IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No. 232 of 2018 Reserved on : 04.09.2025 Decided on : 08.09.2025. HPFC .....Applicant-Appellant Versus Dharam Lata (deceased) through LRs and another ……….Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Applicant : Mr. Ajay Sharma, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Tarun Brakta, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Ajay Sharma and Mr. Abhishek Sharma, Advocates, for respondents No. 1(a) to 1(c). : Mr. Prantap Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge CMP(M) No. 232 of 2018 & RSA No. 17 of 2019 The present application i.e. CMP(M) No. 232 of 2018 has been filed seeking condonation of delay of two years, eight months and seven days in filing the accompanying Regular Second Appeal. The impugned judgment in the case at hand was passed by the District Judge, Forest Shimla on 23.3.2015. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2. On the basis of the pleadings filed by the applicant, application seeking condonation of delay & rejoinder filed, it is submitted that within the period of limitation (23.3.2015 to 23.6.2015), a certified copy of the impugned order had been obtained. Post obtaining the same, one of the existing panel counsels of the applicant was engaged for filing the Regular Second Appeal. Thereafter, it is contended that the counsel engaged had informed the applicant that the appeal had been filed and it would be listed in due course. When nothing was heard for a long time, then a letter dated 21.8.2017 was addressed to the counsel engaged for filing the appeal to inform the applicant qua the status of the appeal so filed. In response to the aforesaid letter dated 21.8.2017, the counsel had informed the applicant that the case is pending for final adjudication and as and when the same is listed, the applicant would be informed. 3. Subsequent thereto, letters dated 29.8.2017, 18.9.2017 and 21.7.2017 were written by the applicant seeking information about the appeal alleged to have been filed by the counsel. The letters are collectively appended alongwith the rejoinder & are at page Nos. 127 to 132 of the paper book. Other than the aforesaid, information qua the appeal alleged to have been filed by the counsel engaged was sought from the High Court on 27.10.2017. The application in this respect is at page No. 133 of the paper book. Information supplied in pursuance thereto is at page No. 134 of the 3 paper book. From the information supplied, it is evident that the appeal though filed had been returned to the counsel engaged on 24.7.2015 for removing of the objections, however thereafter, the appeal had not been refilled by the counsel engaged. 4. In the aforesaid backdrop, it is alleged that a fresh certified copy of the impugned judgment passed by the District Judge Forest, Shimla dated 23.3.2015 was obtained and a fresh appeal was filed. The delay in the case at hand, in the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, as per the applicant squarely rests on the shoulder of the counsel engaged for filing of the appeal and hence, it is requested that the delay in filing the present appeal be condoned and for the acts of the counsel, the applicant be made not to suffer. 5. The respondents contends that the preliminary decree in the case at hand had been passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No-I, Shimla on 17.6.2008. Appeal preferred against the same had been dismissed vide the impugned order dated 23.3.2015 by the District Judge, Forest Shimla. The respondents submits that in the month of December 2015, an appropriate application under Order 26 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC had been filed seeking appointment, issuance of a commission as per the preliminary decree passed for settlement of accounts and further praying for passing of a final decree. Notice in the aforesaid application was issued and the applicant was duly served for 4 11.3.2016. The notice had been served on the Law Officer of the applicant on 1.1.2016. Despite service, none had appeared on behalf of the applicant on 11.3.2016, hence, the applicant therein was proceeded against ex parte. The summon has been placed on record as Annexure R-1 to the reply (Page Nos. 92 to 94 of the paper book). 6. Subsequent to the aforesaid, a Local Commissioner was appointed, who had sent a notice through registered post to the applicant for putting in an appearance before him on 9.11.2016. Despite service, none had appeared, hence, the Local Commissioner had submitted his report. The same was accepted and a final decree was passed on 10.3.2017. After the passing of the final decree, an execution petition was preferred in the month of May, 2017 by the respondents. In the same, notices were issued to the applicant, who post service appeared on 15.9.2017. Objections to the execution were filed on 14.3.2018. Reply thereto was filed by the respondents on 30.4.2018 and finally the objections filed by the applicant were dismissed vide order dated 10.10.2018. Zimni orders in this respect have been appended alongwith the reply as Annexure R-4. In the aforesaid backdrop, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the applicant has not at all been vigilant in pursing remedies available at law. The applicant for his own negligence cannot blame the counsel. 5 7. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in SLP (C) No.17575 of 2023 Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran & Anr. decided on 13.05.2025, relevant extract whereof is being reproduced herein below; “Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet”. 8. Other than the aforesaid it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation. “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and 6 to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.” 9. Law applies with full vigour to all. “None are exempt from the applicability of the law of limitation”. 10. Admittedly, the delay in the case at hand is two years eight months and eleven days. The length of delay is immaterial. The condonation of delay is a discretionary power. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of cause shown and the degree   of its acceptability thereof. The expression “sufficient cause” is to be duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient 7 cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part (Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81). The sole contention urged on behalf of the applicant is that the delay in filing the accompanying Regular Second Appeal is on account of negligence/carelessness of the counsel previously engaged. Hence, it is contended that the applicant should not be made to suffer for the acts of the counsel. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3380 titled as Rajneesh Kumar and another vs. Ved Prakash. Relevant extract whereof reads as follow:- “10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.” 11. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal 8 Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531. The relevant extract of the same are as under: “…...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication. 12. Admittedly in the case at hand, immediately after the dismissal of the first appeal by the District Judge, Forest Shimla on 23.3.2015, a certified copy of the same was obtained and during the period of limitation, action was taken by the applicant for filing the Regular Second Appeal. Thereafter from the document placed on record, it is evident that for the first time on 21st August, 2017 (page 127 of the paper book), a letter was written to the counsel previously engaged for filing the Regular Second Appeal to inform 9 about the status of the appeal filed. Successive letters in this respect have been written as have been detailed (supra) and information under the RTI was sought on 27.10.2017 from the High Court. In response whereto, for the first time on 4.12.2017, the applicant was informed that the appeal initially filed had been returned to the counsel engaged previously for removing objections therein on 24.7.2015 and thereafter the same had never been re- filled. 13. In the aforesaid backdrop, it is clearly evident that the applicant was not at all vigilant qua the filing of the Regular Second Appeal in the case at hand and its further progress. Other than the aforesaid in the month of December, 2015 in pursuance to the preliminary decree passed, an application under Order 26 Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC for appointment, issuance of commission and for passing of a final decree was prayed for by the respondents, notices were issued in the said application for 11.3.2016. The applicant was served through his Law Officer on 1.1.2016. Despite service none had put in appearance on 11.3.2016. 14. Subsequent thereto, a Local Commissioner was appointed, who had served the applicant through registered post for 9.11.2016, despite service, none had put in appearance before the Local Commissioner and hence a final decree was passed on 10.3.2017. The aforesaid facts are conspicuous by absence in the 10 application filed seeking condonation of delay on behalf of the present applicant. The same reflects a complete lack of diligence on the part of the present applicant in keeping a track of the previous Regular Second Appeal filed by the previous counsel engaged. 15. The Regular Second Appeal filed through the previous counsel was accompanied by an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2. The urgency is evident from the interim relief application filed alongwith the RSA. The subsequent proceedings post passing of the preliminary decree dated 23.3.2015 would have been stayed had an appropriate order in this respect been passed in the application filed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 in the Regular Second Appeal. Since no appeal alongwith an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 was filed, therefore, proceedings post passing of the preliminary decree continued/unhindered. In the proceedings which so continued, the applicant was served at least on two occasions but did not join the same. The continuation of the same should have been reason enough to activate the applicant to ascertain the status of the Regular Second Appeal stated to have been filed by the previous counsel. Non-ascertaining of the status of the same depicts complete inaction, negligence on the part of the applicant, who should have been vigilant. 16. The application for condonation of delay in the case at hand for the aforesaid reasons does not indicate facts which would 11 constitute sufficient cause to permit condonation of delay in the case at hand. The delay in filing the RSA is attributable to the negligence on the part of the applicant in the case at hand. 17. In view of the aforesaid, present application as well as appeal are dismissed being devoid of any merit. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge September, 2025 (Tarun)