1 2025:CGHC:56484 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 419 of 2003 1. Ful Singh Nag (Died Through Lrs) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 01-08- 2025 1.1 - Smt. Rukhmani Nag Wd/ Late Shri Ful Singh Nag Aged About 54 Years R/o Vill. Talnaar, Tah. Konta, District - Dantewada (C.G.) 1.2 - Chuman Singh Nag S/o Late Shri Ful Singh Nag Aged About 33 Years R/o Vill. Talnaar, Tah. Konta, District - Dantewada (C.G.) 1.3 - Smt. Tulawati Baghel W/o Late Mahadev Baghel D/o Late Ful Singh Nag Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Sargipal Tahsil Bakawand District - Bastar (C.G.) 1.4 - Smt. Hemlata Kashyap W/o Dharam Kashyap D/o Late Ful Singh Nag Aged About 37 Years R/o Village Adavati Tah. Jagdalpur District - Bastar (C.G.) 1.5 - Smt. Premlata Baghel W/o Late Manoj Kumar Baghel D/o Late Ful Singh Nag Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Amaguda Kachnaar Tah. Bakawand District - Bastar (C.G.) 1.6 - Smt. Anita Kashyap W/o Ghanshyam Kashyap D/o Late Ful Singh Nag Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Chuachand Tah. Bakawand, District - Bastar (C.G.) 2. Rop Singh Nag S/o Late Narpat Singh Aged About 47 Years R/o Village Talnaar, Teh. Konta, Distt. Dantewada Chhattisgarh , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 3. Bal Singh Nag S/o Late Narpat Singh Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Talnaar, Teh. Konta, Distt. Dantewada Chhattisgarh , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 4. Son Singh Nag S/o Late Narpat Singh Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Talnaar, Teh. Konta, Distt. Dantewada Chhattisgarh , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 5. Sampat Singh Nag S/o Late Narpat Singh Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Talnaar, Teh. Konta, Distt. Dantewada Chhattisgarh , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Mandev And Others S/o Mangatu Kumhar Aged About 39 Years R/o Village Talnaar, Teh. Konta, Distt. Dantewada Chhattisgarh SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2025.11.25 10:32:59 +0530 2 2. Vasudev S/o Mangatu Kumhar Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Talnaar, Teh. Konta, Distt. Dantewada Chhattisgarh, District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 3. State Of Chhattisgarh S/o Through Collector, Dantewada Chhattisgarh , District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellants : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Akash Pandey, Advocate For Respondents No. 1 & 2 : Mr. Alok Dewangan, Advocate For State/respondent No. 3 : Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Deputy Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 19.11 .2025 1. This appeal was preferred by defendant No. 1/Narpat Singh assailing judgment and decree passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Bastar place Jagdalpur passed in Civil Appeal No. 27-A/2002 dated 30.06.2003, whereby appeal preferred by the plaintiffs was decreed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Court was set-aside. After death of Narpat Singh his legal representatives are pursuing the matter. 2. This appeal was admitted for hearing on following substantial question of law vide order dated 10.08.2015 and 10.11.2025 and the same is reproduced herein-below :- a) Whether in the light of an order being passed by the Sub Divisional Officer under Section 170 (b) of M.P.L.R. Code and which having been upheld by the Collector, Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, the suit of the plaintiff would have been maintainable keeping in view Section 257 of M.P.L.R. Code ? b) Whether the first appellate court could have decided the caste status of the plaintiff as well as the defendant in a first appeal 3 arising out of a suit for declaration of title ? c) Whether the civil suit filed by the plaintiff would be competent when the plaintiff failed to challenge the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities in a proceeding under Section 170(b) of CG Land Revenue Code ? 3. The plaintiffs filed a Civil Suit for declaration of title and possession inter alia on the ground that their father Mangatu had purchased land bearing survey No. 223 area 5.30 acre situated at Village Talnaar, Tehsil Konta, District Dantewada through a registered sale-deed dated 18.05.1967 from one Sonadei Wd/o Late Garjan Singh. After death of Mangatu, names of the plaintiffs were entered in the revenue record and they got possession too. It is pleaded that a proceeding under Section 170 (b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 was initiated by the Sub-Divisional Officer(Revenue), Konta and an order of reversion of land was passed in favour of defendant No. 1/Narpat Singh. The said order was challenged by the plaintiffs before the Additional Collector by filing an appeal and it was dismissed. Second Appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs before the Commissioner and it was allowed and said order was challenged by the defendant No. 1 by filing revision before the Board of Revenue, which was allowed. It is further pleaded that the caste of husband of Late Sonadei was “Dhakad”, which is not a notified Scheduled Tribes. It is pleaded that as Sonadei/seller of the suit property was not a member of ab-oribinal Tribe; therefore, the orders passed by the revenue authorities under the provisions of Section 170(b) of MP Land Revenue Code are void-ab-initio and the defendant No. 1 has no right and title over suit property. It is also pleaded that the orders passed by the Revenue authorities are not binding upon the plaintiffs. 4. The defendant No. 1 filed written statement and pleaded that the sale-deed 4 executed in favour of father of the plaintiffs on 18.05.1969 was outcome of fraud. The defendant No. 1 further pleaded that the revenue authorities are competent to decide social status and Civil Court has no jurisdiction. Further, no complaint was made by the plaintiffs before the competent authority with regard to social status of Sonadei. The defendant No. 1 further pleaded that the defendant No. 1 and his family belong to “Bhatra” caste, which is a notified Scheduled Tribe, they use surname “Dhakad”. The defendant No. 1 denied the contention made by the plaintiffs that he belongs to non-tribe. The defendant No. 1 also pleaded that against any order passed under the provisions of Section 170 (b) and 165(6) of the Land Revenue Code, Civil Suit would not be maintainable according to bar contained in the Section 257 of the MP Land Revenue Code. 5. The learned Trial Court framed issues; parties led evidence, and thereafter, the suit was decreed by the learned Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 17.11.1998, thereafter, an appeal was preferred bearing Civil Appeal No. 1-A/1999 and matter was remitted back to the learned Trial Court. The learned Civil Court passed judgment on 02.01.2001 and dismissed the suit on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide social status of an individual and according to the provisions of Section 257 l-1 of MP Land Revenue Code, Civil Suit is not maintainable. An appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs and the learned Appellate Court decided the social status of Sonadei and held that she was not a member of ab-original Tribes as in the revenue records caste of her husband was mentioned “Dhakad”, which is recognized as Other Backward Class. Against said judgment and decree this appeal has been preferred by the legal representatives of defendant No. 1. 5 6. Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants would argue that according to the provisions of Section 257 l (1) of the MP Land Revenue Code, the suit instituted by the plaintiffs was not maintainable. He would submit that a proceeding under Section 170 (b) of the Land Revenue Code was initiated by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Konta and an order was passed in favour of ab-original Tribe, namely Narpat Singh. He would contend that the said order was affirmed by the Collector, and thereafter, Board of Revenue. He would submit that the plaintiffs have not challenged the enquiry part of the proceedings of Section 170 (b) of Land Revenue Code rather they filed a suit for declaration of title and possession. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench in the matter of Dhanajiram and Anr. Vs.Praveen Kumar and Ors., 2014 (2) CGLJ 334, wherein it is held that the Civil Suit against an order passed in a proceeding under Section 170 (b) of the Land Revenue Code would be maintainable, wherein the enquiry part has been challenged. Mr. Bharat, Senior Advocate would further submit that the Civil Suit was filed by the original plaintiffs on the ground that Sonadei was not a member of ab-original Tribe and she was member of Other Backward Class. He would contend that as suit was filed to decide social status of Sonadei, it was not maintainable at all according to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kumari Madhuri Patil and another vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development and others reported in AIR 1995 SC 94. Mr. Bharat would further argue that in the plaint, the original plaintiffs have described the proceedings initiated by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) and subsequent orders passed by the Additional Collector, 6 Commissioner and Board of Revenue, but they failed to challenge the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Additional Collector and the Board of Revenue; therefore, the suit would not be maintainable according to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jugraj Singh vs. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 1971 SC 761. He would pray to allow this appeal. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Alok Dewangan, Advocate appearing for the plaintiffs would oppose. He would contend that Sonadei was not a member of ab-original Tribe. He would further submit that except Ex. D/2, which is a revenue document of 1959-60 caste of Sonadei and her husband was mentioned as “Dhakad”. He would contend that the caste “Dhakad” is recognized as Other Backward Class in the State of M.P./C.G. He would submit that the original plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration of title and possession on the ground that the transaction between father of the plaintiffs and Sonadei was bonafide transaction and there was no requirement to obtain permission according to the provisions of Section 165 (6) of the MP Land Revenue Code as Sonadei was not a member of ab-original Tribe. He would submit that the transaction was not an outcome of fraud and the revenue authorities illegally exercised power under Section 170(b) of the MP Land Revenue Code; therefore, the learned appellate Court rightly decreed the the suit filed by the plaintiffs. He would contend that the learned appellate Court has not decided social status of Sonadei rather touched the issue of valid transaction. He would submit that the learned appellate Court found the transaction between father of the plaintiffs and Late Sonadei bonafide, and therefore, decreed the suit. With regard to provisions of Section 257 of MP Land Revenue Code, he would submit that said possession would not attract as the plaintiff has not 7 challenged the orders passed by the revenue authorities rather suit was filed for declaration of title and possession, and there was no need to challenge the orders passed by the revenue authorities against the plaintiffs. He would submit that appeal filed by the defendant No. 1 deserves to be dismissed. 8. Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State would support the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10. Perusal of the plaint filed by the original plaintiff would make it clear that suit was filed alleging the proceeding initiated by the revenue authorities under Section 170(B) of the MP Land Revenue Code on the ground that Sonadei was not a member of ab-original Tribe and she was member of Other Backward Class. The plaintiffs presented revenue records of Ex. P/2 to P/15 to demonstrate that caste of Sonadei and her husband “Dhakad”(OBC). With regard to jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide social status of an individual, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) has held in sub-para 12 of para 13 that No suit or other proceedings before any other authority should lie to determine a social status of a person. 11. Thus, in Kumari Madhuri Patil (supra) (direction No.12), the Supreme Court has clearly held that no suit or other proceedings before any other authority should lie in respect of matters covered by that decision the suit is held to be barred. Directions issued by the Supreme Court in exercise of 8 power conferred under Article 141 of the Constitution of India is binding. Their Lordships also expected from all the State Governments to make endeavour to give effect to it and see that constitutional objectives intended for the benefit and advancement of genuine SC/ST or backward classes, as the case may be, are not defeated by unscrupulous persons. 12. Thus, it can safely be held that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to decide social status of a person. Accordingly, the substantial question of law No. b) is answered accordingly. The first appellate Court had no jurisdiction to decide the social status of defendants. 13. Section 257 of the Land Revenue Code deals with exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. Sub-Section l-1 of the Code, 1959 is reproduced herein-below :- “S.257 Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities -- Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters : XXX (l-1) any other covered under Section 170-B;” 14. Any order passed in a proceeding under Section 170(B) of the Land Revenue Code can be challenged in a duly constituted Civil Suit, if the revenue authorities have not followed due procedure or failed to comply with the principle of natural justice including the enquiry part in a proceeding of Section 170(B) of the Land Revenue Code. 15. In the matter of Dhanajiram Vs.Praveen Kumar, 2014 (2) CGLJ 334, the 9 Coordinate Bench while dealing with the similar issue from paras 6 to 9 held as under :- “6.The provision of section 257(l-1) of Code reads thus: 257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities--Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine,decide or dispose of and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters: XXX (l-1) any matter covered u/s 170B. It entails special bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a dispute which requires to be decided by the Sub Divisional Officer u/s 170B of the Code. 7. The short question that arises for consideration as to what extent in a provision of exclusive jurisdiction any interference can be made by the civil court. The Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (i) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil courts'' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (ii) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is 10 not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (iii) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (iv) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (v) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegality collected a suit lies. (vi) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (vii) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred 11 unless the conditions above set down apply. 8. The same principles are again enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) By L.rs. and Others, Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, 5. The normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided u/s 9 of the CPC but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts to try a civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals, jurisdiction of the civil courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 9. Thus, in such cases civil court has to see only to the extent whether basic fundamental principles of the judicial process have been followed or not by the competent authority while passing the order impugned and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is limited as laid down in the case of Dhulabhai AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662 (supra) and case must fall within the parameter of the tests mentioned in case of 12 Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) By L.rs. and Others. 16. Considering the fact that the plaintiffs failed to challenge the orders passed by the revenue authorities, at the same time alleged the proceedings, and therefore, the provisions of Section 257 (l-1) of Land Revenue Code would attract and thus suit was not maintainable. Thus, the substantial question of law number a) is decided in favour of the appellants herein and against the plaintiffs. . 17. The plaintiffs failed to challenge the orders passed by the Revenue authorities. In para 4, 6 and 7(b) of the plaint, the plaintiffs pleaded the case numbers registered by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Konta, Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, Commissioner, Jagdalpur and Board of Revenue and also pleaded respective dates of orders, but failed to challenge those orders in prayer clause. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jugraj Singh (supra) held that as the plaintiff failed to challenge the order of Collector while seeking relief of declaration, such a suit would be hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, relevant para 11 is reproduced herein-below :- "11. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that there was proper execution of the document and registration. It is hardly necessary in view of our decision to say anything more about this case. We are also satisfied that the appel-lants were not entitled to a declaration, We have reproduced the paragraph in which the reliefs were asked in the plaint. It will be noticed that they neither asked for the cancellation of the order of the Collector nor for any in-junction, two of the reliefs which they were entitled to ask in the case in addition to the declaration. Such a suit would be hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and we would be quite in a position to deny from the declaration without these specific reliefs. 13 Indeed they had only to ask for the setting aside of the order." 19. In light of the judgment passed in the matter of Jugraj Singh (supra) and fact that the plaintiff failed to challenge the orders passed by the revenue authorities, the relief could have not been granted by the learned First Appellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, the substantial question of law number c) is decided in favour of the appellants herein and against the plaintiffs. 20. In result, the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court is hereby set-aside. The appeal preferred by the legal representatives of defendant No. 1 is hereby allowed. 21. A decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge $iddhant