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2025 DAILYLAW 58363 (AP)

COMMISSIONER, VIZIANAGARAM MUNCPALITY v. MUDDADA SRIDEVI, VIZIANAGARA DIST

WA/840/2017 · 2025-10-26

Challa Gunaranjan, Dhiraj Singh Thakur

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Judgment text

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APHC010476272017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI WRIT APPEAL NO: 840 of 2017 Bench Sr.No:- 35 [3552] Commissioner, Vizianagaram Municipality ...Appellant Vs. Muddada Sridevi, Vizianagaram. ...Respondent ********** Advocate for Appellant: Mr.M. Krishna Rao SC for skl vzm kkd Municipal Corporations Advocate for Respondent: Mr.A. Jagannadha Rao CORAM : THE CHIEF JUSTICE DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN DATE : 27th October 2025 JUDGMENT: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Challa Gunaranjan) Present Writ Appeal is directed against common order and judgment, dated 28.0.2016, passed in Suo Motu Contempt Case No.1888 of 2016 and Contempt Case No.1725 of 2016 in W.P.No.28233 of 2016 and W.P.No.28233 of 2016, wherein the action of appellant herein/2nd respondent in writ petition, in demolishing the residential structure erected by writ petitioner without following due process of law was held to be arbitrary and illegal and consequently, 2 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 was directed to pay a sum of Rs.1.00 Lakh to the writ petitioner towards damages, within four weeks, which to be in addition to the compensation that the writ petitioner may claim by filing appropriate Suit. By the said order, learned Single Judge has also directed the 1st respondent in the writ petition viz., State of A.P., Municipal Administration Department, rep. by its Secretary, to take note of the conduct of the appellant-Municipal Commissioner in disregarding the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965, (for short, “the Act”), and to initiate appropriate disciplinary action against the offending officials responsible for the illegal demolition. 2. Brief facts germane for consideration of the present appeal are set out as under: The respondent herein-writ petitioner claimed to be in possession and enjoyment of house property bearing Door No.21, Revenue Ward No.21, Phoolbagh Road, Vizianagaram. She stated to have been granted house-patta and the said factum has been confirmed by the Tahsildar, Vizianagaram, vide confirmation certificate, dated 09.11.2008, as per which, she has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of subject property since 12 years as on date of issuance of such certificate. She stated to have later constructed house on the said site, and the 3 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 same has been assessed to property tax by the municipality vide Assessment No.1093041872, and ever since, she has been paying property tax. That being so, the appellant and their office staff, under the guise of widening of existing road to 80 feet leading from Ambati Satram to Kothapet water tank, marked the subject property along with other properties on 18.08.2016 for demolition. The respondent- writ petitioner has tried to resist such action by reasoning that the proposed action of demarking and proceeding with demolition without issuing any prior notice and conducting enquiry to be in clear violation of principles of natural justice and arbitrary exercise of power, however, as they did not heed to said objection, she was constrained to file writ petition No.28233 of 2016. The writ court has initially passed interim order, dated 22.08.2016, wherein the respondents therein were directed not to demolish the subject property. However, when it was brought to the notice of the writ court that the demolition has been carried on 23.08.2016, Suo Motu Contempt Case No.1888 of 2016 came to be registered. Subsequently, even writ petitioner has filed Contempt Case No.1725 of 2016 alleging violation and wilful disobedience of interim orders passed. 3. The writ petition came to be resisted by filing counter-affidavit, inter alia stating that the subject property belongs to the municipality 4 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 and the writ petitioner being encroacher cannot claim any right and title to the same, besides contending that in view of Sections 192 and 194 of the Act, the Municipality was well within its power to remove the encroachments without issuing any prior notice. It was further contended that the writ petitioner has also given consent for widening the road by demolishing the structures, in lieu, she would be allotted house at JNNURM. 4. The learned singe Judge, after considering the rival submissions and also going through the record and documents placed before him, has come to conclusion that except for entry in Town Survey Register, which reflected S.No.46, being classified as municipal land, no other document was placed to claim the title and even the Town Survey Register so produced was containing number of interpolations and corrections, therefore, concluded that mere such entries would not confer any title to the Municipality. Besides, coming to the aspect of right of writ petitioner over subject property, considering the proceedings of the Tahsildar, which in a way certified the subject property to be in her possession for a considerable length of period, it was concluded that, prima facie, writ petitioner also has a reasonable claim. Having said so, since the demolition was resorted to without issuing any prior notice and such action came to be justified 5 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 by relying on Sections 192 and 194 of the Act, it was held that the said powers cannot be exercised and resorted to in normal circumstances, much less that of a situation of non-emergency, therefore, the action of the appellant and the officers concerned was held to be arbitrary and illegal and thereby consequently, a compensation of Rs.1.00 Lakh came to be directed to be paid towards interim compensation, which to be in addition to the compensation that writ petitioner may seek by initiating appropriate proceedings. Further, the State Government was directed to take note of the aforesaid act and conduct of the officers, who violated the provisions of the Act, and to initiate appropriate disciplinary action. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned single Judge has miserably failed in appreciating that the subject property clearly was classified as municipal land, falling under Survey No.46 in the Town Survey Register, in the absence of any contra documents in favour of writ petitioner confirming the assignment in her favour by Municipality, no right much less right to subject property would accrue to her, therefore, ought not to have held that the demolition was illegal. He further contended that even the certificate of Tahsildar, dated 09.11.2008, merely confirmed the possession, but not title, and at any rate, since the possession claimed by writ 6 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 petitioner is only 12 years, as on the date of issuance of said certificate and 20 years as on date of consideration of writ petition, adverse possession cannot be claimed against the Municipality, as the length of possession to perfect title by adverse possession against Government being 30 years, even that right also would not accrue to her, and therefore, the learned single Judge has erred in recording finding that prima facie she acquired title to subject property by adverse possession. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner tried to sustain the findings and conclusions arrived at by the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment under challenge. He contended that mere entry in Town Survey Register showing that survey number being classified as municipal land by itself would not be conclusive proof to claim title and since the possession of writ petitioner was not in dispute, and that the subject property was also assessed to tax on the other hand, the appellant only had a remedy of seeking for declaration of title before competent Court and for eviction, if any, but could not have directly resorted to demolition of structure without even issuing prior notice and conducting enquiry, which is clearly in violation of principles of natural justice. 7 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 7. We have perused the record and considered the rival submissions of respective learned counsels. 8. The subject property is a house site, which writ petitioner claim to have been assigned. Her possession and enjoyment came to be certified by the Tahsildar, by proceedings, dated 09.11.2008, wherein it was stated that she has been in possession and enjoyment since 12 years thereof. She later constructed a building on the said house site, and the same has been assessed to municipal tax, which is not disputed by Municipality. But, for initiation of steps for widening of existing road, the present controversy could not have arisen. In order to widen the road, certain properties have been identified, which were affecting the cause. The writ petitioner’s property was one amongst them. It is the claim of appellant that subject property has been falling in Survey No.46, which was classified as municipal land in Town Survey Register, therefore, the respondent-writ petitioner was merely an encroacher. It is an admitted scenario that the appellant had initially marked subject property for demolition and later even undertook to demolish the same without issuing any prior notice and conducting enquiry. 8 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 9. Be that as it may, now the subject property is being claimed by the appellant to be that of municipal land and whereas the writ petitioner to be that of an assignment, and her possession was being certified by the certificate of Tahsildar. To justify the claim of appellant, the only piece of document that has been produced is Town Survey Register. Learned single Judge after considering the same has recorded finding that, firstly, mere entries in the Town Survey Register would not be conclusive proof of title, and secondly, that even the so- called register exhibited was interpolated and corrected at various columns, throwing any amount of suspicion on the entries made therein. On the other hand, the writ petitioner has also tried to assert her right by heavily relying on the certificate of Tahsildar. Since, normally the writ court would not embark on deciding title dispute, only prima facie opinion has been expressed by the learned single Judge that when right to title has been disputed and that it was the appellant, who was disputing the same, the proper course of action would be to seek adjudication of the same before the competent Court, we are in respectful agreement with such reasoning. 10. Coming to the aspect of demolition of structure, when the appellant had not conclusively established right to property and there is any amount of dispute on it, even if the writ petitioner to be merely 9 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 an encroacher, still, without issuing prior notice and causing enquiry, the structures could not have been demolished. Insofar as the contention that Sections 192 and 194 of the Act empower the appellant to evict the encroachers without issuing any prior notice and, that the appellant was well within its rights in undertaking the exercise of demolition, we are not impressed with the said submission for the reason that at first instance it has to be conclusively established that subject property clearly belongs to or vests with the municipality, and secondly, that even for invoking the power under the aforesaid provisions, the Municipality has to make an exceptional case of urgency. The learned single Judge has clearly found that no such urgency has been shown and rather demolition was done in haste, despite the interim protection granted. Anyhow, we are not going into the aspect of the exact date of demolition undertaken and whether the same tantamounted to contempt, since that is not subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. 11. Section 192 of the Act bestows power on Commissioner to take steps for removal of encroachments obstructing public place or public street. The said provision does not specifically envisage prior show- cause notice before Commissioner exercises his power to remove the structures raised. However, the law is fairly well settled now that, 10 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 before any such action is initiated, which resulted in various adverse consequences to a person, he is definitely entitled to a notice even in the absence of statutory provision providing for the same. Such requirement is required to be read into the statutory provision, as otherwise, it would clearly amount to violation of principles of natural justice. (Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India1 and Manohar v. State of Maharashtra2). 12. Coming to Section 194 of the Act, the same bestows power on Commissioner to initiate proceedings for evicting the unauthorized occupants from municipal premises. This provision clearly contemplates notice before taking any adverse steps. Admittedly, in the present case, no such notices were issued to respondent-writ petitioner under aforesaid provisions. 13. The learned single Judge further has made an observation regarding the writ petitioner acquiring title to subject property by adverse possession. We have gone through the finding recorded at para.11, the said opinion expressed is only prima facie view, but not, conclusive, we are conscious of the fact that the length of possession to perfect title as against the Government would be 30 years and in 1 (1981) 1 SCC 664 2 (2012) 13 SCC 14 11 HCJ & CGR, J. W.A.No.840 of 2017 the present case, even as on the date of adjudication of writ petition, the possession was for a continuous period of only 20 years. 14. Be that as it may, as the final conclusion of learned single Judge does not merely rest on the finding on adverse possession and even otherwise since the same is only a prima facie view, we make it clear that in the event the Municipality resorts to appropriate legal remedy, it is open to canvass its rights and the aspect of adverse possession, even if any put against it, would be considered uninfluenced by such observations of the learned single Judge. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the aforesaid submissions. 15. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal stands dismissed, however, without costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending in this case, if any, shall stand closed. DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CJ CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J cs