M/S ABP TRAVELS AND FACILITY MANAGEMENT PRIVATE LIMITED, v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
WPC/5748/2025 · 2025-11-05
Shri Bibhu Datta Guru
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 58321 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 58321 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1
2025:CGHC:54060-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 5748 of 2025 M/s Abp Travels And Facility Management Private Limited, (Formerly Known As Abp Travels Pvt. Ltd.) A Company Registered Under The Companies Act, 1956, And Having Its Registered Office At Plot No. 1320, Sector-31, Gurugram- 122001, Haryana
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Home, Mahanadi Bhawan, North Block, Sector 19, Atla Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 492002 2 - Chhattisgarh Police Headquarters Through Its Addl. Director General Of Police (P And P), Police Headquarters, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Raipur (C.G.) 492002
... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Sr. Adv. assisted by Mr. Mayank Gupta and Mr. Shikhar Shrivastava, Advocates For Respondent(s) : Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, A.G. and Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri
Ramesh Sinha,
Chief Justice
Hon'ble
Shri Bibhu Datta Guru
, Judge
Judgment
on Board
MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.11.07 10:36:42 +0530
2 Per
Ramesh Sinha
, Chief Justice
06.11.2025
1. Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Mayank Gupta and Mr. Shikhar Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Advocate General along with Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate for respondent / State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers:
“a) Issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction declaring that Clause 7.6 at Sr. No. 4 of the Request for Proposal bearing Tender No. PHQ/TS/Dial- 112/317/2025 dated 03.10.2025, read with Corrigendum entries Sr. No. 33 to 41, which prescribes a minimum average annual turnover of ₹75 crore during the last three consecutive financial years (FY 2022-23, FY 2023-24, and FY 2024-25) with a mandatory 50 crore turnover in FY 2024-25, and prohibits consortium participation, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; b) Pass such other order(s) or direction(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem just, equitable, and proper in the interest of justice.”
3.
Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, is engaged in providing comprehensive fleet-management and emergency-response services to various State Governments across India and has been successfully
3 operating the Dial-112 Emergency Response System in the State of Chhattisgarh since 2018 under successive agreements executed with the respondent authorities. The respondent No. 2, after completion of the earlier contract period and subsequent extensions, issued a fresh Request for Proposal (RFP) dated 12.09.2025 for selection of an agency for fleet management and operations of the next phase of the CG Dial-112 Project. Unlike previous tenders, the present RFP was limited to fleet management and operations only, excluding IT or software system components. The grievance of the petitioner arises from Clause 7.6 (Sr. No. 4) of the said tender which prescribes a pre- qualification condition requiring an average annual turnover of Rs.75 crores during FY 2022–23 to 2024–25, with a mandatory turnover of Rs.50 crores in FY 2024–25, which according to the petitioner is arbitrary, disproportionate, and unrelated to the limited scope of the present fleet-only contract.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that such an onerous turnover requirement has been deliberately incorporated to exclude experienced service providers like itself, despite its satisfactory record of operating the Dial-112 System since 2018. The petitioner submitted pre-bid representations on 15.10.2025 objecting to the said condition, but the respondent No. 2, through its Corrigendum dated 22.10.2025, declined to modify the clause. Being aggrieved, the present has preferred this present petition.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the scope
4 of judicial review in tender matters is limited, it squarely applies where the eligibility conditions are ex-facie arbitrary, discriminatory, or lacking rational nexus with the project objectives. Reliance is placed on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Watergrace Products v. Nashik Municipal Corporation & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 330, wherein it was held that the tender conditions which unreasonably restrict competition warrant interference under Article 226. It is contended that the impugned Clause 7.6 (Sr. No. 4) of Tender No. PHQ/TS/Dial-112/317/2025, prescribing an average annual turnover of Rs.75 crores for FY 2022-23 to 2024-25 with a mandatory ₹50 crores in FY 2024-25, is wholly arbitrary and disproportionate to the limited fleet- management scope of the present contract. Unlike the earlier Dial-112 tenders of 2017 and 2023, which permitted consortium participation and allowed turnover to be calculated on a “best three of four/five years” basis, the present tender prohibits consortiums and mandates strict consecutive-year turnover assessment, thereby disqualifying the petitioner, who has been successfully operating the Dial-112 system since 2018 without any rational justification. 6. It is further submitted that while the project scope has been substantially reduced from an integrated IT-enabled emergency response system to a fleet-only operational contract, the respondents have unjustifiably escalated the financial thresholds and excluded consortium participation, thereby narrowing the field of competition and favouring a few large players. Such conditions, according to the petitioner, are arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Articles 14 and
5 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel relies on Reliance Energy Ltd. v. MSRDC, (2007) 8 SCC 1, and Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216, to contend that the doctrine of level playing field is intrinsic to Article 14, and that tender conditions must be fair, transparent, and non- discriminatory. The impugned turnover clause, having no rational nexus with the project objectives and being contrary to public interest, defeats the very purpose of competitive bidding, thereby warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 to ensure fairness and equality in the procurement process. 7. Per contra, learned Advocate General opposed the submissions and submits that the scope of judicial review in matters relating to tender and contractual terms is extremely limited, and the Court ought not to interfere with the policy decisions of the State or its instrumentalities unless the same are shown to be mala fide, arbitrary, or actuated by extraneous considerations.
Reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489; and Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818, wherein it has been consistently held that the terms of a tender are within the exclusive domain of the tendering authority and cannot be subjected to judicial review merely on the ground that they appear restrictive or that another view is possible. 6
8. It is further submitted that the impugned eligibility condition prescribing a minimum average annual turnover of Rs.75 crores with a mandatory turnover of Rs.50 crores in FY 2024-25 has been fixed after due deliberation, considering the enhanced operational scale, increased fleet size of 460 vehicles, fuel cost, maintenance, insurance, manpower deployment, and the financial capacity required for uninterrupted service delivery in a project of statewide importance. The said criterion is uniformly applicable to all bidders and does not single out or exclude the petitioner or any class of participants. The prohibition on consortium participation has been introduced to ensure singular accountability and avoid coordination difficulties encountered in earlier contracts. Hence, the impugned tender condition is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory but a policy decision taken in public interest to secure competent and financially capable service providers. Therefore, no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted in the tender process initiated by the respondent authorities. 9. Learned State Counsel further submits that the technical bids pursuant to the impugned tender have already been opened on 29.10.2025, and the evaluation process is presently underway. Therefore, at this advanced stage of the tender proceedings, any interference by this Court would not only disrupt the ongoing procurement process but also adversely affect the timely continuation of the State’s emergency response services.
It is contended that once the bids have been opened, the tender process has substantially progressed, and any judicial intervention at this stage would prejudice
7 the interests of other participants and delay a project of critical public importance. Accordingly, it is urged that since the tender process has already advanced beyond the bid submission stage and the impugned condition applies uniformly to all bidders, no case for interference is made out. The present writ petition, being devoid of merit and filed at a belated stage after the opening of bids, deserves to be dismissed in limine
10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the
submissions advanced by the respective counsel.
11. This Court is of the considered view that the scope of judicial review in tender matters is well settled. The Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the tendering authority nor can it substitute its own view for that of the expert body formulating eligibility conditions. Interference is warranted only when the terms of the tender or the decision-making process are found to be arbitrary, mala fide, or lacking rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases has consistently held that courts must exercise restraint in matters involving commercial tenders and policy decisions of the executive.
12. In the present case, it is evident that the impugned eligibility condition prescribing a minimum average annual turnover of Rs.75 crores with Rs.50 crores in FY 2024-25, as contained in Clause 7.6 (Sr. No. 4) of Tender No. PHQ/TS/Dial-112/317/2025, has been fixed by the respondent authorities after due consideration of the financial and
8 operational requirements of the project. The condition is uniformly applicable to all participants and cannot be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory merely because it excludes certain bidders, including the petitioner. Moreover, the technical bids have already been opened on 29.10.2025 and the evaluation process is in progress. At this advanced stage, judicial interference would not only impede the tender process but also adversely affect the public interest involved in maintaining uninterrupted emergency response services across the State. Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity or arbitrariness in the impugned tender condition warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. Hence, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. No
order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet