CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 IN THE HIGH D. Rajesh Kumar @ Darapu Rajesh Kumar. State of Odisha (Vig) THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Chittaranjan Dash, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the Parties. 2. The legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 06.07.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Berhampur in G.R. Case No.9 of 2018 (v) has been called in question in this revision. 3. The background facts of the case are that the Petitioner, while serving as the Sarpanch of K. Sitapur Grama Panchayat under Kashinagar Block, District Gajapati, allegedly misappropriated government funds. It is alleged that he caused loss to the public exchequer by withdrawing money from the PDS Savings Bank CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 D. Rajesh Kumar @ Darapu …. Mr. P.V. Balakrishna -versus- State of Odisha (Vig) …. Opposite Mr. Sangram Das, Standing Counsel for Vigilance CORAM: BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Date of Judgment: 09.07.2025 Chittaranjan Dash, J. Heard learned counsel for the Parties. legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 06.07.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Berhampur in G.R. Case No.9 of 2018 (v) has been called in question in this revision. The background facts of the case are that the Petitioner, while serving as the Sarpanch of K. Sitapur Grama Panchayat under Kashinagar Block, District Gajapati, allegedly misappropriated government funds. It is alleged that he caused loss to the public hequer by withdrawing money from the PDS Savings Bank OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK Petitioner P.V. Balakrishna, Advocate Opposite Party angram Das, Standing Counsel for Vigilance BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 06.07.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Berhampur in G.R. Case No.9 of 2018 (v) has been called in The background facts of the case are that the Petitioner, while serving as the Sarpanch of K. Sitapur Grama Panchayat under Kashinagar Block, District Gajapati, allegedly misappropriated government funds. It is alleged that he caused loss to the public hequer by withdrawing money from the PDS Savings Bank CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 account maintained jointly with the Panchayat Executive Officer at Axis Bank, Kashinagar Branch. 4. It emerges that on 17.03.2018, the Inspector of Police, Vigilance, Paralakhemundi Unit addressing to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance alleging that the Petitioner along with the P.E.O. jointly withdrew an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/ Fifty Thousand only) Additionally, a sum of Thousand Three Hundred Ninety the cash book, was not found during physical verification. Consequently, the Petitioner and the P.E.O. were prima responsible for the misappropriation of the said funds. Upon completion of investigation, they were charge Sections 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Sections 409/12 of the IPC. The Petitioner being aggrieved by the submission of the said charge-sheet prayed the learned trial court to discharge him from the aforesaid charges proceeding under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. The learned Trial Court, vide the impugned order, w reject the prayer of the Petitioner for discharge, thereby giving rise to the present Revision Petition. 5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner, during the course of hearing in the present revision, vehemently argued by referring to the audit report submitted by the prosecution in support of their allegations against the Petitioner. It was pointed out that the District Audit Officer had categorically stated that the amount of CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page account maintained jointly with the Panchayat Executive Officer at Axis Bank, Kashinagar Branch. It emerges that on 17.03.2018, the Inspector of Police, Vigilance, Paralakhemundi Unit, submitted a writt addressing to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance alleging that the Petitioner along with the P.E.O. of K. Sitapur Gram Panchayat jointly withdrew an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand only) which was not entered in the cas Additionally, a sum of ₹2,53,397/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Seven only), though recorded in the cash book, was not found during physical verification. Consequently, the Petitioner and the P.E.O. were prima responsible for the misappropriation of the said funds. Upon completion of investigation, they were charge-sheeted under Sections 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Sections 409/12 . The Petitioner being aggrieved by the submission of the sheet prayed the learned trial court to discharge him from the aforesaid charges proceeding under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. The learned Trial Court, vide the impugned order, was pleased to reject the prayer of the Petitioner for discharge, thereby giving rise to the present Revision Petition. The learned counsel for the Petitioner, during the course of hearing in the present revision, vehemently argued by referring to report submitted by the prosecution in support of their allegations against the Petitioner. It was pointed out that the District Audit Officer had categorically stated that the amount of account maintained jointly with the Panchayat Executive Officer at It emerges that on 17.03.2018, the Inspector of Police, a written report addressing to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance alleging that of K. Sitapur Gram Panchayat (Rupees One Lakh cash register. (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty-Three Seven only), though recorded in the cash book, was not found during physical verification. Consequently, the Petitioner and the P.E.O. were prima facie held responsible for the misappropriation of the said funds. Upon sheeted under Sections 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Sections 409/120-B . The Petitioner being aggrieved by the submission of the sheet prayed the learned trial court to discharge him from the aforesaid charges proceeding under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. as pleased to reject the prayer of the Petitioner for discharge, thereby giving rise The learned counsel for the Petitioner, during the course of hearing in the present revision, vehemently argued by referring to report submitted by the prosecution in support of their allegations against the Petitioner. It was pointed out that the District Audit Officer had categorically stated that the amount of CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 ₹1,50,000/, withdrawn under the joint signatures of the Petitioner and the P.E.O., was retained in the custody of the P.E.O. after encashment of the cheque, and that the Petitioner, in his capacity as Sarpanch, cannot be held responsible for any alleged misappropriation. Attention of this Court was also drawn to documents indicating that the said amount of withdrawn through self Account No. 914010002713426, was misappropriated by the then P.E.O. Furthermore, it was also pointed out that an additional sum of ₹14,04,870/- who, being the custodian of the withdrawn funds, was held responsible for the same. 6. Mr. Das, learned Standing Counsel for the State (Vigilance), on the contrary by the Petitioner to exonerate him from the charges at the very threshold cannot be allowed at this stage the documents basing on which the Petitioner claims his exoneration are the audit reports concerning a part of the total amount allegedly to one of the ground trial court during adjudication of the matter in dispute and does not ipso facto absolve the Petitioner from the charges. relied upon the decision in the matter of Superintendent of Police Vs. R.Soundirarasu Etc. held that even a strong suspicion, founded on material leading the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page ₹1,50,000/, withdrawn under the joint signatures of the Petitioner nd the P.E.O., was retained in the custody of the P.E.O. after encashment of the cheque, and that the Petitioner, in his capacity as Sarpanch, cannot be held responsible for any alleged misappropriation. Attention of this Court was also drawn to indicating that the said amount of withdrawn through self-Cheque No. 59464 from Savings Bank Account No. 914010002713426, was misappropriated by the then P.E.O. Furthermore, it was also pointed out that an additional sum had been misappropriated by the former P.E.O., who, being the custodian of the withdrawn funds, was held responsible for the same. Mr. Das, learned Standing Counsel for the State on the contrary, submitted that the grounds er to exonerate him from the charges at the very threshold cannot be allowed at this stage. The simple reason being the documents basing on which the Petitioner claims his exoneration are the audit reports concerning a part of the total amount allegedly to have been misappropriated and this could one of the grounds for defence which need to be proved before the trial court during adjudication of the matter in dispute and does not absolve the Petitioner from the charges. Mr. Das on the decision in the matter of State through Deputy Superintendent of Police Vs. R.Soundirarasu Etc., wherein it was held that even a strong suspicion, founded on material leading the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the ₹1,50,000/, withdrawn under the joint signatures of the Petitioner nd the P.E.O., was retained in the custody of the P.E.O. after encashment of the cheque, and that the Petitioner, in his capacity as Sarpanch, cannot be held responsible for any alleged misappropriation. Attention of this Court was also drawn to indicating that the said amount of ₹1,50,000/-, Cheque No. 59464 from Savings Bank Account No. 914010002713426, was misappropriated by the then P.E.O. Furthermore, it was also pointed out that an additional sum en misappropriated by the former P.E.O., who, being the custodian of the withdrawn funds, was held Mr. Das, learned Standing Counsel for the State s propounded er to exonerate him from the charges at the very simple reason being the documents basing on which the Petitioner claims his exoneration are the audit reports concerning a part of the total have been misappropriated and this could be for defence which need to be proved before the trial court during adjudication of the matter in dispute and does not Mr. Das also State through Deputy wherein it was held that even a strong suspicion, founded on material leading the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, would justify the framing of charge against the accused. 7. In the context of the challenge to the framing of charge, it is useful to recall the settled legal position laid down by the Hon Supreme Court Kumar Kashyap reiterated – “9.1 In the case of P.Vijayan (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. What is required to be considered charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charg 228 Cr.P.C., if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not neces cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the Court 9.2 In the recent decision of this Court in the case of M.R. Hiremath (supra), one of us (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in paragraph 25 as under: CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page ingredients constituting the offence alleged, would justify the framing of charge against the accused. In the context of the challenge to the framing of charge, it is useful to recall the settled legal position laid down by the Hon Supreme Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok reported in AIROnline 2021 SC 210, In the case of P.Vijayan (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find t whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C., if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function Court, after the trial starts. In the recent decision of this Court in the case of Hiremath (supra), one of us (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in paragraph 25 as under: ingredients constituting the offence alleged, would justify In the context of the challenge to the framing of charge, it is useful to recall the settled legal position laid down by the Hon’ble State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok , wherein it is In the case of P.Vijayan (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. What is at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find t whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient e under Section 228 Cr.P.C., if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function In the recent decision of this Court in the case of Hiremath (supra), one of us (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) speaking for the Bench has observed and CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial application for discharge un Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge t assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the ex constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (SCC pp. 721 “29. ... materials has to be gone into and the expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a grou offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 8. It was further held in Police Vs. R. Soundirarasu Etc. 768, as follows “55. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for consideration of this Court in others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page 25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial Court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the Court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) 29. ... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the Court expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the Court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the Court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” It was further held in State by Deputy Superintendent of Police Vs. R. Soundirarasu Etc. reported in (2023) 6 SCC , as follows – 55. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2008) 2 25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of was dealing with an der the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, istence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, adverting to the earlier decisions on the 22, para 29) At this stage, probative value of the Court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is nd for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at State by Deputy Superintendent of (2023) 6 SCC 55. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for Mishra and , (2008) 2 CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 SCC 561, and referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa SCC 659, and the State of (2000) 6 SCC 338, it was held that at t Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The relevant observations made in follows:- “11. The relevant observations made in follows:- “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the off committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 56. Then again in the case of a three- Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections i. resply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 resply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32). “32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it di were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page SCC 561, and referring to its earlier decisions in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, and the State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338, it was held that at that stage, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as 11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed e existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 56. Then again in the case of Som Nath Thapa (supra), Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections i.e. (i) Sections 227 and 228 resply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 resply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of aming of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32). 32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for SCC 561, and referring to its earlier decisions in , (1996) 4 M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, hat stage, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The the judgment are as 11. The the judgment are as 11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed e existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is ence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in (supra), Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the e. (i) Sections 227 and 228 resply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 resply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of aming of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing fferently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. 57. In a later decision in Court, referring to several of that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. 58. Reiterating a similar view in Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to eval sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at t discharge. 75. In Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2001) 9 SCC 631, this Court held as under: “3.....The revision power under the Procedure manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts ar required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.” In a later decision in Mohanlal Soni (supra), this Court, referring to several of its previous decisions, held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is t required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to eval sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (2001) 9 SCC 631, this Court held as under:- 3.....The revision power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts ar required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to (supra), this its previous decisions, held 7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is t required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of he stage of Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., Code of Criminal cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are take face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. 76. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest erro would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and in view of the principle enunciated by the Hon above, this Court is of the considered view that the facts requiring adjudication cannot be conclusively determined at the threshold stage of the proceeding. An inference that the amount withdrawn under the joint signatures of the Sarpanch and the Panchayat Executive Officer (P.E.O.) is solely the responsibility of the P.E.O., as its custodian, and that the Sarpanch money withdrawn for the purpose of the expenses to be borne by the Panchayat, cannot be drawn without proper trial. The questio as to whether the Sarpanch had any involvement in the alleged misappropriation of funds intended for Panchayat expenditure is a CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.” 76. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not stitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and in view of the principle enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as noted Court is of the considered view that the facts requiring adjudication cannot be conclusively determined at the threshold stage of the proceeding. An inference that the amount withdrawn under the joint signatures of the Sarpanch and the Panchayat Officer (P.E.O.) is solely the responsibility of the P.E.O., as its custodian, and that the Sarpanch has no axe to grind in the money withdrawn for the purpose of the expenses to be borne by , cannot be drawn without proper trial. The questio as to whether the Sarpanch had any involvement in the alleged misappropriation of funds intended for Panchayat expenditure is a only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first n at the value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been 76. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised r of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not stitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and in view ble Supreme Court as noted Court is of the considered view that the facts requiring adjudication cannot be conclusively determined at the threshold stage of the proceeding. An inference that the amount withdrawn under the joint signatures of the Sarpanch and the Panchayat Officer (P.E.O.) is solely the responsibility of the P.E.O., has no axe to grind in the money withdrawn for the purpose of the expenses to be borne by , cannot be drawn without proper trial. The question as to whether the Sarpanch had any involvement in the alleged misappropriation of funds intended for Panchayat expenditure is a CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 matter that must be resolved through due adjudication during the course of trial. 10. This Court is well persuaded by the learned counsel for the State (Vigilance) that the amount of misappropriation alleged only the extent of amount sought to have been withdrawn under the joint signature of the Petitioner and the P.E.O 1,50,000/- but also the balance physically as entered in the cash book found not tallied. 11. In any case, the submission made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner with regard to the report of the auditor e the Sarapanch from his responsibility as to the custody of the withdrawn amount from the Bank is a matter of appreciation of evidence. 12. Consequently, the ground could be one for his defence, the benefit whereof can upon a proper adjudication after the matter being led in evidence during trial but cannot ipso exonerate the Petitioner from the charges in as much as the offence allegedly charge against the Petitioner need at the stage of framing of charge but a strong presumption of the allegations would be suffice to implicate him to proceed in the trial. 13. Having regard to the principles enunciated as above by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the disc cannot be said to have substantiated the ground whereupon an CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page matter that must be resolved through due adjudication during the ourt is well persuaded by the submission made by the learned counsel for the State (Vigilance) that the amount of misappropriation alleged, as reflected in the charge- only the extent of amount sought to have been withdrawn under the joint signature of the Petitioner and the P.E.O. amounting to Rs. but also the balance amount required to be found physically as entered in the cash book found not tallied. In any case, the submission made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner with regard to the report of the auditor e the Sarapanch from his responsibility as to the custody of the withdrawn amount from the Bank is a matter of appreciation of Consequently, the grounds propounded by the Petitioner could be one for his defence, the benefit whereof can be taken only upon a proper adjudication after the matter being led in evidence during trial but cannot ipso facto be inferred as the Petitioner from the charges in as much as the offence allegedly charge against the Petitioner need not be a full proof one at the stage of framing of charge but a strong presumption of the allegations would be suffice to implicate him to proceed in the trial. Having regard to the principles enunciated as above by the ble Supreme Court and the discussion as above, the Petitioner cannot be said to have substantiated the ground whereupon an matter that must be resolved through due adjudication during the on made by the learned counsel for the State (Vigilance) that the amount of -sheet, is not only the extent of amount sought to have been withdrawn under the . amounting to Rs. required to be found physically as entered in the cash book found not tallied. In any case, the submission made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner with regard to the report of the auditor exonerating the Sarapanch from his responsibility as to the custody of the withdrawn amount from the Bank is a matter of appreciation of propounded by the Petitioner be taken only upon a proper adjudication after the matter being led in evidence facto be inferred as sufficient to the Petitioner from the charges in as much as the offence not be a full proof one at the stage of framing of charge but a strong presumption of the allegations would be suffice to implicate him to proceed in the trial. Having regard to the principles enunciated as above by the ussion as above, the Petitioner cannot be said to have substantiated the ground whereupon an CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 instant opinion can be formed as to his innocence to absolve him from the charge at the very threshold 14. As a result and the same, being devoid of merit Bijay CRLREV No. 546 of 2024 Page instant opinion can be formed as to his innocence to absolve him from the charge at the very threshold. a result, this Court finds no merit in the present being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. (Chittaranjan Dash) Judge instant opinion can be formed as to his innocence to absolve him the present revision stands dismissed. (Chittaranjan Dash)