led by the plaintiff and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is also important to note here that the plaintiff was not willing to get the sale deed registered in his own name, but it was to be registered in the name suggested by the plaintiff. It is mentioned in the agreement that “;fn mDr Hkwfe dk iath;u jftLVªh dzsrk tc pkgsaxs] ftlds uke ij pkgsaxs] muds i{k esa eSa jft- iath;u djkus gsrq lger gwaA”, which clearly reflects that the plaintiff was intended to get the sale-deed registered in the name of someone else. It is mentioned in the agreement that “;fn mDr Hkwfe dk iath;u jftLVªh dzsrk tc pkgsaxs] ftlds uke ij pkgsaxs] muds i{k esa eSa jft- iath;u djkus gsrq lger gwaA”, which clearly reflects that the plaintiff was intended to get the sale-deed registered in the name of someone else. Therefore, the evidence produced by the plaintiff does not demonstrate that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of execution of the agreement till the filing of the suit. 28. Since, the plaintiff has not prayed for a refund of the advance amount in his plaint and has not sought any relief for the same, in view of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima and others ” 2025 SCC Online SC 1014, no order for refund of the advance amount can be passed. 29. From the foregoing considerations, this Court does not find any sufficient ground to sustain the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court granting a decree of specific performance of the contract in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellants is allowed, and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is set aside . Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiff is also dismissed. 30. The parties shall bear their own costs. 31. An appellate decree be drawn accordingly.