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2025 DAILYLAW 58254 (CHH)

KRISHNA KUMAR @ USHA PRATAP SAHU v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

CRA/859/2023 · 2025-11-05

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

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Judgment text

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1 2025:CGHC:54193 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 859 of 2023 1 - Krishna Kumar @ Usha Pratap Sahu S/o Bharatlal, Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Hardi Jarve Mahamaya, P.S. Baloda, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Ps Baloda, District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Bharat Lal Dembra, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Arvind Dubey, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 06/11/2025 1. This appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, (for short the, Cr.P.C.) against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 28.02.2023 passed by learned Special Judge (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989), Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Special Sessions Case No. 22/2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC and sentenced for RI for 10 years with fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine further RI for 20 days. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 25.09.2020 at about 4:30 pm, the deceased Jigar Sarathi was coming to his house along with his younger ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2025.12.03 13:22:09 +0530 2 sister Kinjal Sarathi. On the way the appellant was standing in his house and after seeing the deceased and PW-4 Kinjal Sarathi, he started abusing them by saying that why they used to bypass their house regularly and assaulted the deceased by stone which was lying there. By the assault made by the appellant, the deceased received grievous injuries. He was being taken to hospital where he died in the night. The unnumbered merg intimation Ex.P/7 was given to City Kotwali, Bilaspur by the CIMS, Bilaspur. Inquest Ex.P/9 was prepared by City Kotwali Police in presence of the witnesses and the dead body was sent for its post-mortem to CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur, where PW-16, Dr. Hemant Kumar conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of the deceased and gave post-mortem report Ex.P/26. During the post-mortem the doctor noticed numerous injuries on the various parts of the body of the deceased and opined that cause of death is craniocerebral damage as a result of multiple injuries sustained to head, which is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Consequent upon blunt force/surface impart, all injuries are anti-mortem in nature. The merg intimation was forwarded to Police Station Baloda, District Janjgir-Champa where it was recorded as Ex.P/11. On 25.09.2020 the FIR was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 294, 323 of IPC and after receiving the merg- intimation Ex.P/11, the offence of Section 302 of IPC was added. 3. The spot map Ex.P/2 was prepared by the police. The MLC report Ex.P/4 was given by Dr. Vishal Khanna PW-5. The bed head ticket of the deceased was also seized by the police from CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur which is Ex.P/16, stone has been seized from the spot vide seizure memo Ex.P/20. The clothes of the deceased also seized vide seizure memo Ex.P21. The stone seized from the spot, clothes of the deceased and blood stained and plain soil seized from the spot were sent for its chemical examination to regional FSL, Bilaspur from where report Ex.P/15 was received and blood has been 3 found on the stone seized from the spot, clothes of the deceased and blood stained soil. 4. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Section 294, 323 and 302 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 294, 302 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 16 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. have also been recorded in which he denied the circumstances that appears against him, pleaded innocence and have submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. One defence witness Dr. Divyaprakash Dewangan, DW-1, has been examined by the appellant in his defence. 6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Court has acquitted the appellant from the offence under Section 294 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989. However, instead of Section 302 of IPC the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC and sentenced as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradiction in the evidence of prosecution witnesses which cannot be lead to conviction of the appellant for the alleged offence. The incident was occurred in head of passion and without taking any undue 4 advantage of any dangerous weapon. The appellant have allegedly caused injuries to the deceased by the stone which was lying there and there was no intention to commit his murder. There was no previous enmity with the deceased and it is only on the issue of passing by his house by the appellant regularly, some altercation took place by which he received injuries. Though the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC but under the facts and circumstances and the evidence available on record, the conviction of the appellant would fall under Section 304 Part -II of IPC for the reason that the appellant was not intended to commit the murder of the deceased. He would further submits that the appellant is in jail since 27.09.2020, thereby he has already undergone more 05 years of his sentence. Therefore, by modifying his conviction for the offence under Section 304 Part -II of IPC, his undergone period may be considered to be sufficient sentence for the offence and his appeal may be allowed. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes have submitted that the learned trial Court has already shown its leniency in convicting and sentencing the appellant. Looking to the fact that the learned trial Court has considered it to be intentional, however, no knowledge, convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC. Looking to the injuries found on the body of the deceased, it cannot be said that the appellant was not intended to commit his murder. Therefore, conviction of the appellant under Section 304 Part-I is absolutely justified and there is no need to any interference. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 10. In the present case the injuries found on the body of the deceased and has been proved by PW-4 Kinjal, who is the younger sister of the deceased and the doctor PW-5 Dr. Vishal Sinha who gave the primary treatment to the 5 deceased and referred him for further treatment to the CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur. The injuries found on the body of the deceased is also proved by PW-12 Dr. Dushyant Kumar who treated him at CIMS, Bilaspur and PW-16 Dr. Hemant Kumar who conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of the deceased. 11. PW-5, have stated that on 25.09.2020, the deceased was taken to hospital he found various injuries on the head of the deceased and looking to his condition he was referred to CIMS, Bilaspur for further treatment. His injuries were grievous in nature which was caused by hard and blunt object and his report is Ex.P/4. He also gave a query report Ex.P/5 that injuries on the body of the deceased could have been caused by the said stone. Though in cross- examination he stated that if a person would fall from 6 – 7 feet height on the stone, the injuries could have been caused to the person similar to the injuries found on the body of the deceased. However, this Court does not found it sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of this witness that the injuries found on the body of the deceased would caused due to fall from the 6 – 7 feet height on the stone because it is not the defence taken by the appellant from the eye-witness PW-4 Kinjal Sarathi that the deceased fell from 6 – 7 feet height. 12. PW-12, Dr. Dushyant Kumar who treated the deceased at CIMS, Bilaspur have stated that at CIMS, Bilaspur he treated the deceased, however, he died on 25.09.2020 at about 09:10 pm. His bed head ticket is Ex.P/16. He admitted in his cross-examination that the attendant came along with the deceased have informed that the deceased was being assaulted and he received injuries. 13. PW-16, Dr. Hemant Kumar who conducted the post-mortem of the dead body of the deceased have stated that on 26.09.2020 he conducted the post- mortem of the dead body and found the following injuries over the body: • stitched lacerated wound of size 3x1cm, bone deep present horizontally over right face, 1cm below high and 6cm lateral to 6 midline with 2 stitches in size surrounding by reddish contused abrasion over area 5x4cm. • Reddish abraded contusion of size 6x2 cm present over right side of face and head, over and joint above right ear. • Stitched lacerated wound of size 4.5cm x 0.1cm, bone deep present vertically over right forehead and head, 5cm lateral to midline and 5cm above right eyebrow with 4 stitches present in size. • lacerated wound 4x.5cm, bone deep over head in midline, 11cm above occipital prominence. • Reddish abrasion 2x1.5cm over left forehead, 4cm lateral to midline and 2cm above eyebrow. • Reddish abrasion 4x2cm over left head, 5cm above eyebrow and 8cm lateral to midline. • Reddish abrasion 3x1 cm over midline and left side of chest, 11cm below sternal notch. • Blue contusion of size 3x2 cm over right chest, 1cm lateral to midline and 8cm below sternal notch. • Reddish graded abrasion of size 4x3 cm over right side of neck, 3 cm lateral to midline and 3cm above clavicle. 14. On being internal examination he found subscalp extravasation of blood present all over subscalp area, multiple comminuted fracture present over occipital, right parietal and right frontal area, linear fracture coming out from comminuted fracture to occipital, parietal and frontal temporal bone, extending to right anterior cranial fossa. He opined the cause of death is Craniocerebral damage as a result of multiple injuries sustained to head which is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature, consequent upon blunt force, surface impart. All injuries are ante-mortem in nature. 15. In cross-examination nothing has been asked by the defence to disbelieve the evidence of this witness and thus from the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses the prosecution has clearly established the homicidal death of the deceased by the injuries found on his body. 16. The next question would be the involvement of the appellant in the offence in question. The case of the prosecution is based on two eye-witnesses i.e. PW-2 Sukmati and PW-4 Kinjal Kumari. 7 17. PW-4, Kinjal Kumari is the younger sister of the deceased who was with him at the time of incident. She stated in her evidence that at the time of incident when she along with her elder brother was going to their house, the appellant chased them and she was ahead of her brother and when her brother shouted, she saw that the appellant caught hold the deceased and assaulting him. When she shouted, the parents of the appellant went inside the house and then she called her grandmother and her father. In cross-examination, she denied the suggestion given by the defence that she could not see the assault made by the appellant to her brother. She also denied that her brother has received injuries by falling on the hard surface. Though she admitted that her grandmother had informed her as to what statement she has to make before the Court, however, considering the totality of her evidence it cannot be said that she is the tutored witness and she stated on the instance of her grandmother. There is no enmity between the grandmother of the deceased and the appellant. This witness is a child witness having 10 years of age and in such a tender age she remained firm in saying that the appellant has caused injuries to her brother in which this Court did not find any infirmity or any contradictions which makes her evidence doubtful. 18. PW-2, is the grandmother of the deceased to whom PW-4 had called she stated in her evidence that at the time of incident PW-4 Kinjal Sarathi came to her house and informed and then she went on the spot, where she saw that the deceased was lying in injured condition. When she asked from the deceased he informed her that the appellant has assaulted him by stone. She took him to district hospital, Janjgir, from where he was referred to CIMS, Bilaspur. Though she is not the eye-witness to the incident of actual assault, however, she is the witness of oral dying declaration made by the deceased to this witness. She immediately went to the spot and asked from the deceased about the incident then the deceased have disclosed that it is 8 the appellant who caused injuries to him by stone. The defence could not extracted any material from her cross-examination to disbelieve her evidence or it can be said that the deceased could not inform any incident to her. She is the person who took the deceased to the hospital and her evidence is sufficient to hold that the appellant has caused injuries to the deceased. The learned trial Court has also considered these two witnesses with respect to the involvement of the appellant in the offence in question and came to the conclusion that by the injuries caused by the appellant to the deceased he died and thus the involvement of the appellant is also proved with the offence in question. 19. So far as the offence of Section 304 Part-I is concerned, in view of the aforesaid evidence of eye-witnesses as well as medical evidence and the injury report of the deceased. The learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- 9 “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 22. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 10 23. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly. ” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal 4 (2017) 3 SCC 2472024:CGHC:9062 DB 11 Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 24. Reverting to the facts of the present case, from the evidence of PW-4 Kinjal Kumari, PW-2 Sukmati and also from the evidence of PW-5 Dr. Vishal 11 Khanna, PW-12 Dr. Dushyant Kumar, PW-15 Dr. Hemant Kumar, the manner in which the deceased was being assaulted by the appellant all the injuries found on the body of the deceased and the part of the body on which the injuries was inflicted by the appellant it can safely be hold that the appellant was intended to commit murder of the deceased though knowledge cannot be attributed that he might have died, therefore, this Court is of the considering opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC, which does not require any interference by this Court and the same is hereby affirmed. 25. The appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 304 Part -I of IPC and sentenced for RI for 10 years. The offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC does not provided any minimum sentence, however, which may extend to life or for upto 10 years. 26. The submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the incident arose spontaneous and on a trivial issue of bye passing the appellant from his house regularly. He was not taken the advantage of any deadly weapon, however, the assault was made by a stone which was lying there. He also took the defence of the mental status of the appellant that he was not mentally sound. At the time of incident the appellant was 43 years of age at the time of incident. He already remained in jail for more than 05 years, therefore, the sentence awarded to the appellant may be reduced. 27. With respect to the sentence part, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in the matter of Rajabala Vs. State of Haryana & Others, 2016 (1) SCC 463 in paragraph 1 & 2 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “1. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttrakahand[1], while focusing on the gravity of the crime and the concept of proportionality as regards the punishment, the Court had observed:- "18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. A punishment should not be 12 disproportionately excessive. The concept of proportionality allows a significant discretion to the Judge but the same has to be guided by certain principles. In certain cases, the nature of culpability, the antecedents of the accused, the factum of age, the potentiality of the convict to become a criminal in future, capability of his reformation and to lead an acceptable life in the prevalent milieu, the effect - propensity to become a social threat or nuisance, and sometimes lapse of time in the commission of the crime and his conduct in the interregnum bearing in mind the nature of the offence, the relationship between the parties and attractability of the doctrine of bringing the convict to the value-based social mainstream may be the guiding factors. Needless to emphasise, these are certain illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed manner.We may hasten to add that there can neither be a straitjacket formula nor a solvable theory in mathematical exactitude. It would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self- adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors which we have indicated hereinbefore and also have been stated in a number of pronouncements by this Court. On such touchstone, the sentences are to be imposed. The discretion should not be in the realm of fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just punishment." [Emphasis supplied] 2. Seven years prior to that, in Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat [2], it has been held that:- "7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: "State of criminal law continues to be-as it should be-a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society." Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. 8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not 13 long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N.[3]" [Emphasis supplied] And again:- "The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and the victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal"." 28. In the matter of Mohammad Giasuddin Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1977) 3 SCC 287 Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that If you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you must improve him and, men are not improved by injuries and held in Para 9 as follows:- “9.Western jurisprudes and sociologists. from their own angle have struck a like note. Sir Samuel Romilly, critical of the brutal penalties in the then Britain, said in 1817 : “The laws of England are written in blood”. Alfieri has suggested : 'society prepares the crime, the criminal commits it'. George Micodotis, Director of Criminological Research Center, Athens, Greece, maintains that 'crime is the result of the lack of the right kind of education'. If it is thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration. that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed. that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub- culture that leads to anti-social behaviour has to be countered not by undue cruelty but by reculturisation. Therefore, the focus of interest in penology is the individual, and the goal is salvaging him for society. The infliction of harsh and savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times. The human today views sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated into criminality and the modern community has a primary stake in the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defense. We, therefore, consider a therapeutic, rather than an 'in terrorem' outlook, should prevail in our criminal courts. since brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind. In the words of George Bernard Shaw : 'If you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you must improve him and, men are not improved by injuries'. We may permit ourselves the liberty to quote from Judge Sir Jeoffrey Streatfield : “If you are going to have anything to do with the criminal Courts, you should see for yourself the conditions under which prisoners serve their sentences.” 29. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, considering the totality of the evidence available on record, this Court is of 14 the opinion that the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC, does not suffers from any infirmity or perversity. 30. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-I of IPC is maintained. However, looking to the manner in which the reason for which the incident occurred, the age of the appellant and other surrounding circumstances, this Court would deem it appropriate to reduce the sentence of the appellant. 31. Accordingly, the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced from RI for 10 years to RI for 07 years. The fine sentence and default stipulation awarded to the appellant remain intact. The appellant is reported in the jail since 27.09.2020, he shall serve the entire sentence as modified by this Court. He is also entitled for set-off of his undergone period during the trial as well as during the pendency of the appeal. 32. With the aforesaid reduction of the sentence, the appeal is partly allowed. 33. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok