1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1445 of 2024 1 - Smt. Khusboo Sarathi W/o Late Ghanshaym Sarathi Aged About 25 Years Residence Of Village Borid, P.S. Rajim Tehsil Rajim, District Gariyaband (C.G.),.. (Claimants) 2 - Prithviraj S/o Late Ghanshyam Sarathi Aged About 9 Years Minor, Through His Mother Smt. Khusboo Sarathi, Residence Of Village Borid, P.S. Rajim Tehsil Rajim, District Gariyaband (C.G.) 3 - Shri Parmanand Sarathi S/o Shuklal Sarathi Aged About 48 Years Residence Of Village Borid, P.S. Rajim Tehsil Rajim, District Gariyaband (C.G.) 4 - Smt. Usha Sarathi W/o Shri Parmanand Sarathi Aged About 43 Years Residence Of Village Borid, P.S. Rajim Tehsil Rajim, District Gariyaband (C.G.) ... Appellants versus 1 - Hemant Thakur S/o Krishan Kumar Thakur Aged About 27 Years R/o Village Bhotha, P.S. Komakhan, Tehsil Baagbahara, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh),... (Driver) 2 - Tenas Kumar S/o Dayanand (Aged Not Mentioneds As Per Annexure A/1) R/o Village Khairtakla, Tehsil Bagbahara, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh),...(Owner) 3 - Branch Manager I.C.I.C.I. Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, Devendra Nagar Chowk Vanijya Bhawan Ground Floor Devendra Nagar Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur (C.G.),...(Insurer) ... Respondents For Appellants : Mr. Vedant Shadangi, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Virendra Kashyap, Advocate For respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr. Sahil Singh, Advocate holding the brief of Mr.Mayak Kumar, Advocate For Respondent No.3 : Mr.Deepak Sharma, Advocate holding the brief of Mr Raja Sharma,Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 17/11/2025 2 1. Heard on I.A. No.1/2024, an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the award passed by the Learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mahasamund (C.G.) in Claim Case No.77/2021 dated 30.06.2022, whereby, learned Tribunal has passed an award to the tune of Rs.19,96,336/- with interest @ 6% per annum on account of death of Ghanshyam Sarathi. 3. Mr. Shadangi, learned counsel appearing for the claimants would submit that an award was passed on 30.06.2022 and this appeal was preferred on 08.07.2024 with delay of 655 days. He would contend that the appellants are poor villagers and anyhow they manged fund to prefer appeal and thereafter, approached their counsel along with copy of award on 30.06.2022 and immediately, thereafter, appeal was preferred. He would submit that the appellants have good case on merit and application for condonation of delay may be allowed. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondents would oppose. They would submit that there is inordinate delay of 655 days which has not been explained properly. They would further submit that the application deserves to be rejected. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused application for condonation of delay. 6. Admittedly, award of Rs.19,96,336/- was passed on 30.06.2022. The claimants have not pleaded in the application that the compensation granted by the Tribunal was not satisfied by the Insurance Company till filing of appeal. The appellants have pleaded grounds in para 2 of the application wherein, they stated that appellant No.1 is a poor villager and somehow, she maintains herself and her family and when she 3 came to know that an appeal can be preferred, she approached her counsel along with a copy of the award. There is delay of 655 days and the claimants have not explained it properly. The claimants have not pleaded that when copy of award was delivered; when they approached their counsel and when appeal was drafted and thereafter filed. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 while dealing with the issue of limitation in paras 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26 & 30 observed and held as under:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented 4 approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled 5 to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 8. Taking into consideration the fact that there is an enormous delay of 655 days, the same has not been explained properly by the appellants and further considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected. 9. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Rekha