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High Court of Punjab and Haryana · body

2025 DAILYLAW 58926 (PNJ)

ARUN v. DILBAGH SINGH

CRM-A/985/2025 · 2025-09-12

Rajesh Bhardwaj

body2025

Judgment text

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CRM-A-985 1 116 ARUN DILBAGH SINGH CORAM: Present: Rajesh Bhardwaj, J. (Oral) 1. 419 of BNSS dated 18.02.2025 Ferozepur whereby the trial Court has acquitted the respondent complaint filed short, ‘the Act’). 2. Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Crimi discussion and comparative interpretation of Sections 372 and 378(4) of -2025 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-A-985 Date of decision: 12.09.2025 VS. SINGH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ ***** None. ****** Bhardwaj, J. (Oral) The applicant has filed the present 419 of BNSS for grant of leave to file an appeal against the impu 2.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the respondent complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, ‘the Act’). Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Crimi discussion and comparative interpretation of Sections 372 and 378(4) of IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 985-2025 (O&M) Date of decision: 12.09.2025 ….. APPLICANT ….. RESPONDENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ The applicant has filed the present application under Section for grant of leave to file an appeal against the impugned order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, whereby the trial Court has acquitted the respondent-accused in a under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for M/s. Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 208, after considerable discussion and comparative interpretation of Sections 372 and 378(4) of application under Section gned order First Class, accused in a under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for M/s. Celestium Financial vs. A. after considerable discussion and comparative interpretation of Sections 372 and 378(4) of POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document CRM-A-985 2 Cr.P.C., concluded that the victim has a right to file an appeal under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. before the Court of Sessions. Relevant para of the said judgment is as under: “7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can be elaborated as follows: Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent. In t 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been dishonour Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C.. A person convicted of a crime has the right t prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal. Thirdly, it is for this reason insert the proviso to sub condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the -2025 (O&M) Cr.P.C., concluded that the victim has a right to file an appeal under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. before the Court of Sessions. Relevant para of the said ent is as under:- “7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can be elaborated as follows: Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent. In the instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been dishonour Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C.. A person convicted of a crime has the right t prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal. Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it fit to insert the proviso to sub-section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the Cr.P.C., concluded that the victim has a right to file an appeal under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. before the Court of Sessions. Relevant para of the said “7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any he instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been dishonoured. Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C.. A person convicted of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal. that the Parliament thought it fit to section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a an appeal. On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the Cr.P.C., concluded that the victim has a right to file an appeal under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. before the Court of Sessions. Relevant para of the said “7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any he instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely, the accused, Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of o prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally that the Parliament thought it fit to section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document CRM-A-985 3 complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court. However, i always necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. would be cont what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has with regard to a complaina the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant. F under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its absence. This is because the complaint filed under that provision is in the nature of a private complaint as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in the matter of trial of such a deemed offence tried as a criminal offence. Therefore, the complainant, who is the victim of a dishonour of cheque must be construed read with the definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C.” 3. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumar Arora in Criminal Appeal No. 1319 Of 2013 with Criminal -2025 (O&M) complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court. However, i always necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. would be cont what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has with regard to a complaina the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant. Fifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its absence. This is because the complaint filed under that provision is in the nature of a private complaint as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 143 of the Act by an express intention incorporates the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in the matter of trial of such a deemed offence tried as a criminal offence. Therefore, the complainant, who is the victim of a dishonour of cheque must be construed to be victim in terms of the proviso to Section 372 read with the definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C.” Further, applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence vs. Raj Kumar Arora in Criminal Appeal No. 1319 Of 2013 with Criminal complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court. However, it is not always necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. would be contrary to what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant. ifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its absence. This is because the complaint filed under that provision is in the nature of a private complaint as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Section 143 of the Act by an express intention incorporates the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in the matter of trial of such a deemed offence tried as a criminal offence. Therefore, the complainant, who is the victim of a dishonour of cheque must to be victim in terms of the proviso to Section 372 read with the definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the Further, applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence vs. Raj Kumar Arora in Criminal Appeal No. 1319 Of 2013 with Criminal complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course t is not always necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High rary to what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to circumscribe the victim's right nt or the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the ifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its absence. This is because the complaint filed under that provision is in the nature of a private complaint as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Section 143 of the Act by an express intention incorporates the provisions of the Cr.P.C. in the matter of trial of such a deemed offence tried as a criminal offence. Therefore, the complainant, who is the victim of a dishonour of cheque must to be victim in terms of the proviso to Section 372 read with the definition of victim under Section 2(wa) of the Further, applying the doctrine of prospective overruling, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence vs. Raj Kumar Arora in Criminal Appeal No. 1319 Of 2013 with Criminal POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document CRM-A-985 4 Appeal No. 272 of 2014 decided on 17.04.2025, judgments shall be applicable retrospectively, has held as under: “91. The decla legislature, is considered to be prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. The legal maxim "Nova Constitutio Futuris Forman Imponere Debe Praeteritis" indicating that a new law ought to regulate what is to follow and not the past, carries with it a presumption of prospectivity and this presumption is generally said to operate unless the contrary is shown by an express provision in the otherwise discernible through necessary implication. This is because such statutes would have the consequence of affecting vested rights, impose new burdens or impair existing obligations. However, when a decision rend provision is subsequently overruled by the decision of a larger bench, the consequence of the overruling is starkly different and by default, retrospective. by this Court is retrospective and is normally assumed to be the law from the inception 92. The operation of a newly enacted statute or rule must not be confused with the effect of a judgment. which interprets a statu meaning of the statute as it should be construed from the date of its enactment. In other words, the judgment declares what the legislature had said at the time when the law was promulgated and therefore, it has retrosp statute or the rule which is presumed to be prospective unless expressly made retrospective. What follows from the same, is that a decision or judgment enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all -2025 (O&M) Appeal No. 272 of 2014 decided on 17.04.2025, judgments shall be applicable retrospectively, has held as under: “91. The declaration of a statute dealing with substantive rights, by the legislature, is considered to be prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. The legal maxim "Nova Constitutio Futuris Forman Imponere Debe Praeteritis" indicating that a new law ought to regulate what is to follow and not the past, carries with it a presumption of prospectivity and this presumption is generally said to operate unless the contrary is shown by an express provision in the statute or if the retrospectivity is otherwise discernible through necessary implication. This is because such statutes would have the consequence of affecting vested rights, impose new burdens or impair existing obligations. However, when a decision rendering an opinion as regards the interpretation of a penal provision is subsequently overruled by the decision of a larger bench, the consequence of the overruling is starkly different and by default, retrospective. This is because it is settled law that th by this Court is retrospective and is normally assumed to be the law from the inception. 92. The operation of a newly enacted statute or rule must not be confused with the effect of a judgment. which interprets a statute or provision thereof declares the meaning of the statute as it should be construed from the date of its enactment. In other words, the judgment declares what the legislature had said at the time when the law was promulgated and therefore, it has retrospective effect. statute or the rule which is presumed to be prospective unless expressly made retrospective. What follows from the same, is that a decision or judgment enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all Appeal No. 272 of 2014 decided on 17.04.2025, while clarifying that judgments shall be applicable retrospectively, has held as under:- ration of a statute dealing with substantive rights, by the legislature, is considered to be prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. The legal maxim "Nova Constitutio Futuris Forman Imponere Debet, Non Praeteritis" indicating that a new law ought to regulate what is to follow and not the past, carries with it a presumption of prospectivity and this presumption is generally said to operate unless the contrary is statute or if the retrospectivity is otherwise discernible through necessary implication. This is because such statutes would have the consequence of affecting vested rights, impose new burdens or impair existing obligations. However, when a ering an opinion as regards the interpretation of a penal provision is subsequently overruled by the decision of a larger bench, the consequence of the overruling is starkly different and by default, This is because it is settled law that the law declared by this Court is retrospective and is normally assumed to be the 92. The operation of a newly enacted statute or rule must not be confused with the effect of a judgment. A judgment or decision te or provision thereof declares the meaning of the statute as it should be construed from the date of its enactment. In other words, the judgment declares what the legislature had said at the time when the law was promulgated ective effect. On the contrary, it is the statute or the rule which is presumed to be prospective unless expressly made retrospective. What follows from the same, is that a decision or judgment enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all while clarifying that ration of a statute dealing with substantive rights, by the legislature, is considered to be prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. The legal t, Non Praeteritis" indicating that a new law ought to regulate what is to follow and not the past, carries with it a presumption of prospectivity and this presumption is generally said to operate unless the contrary is statute or if the retrospectivity is otherwise discernible through necessary implication. This is because such statutes would have the consequence of affecting vested rights, impose new burdens or impair existing obligations. However, when a ering an opinion as regards the interpretation of a penal provision is subsequently overruled by the decision of a larger bench, the consequence of the overruling is starkly different and by default, e law declared by this Court is retrospective and is normally assumed to be the 92. The operation of a newly enacted statute or rule must not be A judgment or decision te or provision thereof declares the meaning of the statute as it should be construed from the date of its enactment. In other words, the judgment declares what the legislature had said at the time when the law was promulgated On the contrary, it is the statute or the rule which is presumed to be prospective unless expressly made retrospective. What follows from the same, is that a decision or judgment enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document CRM-A-985 5 cases irre since what has been enunciated is the meaning of the law which existed from the inception of the concerned statute or provision. What has been declared to be the law of the land must be held to have always been the law of the land. This conclusion also stems from the rationale that the duty of the court is not to "pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one". (emphasis added) 4. Supreme Court in Intelligence the present leave to appeal as an appeal filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and entrust the same to the appropriate Court for its disposal on merits. 5. record of the case to learned Sessions Judge, concerned, forthwith. 6. stand disposed of. 12.09.2025 Poonam Sharma -2025 (O&M) cases irrespective of the stage of pendency before different forums since what has been enunciated is the meaning of the law which existed from the inception of the concerned statute or provision. What has been declared to be the law of the land must be held to have always been the law of the land. This conclusion also stems from the rationale that the duty of the court is not to "pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one". (emphasis added) Therefore, in view of the judgments rendered by the Ho Supreme Court in Celestium Financial (supra) and (supra), learned Sessions Judge, concerned, is directed to treat the present leave to appeal as an appeal filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and entrust the same to the appropriate Court for its disposal on merits. Registry is directed to send the co record of the case to learned Sessions Judge, concerned, forthwith. Disposed of, accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/No Whether Reportable : Yes/No spective of the stage of pendency before different forums since what has been enunciated is the meaning of the law which existed from the inception of the concerned statute or provision. What has been declared to be the law of the land must be held to have always been the law of the land. This conclusion also stems from the rationale that the duty of the court is not to "pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one". (emphasis added) Therefore, in view of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble (supra) and Directorate of Revenue (supra), learned Sessions Judge, concerned, is directed to treat the present leave to appeal as an appeal filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. and entrust the same to the appropriate Court for its disposal on merits. Registry is directed to send the complete paperbook and the record of the case to learned Sessions Judge, concerned, forthwith. Disposed of, accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also (RAJESH BHARDWAJ) JUDGE g/Reasoned : Yes/No spective of the stage of pendency before different forums since what has been enunciated is the meaning of the law which existed from the inception of the concerned statute or provision. What has been declared to be the law of the land must be held to have always been the law of the land. This conclusion also stems from the rationale that the duty of the court is not to "pronounce a new law but n’ble Directorate of Revenue (supra), learned Sessions Judge, concerned, is directed to treat the present leave to appeal as an appeal filed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. mplete paperbook and the Disposed of, accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also POONAM SHARMA 2025.09.16 14:53 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document