1 2025:CGHC:55968 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1000 of 2022 1 - Steel Authority Of India Limited (M/s Bhilai Steel Plant) (Pandridalli And Rajhara Pahar Mining Lease Of Bhilai Steel Plant (Rajhara Mechanised Mine), Ispat Bhawan, Bhilai, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. Through Its Power Of Holder Attorney Shri Hemant Doshi, (Wrongly Mentioned As Pandridalli And Rajhara Pahar Mining Lease Of Bhilai Steel Plant In The Complaint And Impugned Order Of The Trial Court), 2 - Shri Manash Biswas, Executive Director (Mines And Rowghat), M/s Bhilai Steel Plant, 5th Floor, Ispat Bhawan, Bhilai, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Shri A. K. Nath (Retired), Through General Manager, Mines, Rajhara Administrative Building, Dallirajhara, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Shri Surendra Singh Earlier Posted As General Manager Mines, Presently Posted As Chief General Managar (Safety And F.S.), Quarter No. 4, Street No. 10, Sector 9, Bhilai, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Shri Tapan Sutradhar, Earlier Posted As General Manager Mines (Ioc), Presently Posted As Chief General Manage (Ioc), Rajhara Administrative Building, Dallirajhara, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Shri Jaiprakash Earlier Posted As Asstt. General Manager Mines-Rajhara, Presently Posted As General Manager (Mines Rawghat), Rajhara Administrative Building, Dallirajhara, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. 7 - Shri P.M. Sirpourkar, Earlier Posted As Asstt. General Manager Mines-Rajhara, Presently Posted As General Manager (Mines Rawghat), Rajhara Administrative Building, Dallirajhara, 2 District Balod Chhattisgarh. 8 - Shri Rakesh Singh Earlier Posted As Asstt. General Manager Mines-Rajhara, Presently Posted As General Manager (Mines Rawghat), Rajhara Administrative Building, Dallirajhara, District Balod Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Regional Officer Chhattisgarh Environment Protection Board, Regional Office, 5/32 Bungalow, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Pinki Anand, Mr. Rupesh Kumar, Senior Advocates assisted by Mr. Ankit Singhal and Ms. Saudamini Sharma, Advocates. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Abhijeet Mishra, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma Order on Board 17.11.2025 1. Challenge in this petition, filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the Cr.P.C.) is to the order dated 11.02.2020 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dalli Rajhara, District Balod, in Complaint Case No. 92 of 2020 wherein the learned JMFC took cognizance and issued process through summons to all the petitioners herein. 2. The facts, in brief, as projected by the petitioners are that the petitioners are that the petitioner No. 1 is a Government Company incorporated and registered under the Companies 3 Act, 1956/2013 and is the largest producer of iron and steel in India. The petitioners No. 2 to 8 are or were the officials of the petitioner No. 1 Company. Hindustan Steel Ltd. (now SAIL) was granted a mining lease over an area of 1522 ha at Mahamaya- Dulki Area in Durg District for mining of Iron Ore for a period of 30 years i.e. 04.11.1971 03.11.2001 by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh on 05.05.1971. The Ministry of Environment Forest and Climate Change (for short, the MoEFCC) issued Notification [EIA 1994] on 27.01.1994 on Environment Impact Assessment of Development Projects stipulating that on and from the date of publication of this Notification in the official gazette, expansion or modernization of any activity (if pollution load to exceed the existing one) or a new project listed in Schedule I, shall not be undertaken in any part of India unless it has been accorded Environment Clearance (EC) by the Central Govt. in accordance with the procedure specified in the Notification. In para 8 of the ‘Explanatory Note’ under the heading “Exemption for project already initiated” it was stated that “for projects listed in Schedule I to the Notification in respect of which required land has been acquired and all relevant clearances of the State Govt. including NOC from the respective State Pollution Control Board has been obtained before 27.01.1994, a project proponent will not be required to seek EC from the IAA”. In the meantime, on 29.02.2000, the lease deed for the subject mining area [241.76 ha] at the same location was further renewed for a period of 5 years and Lease 4 Deed (renewal) dated 29.02.200 was executed between the State of Madhya Pradesh and SAIL. On 12.02.2002, the Ministry issued Circular regarding applicability of EIA 1994 to renewal cases of mining lease, clarifying that EC is not required at the time of renewal of mining lease if there is no increase in the originally sanctioned lease area and/or production. On 28.10.2004, the Ministry issued another Circular and, further clarified that all mining projects of major minerals of more than 5 Ha lease area which have so far not obtained an EC under the EIA 1994 shall do so at the time of renewal of their lease in the context of SC Judgment dated 18.03.2004 in the case of M.C. Mehta v UoI & Others {(2004) 12 SCC 118. The term "Expansion" in point III(c) was explained that if the annual production of any year from 1994-95 onwards exceeds the annual production of 1993-94 or its preceding years (even if approved by IBM) it would constitute expansion. SAIL has never exceeded 1993-94 production level [2.795 MTPA] of iron ore from this mining lease. 3. The MoEFCC issued Notification (EIA 2006") on 14.09.2006 in suppression of EIA 1994, directing that on and from the date of its publication the required construction of new projects or mining activities or the expansion or modernisation of existing projects or activities listed in the Schedule to this notification entailing capacity addition with change in process and or technology shall be undertaken in any part of India only after the prior EC from the Central 5 Government or as the case may be, by the State Legal Environment Impact Assessment Authority, in accordance with the procedure specified in this Notification. On 24.04.2015, the SAIL planned to enhance the production capacity from existing 2.795 ΜΤΡΑ to 3.5 MTPA, it filed application in Form-I for EIA/EMP study under provisions of EIA 2006 and, consequently, for grant of EC for increased capacity. Accordingly, in terms of EIA 2006, SAIL applied for grant of EC on priority basis. Thereafter, on 02.07.2007, the Government of India issued circular clarifying that all mining projects which did not need EIA clearance (EC) under the EIA Notification 2006 would require EIA clearance at the time when mining lease falls due for renewal if there was no increase in production or lease area. Since SAIL lease did not fall for renewal till 2021 and had no increase in mining area or production and thus did not require EIA/EC clearance. 4. Ms. Pinky Anand as well as Mr. Rupesh Kumar, learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioners submit that the Hon'ble High Court shall be correct in exercising its inherent powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C to prevent abuse of the process of law or to otherwise secure the ends of justice where it finds that the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused or where it finds that the uncontroverted allegations made in the 6 complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. A bare perusal of the facts and allegations made in the complaint filed by the respondent under Section 15 & 16 read with Section 3(1), 2(5) of the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 read with Section 34 IPC, do not show even prima facie case against the petitioners. It has been admitted in the complaint that SAIL had all requisite permissions and approval under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1975, for the mining capacity of 2.795 MT and the same were renewed regularly from time to time. However, by erroneously relying upon Circulars dated 12.02.2002, 28.10.2004, 07.12.2004 and 25.04.2005, it has been alleged that the SAIL was required to obtain EC at the time of renewal of its Mining Lease. It was alleged that such mining activities were also in violation of EIA Notification dated 14.09.2006 issued under the Environment (Protection) Act 1986, punishable under Sections 15 and 16 read with Section 3(1), (2) clause 5 of the said Act. 5. Ms. Anand submits that the EIA Notification dated 27.01.1994 read with Para 8 of the Explanation Note regarding the Impact Assessment Notification date 27.01.1994 clearly granted exemption to SAIL to obtain EC, as it had all the relevant clearance of the State Government including NOC from the State Pollution Control Board and the production also 7 started much prior to 27.01.1994. The petitioners had duly filed application for renewal at least one year from the date of lease expiry, as per the statutory requirement. In fact, the mining lease was renewed for a period of 20 years i.e. 28.04.2003 to 27.04.2023. During all these periods petitioners had been regularly filing environmental statements under Rule 14 of the E.P. Rules along with all other relevant statutory information. All the information were duly accepted by the authorities concerned and no dispute was ever raised regarding the requirement to obtain EC at the time of renewal of mining lease w.e.f. 28.04.2003. Further, SAIL had never increased the original sanctioned lease and/or production i.e. 2.795 ΜΤΡΑ. The fact that SAIL was not required to obtain EC at the time of renewal of mining lease if there is no increase in the originally sanctioned lease area and/or production, is clearly supported by the Circular dated 12.02.2002 relied upon in the Complaint which clearly stipulated that EC was not required at the time of renewal of mining lease if there was no increase in the originally sanctioned lease and and/or production. As on the date of applying for renewal of mining lease, admittedly, petitioners had not increased its production and the same all along remained within the sanctioned limit i.e. 2.795 ΜΤΡΑ stated in the complaint. The circular dated 28.10.2004 read with Corrigendum dated 07.12.2004 relied upon in the complaint, which modified the circular dated 12.02.2002, provided that all mining projects of major minerals 8 of more than 5 ha. lease area which have so far not obtained an environment clearance under the EIA Notification 1994 shall do so at the time of renewal of their lease. The circular dated 25.04.2005 which is also relied upon in the complaint further stipulates that "mining units which continue to operate at pre- 994 capacity or less and did not require renewal so far after the Notification(s) coming into force shall obtain environmental clearance at the time of renewal as and when due". 6. Ms. Anand next submits that the lease period was already extended for a period of 20 years w.e.f. 28.04.2003 much prior to the issuance of the said circulars dated 12.02.2002, 28.10.2004, 07.12.2004 and 24.05.2005, the said circulars will have no bearing on the case of the petitioners and, rather, they support the case of the petitioners. Thus, reliance placed in the complaint on the said four circulars is totally misplaced. The petitioners have not violated EIA Notification dated 14.09.2006 which required prior EC for new projects. The petitioners’ project was not new and once the mining lease of the petitioners already got renewed prior to the issuance of the said EIA Notification dated 14.09.2006, there was no requirement of obtaining EC under the said Notification, as is clarified by MoEF vide Circular dated 02.07.2007 with regard to applicability of EIA Notification, 2006 stating that "all such mining projects which did not require environmental clearance under the EIA Notification 1994 would continue to operate without obtaining environmental clearance till the mining lease 9 falls due for renewal, if there is no increase in the lease area and/or there is no enhancement of production". It is neither the allegation in the complaint nor is it a fact that the petitioners had ever increase either the lease area or there was enhancement of production. Insofar as the renewal of mining lease was concerned, that already got renewed prior to issuance of the said EIA Notification No. 14.09.2006, therefore, there cannot be any violation of said ΕΙΑ Notification. The petitioners had not violated provisions of EIA 2006 which requires that on and from the date of its publication the requirement construction of new projects or activities or the expansion or modernization of existing projects or activities listed in the schedule to the said EIA 2006 entailing capacity addition with the change in process or technology shall be undertaken only after the prior environment clearance from the Central Government or as the case may be, by the State Legal Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, in accordance with the procedure specified in the said EIA 2006. Further, the petitioners have been granted CTO under Air and Water Act and the same are being renewed regularly since then as admitted in the Complaint also and there was no increase in the production which is also admitted in the complaint. The complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioners. The learned Judicial Magistrate has issued process without appreciating the 10 documents brought on record by the complainant. The order of the learned Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the fact of the case and the law applicable thereto. The learned Magistrate was required to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary in support thereof and as to whether that would be sufficient for proceeding against the accused. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate, {(1998) 5 SCC 749} Inox Air Products Ltd. v. Stateo f A.P. {2025 INSC 128} and M/s. J.M. Laboratories & Others v. State of A.P. {2025 INSC 127}. 7. In the present case, it appears that while issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has not perused the documents and/or examined the nature of allegations made in the complaint as well as the evidence, both oral and documentary in support thereof. A bare perusal of EIA Notification along with Circulars referred to in the Complaint would have shown that the Petitioners have not committed any offence under the provisions of EP Act. Had the learned Judicial Magistrate would have looked into these documents forming part of the complaint, it would have clearly appreciated that there is nothing brought on record by the complainant to substantiate the allegation that the petitioners had violated provisions of EP Act or the Rules, Orders, Notifications and 11 Circulars issued thereunder. No prima facie case has been made out against the Petitioners even by reading the averments/allegations made in the complaint. The learned Magistrate has also not recorded any reasons for issuing the process against the petitioners except for stating that the complainant is a public servant and, thus, his statement or statement of other witnesses are not required to be recorded in terms of Section 200 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance. It is also submitted by Ms. Anand that there is an inordinate delay in filing criminal complaint. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Hasmukhlal D Vora & Anr v. State of Tamil Nadu {(2022) 15 SCC 164}. In the present case, the respondent has provided no explanation for the delay of more than four years between the initial site inspection, the show cause notice and the complaint. In fact, the absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint. Hence, this petition deserves to be allowed. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Abhijeet Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the grievance of the Petitioner is that there was no "locus-standi" of the respondent (Complainant) to file a complaint under the provision of the EP 12 Act as under the entire scheme of the aforesaid Act, there is no provision of delegation of power to the Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board i.e. the State Board or officers of the State Board for the purposes of implementation of the provisions of the Environment Protection Act, 1986. Thus the complaint filed by the Respondent is not maintainable because of want of "locus-standi". The complaint filed by the respondent under Section 19 of the EP Act is with authorization, which makes the entire proceedings including all actions taken therein legal and under authority in law. In support of the aforesaid averments, Mr. Mishra submits that vide Notification S.O. 394(E) dated 16th April, 1987 the Central Government has authorized the Regional Officers of the State Environment Conservation Board for institution of complaint under Section 19 of the EP Act in exercise of the powers conferred under clause (a) of Section 19 of the EP Act. As per the aforesaid Notification, the Central Government had also delegated its power to file complaint under Section 19 of the EP Act to the Chairman or Member-Secretary of the State Pollution Control Board. Moreover the complainant had filed the Office Order along with the complaint wherein the Regional Officer of the Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board has been authorized by the Chairman, Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board to file complaints under EP Act. Thus, the objection of the petitioners that the complaint filed by the respondent under the EP Act is without any 13 authorization, which makes the entire proceedings including all actions taken therein illegal and without any authority in law is not tenable and liable to be dismissed in light of the aforesaid submissions. It is submitted that the petitioners were granted mining lease for 30 years. Before renewal of mining lease, it was mandatory for the petitioners to obtain proper EC from the MoEFCC. However the defense taken up by the petitioner before this Hon'ble High Court is that as per Circular Dated 12.02.2002 issued by the MoeFCC clarifying applicability of the Notification to renewal cases for mining and expansion of existing projects at Clause 3(d) the EC was not at all required to be sought by the petitioner Industry at the time of renewal of their mining lease in the year 2001 because there was no increase in the originally sanctioned lease area and/or production. The MoEFCC vide Circular dated 02.07.2007 had clarified regarding applicability of EIA Notification dated 14" September, 2006 to mining leases of 5 Hectares for major minerals and mining leases of minor minerals which have been in operation before the said Notification came into force, which is the situation with the present Petitioner Industry. Mr. Mishra submits that admittedly, there is no increase in the originally sanctioned lease area and/or production level by the Petitioner Industry with regard to the subject mine as is also confirmed by the Regional Officer of the Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF). With the coming into force of the EIA Notification, 2006 the aforesaid circular dated 02.07.2007 was 14 issued which clarified that all such projects which have been operating without any EC would obtain EC at the time of their lease renewal even if there is no increase either in terms of lease area or production. However, as per the petitioner Industry since they have already renewed their mining lease under the EIA Notification, 1994 regime and its Clarification Circulars therefore mechanism of obtaining Environmental Clearance under the EIA Notification, 2006 will not be applicable as the mining lease has already been renewed and granted to the Petitioner Industry from 2001. It is humbly submitted that the aforesaid averment of the petitioner Industry is not tenable since as per the operation of Clause 12 of the EIA Notification, 2006 with regard to operation of EIA Notification, 1994 till disposal of pending cases, the operation of all provisions of EIA Notification, 1994 as well as relaxation will cease to operate after 1 year from the date of issuance of the EIA Notification, 2006 for list of projects or activities requiring prior EC. Thus the EC being a mandate under the EIA Notification, 2006 the petitioner industry ought to have applied for a fresh environmental clearance after the expiry of 1 year from the enactment of EIA Notification, 2006 but it did not do so. The mining project and mining activity without prior environmental clearance is a violation of EP Act. Further the Secretary, Department of Environment, Government of Chhattisgarh was requested to initiate action against the project proponent i.e. the Petitioner Industry as per law and 15 procedure, with intimation to the Ministry and to this office." Thus accordingly the complaint was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dalli Rajhara, District - Balod under Section 15 read with Section 16 of the EP Act which was registered as Complaint Case No. 92 of 2020. Hence, the learned Additional Session Judge, Balod, District - Balod has followed the provision under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and has rightly taken cognizance of the offence and issued summons under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. Lastly it is humbly submitted that the learned Trial Court has only at this stage has issued summons to the alleged accused and the averments in the complaint is subject to evidence by the parties during the course of trial and which is pending consideration and it cannot be adjudicated before the appellate forum. As such, this petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the pleadings and materials available on record. 10. This Court, vide order dated 18.07.2022, had granted an interim protection to the petitioners by staying the further proceedings of Criminal Complaint Case No. 92 of 2020 taking cognizance by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dallirajhara. The said interim order has continued till date. 11. A bare perusal of the complaint goes to suggest that not only the petitioner-Company but its authorities have also been arrayed as an accused. The basic allegation against 16 the petitioner(s) is that they continued mining operation without obtaining EC from the competent authority and have violated the provisions of the EP Act. The Notification dated 14.09.2006 is alleged to have been violated. The learned JMFC, Dalli Rajhara, vide its order dated 11.02.2020 has directed issuance of summons against the petitioners for their appearance on 16.03.2020. However, from perusal of the order sheet, it transpires that the petitioners did not appear on the said date and the matter was fixed for 27.04.2020. Thereafter the proceedings were stayed due to COVID-19 pandemic. According to the petitioners, the petitioners have not violated any of the provisions of the EP Act or any Notification issued by the Central Government. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioner no. 1 was granted lease for an area of 720 acres (291.37 ha) under the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 initially for a period of 30 years vide Lease Deed executed on 05.03.1962 in favour of Hindustan Steel Ltd. The lease tenure was extended from time to time and presently, the lease of the mines is valid upto 27.04.2023. The Ministry issued a circular regarding applicability of EIA 1994 to renewal cases of mining lease clarifying that EC was not required at the time of renewal of mining lease if there was no increase in the originally sanctioned lease area and/or production. It was further 17 clarified by the Ministry on 28.10.2004 that all mining projects of major minerals of more than 5 Ha. Lease area which have so far not obtained EC under the EIA 1994 shall do at the time of renewal of their lease. It is an admitted position that the petitioners never exceeded production level i.e.2.795 MTPA of iron ore from this mining lease. Only when the petitioner planned to enhance the production capacity from existing 2.795 MTPA to 3.5 MTPA in terms of EIA 2006, the petitioner filed application in Form-I for scoping for EIA/EMP for grant of EC. The complaint was filed under Section 19 read with Section 15 and 16 of the EP Act and Section 43 of the Water Act for violation of EIA 2006, regarding which cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate ought to have taken into consideration that the EIA Notification dated 27.01.1994 read with paragraph 8 of the Explanation Note regarding the Environment Impact Assessment Notification dated 27.01.1994, clearly granted exemption to the petitioner/SAIL to obtain EC as it had all the relevant clearances of the State Government including NOC from the State Pollution Control Board and the production also started much prior to 27.01.1994. The circular dated 12.02.2002 clearly stipulated that the EC was not required at the time of renewal of mining lease if there was no increase in the originally sanctioned lease and/or 18 production. The petitioner’s lease was already extended for a period of 20 years w.e.f. 28.04.2003 much prior to issuance of the circulars dated 12.02.2002, 28.10.2004, 07.12.2004 and 24.05.2005 and the renewal of mining lease became due on the date of issuance of the respective three circulars on 03.11.2021 and as such, the said circulars will have no effect on the case of the petitioners. 12. It is pertinent to mention here that as per Annexure P/18, P.R. Sakhare, Scientist-D of RO Office, Nagpur inspected the said mines and submitted the report before the Additional Director, IA Division (Non-coal Mining), Ministry of Environment Forest & Climate Change on 11.10.2018 in which he made the following recommendations: “Based on the documents/submissions/verification and discussions held with M/s SAIL Officials, it is observed that Rajhara mechanised iron ore mine under Pandridalli & Rajhara Pahar lease of Bhilai Steel Plant is in operation since June, 1958. Mining Lease area of 220.42 ha was renewed by Government of Chhattisgarh for a period 28.04.2003 to 27.04.2023. Forest Clearance (FC) was obtained on 06.04.2004 for an area of 100.76 ha making it coterminous to mining lease up to 27.04.2023. Air & Water consent for the Rajhara mine since 01.04.1993 till date have been obtained. PP submitted the copies of Mining Plan, Mining Scheme (Approved by IBM). As per the production details submitted by PP highest production 2.795 MTPA was achieved in 1993- 94. Production of the subsequent years was less than 2.795 MTPA. The PP submitted that the 19 Rajhara Mine is a mechanised mine since inception. Drilling, blasting followed by excavation of ore by excavator and transportation of ore to crushing plant by dumpers was being followed since inception. Hence there was no modernisation of the mine. The iron ore production from Pandri-Dalli & Rajhara Pahar lease never exceeded the 1993-94 production level of 2.795 MTPA. Therefore, it could be concluded, that there is no modernization, expansion, done by M/s SAIL since from 1958 till date. PP regularly obtained renewal of CTO from CECB.” 13. Therefore, as per inspection and report of Dr. P.S. Sakhare, Scientist ‘D’, it is crystal clear that the Rajhara mechanised iron ore mine of M/s SAIL, operating under the Pandri-Dalli and Rajhara Pahar lease, has been in continuous operation since June 1958. The mining lease area of 220.42 hectares was renewed by the Government of Chhattisgarh for the period from 28.04.2003 to 27.04.2023. Forest Clearance for 100.76 hectares was obtained on 06.04.2004 and remained coterminous with the mining lease. Necessary Air and Water Consents have been regularly obtained since 01.04.1993. The mine has been mechanised since inception, following the same process of drilling, blasting, excavation by excavators, and transportation of ore to the crushing plant by dumpers. The highest iron ore production achieved was 2.795 MTPA in 1993–94, and production has never exceeded this level thereafter. Accordingly, there has 20 been no modernization or expansion of the mine since 1958. M/s SAIL has regularly obtained renewal of Consent to Operate (CTO) from the Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board (CECB). 14. The learned Magistrate ought to have issued the process only after appreciating the aforesaid facts. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and the order passed by the learned Magistrate summoning the petitioners do not reflect that it had applied its mind to the facts of the case and provisions of law applicable thereto. No prima facie case is made out against the petitioners herein. Further, the learned Magistrate ought to have considered that there has been an inordinate delay in filing the complaint. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Hasmukhlal D. Vora & Another (supra), it has been observed as under: “ 22. There has been a gap of more than four years between the initial investigation and the filing of the complaint, and even after lapse of substantial amount of time, no evidence has been provided to sustain the claims in the complaint. As held by this Court in Bijoy Singh & Anr. Vs State Of Bihar {(2002) 9 SCC 147}, inordinate delay, if not reasonably explained, can be fatal to the case of the prosecution. The relevant extract from the judgment is extracted below: (SCC p. 153, para 7) “7…..Delay wherever found is required to be explained by the prosecution. If the 21 delay is reasonably explained, no adverse inference can be drawn, but failure to explain the delay would require the Court to minutely examine the prosecution version for ensuring itself as to whether any innocent person has been implicated in the crime or not. Insisting upon the accused to seek an explanation of the delay is not the requirement of law. It is always for the prosecution to explain such a delay and if reasonable, plausible and sufficient explanation is tendered, no adverse inference can be drawn against it.” 23. In the present case, the Respondent has provided no explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings. 24. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint. 25. While this court does not expect a full-blown investigation at the stage of a criminal complaint, however, in such cases where the accused has been subjected to the anxiety of a potential initiation of criminal proceedings for such a length of time, it is only reasonable for the court to expect bare-minimum evidence 22 from the Investigating Authorities.” 16. In Inox Air Products Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “34. In this respect, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra): “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the 23 accused.” 35. This Court has clearly held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. It has been held that the order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. This Court held that the Magistrate is required to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary in support thereof and as to whether that would be sufficient for proceeding against the accused. It has been held that the Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the accused. 36. The said law would be consistently following by this Court in a catena of judgments including in the cases of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, {(2015) 4 SCC 609 : 2015 INSC 18}, Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others, {(2015) 12 SCC 420} and Krishna Lal Chawla and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another {(2021) 5 SCC 435}. 37. Recently, a Bench of this Court to which one of us (Gavai, J.) was a Member, in the case of Lalankumar Singh (supra), has observed thus: “38. The order of issuance of process is not an empty formality. The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the case or not. The formation of such an 24 opinion is required to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reasons are given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the accused. No doubt, that the order need not contain detailed reasons. A reference in this respect could be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, which reads thus: “51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance ofacase (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused. 52. A wide discretion has been given as to grant or refusal of process and it must be judicially exercised. A 25 person ought not to be dragged into court merely because a complaint has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process and it cannot be refused merely because he thinks that it is unlikely to result in a conviction. 53. However, the words “sufficient ground for proceeding”appearing in Section 204 are of immense importance. It is these words which amply suggest that an opinion is to be formed only after due application of mind that there is sufficient basis for proceeding against the said accused and formation of such an opinion is to be stated in the order itself. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein while coming to the conclusion that there is prima facie case against the accused, though the order need not contain detailed reasons. A fortiori, the order would be bad in law if the reason given turns out to be ex facie incorrect.” 17. In the present case also, we find that there is no application of mind even for the namesake by the learned Magistrate while issuing the process which has been done in a mechanical manner and on this ground alone, the petition deserves to be allowed. Prima facie, this Court 26 does not find any merit in the complaint filed by the respondent before the learned Magistrate and as such, the registration of the Complaint Case No. 92 of 2020 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dalli Rajhara, District Balod, is hereby quashed. 18. Resultantly, this petition stands allowed. Interim order passed on 18.07.2022 is made absolute. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE Madhurima