- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B. WRIT PETITION NO. 106915 OF 2023 (S-KAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA M. S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-01 R/BY ITS REGISTRAR LOKAYUKTA. 2. THE ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR ENQUIRIES-4, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-01. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. SRINIVAS B. NAIK, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SRI C.S. CHANDRAMOULI S/O. SHIVANNA AGE. 58 YEARS, OCC. EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HULIGAMMADEVI TEMPLE, HULIGI TALUKA KOPPAL DIST. KOPPAL, R/AT. HULIGI TEMPLE QUARTERS, HULIGI, KOPPAL DISTRICT. 2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT (MUJARAI), M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-01. Digitally signed by BHARATHI H M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH Date: 2025.10.31 10:51:38 +0530 - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 3. THE COMMISSIONER HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS ENDOWMENT DEPARTMENT CHAMARAJPETH, BENGALURU-562218. 4. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KOPPAL DISTRICT KOPPAL-570012. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SHARAD V. MAGADUM, AGA FOR R2-4) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO, ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED. 18-12- 2019 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL BELAGAVI IN APPLICATION NO.3368/2017 PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A IN THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND CONSEQUENTLY, PERMIT THE PETITIONERS FOR CONTINUATION OF DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRY AGAINST THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 IN ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 ORAL ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT) This writ petition by Karnataka Lokayukta represented by its Registrar is directed against the Order dated 18.12.2019 in Application No.3368/2017 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Belagavi, whereunder the order of entrustment of enquiry dated 08.05.2017 (Annexure-A8) and consequential articles of charge dated 05.06.2017 (Annexure-A9) are set aside on the ground that respondent No.2 - State has failed to apply its mind while passing the order of entrustment. 2. Heard the learned counsel, Sri.Srinivas B Naik for petitioners and learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent Nos.2 to 4. Perused the entire writ petition papers. 3. The respondent - Executive Officer of Revenue Department was before the Tribunal questioning the order of entrustment of enquiry under Rule 14(A) of KCS (CCA) - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 Rules 1957 (for short ‘CCA Rules’) by Government Order dated 08.05.2017 (Annexure-A8) to the petitioners and also consequential articles of charge dated 05.06.2017 (Annexure-A9). The Tribunal after considering the contentions of the parties, under impugned order dated 18.12.2019, set aside the order of entrustment dated 08.05.2017 and also the articles of charge dated 05.06.2017 on the ground that there was no application of mind by respondent No.2 - State while passing the entrustment of enquiry. 4. Learned counsel, Sri.Srinivas B Naik would contend that the observation of the Tribunal is that the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 01.03.2012 is not taken into account by the State Government since it is for the State to look into the report submitted under Section 12(3) of Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 and pass order either to entrust the enquiry to the Lokayukta or to drop further proceedings. In the said circumstances, for not looking into the report of the Assistant Commissioner, - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 cannot be a reason to say that the State has not applied its mind while passing the order entrusting the enquiry to the petitioner - Lokayukta. 5. When the order of entrustment is quashed on the ground that the State has not applied its mind to the material on record, always it is for the State to establish application of mind by filing writ petition. Admittedly, the State has not filed any writ petition questioning the impugned order dated 18.12.2019 in Application No.3368/2017. When the State has accepted the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, it is not open for the Lokayukta to come before this Court questioning the order by which the order of entrustment of enquiry is quashed on the ground of non-application of mind by the State authorities. 6. It is seen that the impugned order is dated 18.12.2019 whereas the present writ petition is filed on 19.06.2023 after nearly 4 years from the date of passing - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 the impugned order by the Tribunal. There is nearly 4 years delay in preferring the writ petition. The delay in preferring the writ petition is not explained by the petitioner Lokayukta in the writ petition. There is no averment whatsoever in the entire writ petition with regard to delay in preferring the writ petition. In the absence of any explanation for delay in preferring the writ petition, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed solely on the ground of delay in preferring the writ petition. 7. It is also to be seen that respondent No.1 was aged 57 years when he filed application before the Tribunal in the year 2017. The respondent No.1 has attained superannuation and has retired long before filing of writ petition. Though the writ petition was filed in June 2023, petitioner Lokayukta has not made any effort to bring the writ petition before the Court by complying the office objections. From the date of passing the order by the Tribunal in the year 2019, the writ petition has come up before the Court in October 2025. At this length of time, it - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 would be unreasonable and harsh on respondent No.1 to issue notice that too when respondent No.1 has retired from service more than 5 years prior to this date. Though there is no time limit for filing the petition, the same shall be filed within a reasonable period. 8. It is relevant to note the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others1 on delay in filing the writ petition, at paragraphs 9 to 12, which read thus: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:14224-DB WP No. 106915 of 2023 9. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition stands rejected. Sd/- (S G PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (GEETHA K.B.) JUDGE SH CT-CMU LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 15