1 2025:CGHC:56233-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1041 of 2022 1 - Raja Saluja S/o Late Shri Pratap Singh Saluja Aged About 35 Years R/o Balbhadra Ward, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 2 - Satyajeet Singh S/o Late Shri Pratap Singh Saluja Aged About 42 Years R/o Balbhadra Ward, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 3 - Jagjit Singh Saluja S/o Late Pratap Singh Aged About 51 Years R/o Hatri Bazar, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 4 - Jagpreet Saluja S/o Late Shri Pratap Singh Saluja Aged About 49 Years R/o Hatri Bazar, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh ---Petitioners Versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Suhela, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Ramrajji Chhabda W/o Late Shri Sharan Singh Chhabda R/o Village Kharora, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Arpan Verma as well as Mr. Anshul Tiwari, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Rishabh Bajaj, Advocate ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.11.20 10:36:43 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 18.11. 2025 1. Though CRMP No. 2615/2019, CRMP No. 2616/2019 and CRMP No. 1041/2022 were earlier disposed of by this Court vide common order dated 02.12.2024, the order passed in CRMP No.1041/2022 came to be challenged by the complainant/ respondent No. 2 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 9445/2025. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide order dated 28.10.2025, has been pleased to set aside the order to the extent it pertains to CRMP No. 1041/2022 and remand the matter to this Court for fresh consideration. 2. As a result, and in view of the remand order dated 28.10.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.004644/2025 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9445/2025, only CRMP No. 1041/2022 now survives for adjudication, and we proceed to consider this sole petition on its own merits. 3. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Anshul Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent No.1 as well as Mr. Rishabh Bajaj, leaned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3 4. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘CrPC’) with the following prayer :- “It is therefore, most humbly prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant 482 petition filed by the petitioners and the order dated 24.12.2019 (Annex.P/1), passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, passed in Unregistered MJC No. 2018 in the matter of State of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Suhela vs. Unknown, may kindly be set-aside and the action on the part of the police authorities, whereby the police authorities have started reinvestigation of the entire crime No. 23/2008, may also kindly be set-aside, in holding the same as without jurisdiction and the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga to pass the detailed order on merit, on the closer report submitted by the police and the Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to grant any other relief which is deemed fit and proper.” 5. Brief facts of the case in a nutshell are that the respondent No.2/complainant lodged FIR No. 23/2008 on 12.03.2008 at Police Station Suhela alleging offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) against the petitioners in respect of alleged fraudulent sale deeds dated 08.06.2007, 12.06.2007 and 26.06.2007 concerning lands situated at Villages Aurethi, 4 Farhada and Kholwa. The allegations were that the petitioners, by misusing certain signed papers allegedly given to Shri Pratap Saluja (father of the petitioners), prepared a forged power of attorney in the name of Jagjit Singh Saluja, who thereafter executed the aforesaid sale deeds in favour of co-accused Raja Saluja. 6. It was also alleged that the complainant had never executed any power of attorney and that the alleged power of attorney stood cancelled on 08.05.2007. The police investigated the matter and submitted a closure report on 26.07.2014 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga, whereupon MJC No. 75/2014 was registered. Notice was issued to the complainant, and the order sheets (Annexure P/2) reflect that after 20.10.2016, no proceedings took place till 27.04.2022. Meanwhile, on 13.06.2022, the petitioners received a notice under Section 160 CrPC from Police Station Suhela (Annexure P/3), prompting them to seek information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, ‘RTI Act’) regarding the fate of the closure report. 7. Upon obtaining the order sheets, the petitioners discovered that the counsel for the complainant had moved an application dated 26.05.2022 stating that the closure had already been refused and re-investigation ordered. Relying on this, the Magistrate passed an order dated 16.06.2022 closing the MJC on the ground that the closure had been refused earlier and the case diary already 5 returned to the police for re-investigation. 8. Shockingly, the petitioners came to know for the first time that the police had independently submitted another closure report on 30.10.2018, which was registered as an unregistered MJC titled as State of Chhattisgarh v. Unknown, and in that proceeding the Magistrate passed the impugned order dated 24.12.2019 returning the case diary for “re-investigation”. This parallel proceeding was conducted behind the back of the petitioners, despite MJC No.75/2014 being already pending and without any order either accepting or rejecting the original closure report. 9. It is also an admitted position that the Magistrate never passed any final order either accepting or rejecting the closure report in MJC No. 75/2014 or even in the unregistered MJC. The letter dated 06.12.2019 (Annexure P/8) written by the In-charge Police Station Suhela requesting return of the case diary for re- investigation formed the basis for the order dated 24.12.2019, which is neither an order of refusal of the closure report nor a lawful order directing reinvestigation as per law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762. 10. During the said period, the police suo motu commenced re- investigation and issued notice dated 13.06.2022 to the petitioners without there being any lawful order of the Magistrate refusing the closure report or directing further investigation. This 6 unilateral action of the police is wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the settled law that re-investigation/fresh investigation can be ordered only by higher courts and not by the police on their own. 11. It is also relevant that the complainant has filed Civil Suit No.23A/2008, which is pending adjudication. The documents (Annexure P/10) show that the alleged cancellation deed dated 08.05.2007 was in fact prepared only on 02.07.2007, i.e., after the sale deeds had already been executed. 12. Another important feature is that, after FIR No. 23/2008, two more FIRs, namely FIR No. 285/2018 and FIR No. 286/2018 were registered on identical allegations in respect of the same lands at Aurethi and Kholwa. These FIRs stand challenged by the petitioners in Cr.M.P. No. 2616/2019 and Cr.M.P. No. 2615/2019 on the ground that multiple FIRs on the same cause of action are impermissible. In the return filed by the State in those matters, even the police suppressed the fact of the order dated 24.12.2019, which shows mala fide on their part. 13. Thus, the initiation of re-investigation without any order of the court, the passing of the order dated 24.12.2019 behind the back of the petitioners, and the parallel proceedings conducted without rejecting the pending closure report are wholly illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles laid down in Vinay Tyagi (supra). 14. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 7 petitioners submits as under :- • The impugned order dated 24.12.2019, as well as the subsequent action of the police in reinvestigating the entire matter, is wholly without jurisdiction, arbitrary and illegal. Once the police had submitted the closure report, the police could not have been permitted to reopen the investigation merely on the request of the complainant. • The learned Magistrate has nowhere passed an order directing re-investigation. The only act reflected from the order dated 24.12.2019 is that the case diary was returned to the police. No judicial order assigning reasons or authorising re- investigation has been passed. • The police authorities have absolutely no jurisdiction to undertake re-investigation merely because the complainant so desires. In law, re-investigation, fresh investigation or de novo investigation can be directed only by the higher constitutional courts, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Tyagi (supra). • The Magistrate has neither accepted nor rejected the closure report. Merely returning the case diary to “facilitate” the police to re-investigate the matter amounts to abdication of jurisdiction and is unsustainable in law. • Even otherwise, the Magistrate is not empowered to order re- investigation after submission of the closure report. The 8 scheme of Section 173 CrPC permits only “further investigation”, and that too with a speaking order and judicial application of mind, none of which is present here. • The impugned action of the Magistrate and the police is in the teeth of the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Tyagi (supra), which categorically prohibits re-investigation or fresh investigation once a report under Section 173(2) CrPC is filed, unless the same is specifically ordered by a higher Court. • Reopening of simultaneous proceedings without registering an MJC, without impleading the accused, and without issuing notice, is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of natural justice. • Even assuming the contents of the FIR to be true, no offence is made out against the petitioners, and the allegations do not disclose the basic ingredients of the offences alleged. • The entire dispute is civil in nature, arising out of execution of sale deeds and the alleged cancellation of power of attorney. The complainant has converted a civil dispute into a criminal case solely to harass the petitioners and misuse the process of law. • The petitioners are bona fide purchasers, having paid full consideration prior to execution of the sale deeds, which further shows that the allegations of cheating and forgery are baseless. 9 • Continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of the Court, especially when the complainant has already pursued civil remedies. • The documents produced by the petitioners are unimpeachable and demonstrate that the dispute is civil; hence, they can be looked into even at this stage. • The complaint itself is based on false and frivolous allegations and is filed with mala fide intent. • It is well settled that the same set of facts may constitute a purely civil wrong or both a civil and criminal wrong; however, criminal law cannot be invoked where the allegations do not disclose the essential elements of the alleged offence. • Even taking the prosecution case at face value, no criminal offence is disclosed, and therefore the FIR deserves to be quashed because no preliminary enquiry was conducted, though mandatory in cases involving commercial disputes and abnormal delay, as held in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1. • The contents of the FIR do not disclose any cognizable offence, and its registration itself is contrary to law and no further investigation, fresh investigation or re-investigation can be carried out while the closure report is pending, without the Magistrate having accepted or rejected it. 10 • The respondents are now attempting to arrest the petitioners under the guise of re-investigation, which is impermissible in law. • Since the dispute is purely civil in nature, registration of the FIR and initiation of criminal proceedings amounts to misuse of the criminal justice system and warrants interference by this Court. • Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha and others v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 and Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya and others State of Gujarat and another, (2019) 17 SCC 1 as well as the order passed by this Court in CRMP No.3316/2025 (Surendra Singh Chouhan v. State of Chhattisgarh and another) vide order dated 06.11.2025. 15. On the other hand, Mr. Rishabh Bajaj, learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant, opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and submits as follows :- • The petitioners have suppressed material facts and have approached this Court with unclean hands. It is submitted that the petitioners, in conspiracy with the co-accused persons, have played a fraud upon the complainant by fabricating a forged and fabricated power of attorney and, on its basis, executed several sale deeds without authority. 11 • The complainant had never executed any power of attorney in favour of the petitioners or their family members for sale of the lands in question. The so-called power of attorney relied upon by the petitioners is forged, and the petitioners, taking advantage of certain signed papers given to their father, have misused the same to prepare a fabricated document. • The power of attorney was categorically cancelled, and intimation was duly sent to the concerned persons prior to the execution of the sale deeds. Despite such cancellation, the petitioners, in connivance with the co-accused, proceeded to execute sale deeds dated 08.06.2007, 12.06.2007 and 26.06.2007, thereby committing serious offences of cheating, forgery and criminal conspiracy. • The police, during investigation, failed to consider crucial material and filed the closure report mechanically. Therefore, when the complainant pointed out the lapses and requested re-investigation, the police were justified in seeking the case diary for conducting proper investigation. • The Magistrate has not committed any illegality in returning the case diary, as the Magistrate is competent to permit further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC, even after submission of the closure report. It is urged that the petitioners are giving an exaggerated interpretation to the order dated 12 24.12.2019, whereas the order merely facilitates proper and fair investigation. • The action of the police in conducting further investigation/re- investigation is fully justified, particularly when fresh material has come on record, and the complainant has produced additional documents demonstrating the fraudulent acts of the petitioners. • The dispute is not purely civil in nature, as alleged by the petitioners. The acts complained of involve forgery of documents, cheating, dishonest concealment of facts and criminal conspiracy, all of which constitute serious cognizable offences. Merely because a civil suit is pending does not preclude criminal prosecution. • The FIR discloses commission of cognizable offences, and therefore the police were duty-bound to investigate. The petitioners cannot seek to quash the FIR or prevent investigation merely on the ground that they consider the dispute to be civil. • The allegations, when taken at face value, clearly make out offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, and therefore the petitioners’ plea for quashing is wholly untenable. • The judgments relied upon by the petitioners are distinguishable on facts, and the case of Vinay Tyagi (supra) 13 does not come to their rescue because what has been undertaken in the present case is “further investigation” based on new material pointed out by the complainant. • The petitioners are attempting to scuttle a fair and complete investigation by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. At this stage, when the investigation is underway, this Court may not interfere, particularly when the allegations relate to serious economic offences and forgery of title documents. 16. Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondent No.1 submits that the instant petition under Section 482 CrPC is wholly misconceived and not maintainable. The police had only sought permission for further investigation during the pendency of the closure report, and not for re-investigation as incorrectly projected by the petitioners. It is submitted that unless the Magistrate passes a final order accepting the closure report, the police is well within its statutory powers under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. to conduct further investigation on the basis of new material or additional information furnished by the complainant. It is further submitted that the petitioners have failed to cooperate with the ongoing investigation, thereby causing delay in filing of the charge-sheet. In these circumstances, no interference is warranted in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 14 17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, carefully perused the pleadings and documents brought on record, and also perused the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. Vide order dated 28.10.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the criminal appeal arising out of Criminal Appeal No.004644/2025 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9445/2025, has passed the following order :- “1. Leave granted. 2. Appellant lays challenge to the judgment and order dated 02.12.2024 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Cr.M.P No. 1041 of 2022 titled "Raja Saluja & Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr." 3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that the High Court could not have issued the directions more so as contained in paragraph nos. 14 & 15 which are extracted as under: 14. In the present petitions, the complainant has lodged an FIR against the present petitioners alleging that the petitioners have fraudulently got executed the sale deeds in respect of different lands. The FIR bearing No. 23/2008 (CRMP No. 1041/2022) was registered by Police Station Suhela in respect of all lands i.e. Aurethi, Farhada and Kholwa. Thereafter, FIR bearing No. 285/2018 (CRMP No.2616/2019) allegations was lodged only in respect of the land 15 situated at Village-Aurethi and the FIR bearing No. 286/2018 (CRMP No.2615/2019) on the same allegations at Police Station- Bhatapara City in respect of the land at Kholwa. 15. In view of above, considering that the closure. report has already been filed and there is a family dispute in respect of above subject land, for which, civil suit is also pending before the competent Civil Court and instead of pursuing the civil remedy, respondent No.2 who is the close relative of the petitioners has lodged the impugned FIRS in the present petition which appears to be a pressure tactics and with a malafide intention. Hence, the FIR bearing Nos. 285/2018 in CRMP NO. 2616/2019, 286/2018 in CRMP No. 2615/2019 and 23/2008 in CRMP No. 1041/2022 along with consequential criminal proceedings are hereby quashed." 4. As such, we quash and set aside the impugned order dated 02.12.2024 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur qua Cr.M.P No, 1941 of 2022 titled "Raja Saluja & Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr." and remand the matter to the High Court for consideration afresh. 5. The parties shall appear before the High Court on 13th November, 2025. 6. We request the High Court to expedite the hearing. 16 7. All contentions raised by the parties are left open. 8. With the above observations, appeal alongwith pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.” 19. From a meticulous examination of the record, it emerges that the first FIR, registered as Crime No. 23/2008 at Police Station Suhela, was lodged on 12.03.2008 concerning the villages Aurethi, Kholva and Farhada. Pursuant to investigation, the police submitted a closure report on 26.07.2014, which remained pending consideration before the concerned Magistrate. During the pendency of the said report, the complainant instituted two more FIRs on the very same allegations Crime No. 285/2018 dated 12.10.2018 at Police Station Bhatapara relating to village Aurethi, and Crime No. 286/2018 dated 13.10.2018 relating to village Kholva. Although notices were issued in MJC No. 75/2014 on 11.08.2014, the complainant remained absent on fourteen consecutive dates till 20.10.2016. Surprisingly, yet another closure report in respect of the same Crime No. 23/2008 was submitted on 30.10.2019, in which the case was oddly registered as State v. Unknown, and on the very same day, the statement of the complainant was recorded. 20. The complainant thereafter filed an application before the police expressing dissatisfaction with the investigation and seeking a re- investigation. Meanwhile, the Judicial Magistrate issued summons to two witnesses, namely Sananda Bhoi and G.R. 17 Suryavanshi vide order dated 30.10.2018. As per order-sheet dated 29.04.2019, Sananda Bhoi was reported dead and his death certificate taken on record. With regard to witness G.R. Suryavanshi, it was noted that he resided in Bilaspur and his whereabouts were not ascertainable; consequently, a bailable warrant of Rs.500/- was issued against him on 26.07.2019. Thereafter, by order dated 24.12.2019, the Magistrate recorded that the Station House Officer, Police Station Suhela, had moved an application seeking return of the original case diary for the purpose of re-investigation in Crime No. 23/2008. The application stated that no offence was found during investigation and that a closure report bearing No. 19/09 had been prepared with the approval of senior officers and submitted to the Court on 30.10.2018. The complainant simultaneously filed an affidavit asserting that he had not consented to the closure and sought further action. Taking both documents into consideration, the Magistrate allowed the application and directed return of the original case diary, while observing that since no proceedings remained pending, the case was ordered to be closed. 21. The petitioner Satyajeet Singh first came to know of these proceedings only when a notice under Section 160 CrPC was issued to him on 13.06.2022. The order-sheet dated 16.06.2022 reveals that the closure report submitted on 26.07.2014 was originally placed before the Court for approval, but was returned on 05.06.2015 upon request of the Station House Officer for 18 production before the High Court, after which the matter kept pending awaiting its return. A memorandum dated 27.04.2022 again directed production of the case diary. The order-sheet further records that, besides the 2014 closure report, another closure report in the same Crime No. 23/2008 was submitted on 30.10.2018 and registered separately. Ultimately, vide order dated 24.12.2019, the application for re-investigation was allowed, the original case diary was recalled, and the miscellaneous proceedings were closed on the ground that nothing further remained pending. Consequently, both closure reports were left without adjudication, and MJC No. 75/2014 was shown as disposed of without any judicial determination. 22. It is therefore evident that the closure report dated 26.07.2014 in MJC No. 75/2014 was never adjudicated by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga. No order accepting or rejecting it was ever passed. Despite the pendency of that closure report, a parallel and unregistered miscellaneous proceeding was entertained on the basis of a second closure report dated 30.10.2018, and it was in that irregular proceeding that the impugned order dated 24.12.2019 came to be passed. 23. The record thus unmistakably demonstrates that the case diary was returned to the police without any judicial consideration of the earlier closure report, and without recording reasons as mandated by law. The Magistrate failed to exercise jurisdiction 19 under Section 173(2) CrPC and did not record any satisfaction warranting further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC. 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya (supra) while dealing the judgment in Vinay Tyagi (supra) has held as under :- “35. We now come to the decision in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762. This is another case that arose out of a CBI Report to the Magistrate, which requested for closure of the case against the accused. The judgment of the Court first discussed in detail how the criminal investigative machinery is set into motion right until the stage at which the trial begins. The Court then held: (SCC p. 782, para 20) "20. Having noticed the provisions and relevant part of the scheme of the Code, now we must examine the powers of the court to direct investigation. Investigation can be ordered in varied forms and at different stages. Right at the initial stage of receiving the FIR or a complaint, the court can direct investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section 156(1) in exercise of its powers under Section 156(3) of the Code Investigation can be of the following kinds: (i) Initial investigation, (ii) Further investigation, (iii) Fresh or de novo or reinvestigation." 36. Thereafter, the question with which we are 20 faced was directly tackled as follows: (Vinay Tyagi (supra), SCC pp. 785-90 & 793-94, paras 29, 32- 40 & 48-51) "29. Now, we come to the former question ie, whether the Magistrate has jurisdiction under Section 173(8) to direct further investigation. xxx 32. In Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 SCC 359 (SCC pp. 363-64, para 11), this Court explained the powers that are vested in a Magistrate upon filing of a report in terms of Section 173(2)(i) and the kind of order that the court can pass. The Court held that when a report is filed before a Magistrate, he may either (i) accept the report and take cognizance of the offences and issue process; or (ii) may disagree with the report and drop the proceedings; or (iii) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require the police to make a further report. 33. This judgment, thus, clearly shows that the Court of Magistrate has a clear power to direct further investigation when a report is filed under Section 173(2) and may also exercise such powers with the aid of Section 156(3) of the Code. The lurking doubt, if any, that remained in giving wider interpretation to Section 173(8) was removed and controversy put to an end by the judgment of this Court in Hemant Dhasmana v. CBP (2001) 7 SCC 536 where the Court held that although the said section does not, in specific terms, mention the power 21 of the court to order further investigation, the power of the police to conduct further investigation envisaged therein can be triggered into motion at the instance of the court. When any such order is passed by the court, which has the jurisdiction to do so, then such order should not even be interfered with in exercise of a higher court's revisional jurisdiction. Such orders would normally be of an advantage to achieve the ends of justice. It was clarified, without ambiguity, that the Magistrate, in exercise of powers under Section 173(8) of the Code can direct CBI to further investigate the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objections raised by the appellant to the investigation and the new report to be submitted by the investigating officer, would be governed by sub-section (2) to sub-section (6) of Section 173 of the Code. There is no occasion for the Court to interpret Section 173(8) of the Code restrictively. After filing of the final report, the learned Magistrate can also take cognizance on the basis of the material placed on record by the investigating agency and it is permissible for him to direct further investigation. Conduct of proper and fair investigation is the hallmark of any criminal investigation. 34. In support of these principles reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in UPSC v. S. Papaiah, (1997) 7 SCC 614, State of Orissa v Mahima, (2007) 15 SCC 580, Kishan Lal v. Dharmendra Bafna, (2009) 7 SCC 22 685 and State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, (1995) 1 SCC 42. 35. We may also notice here that in S. Papaiah (supra), the Magistrate had rejected an application for reinvestigation filed by the applicant primarily on the ground that it had no power to review the order passed earlier. This Court held that it was not a case of review of an order, but was a case of further investigation as contemplated under Section 173 of the Code. It permitted further investigation and directed the report to be filed. 36. Interestingly and more particularly for answering the question of legal academia that we are dealing with, it may be noticed that this Court, while pronouncing its judgment in Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI, (2001) 7 SCC 536 has specifically referred to the judgments S. Papaiah (supra) and Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537, While relying upon the three-Judge Bench judgment of Bhagwant Singh (supra), which appears to be a foundational view for development of law in relation to Section 173 of the Code, the Court held that the Magistrate could pass an order for further investigation. The principal question in that case was whether the Magistrate could drop the proceedings after filing of a report under Section 173(2), without notice to the complainant, but in para 4 of the judgment, the three-Judge Bench dealt with the 23 powers of the Magistrate as enshrined in Section 173 of the Code. 37. In some judgments of this Court, a view has been advanced, [amongst others in Reeta Nag v. State of W.B., (2009) 9 SCC 129, Ram Naresh Prasad v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 11 SCC 299 and Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1997) 1 SCC 361 that a Magistrate cannot suo motu direct further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code or direct reinvestigation into a case on account of the bar contained in Section 167(2) of the Code, and that a Magistrate could direct filing of a charge-sheet where the police submits a report that no case had been made out for sending up an accused for trial. The gist of the view taken in these cases is that a Magistrate cannot direct reinvestigation and cannot suo motu direct further investigation. 38. However, having given our considered thought to the principles whom a report under Section 173(2) of the Code is filed, is empowered stated in these judgments, we are of the view that the Magistrate before in law to direct "further investigation" and require the police to submit a further or a supplementary report. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Bhagwant Singh (supra) has, in no uncertain terms, stated that principle, as aforenoticed. 39. The contrary views taken by the Court in Reeta Nag (supra) and Randhir Singh (supra) do not consider the view of this Court 24 expressed in Bhagwant Singh (supra), The decision of the Court in Bhagwant Singh (supra) in regard to the issue in hand cannot be termed as an obiter. The ambit and scope of the power of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173 of the Code was squarely debated before that Court and the three-Judge Bench concluded as aforenoticed. Similar views having been taken by different Benches of this Court while following Bhagwant Singh (supra), are thus squarely in line with the doctrine of precedent. To some extent, the view expressed in Reeta Nag (supra), Ram Naresh (supra) and Randhir Singh (supra), besides being different on facts, would have to be examined in light of the principle of stare decisis. 40. Having analysed the provisions of the Code and the various d judgments as aforeindicated, we would state the following conclusions in regard to the powers of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173(2) read with Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code: 40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct "reinvestigation" or "fresh investigation" (de novo) in the case initiated on the basis of a police report. 40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct "further investigation" after filing of a police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code. 40.3. The view expressed in sub-para 40.2 above is in conformity with the principle of law stated in Bhagwant Singh case (supra) by a 25 three-Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the doctrine of precedent. 40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8). 40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would advance the cause of justice and legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation to the police even after filing a report, but intended to curtail the power of the court to the extent that even where the facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the court can still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own. 40.6. It has been a procedure of propriety that the police has to seek permission of the court to continue "further investigation" and file supplementary charge-sheet. This approach has been approved by this Court in a number of judgments. This as such would support the view that we are taking in the present case. xxx 26 xxx 48. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the expression "fair and proper investigation" in criminal jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose: Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law; secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction. Once these twin paradigms of fair investigation are satisfied, there will be the least requirement for the court of law to interfere with the investigation, much less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency. Bringing out the truth by fair and investigative means in accordance with law would essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted investigation or cases of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for a court of law to pass a specific order as to the fate of the investigation, which in its opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of the settled principles of investigative canons. 49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct "further investigation" or file supplementary report with the leave of the court, the investigating agencies have not only 27 understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct "further investigation" and file "supplementary report" with the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the court to conduct "further investigation" and/or to file a "supplementary report" will have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such interpretation as the matters which are understood and implemented for a long time, and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as part of the interpretative process. 50. Such a view can be supported from two different points of view: firstly, through the doctrine of precedent, as aforenoticed, since quite often the courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the investigating agencies which have also so understood and applied the principle. The matters which are understood and implemented as a legal practice and are not opposed to the basic rule of law would be good practice and such interpretation would be permissible with the aid of doctrine of contemporanea expositio, Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the court would meet the ends of justice and also provide adequate safeguard against a suspect/accused. 28 51. We have already noticed that there is no specific embargo upon the power of the learned Magistrate to direct "further investigation" on presentation of a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. Any other approach or interpretation would be in contradiction to the very language of Section 173(8) and the scheme of the Code for giving precedence to proper administration of criminal justice. The settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would support such approach, particularly when in terms of Section 190 of the Code, the Magistrate is the competent authority to take cognizance of an offence. It is the Magistrate who has to decide whether on the basis of the record and documents produced, an offence is made out or not, and if made out, what course of law should be adopted in relation to committal of the case to the court of competent jurisdiction or to proceed with the trial himself. In other words, it is the judicial conscience of the Magistrate which has to be satisfied with reference to the record and the documents placed before him by the investigating agency, in coming to the appropriate conclusion in consonance with the principles of law. It will be a travesty of justice, if the court cannot be permitted to direct "further investigation" to clear its doubt and to e order the investigating agency to further substantiate its charge-sheet. The satisfaction of the learned Magistrate is a condition precedent to commencement of further 29 proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. Whether the Magistrate should direct "further investigation" or not is again a matter which will depend upon the facts of a given case. The learned Magistrate or the higher court of competent jurisdiction would direct "further investigation" or "reinvestigation" as the case may be, on the facts of a given case. Where the Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the courts of higher jurisdiction can direct further reinvestigation or even investigation de novo depending on the facts of a given case. It will be the specific order of the court that would determine the nature of investigation. In this regard, we may refer to the observations made by this Court in Sivanmoorthy v. State, (2010) 12 SCC 29.” 25. This Court in Surendra Singh Chouhan (supra) while dealing with the case of Abhinandan Jha (supra) has observed as follows :- “18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Abhinandan Jha and others v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117 has held as under:- “14.In these two appeals, which are from the State of Bihar, the reports, under Section 169, are referred to as 'final report'. Now, the question as to what exactly is to be done by a Magistrate, on receiving a report, under Section 173, will have to be considered. That report may be in respect of a case, coming under Section 170, or one coming under Section 169. We have already referred to 30 Section 190, which is the first section in the group of sections headed 'Conditions requisite for Initiation of Proceedings.' Sub-section (1), of this section, will cover a report sent, under Section 173. The use of the words 'may take cognizance of any offence', in sub-section (1) of section 190, in our opinion, imports the exercise of a 'judicial discretion', and the Magistrate, who receives the report, under section 173, will have to consider the said report and judicially take a decision, whether or not to take cognizance of the offence. From this it follows, that it is not as if, that the Magistrate is bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is a case for placing the accused, on trial. It is open to the Magistrate to take the view that the facts disclosed in the report do not make out an offence for taking cognizance or he may take the view that there is no sufficient evidence to justify an accused being put on trial. On either of these grounds, the Magistrate will be perfectly justified in declining to take cognizance of an offence, irrespective of the opinion of the police. On the other hand, if the Magistrate agrees with the report, which is a charge-sheet submitted by the police, no difficulty whatsoever is caused, because he will have full jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence, under Section 190(1) (b) of the Code. This will be the position, when the report under Section 173, is a charge-sheet. 15. Then the question is, what is the position, when the Magistrate is dealing with a report submitted by the police, under Section 173, that no case is made out for sending up an accused 31 for trial, which report, as we have already indicated, is called, in the area in question, as a 'final report'? Even in those cases, if the Magistrate agrees with the said report, he may accept the final report and close the proceedings. But there may be instances when the Magistrate may take the view, on a consideration of the final report, that the opinion formed by the police is not based on a full and complete investigation, in which case, in our opinion, the Magistrate will have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police, under S. 156(3), to make a further investigation. That is, if the Magistrate feels, after considering the final report, that the investigation is unsatisfactory, or incomplete, or that there is scope for further investigation, it will be open to the Magistrate to decline to accept the final report and direct the police to make further investigation, under Section 156(3). The police, after such further investigation, may submit a charge-sheet, or, again submit a final report, depending upon the further investigation made by them. If, ultimately, the Magistrate forms the opinion that the facts, set out in the final report, constitute an offence, he, can take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(c), notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police, expressed in the final report.” xxx xxx 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (supra) relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha (supra) 32 held as under:- “18. Thus, when he proceeds to take action by way of cognizance by disagreeing with the conclusions arrived at in the police report, he would be taking cognizance on the basis of the police report and not on the complaint. And, therefore, the question of examining the complainant or his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code would not arise. This was the view clearly enunciated.” xxx xxx 23. The learned JMFC, on one hand, observed that there is no provision empowering a Magistrate to order a re-investigation in any case. It was further noted that there are no facts available in the present case to justify a direction to the Investigating Officer to conduct further investigation, nor is there any basis shown for conducting any additional inquiry in the matter. However, on the other hand, learned Magistrate partly allowed the application filed by the complainant/respondent No. 2, took cognizance against petitioner Surendra Singh Chauhan for offence punishable under Sections 103(1), 61(2) (a), 190, 191(2), and 191(3) of the BNS, issued a warrant of arrest for his appearance, and further directed the Police Station Pali to record the statements of Surfaraz Memon & Roopchand Dewangan, son of Bajrang Lal Dewangan, under Section 180 of the BNSS, and to submit the same before the Court by way of a supplementary 33 charge-sheet, which the learned Magistrate was not empowered to do. 24. Learned Magistrate failed to consider the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abhinandan Jha (supra), Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (supra) and H.S. Bains (supra), wherein learned Magistrate had three options available on the protest petition filed by the complainant/respondent No.2 against the closure report filed by the police. At the most, if learned Magistrate was not satisfied with the investigation and intended to allow the protest petition, the proper course was to direct further investigation under Section 193(8) of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 173(8) of the CrPC). However, learned Magistrate failed to adopt the said course, thereby acting contrary to the settled legal position. ” 26. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has neither accepted nor rejected the closure report dated 26.07.2014 submitted by the police upon completion of investigation. The order-sheets reveal that no judicial determination was made on the closure report and, significantly, no direction under Section 173(8) CrPC was issued by the Magistrate at any point of time. In spite of this, the impugned order dated 24.12.2019, passed in a parallel unregistered MJC, without issuance of notice to the petitioners and without first adjudicating the pending closure report, has the effect of 34 permitting the police to undertake a reinvestigation/fresh investigation, which is impermissible in law. The mere act of “returning the case diary” without assigning reasons or recording judicial satisfaction cannot, by any stretch, be construed as an order authorising further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC. The police, in turn, acted wholly without jurisdiction in commencing suo motu re-investigation, contrary to the law laid down in Vinay Tyagi (supra) and Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya (supra), wherein it has been unequivocally held that re- investigation or fresh investigation cannot be initiated by the police on its own and requires specific judicial or constitutional Court direction. 27. Having considered the rival submissions advanced at the Bar, meticulously examined the original record and the order-sheets of the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga, and evaluated the legal position emerging from the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court governing the powers and duties of a Magistrate while dealing with a police report under Section 173 CrPC, this Court is persuaded to hold that the impugned order dated 24.12.2019 suffers from fundamental jurisdictional infirmities and cannot be allowed to stand. 28. The factual narrative, as discussed in detail in paragraphs 19 to 22 of this order, unmistakably reveals that the closure report dated 26.07.2014 filed in MJC No. 75/2014 remained pending for 35 adjudication before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga. At no point did the Magistrate pass any judicial order accepting or rejecting the report, nor did he record reasons either (i) summoning the complainant, (ii) directing further investigation, or (iii) taking cognizance. Instead, the closure report and case diary were returned to the police without any judicial adjudication or recording of satisfaction. Such a course of action is alien to the CrPC and contrary to the law laid down in Vinay Tyagi (supra), which forbids bypassing judicial scrutiny in matters concerning police reports. 29. Simultaneously, and even more impermissibly, a separate unregistered MJC appears to have been entertained on the basis of a second purported closure report dated 30.10.2018, although the earlier closure proceedings were still pending and undecided. This led to two parallel chains of proceedings one judicially pending and another administratively entertained, which is wholly antithetical to the procedural discipline required under the CrPC. The resultant impugned order dated 24.12.2019 proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the police could simply resume investigation by recalling the case diary, even though no judicial order under Section 173(8) CrPC had been passed permitting further investigation. 30. The Magistrate, while functioning as a judicial authority, could not abdicate the statutory obligation to test the closure report on legal 36 parameters. The return of the case diary, without more, is not a substitute for a judicial determination. 31. The Supreme Court in Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya (supra) has emphatically held that once a closure report is filed, investigation cannot be revived or expanded without a proper judicial order recording satisfaction under Section 173(8) CrPC. The Magistrate is duty-bound to act judiciously, record reasons, and ensure that the rights of all parties including the accused are protected by adherence to procedural fairness. In the present case, none of these statutory safeguards were observed. The Magistrate neither accepted the closure report, nor rejected it, nor directed further investigation with recorded reasons. Instead, an unreasoned and procedurally irregular return of the case diary has led to a de facto re-investigation, wholly unsupported by judicial authority. 32. Moreover, the filing of multiple FIRs by the complainant in 2018, despite the pendency of the earlier FIR and closure report, strengthens the inference that the criminal apparatus was invoked to give colour to a dispute that is fundamentally civil in nature. The pendency of Civil Suit No. 23A/2008 further corroborates that the gravamen of the dispute pertains to land rights and possession. The criminal process cannot be permitted to be weaponised to exert pressure in a civil conflict. The continuation of such proceedings, based on an irregular re- 37 investigation, is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. 33. Considering the matter in its entirety, we are of the considered view that the cumulative effect of (i) entertaining parallel closure proceedings without jurisdiction, (ii) failing to decide the closure report dated 26.07.2014, (iii) returning the case diary in violation of Section 173 CrPC, (iv) permitting re-investigation without judicial satisfaction, and (v) allowing administrative correspondence to dictate investigative steps, renders the entire process tainted, irregular, and legally unsustainable. Such a mode of proceeding erodes the sanctity of judicial oversight, undermines the statutory scheme of Sections 156 and 173 CrPC, and violates the principles of legality and fairness that lie at the heart of criminal adjudication. 34. This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned order dated 24.12.2019 cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and is liable to be interfered with in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 CrPC. 35. Accordingly, and for all the reasons delineated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 24.12.2019 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Simga in Unregistered MJC (State of Chhattisgarh v. Unknown), is hereby set aside. As a consequence thereof, the entire action of the police authorities in initiating and conducting re-investigation in Crime No.23/200/ being without 38 authority of law, is also declared illegal and stands quashed in its entirety. 36. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present CRMP No.1041/2022 is allowed. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu