1 2025:CGHC:55976 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 294 of 2006 1 - Shiv Prasad Tiwari (Died Through LRs) 1.a - Abhishekh Tiwari S/o Late Shri Shiv Prasad Tiwari Aged About 48 Years R/o Kelkar Para Nahar Para Beside Shiv Mandir Indira Gandhi Ward Raipur (C.G) 1.b - Abhinav Tiwari S/o Late Shri Shiv Prasad Tiwari Aged About 43 Years R/o Kelkar Para Nahar Para Beside Shiv Mandir Indira Gandhi Ward Raipur (C.G) 1.c - Ankur Tiwari S/o Late Shiv Prasad Tiwari Aged About 39 Years R/o Kelkar Para Nahar Para Beside Shiv Mandir Indira Gandhi Ward Raipur (C.G) ... Appellants versus 1 - Suresh Kumar Vig, S/o Late Shriram Vig, Vig Medical Stores, Station Road Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellants : Shri Amrito Das and Shri Yashraj Verma, Advocates. For Respondent : Ms. Siddhi Tiwari on behalf of Shri Arvind Dubey, Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 17.11.2025 1. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment and decree dated 17.03.2006 passed by the 9th Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Appeal No.8-A/2005 whereby the First Appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.01.06 10:53:11 +0530 2 23.07.2003 passed by 3rd Additional Civil Judge Class-I Raipur in Civil Suit No.30-A/2002 has been dismissed and the judgment and decree of trial court has been affirmed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown and nomenclature in the suit before the trial court. 3. The present Second Appeal was admitted for hearing by this court on 13.12.2007 on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the findings recorded by both the courts below that the appellant/plaintiff is not the owner and the respondent/ defendant not his tenant, is perverse since both the courts below overlooked the oral evidence of the plaintiff as also the documents Ex.P/1 and P/2 produced by Smt. Bhagwati Bai, mother of the appellant/plaintiff? 2. If yes, whether the judgment and decree passed under Section 12(1)(a)&(c) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is liable to be set aside?” 4. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit accommodation was owned by his mother Bhagwati Bai, which she purchased through registered sale deed dated 01.08.1963 from Smt. Chironjiya Bai and Smt. Keshar Bai (Ex.P/1&P/2) and came into possession thereof. Subsequently, she constructed a shop therein which was let out to the father of defendant Shriram Vig. After death of Shriram Vig, the defendant came into tenancy of plaintiff. The monthly rent of the suit accommodation was Rs.500/- and defendant came into possession as tenant of the plaintiff. It is the further case of plaintiff that the defendant have stopped paying rent for about three years for which he served a legal notice on 20.08.1998, Ex.P/3 and the defendant, in turn, by its reply dated 26.08.1998, Ex.D/1, denied tenancy and title of the plaintiff and neither 3 paid rent nor handed over the vacant possession of the suit accommodation and therefore the plaintiff has filed the suit for eviction against the defendant under Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(c) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short, the Act of 1961). 5. Contesting the suit, the defendant filed his written statement and denied the plaint averment and pleaded that he is not tenant of the plaintiff. He also denied that his father was tenant of Bhagwati Bai. He himself is the owner of suit accommodation. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for decree of eviction. He also pleaded that the plaintiff has also issued a notice to the defendant on 19.03.1986 and claimed arrears of rent and eviction. That notice was also replied by the defendant and the plaintiff was not pursued the said notice dated 19.03.1986 which shows that plaintiff is not the landlord of suit accommodation. The defendant is the owner of suit accommodation since 1963 and is in possession. There exists no tenancy relation between plaintiff and defendant and therefore, he is not entitled for any relief. 6. On the basis of pleadings made by the parties, the trial court framed the following issues: dzekad okn iz’u fu"d"kZ 1 D;k izfroknh oknxzLr nqdku dk rhu o"kksZ ls fdjk;k oknh vnk u djus o oknxzLr nqdku ij oknh ds LoRo dks badkj djus ds ifj.kkeLo:i fu"dk"ku dk Hkkxh gS A ugh 2 D;k oknh oknxzLr nqdku dk Lokeh ugh gS vkSj izfroknh mldk fdjk;snkj ugh gSA gkW 3 D;k oknh nkok fnukad ls 500@&izfrekg dh nj ls o fu.kZ; fnukad ls fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr gksus rd 50@& izfrfnu dh nj ls {kfriwfrZ ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA ugh 4 4 D;k izfroknh oknh ls 5000@&:+ {kfriwfrZ ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA Ukgh 5 Lkgk;rk ,oa O;; vkKkfir vuqlkj dqN ughA 7. In support of claim of respective parties, the plaintiff examined Janak Ram, PW-1, Shiv Prasad Tiwari (Plaintiff), PW-2 and relied upon documents Ex.P/1 & P/2 which are sale deeds executed in favour of mother of plaintiff Smt. Bhagwati Bai, Ex.P/3 is the legal notice dated 20.08.1998, Ex.P/4 & P/5 are the postal receipt and acknowledgment. The defendant examined himself as DW-1, KK Mishra, DW-2 and Gulshan Vig, DW-3 and relied upon documents Ex.D/1, reply of the notice dated 26.08.1998, Ex. D/2 & D/3 i.e. postal receipts and acknowledgment. 8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment and decree dated 23.7.2003, dismissed the suit of plaintiff holding that plaintiff could not establish relationship of landlord and tenant and grounds under Section 12(1)(a) & (c) of the Act of 1961 are not established. On the First Appeal being preferred by the plaintiff, the first appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the first appeal filed by the plaintiff which are under challenge in this Second Appeal. 9. In the present Second Appeal, on 23.06.2006, the plaintiff has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC along with documents which are the tax assessment record of the suit accommodation of Municipal Corporation, Raipur as an additional evidence. 5 10. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that both the courts below have committed legal error in holding that relationship of landlord and tenant is not established between the plaintiff and defendant, ignoring the uncontroverted testimony of Shiv Prasad Tiwari, PW-2. PW-1 Janak Ram has also stated about ownership of suit accommodation with the plaintiff. The defendant could not prove his title or any source of his possession over the suit accommodation and he stated that in the year, 1963 when he came to Raipur, he constructed his shop there which was an open place at that time and this fact is not in his written statement. He has not submitted any evidence with respect to either his title or any source of his possession whereas, the plaintiff has proved by filing his title deed Ex.P/1&P/2 and four corners of the said property purchased by the mother of plaintiff is the same four corners of the suit accommodation. He would further submit that defendant has denied the title of plaintiff which is an additional ground for grant of decree in favour of the plaintiff. The grounds under Sections 12(1)(a) and (c) of the Act, 1961 are fully and clearly established, but both the courts below have dismissed the suit holding that grounds are not established by recording a finding which is perverse to the record. 11. On the other learned counsel for the respondent/defendant, would support the judgment and decree of both the Courts below and submit that both the Courts below have concurrently and rightly held that relationship of landlord and tenant is not established and grounds 6 under Section 12(1)(a) and (c) of the Act of 1961 are also not made out, as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also gone through the records of the courts below. Answer to substantial question of law No.1: 13. It is the case of the plaintiff that his mother Bhagwati Bai purchased the suit accommodation vide sale deed dated 01.08.1963 and 05.10.1964 (Ex.P1 & P2) and constructed a shop therein which was let-out to the father of the defendant Shriram Vig and the monthly rent of suit accommodation was Rs.500/- which was for non-residential purpose. After death of Shriram Vig, the defendant came into possession of the shop as tenant of the plaintiff. Even after service of notice to the defendant on 20.08.1998, Ex.P/3, the defendant have not vacated the suit accommodation and replied the notice on 26.081998, Ex.D/1, denying landlord tenant relationship and title of the plaintiff. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the defendant is not paying rent since 1994-95, as such, the relationship of landlord and tenant is established and he is entitled for decree of eviction on the ground under Section 12(1)(a) and (c) of the Act of 1961, but both the Courts below have held relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant is not established, and dismissed the suit. 14. In order to establish landlord-tenant relationship, the plaintiff Shiv Prasad examined himself as PW-2 and also examined Janak Ram as PW-1. It is quite apparent from record that the suit land on which the 7 accommodation is situated is purchased by the mother of the plaintiff Bhagwati Bai through registered sale deed dated 01.08.1963 from Smt. Chironjiya Bai and dated 05.10.1964 from Smt. Keshar Bai, Ex.P/1 & P/2 respectively. The plaintiff have stated that the father of defendant was running a Medical Shop in the shop of plaintiff and he was tenant. The said shop is running by the defendant at present. The suit accommodation was purchased by his mother from Teja Bai & Keshar Bai. Her mother reconstructed the suit accommodation there and two shops were constructed. One shop was given on rent to the father of defendant Shriram Vig and another was given on rent to one Banshi Lal. The tenancy was started during the lifetime of his mother and the suit accommodation was taken care by his elder brother Durga Prasad and Hanuman Prasad. In the year, 1994-95 he came to know that suit accommodation was given on rent for Rs.500/-per month. The defendant had not paid rent from 1994-95 and he served a legal notice on 20.08.1998 Ex.P/3. The defendant has denied his title over the suit accommodation and has not paid the rent. In paragraph 7 of his cross examination, he has stated that both these sale deeds Ex.P/1 & P/2 was with respect to house No.16/210, however, he voluntarily stated that temporary house (Kachha House) and Hut are one and the same. Though the plaintiff has admitted that there is some variation in the suit map as well as the map shown in document Ex.P/1&P/2, however, on perusal of all these maps, measurement of the property and four corners, this court finds that there is no substantial variation in the said maps and it would quite possible that by the lapse of time certain 8 changes of its four corners may occur. He admitted that in the plaint he has not made any pleading that his mother had purchased the suit accommodation, however, from the pleadings made in the plaint it reveals that the plaintiff have pleaded that he is the owner of the suit accommodation and he also annexed the sketch map of the suit accommodation as Annexure-A annexed with the plaint. The four- corners shown in the plaint map and four-corners shown in the sale deeds Ex.P/1 & P/2 are almost similar which proves the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit accommodation. The defendant has stated in paragraph 6 of his evidence that he did not know as to whether after death of Bhagwati Bai the name of plaintiff is recorded in the Municipal record or not. He further states that since 30-35 years back his father discharged from services and after seeing an open place, he constructed a shop there and till date no one has claimed over the said land, however, he admits that he is not paying any tax to Municipal Corporation and in none of the documents he has been recorded as owner of the suit accommodation. He further stated in paragraph 7 that he did not try to get his name recorded as owner of the suit accommodation in the municipal records. Neither in his written statement nor in the reply of notice Ex.D/1 the defendant has claimed that his father constructed a shop since 30-35 years back in an open place and no one claimed over the said shop. 15. The defendant had asked from the plaintiff that in the year 1986 another notice was served upon him by the plaintiff which was also replied by the defendant through his counsel which also strengthens 9 the case of plaintiff that defendant is his tenant, otherwise there was no reason to sent legal notice in the year, 1986. 16. PW-1, Janak Ram, has also stated that in the year 1963-64 Hanuman Prasad purchased a house at Ganjpara and side of the said house was having a lane. The medical store of defendant is on the said shop purchased by Hanuman Prasad. Hanuman Prasad purchased the shop in the name of his mother and Shriram had opened the medical shop on the accommodation of Hanuman Prasad. In cross examination, he stated that the shop of Hanuman Prasad was taken by Vig Medical. He further states that the suit accommodation was purchased by Hanuman Prasad. 17. The defendant DW-1 have stated in his evidence that the shop was opened by his father and he is running the said shop since six years. They are not paying any rent either plaintiff or anyone. He admits the notice served upon him by Shri Mishra Advocate. In cross examination he has stated that his father died on 20.12.1986 and his father and his brother Ashwani was running the shop. In paragraph 6 he shown his ignorance that the name of mother of plaintiff is recorded in the Municipal records and after her death the plaintiff’s name have been recorded. He further states that his father had constructed a shop in an open place and till date no one claims ownership over the said shop. He is not paying any tax to municipal corporation nor his name has been recorded in municipal records. He also admits that he did not try to get his name recorded as the owner of said shop. He admits that in his written statement he has not pleaded anything about his ownership 10 over the said shop or the fact that his father had constructed the said shop since 35 years back. 18. DW-2, KK Mishra, have stated that since 20 years back, Shriram Vig came to him for preparation of reply of the notice served upon him and then he sent reply to the legal notice to Shri Vaswani Advocate who was the counsel of Shiv Prasad. By the laps of time and shifting of his office, the documents are destroyed. 19. Apart from plaintiff witness in cross examination, the aforesaid facts have been extracted from the PW-1 on suggestion from counsel for the defendant, which is binding to the defendant in which PW-1 have clearly stated that suit accommodation was let-out by Hanuman to the persons of Vig Medical, as such, from the statement of plaintiff Shiv Prasad Tiwari, PW-2 and Janak Ram, PW-1, it is clearly established that the plaintiff's mother Bhagwati Bai purchased the suit property and after death of his mother, the plaintiff has succeeded the suit property, which was let out to the defendant’s father and he started Medical Shop there. After his death, his son is running the Medical Shop and tenant of the plaintiff, as such, findings recorded by two Courts below that relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant is not established, is perverse and is hereby set aside and it is held that relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the plaintiff and defendant. Answer to substantial question of law No.2: 20. The plaintiff has pleaded two grounds in his plaint under Section 12(1) (a) and Section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961. It is the case of the plaintiff 11 that while replying to the notice dated 20.8.1998 (Ex.P3) served to the defendant, he has denied the title of the plaintiff, which is a ground under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 and reply to notice has also been filed as Ex.D/1. The defendant denied the title of the plaintiff over the suit property in his written statement also. 21. Section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 provides as under: “12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : (c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein: Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy.” 22. Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides the Estoppel of tenant; and of license of person in possession. It provides that: “116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession- No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such license was given.” 23. In case of Keshar Bai Vs. Chhunulal, 2014(11)SCC 438, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “14. There is a specific reference to the registered document under which the appellant purchased the suit building from the earlier landlord in the plaint. Yet, in the written statement the respondent denied the title of the appellant. We notice that there are several documents on record relating to the ownership of the appellant, apart from the registered sale deed, such as municipal tax receipts, ration card etc. Yet, the respondent refused to acknowledge the appellant’s title. He denied it in his evidence. This is not a simple case of denial of derivative title by a person who did not know about the purchase of the building by the landlord. Even after going through the relevant 12 documents relating to the appellant’s title the respondent feigned ignorance about it. The High Court has accepted that in his cross- examination the respondent has stated that he was not accepting the appellant as his landlady. The High Court has, however, gone on to say that by this piece of evidence no decree of eviction can be passed against the respondent under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act because the respondent will have no occasion to establish in what circumstances he denied the title of the appellant. The High Court has further held that the respondent was within permissible limit in asking the appellant to produce documentary evidence about his title as a landlord. The High Court, in our opinion, fell into a grave error in drawing such a conclusion. Even denial of a landlord’s title in the written statement can provide a ground for eviction of a tenant. It is also settled position in law that it is not necessary that the denial of title by the landlord should be anterior to the institution of eviction proceedings. This is so stated by this Court in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishnarao(deceased) by LRs. [(1989) 4 SCC 732] [LQ/SC/1989/460].” 24. A careful perusal of written statement of the defendant would show that the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff specifically. For ground under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961, title must be specifically denied by the defendant, which is detrimental to the interest of the plaintiff, then only ground under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act of 1961 is made out. Denial of the title of landlord in the written statement can provide a ground for eviction of a tenant. 25. Section 12(1)(a) of the Act of 1961 specifically contemplates that tenant is duty bound to pay or remit the arrears of rent within two months from the date of service of demand of notice by the landlord and if he fails to tender the same within the statutory period, the landlord get the right to evict the tenant on the said ground. 26. In the instant case, though legal notice has been served to the defendant on 20.8.1998 (Ex.P3) and the defendant has also filed reply vide Ex.D/1 and the suit was filed on 22.12.1998, but arrears of rent has not been paid to the plaintiff on the premises that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant, as such, since it has already been 13 held that relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as landlord and tenant is established and despite service of notice (Ex.P3) to the defendant he has not tendered arrears of rent within two months from the date of notice (Ex.P1), the plaintiff would be entitled to decree under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act of 1961 also. Both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 27. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Satish Chandra v. Jankiprasad, 1992 MPLJ-90, has considered Section 12(1)(a) of the Act of 1961 and held that it is not necessary to mention in the demand notice the period within which arrears to be paid, and even if period less than two months is mentioned, the demand notice shall not become invalid. 28. As regards the filing of the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. by the appellant, with the intent to bring on record the water tax receipts, it is averred in the application that the same was given to his counsel to produce it before the learned Courts below, but he could not produce it. The documents are necessary for the just decision of the case. For accepting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C., the party has to first establish and meet the requirements as envisaged under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. Unless the requirements so envisaged have been met, the documents cannot be taken as additional evidence. The requirements are that the trial Court had refused to admit the additional evidence; the evidence was not available despite the exercise of due diligence; and the evidence is 14 required by the Court to effectively adjudicate the dispute pending before it. 29. In the case of "Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath", 2019 (6) SCC 82, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- “29. Under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, production of additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, is permitted only under three circumstances which are: (I) Where the trial Court had refused to admit the evidence though it ought to have been admitted; (II) the evidence was not available to the party despite exercise of due diligence; and (III) the appellate Court required the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. An application for production of additional evidence cannot be allowed if the appellant was not diligent in producing the relevant documents in the lower court. However, in the interest of justice and when satisfactory reasons are given, court can receive additional documents.” 30. In the present case, from perusal of the contents of the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C., the plaintiff pleaded that the documents had been given to the counsel, but they could not be produced before the learned Courts below. The documents sought to be produced by the appellant as additional evidence are payment receipts of water tax to the Municipal Corporation, Raipur, which are of the period before the filing of the suit. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff was in possession and knowledge about the said documents at the time of filing the suit, but for the reason best known to him, he did not produce them before the learned Courts Below. Except by saying that he had given it to his counsel, no plausible justification has been 15 offered by the plaintiff that prevented him from filing these documents before the learned Courts Below. In the considered opinion of this Court, this is no ground at all for acceptance of additional evidence. 31. In the matter of "Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin", 2012 (8) SCC 148, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that:- “40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal.” 32. Even the documents, i.e. water tax payment receipt, which are sought to be produced as additional evidence, do not establish the title of the plaintiff over the suit property; therefore, these documents cannot be considered to be the documents of title of the plaintiff over the suit property. Further, the documents sought to be produced as additional evidence by the plaintiff do not have a direct bearing on the issue in dispute and necessary to pronounce effective judgment in the case, as this Court has already considered the sufficiency of the evidence available on record. 33. In view of the above, this Court does not find and ground for taking additional evidence on record, and accordingly, the application of Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. filed by the appellant/plaintiff is rejected. 34. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed and the judgment and decree of both the Courts below are hereby set aside and it is held that the plaintiff is entitled for decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(a) and (c) of the Act of 1961 and it is directed that the defendant will hand over 16 the peaceful vacant possession of the suit accommodation as shown in para-1 of the plaint (Annexed plaint map) to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of drawing the decree. The plaintiff will be entitled for the cost throughout. 35. A decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge inder