1 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 2025:CGHC:53273-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1435 of 2017  Firan Ram S/o Ludu, Aged About 50 Years, R/o Village Khukhri, Police Station Rajpur, District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus  State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant :- Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate. For Respondent-State :- Dr. Surendra Kumar Dewangan, Panel Lawyer. Division Bench Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal Judgment On Board (31.10.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J 1.Assail in the present criminal appeal filed under Section 374(2) of the CrPC preferred by the appellant herein, is to the legality, validity and correctness of the judgment dated ANKIT KUMAR SINGH Digitally signed by ANKIT KUMAR SINGH Date: 2025.11.01 17:50:18 +0530 2 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 27.06.2017 passed by the 1st Additional Judge to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh, in Sessions Trial No.96/2015, by which the appellant herein has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced thereunder to suffer imprisonment for life with fine of 200/-; in default of payment ₹ of fine amount the appellant has to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months. Prosecution story:- 2.On 07.08.2015 at about 6:30 pm in the Mauhari forest at village Kundikala, Police Station – Rajpur, District – Balrampur-Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh, the appellant herein murdered his wife Shanti Bai and thereby committed the offence in question. 3.The said incident was reported by Sukhram (PW-1) pursuant to which merg intimation and FIR were registered vide Exs.P/1 & P/2, respectively. Crime details form (Ex.P/5) was prepared. 3 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 Wheels of investigation started running and the appellant was arrested. Inquest proceedings (Ex.P/4) were conducted and the dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. As per postmortem report (Ex.P/15) proved by Dr. R.P. Tirkey (PW-8) cause of death was coma as well as syncope and homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P/12), weapon of offence i.e. axe was seized vide Ex.P/13 and as per the MLC report (Ex.P/16), proved by PW-8, the injuries found over the body of the deceased could be caused by the seized axe. Other articles were also seized. Seized articles were sent for chemical analysis to FSL, but FSL report has not been brought on record for the reason best known to the prosecution. 4.After due investigation, appellant herein was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant / accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence. 4 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 5.In order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 22 documents, whereas, defence, in support of its case, neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. The statement of the appellant / accused was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded innocence and false implication. 6.The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which the appeal has been preferred by the appellant herein questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. Submission of the Parties:- 7.Mr. Keshav Dewangan, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the prosecution 5 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 has not been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He would also submit that Sukhram (PW-1) first informant to whom the appellant is said to have given the extra-judicial confession has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution and further the extra-judicial confession is said to have given by the appellant to his son Babulal (PW-3) is not true and voluntary and, therefore, the same is of no use to the prosecution. He would further submit that though as per the prosecution case, weapon of offence i.e. axe was seized pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant, but FSL report has not been brought on record by the prosecution to prove that the said offence was used in the crime in question. As such, the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 6 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 8.Dr. S.K. Dewangan, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He would also submit that the extra- judicial confession given by the appellant is true and voluntary and also pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant blood stained weapon of offence i.e. axe was seized, as such, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offence in question. Therefore, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9.We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and perused the with utmost care and circumspection. Discussion & Analysis:- 10.The first question, as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, has 7 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 been answered by the trial Court in affirmative by relying upon the postmortem report (Ex.P/15) proved by Dr. R.P. Tirkey (PW-8), which, in our considered opinion, is a correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record and which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the finding of the trial Court holding that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. 11.Now, the question for consideration would be whether the appellant has assaulted the deceased? 12.The case of the prosecution is based upon the extra-judicial confession and also on the evidence that pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant blood stained weapon of offence i.e. axe was seized on which the trial Court has relied upon to convict the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 8 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 Extra-Judicial Confession:- 13.Sukhram (PW-1), to whom the appellant is said to have given the extra-judicial confession, though he had lodged the merg (Ex.P/1) as well as the FIR (Ex.P/2) by stating that the appellant had given extra- judicial confession to him, but before the Court he has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution, as such, the evidence of Sukhram (PW-1) is of no use to the prosecution. Furthermore, Babulal (PW- 3), son of the appellant and the deceased, while answering the leading question he said that his father told him that on account of dispute with regard to money with the deceased, she abused the appellant and, therefore, out of anger the appellant is said to have murdered his wife. However, considering the statement recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC (Ex.P/9) of Babulal (PW-3), it appears that the extra judicial 9 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 confession is not true and voluntary as on being asked by PW-3 his father (appellant) has informed him that on account of dispute of money deceased abused him, and therefore, in aggression he murdered her. As such, it could not be said that the extra-judicial confession which is said to have given by the appellant to his son Bubulal (PW-3) is true and voluntary. Even otherwise, it is the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the Court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, 10 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 it may be difficult for the Court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the Court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration. [See : Sahadevan and another v. State of Tamil Nadu 1 ]. 14.In the matter of Sahadevan (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court further considered the earlier decisions including Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab2 and pertinently laid down the principle in paragraphs 15.1, 15.8 and 16 as under :- “15.1. In Balwinder Singh (supra) this Court stated the principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10) “10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extra- judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance.” 1 (2012) 6 SCC 403 2 1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 11 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambigous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra- judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. (Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B.3 and Pancho v. State of Haryana4.) The principles 16. Upon a proper analysis of the above referred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra- judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These percepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused: (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. 3 (2011) 11 SCC 754 4 (2011) 10 SCC 165 12 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv)An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.” 15.Coming to the facts of the present case in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above stated judgments, it is quite vivid that the extra-judicial confession which is said to have been made by the appellant to PW-3 is not true and voluntary as discussed in the aforesaid paragraphs and even otherwise, the extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence Sahadevan (supra) and Balwinder Singh (supra). As such, the appellant could not be convicted on the basis of extra- 13 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 judicial confession which is not true and voluntary that too for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Furthermore, the trial Court has relied upon the evidence of Shivkumar (PW- 2), Mansai (PW-4) & Heerasai (PW-5), however they have only gone to the spot in search of the deceased and, therefore, they are of no use to the prosecution. 16.Furthermore, the trial Court has relied upon the facts to base the conviction of the appellant that pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant blood stained weapon of offence i.e. axe was seized. However, to prove the fact that the said weapon of offence was used in the offence in question FSL report has not been brought on record by the prosecution for the reasons best known to the prosecution. Even otherwise, it is well settled law that the disclosure alone would not automatically lead to conclusion that offence was also committed by 14 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 the accused and, therefore, the burden lies on prosecution to establish a close link between the discovery of material object and its use in commission of offence. In this regard, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v State of Rajasthan 5 , have held in paragraphs No.25 to 27 which states as under:- “25. With regard to Section 27 of the Act, what is important is discovery of the material object at the disclosure of the accused but such disclosure alone would not automatically lead to the conclusion that the offence was also committed by the accused. In fact, thereafter, burden lies on the prosecution to establish a close link between discovery of the material object and its use in the commission of the offence. What is admissible under Section 27 of the Act is the information leading to discovery and not any opinion formed on it by the prosecution.” 26. If the recovery memos were prepared at the police station itself then the same would lose their sanctity as held by this Court in Varun Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan6. 27. The scope and ambit of Section 27 were also illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor7 reproduced hereinbelow: (IA p. 77). 5 (2011) 11 SCC 724 6 (2011) 12 SCC 545 7 (1946-47) 74 IA 65 : AIR 1947 PC 67 15 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 “… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.” The same were thereafter restated in another judgment of this Court in Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan8.” 17. Returning to the facts of the present case, in light of principles of law laid down by their 8 (2004) 3 SCC 657 16 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above- stated decision, it is quite vivid, as per the prosecution case, the bloodstained weapon of offence i.e. axe was recovered pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant and the same has been supported by the memorandum and seizure witnesses Nanku Ram (PW-6) and Bahadur Singh (PW-7) however, FSL report has not been brought on record by the prosecution to connect the weapon of offence with the crime in question and, therefore, the same is of no use to the prosecution in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen (supra). Even otherwise, no corroborative piece of evidence has been brought on record by the prosecution in support of its case. As such, the prosecution has failed to bring home the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and also failed to complete the chain of circumstances in light of decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of 17 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 Maharashtra 9 and accordingly, the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt. Conclusion:- 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion and analysis, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.06.2017 passed by the trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC, is hereby set aside and the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of principle of benefit of doubt. Appellant is stated to be on bail. He need not surrender. However, his bail bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months as per provisions contained in Section 437-A of the CrPC. 19. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to 9 (1984) 4 SCC 116 18 CRA No. 1435 of 2017 the trial Court concerned, forthwith for information and necessary action, if any. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge Ankit