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2025 DAILYLAW 58523 (CHH)

NANIK RAM SAHU v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

WA/157/2022 · 2025-11-18

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

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Judgment text

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1 WA No. 157 of 2022 2025:CGHC:56288-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 157 of 2022 Nanik Ram Sahu S/o Shri Padum Lal Sahu Aged About 46 Years R/o Village Sirrikala, Pendra, Fingeshwar, Tahsil Rajim, District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh. Appellant(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Social Welfare, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - District Eduction Officer Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Mainpur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. G.P. Mathur and Mr. Vinod Kumar Sharma, Advocates For Respondent(s) : Ms. Astha Shukla and Mr. Sangarsh Pandey, Govt. Advocates Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, J 19/11/2025 RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2025.11.27 18:15:19 +0530 2 WA No. 157 of 2022 1. The appellant, being aggrieved by the order dated 05.01.2022 passed in W.P.(S) No. 1086/2016 dismissing his writ petition, has preferred this appeal and prays as follows: “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this Writ Appeal and set-aside the order of the Hon’ble Single Bench orders of Collector and Commissioner, in the interest of justice.” 2. Facts of the case are that the appellant was initially appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III on 17.08.2007 in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (Bharti Tatha Seva Ki Sharten) Niyam, 1997 (for short, “the Rules of 1997”). After his appointment, the authorities found that the appellant had been erroneously awarded marks towards previous experience, which, according to them, affected the validity of his selection. On this basis, the competent authority passed an order terminating his services. Aggrieved by the termination, the appellant preferred W.P.(S) No. 1392/2011 before this Court. A Coordinate Bench, vide order dated 22.02.2012, set aside the termination order and remanded the matter to the Collector with a direction to provide the appellant an opportunity of hearing and thereafter pass a fresh order strictly in accordance with law. Upon reconsideration, the Collector, by order dated 08.07.2015, again upheld the termination of the appellant. 3 WA No. 157 of 2022 Challenging the said order of the Collector, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Raipur Division, Raipur. The Commissioner, after examining the matter, affirmed the Collector’s order. The appellant then assailed the Commissioner's order by filing W.P.(S) No. 1086/2016, which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Hence, the present appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the rejection of the appellant’s candidature on the ground of improper award of experience marks is unsustainable. It is submitted that the appellant worked from 05.09.2002 to 30.04.2003 (more than eight months in the 2002–2003 session), which constitutes one full year of experience, and that the second spell from 01.07.2004 to 04.09.2004, though less than eight months, must be read in light of the State Government’s order dated 29.05.1998 relaxing the eight-month requirement; consequently the appellant was rightly awarded marks for two years’ experience. It is urged that the Collector and the Commissioner erred in holding that the appellant was entitled to only one year’s experience marks (i.e., 5 marks instead of 8) and that both authorities failed to consider whether deduction of three marks would have affected the appellant’s overall merit position before canceling his appointment. Learned counsel further submits that the question is a pure point of law requiring no factual determination and, in view of the settled law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, may be raised at any stage. 4. Learned State counsel, on the other hand, contends that the appellant’s appointment was rightly cancelled and that the concurrent findings of the 4 WA No. 157 of 2022 Collector and the Commissioner are unimpeachable. It is submitted that Rule 5(9)(kha) of the Rules of 1997 prescribes the manner of awarding experience marks 5 marks for one year, 8 marks for two years and 12 marks for three or more years and the explanation thereto clearly provides that an academic session of at least eight months alone shall be counted as one year. On remand, after affording opportunity of hearing, the Collector recorded that the appellant had completed only one valid session and was therefore entitled to only 5 marks; the Commissioner affirmed that finding. The State further submits that the circular dated 29.05.1998 cannot override the statutory Rules and, even if relied upon, it does not assist the appellant because the appellant plainly lacks a full year’s teaching in the relevant period. Learned State counsel also submits that the contention as to the effect of deduction of three marks on merit was not raised before the authorities below and cannot be permitted to be urged for the first time in this Court. For these reasons, it is submitted that the findings below are based on record and are neither perverse nor contrary to law, and the appeal deserves dismissal. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings and the record with utmost circumspection. 6. Having considered the rival submissions and upon perusal of the records, it is evident that the core dispute pertains to the appellant’s entitlement to experience marks under Rule 5(9)(kha) of the Rules of 1997. The statutory scheme clearly stipulates that only such teaching experience as covers a minimum academic session of eight months can be counted as one completed 5 WA No. 157 of 2022 year. The Collector, on remand, examined the appellant’s service particulars and recorded a categorical finding that the appellant had completed only one valid academic session. This factual finding has been affirmed by the Commissioner upon independent appraisal of the material. 7. The appellant’s reliance on the Government circular dated 29.05.1998 is misplaced. Executive instructions cannot override or dilute statutory rules framed under delegated legislation. Even otherwise, as rightly observed by the learned Single Judge, the alleged relaxation would not advance the appellant’s case because the appellant does not possess a full year of teaching experience for the second spell. Thus, the conclusion of the Collector and the Commissioner that the appellant is entitled only to 5 marks is in consonance with the statutory provisions. 8. The further contention of the appellant that the authorities failed to examine the impact of deduction of three marks on his merit position cannot be accepted. This point was never raised before either the Collector or the Commissioner. The appellant cannot be permitted to urge a fresh factual contention for the first time in appellate jurisdiction. The plea that the issue is a “pure question of law” is untenable, as the determination of the appellant’s comparative merit involves factual assessment and cannot be treated as a purely legal proposition. 9. The factual findings recorded by the Collector and the Commissioner are based on the evidence available on record. They do not appear to be perverse, irrational, or contrary to law. The learned Single Judge, in W.P.(S) No. 6 WA No. 157 of 2022 1086/2016, has rightly refrained from interfering with concurrent findings of fact, and this Court finds no reason to take a different view. 10. In light of the above analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the Collector, the Commissioner, or the learned Single Judge. No ground for interference in appellate jurisdiction is made out. 11. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal stands dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Rahul