2025:HHC:17750 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 481 of 2024 & Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025 Reserved on: 15.5.2025 Date of Decision: 05.06.2025. 1. Cr. MMO No. 481 of 2024 Ajay Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and others ...Respondents 2. Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025 State of H.P. ...Petitioner Versus Mahender Singh @ Gallu Saini ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Kush Sharma, Advocate, in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and Mr.Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, in Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025. For the Respondents : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2-State in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:17750 2024 and Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Vinod Gupta, Advocate, for respondent No.3 in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and for the respondent in Cr.MP(M) No.113 of 2025. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking cancellation of the bail granted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. vide order dated 17.5.2024 in Bail Application No. 40 of 2024, titled Mahender Singh alias Gallu Saini Vs. State of H.P. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police received an information on 24.10.2023 that one person was brought to the hospital after a quarrel. The police went to the hospital for verification of the information. Rakesh Kumar (injured) made a statement that he was going to his home on 24.10.2023 on his motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-17A-4072. He was carrying ₹3,98,000/- with him. 2-3 vehicles stopped near the Lunj factory at 9.00 PM. The petitioner, Mahender Singh, and 15-20 persons came out of the vehicles and started beating the informant. Mahender Singh inflicted blows with a Gandasi on the arms and legs of the 3 2025:HHC:17750 informant. The other people gave him beatings with sticks. His motorcycle was damaged. ₹3,98,000/- kept by the informant in his pocket were removed. The accused ran away from the spot after the incident. The police registered the FIR and conducted an investigation. It was found during the investigation that the money was dropped during the incident and was picked up by Ajay Kumar (the informant’s brother). The left leg of the informant was amputated at PGI on 5.11.2023. The informant was admitted to the MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana, Haryana, and he died during the treatment. The postmortem examination of the informant was conducted, and as per the report of the Medical Officer, the cause of death was vascular degeneration of the kidney, consequent to the injury to the left leg. Accused Mahender Singh made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of Gandasa, with which the injuries were inflicted. Accused Saravjeet Singh got recovered a stick which was used for beatings. Farman got recovered an iron pipe, which was used during the incident. Accused Mahender Singh was involved in the commission of a similar offence, and 12 FIRs were registered against him. The police had arrested other co-accused. The viscera was sent to FSL, and as per the 4 2025:HHC:17750 result, no poison/ethyl alcohol or drug could be detected in the viscera. Blood was not detected in the Gandasa and metallic pipe, however, blood was found in traces on the wooden stick, but it was insufficient for serological examination. 3. The accused, Mahender Singh, filed a bail petition before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib (learned Trial Court). Learned Trial Court held that there were variations in the statement of Rakesh Kumar regarding the incident. The allegations made in the FIR were not corroborated by the medical evidence. MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, wherein the informant was admitted, stated the cause of death was Dengue Shock Syndrome, Multi-Organ Dysfunction Syndrome. Therefore, in these circumstances, the further custody of the accused Mahender Singh was unjustified, and he was ordered to be released on bail in the sum of ₹50,000/- with two sureties to the like amount. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the State as well as the informant’s brother have filed separate petitions for cancellation of bail. The State asserted that the order is against the law and facts and is based 5 2025:HHC:17750 upon conjectures and surmises. It was wrongly held that the accused, Mahender Singh, had no intention to kill the informant. The charge sheet has been filed against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 147, 149, 341, 323, 325, 427 and 120-B of IPC. Doctors at MM Institute of Medical Sciences did not conduct a postmortem examination of the deceased, and they were not in a position to opine about the cause of death. The accused, Mahender Singh, was specifically named in the FIR. Eyewitness Vickey Kumar also stated about his involvement. He is a habitual offender, and many cases are pending against him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5. In the petition filed by the informant’s brother, it was submitted that the learned Trial Court committed a grave error in releasing the accused on regular bail. Considering the nature of allegations, the gravity of the offence and the severity of punishment, he was not entitled to bail. The learned Trial Court did not consider the seriousness of the allegations made against accused Mahender Singh and released him on bail without any justification. Eight persons are still absconding. A 6 2025:HHC:17750 specific role was attributed to accused Mahender Singh in the FIR. He had criminal antecedents, and 11 cases were pending against him. This aspect was not considered by the learned Trial Court. The merits of the case were wrongly appreciated. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6. I have heard Mr. Kush Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the petitioner/State in Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025 and for respondents No.1 and 2-State in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024, Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Vinod Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No.3 in Cr.MMO No. 481 of 2024 and for the respondent in Cr.MP(M) No. 113 of 2025. 7. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in releasing the accused, Mahender Singh, on bail. He was the main accused and was responsible for the murder of the informant. The Medical Officer had categorically mentioned that the cause of death was vascular degeneration of the kidney, consequent to injury to the 7 2025:HHC:17750 left leg. This showed that the proximate cause of death was the injury caused by the accused. Learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the report issued by MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana. The offence is heinous and punishable with capital punishment. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be cancelled. 8. Mr. Kush Sharma, learned counsel for the informant’s brother, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the crime. Reliance was wrongly placed upon the report issued by the MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana. Learned Trial Court failed to consider the criminal antecedents of the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments in Ajwar v. Waseem and another 2024 INSC 438, Rohit Bansal Vs. State and another 2017: DHC:3059, Deepak Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and another (2022) 4 SCR 1, and Gulam Nabi Vs. State of H.P. 2024:HHC:8856 in support of his submission. 8 2025:HHC:17750 9. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the accused Mahender Singh, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view of the matter and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to cancel the bail granted by the learned Trial Court. There is no evidence that the accused, Mahender Singh, has misused the concession of bail granted to him; in the absence of which, the bail cannot be cancelled. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 that the bail, once granted, should not be cancelled mechanically; however, an unreasoned and perverse order is open to interference by the Superior Court. The bail can be cancelled if there are serious allegations against the accused. It was observed at page 783: “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, 9 2025:HHC:17750 the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse bail order is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under 10 2025:HHC:17750 Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24) “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” Considerations for Setting Aside Bail Orders 28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. 29. In Jagjeet Singh [Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-judge Bench of 11 2025:HHC:17750 this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding a bail application. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC 584: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813].) 12. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher and Ors. 2024: INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: - “19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and 12 2025:HHC:17750 repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528; Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118. 27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a three-judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must be weighed with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of the CrPC in the following words: “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat 13 2025:HHC:17750 Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis supplied) 20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: “7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus: ‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; 14 2025:HHC:17750 (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by the grant of bail.’ 8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. …’ 9. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023 INSC 761, this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511, held as follows: ‘13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the cancellation of the grant of bail, cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present, and bail, once granted, cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing to allow fair trial. This proposition draws 15 2025:HHC:17750 support from the Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349, Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and XXX v. State of Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511.’ 10. In XXX v. Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 2023 INSC 767, this Court noted that the principles in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood reiterated in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra (2022) 9 SCC 321. 11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so when an order of pre- arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court. 12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied) 21. In Ajwar (supra), this Court also examined the considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below: “28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only 16 2025:HHC:17750 illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. 29. In Jagjeet Singh (supra) (2022) 9 SCC 321, a three- judge bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well- established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate Court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Ram Bilas (2001) 6 SCC 338; Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC 584)” (emphasis supplied) 13. A similar view was taken in Kailash Kumar versus State of H.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2025 decided on 20.02.2025 (SC) wherein it was observed: “10. The decision of this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem and Anr. (2024) 10 SCC 768, relied on by the High Court, has been perused. In terms of such decision, while seized of an application for cancellation/revocation of bail, the considerations (illustrative, not exhaustive) which ought to weigh with the courts are whether: (i) the accused has misused the concession of liberty; (ii) he has been delaying the trial; (iii) he has been 17 2025:HHC:17750 influencing/threatening the witnesses; (iv) he has been tampering evidence in any manner; and (v) there has been any supervening circumstance after grant of bail warranting a relook. The decision also lays down that orders granting bail could be interfered with if the same is found to be perverse or illegal in the sense that the Court’s conscience is shocked or extraneous material has been considered.” 14. The present petitions have to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It is not disputed that the informant/victim was undergoing treatment from MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana, before his death. It is also undisputed that the Doctors at MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana, had mentioned the cause of death as Dengue Shock Syndrome, Multi-Organ Dysfunction Syndrome. The Doctors treating the informant were the best people to know the cause of death and learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon the report issued by the Doctors of the MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana. 16. It was submitted that the Doctors at MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana, had not conducted the postmortem examination, and they were not competent to depose about the cause of death. This submission is only stated 18 2025:HHC:17750 to be rejected. A Doctor treating the patient is the best person to know the cause of death. The Doctor who conducted postmortem examination only mentions his opinion regarding the cause of death. In any case, when two opinions were available on record, the one in favour of the accused was to be preferred, and the learned Trial Court had not erred in relying upon the report issued by the Doctors at MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana. 17. There is nothing in the petitions that accused Mahender Singh had misused the liberty granted to him. Therefore, bail cannot be cancelled on the ground of supervening circumstances. 18. It was submitted that accused Mahender Singh had criminal antecedents, and these were ignored by the learned Trial Court. This submission is not acceptable. The criminal antecedents would have been relevant in case of a grave offence; however, the report issued by the Doctors at MM Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Mulana, made the present case suspect that the cause of death was unnatural or it was a case of 19 2025:HHC:17750 homicide. Therefore, the criminal antecedents are not sufficient to detain the petitioner in custody. 19. Therefore, there is no perversity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court granting bail to accused Mahender Singh, and no interference is required with the order. 20. Consequently, the present petitions fail and the same are dismissed. 21. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 5th June, 2025 (Chander)