1 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 2025:CGHC:52930-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 144 of 2010 State Of Chhattisgarh Through The S.H.O., P.S. Mungeli, District Bilaspur (C.G.) Appellant(s) versus 1 - Nemdas S/o Sukalu Das Satnami Aged About 36 Years R/o Village Ameri P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - Raju Koshale S/o Baisakhu Koshale Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Ameri P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 - Jagdish S/o Chhabil Barman Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Ameri P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 4 - Subhash S/o Hari Bhargav Aged About 19 Years R/o Village Ameri P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 5 - Saokhi @ Ashok Patre S/o Chandrakumar Patre Aged About 19 Years R/o Village Ameri P.S. Chakarbhata, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 6 - (Deleted) Babla @ Laxminarayan As Per Honble Court Order Dated 17-09- 2025 7 - (Deleted) Madanlal As Per Honble Court Order Dated 17-09-2025 Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant/State : Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Dy. GA For Resp. No.1 : Mr. Rajkumar Pali, Advocate For Resp. No. 2 to 5 : Mr. Baldau Prasad Banjare, Advocate RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2025.10.31 18:27:50 +0530 2 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, J 30/10/2025 Heard. 1. The State has preferred the instant appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 13/12/2007 passed in Sessions Trial No. 35/2007 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Mungeli, District Bilaspur (C.G.) whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondents from the offences punishable under Sections 395, 397 & 412 of of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’). 2. Facts of the case are that on 24.10.2005, complainant Sanjay Kumar Soni, a jeweller, went to Damapur weekly market to sell gold and silver ornaments. Around 6:45 PM, while returning near Mauhar and Jhukhli villages, four persons attacked him with sticks, causing head and hand injuries, and looted about 4 tolas of gold ornaments, 7 kg of silver ornaments, and ₹8,000 cash, before fleeing towards Ratanpur on two motorcycles. During investigation, a black motorcycle (CG 10 ZL 9151) and several articles were recovered near Rajpur Mauhar. On 02.11.2005, based on the memorandum statements of accused Nemdass, Raju Kosle, Jagdish, Subhash, Saubi @ Ashok, and Babla @ Laxminarayan under Section 27 Evidence Act, stolen ornaments and a motorcycle (CG 07 L 6647) were seized. After investigation, a charge sheet under Sections 395, 397, and 412 IPC was filed. The case was committed to the Sessions 3 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 Court, where all accused denied the charges, claiming the ornaments were their own shop’s stock. 3. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined 16 witnesses. Statements of the respondents under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C were recorded wherein they have pleaded that they have been falsely implicated. 4. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 13.07.2007 acquitted the respondents/accused herein from the charges framed against them. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the State submits that the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge are illegal, improper, and contrary to evidence on record, resulting in miscarriage of justice. The learned Court has misappreciated both facts and law, leading to an erroneous finding. The prosecution had duly proved that the accused persons assaulted and robbed the complainant (P.W.1 Sanjay Soni) of ornaments and cash worth ₹ 94,800/-, thereby committing offences under Sections 395 and 397 IPC. The looted ornaments and money were recovered from the accused on the basis of their memorandum statements and seizure memos duly proved by P.W.5, S.K. Dubey. The identified articles were correctly recognized by the complainant as per Ex. P-3, corroborated by P.W.11 Executive Magistrate, Yuvraj Singh and independent witness P.W.14 Yogesh Soni. The prosecution evidence was consistent and reliable, fully establishing the guilt of the accused beyond 4 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 reasonable doubt; hence, the acquittal is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the judgment of acquittal is well merited and does not require any interference. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment passed by the trial Court along with the trial Court record annexed with the present appeal with utmost circumspection. 8. This is appeal against the judgment of acquittal filed by the State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. in exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 378(1) or under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. The appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the trial Court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box and also required to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonably person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair (AIR 2003 SC 182), unless the High Court arrives at definite conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective and also as held by the Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav V. Prabhunath Jha (AIR 2004 SC 1053), the appellate Court in considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial 5 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 10. The scope of interference in appeals against acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 1083), the Supreme Court has held in para 6 as under:- “. . . . the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterized as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of 6 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous." 11. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram (2022 SCC OnLine SC 984) has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 12. In the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala (2022 8 SCC 440), the Supreme Court held as under:- "25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a 7 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 13. While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of acquittal, the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully empowered to appreciate and re-appreciate the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of the trial Court. The appellate Court is required to discuss the grounds given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. 14. In the present case, the learned trial Court while acquitting the accused/respondents has observed as follows:- “…….. The trial Court observed that the independent witnesses Jitendra Singh (PW15) and Shashi Kumar (PW16) turned hostile and denied witnessing the recovery proceedings, though their signatures appeared on the memorandum and seizure memos. The Court noted inconsistencies in the dates mentioned on the memorandum and seizure documents prepared by Investigating Officer S.K. Dubey (PW5), indicating that the alleged recovery and recording of statements did not occur simultaneously, thereby creating doubt about their authenticity. The trial Court further held that there was no reliable evidence linking the seized ornaments and money to the complainant Sanjay Kumar Soni, as the identification of the 8 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 recovered articles was not conclusively proved. The complainant had also failed to identify the accused persons either at the time of incident or during the test identification parade. Moreover, the ownership of the motorcycle (CG 10 ZL 9151) allegedly used in the crime was not established to belong to any of the accused. The trial Court, therefore, concluded that the prosecution could not establish that the recovered ornaments were those looted from the complainant or that the accused were involved in the robbery. Accordingly, it acquitted accused Nemdass, Raju Kosle, Jagdish, Subhash, Saubi @ Ashok, and Babla @ Laxminarayan of offences under Sections 395 and 397 IPC, and Madan Soni of the offence under Section 412 IPC, holding that the evidence was insufficient and doubtful to warrant conviction.” 15. In light of the above findings, the statements of the principal witnesses require careful scrutiny. 16. PW-1 Sanjay Kumar Soni, the complainant, deposed that on 24.10.2005 at about 6:30 p.m., while returning from Dampur Bazaar to Sukli after selling gold and silver ornaments, between Villages Mouhar and Sukli near a pond where there was a tamarind tree, about five to six persons stopped him and assaulted him, causing him to fall on the ground. Thereafter, those persons snatched his bag containing gold and silver ornaments such as locket, tops, phulli, padham jhumka, bali, toda, lachha, payal, hathphool, patta, chudi, and other similar articles and fled from the spot. He somehow managed to reach the police chowki and lodged the 9 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 report of the incident, which was recorded as Ex. P-1. After lodging the report, he was taken to Sukli Police Station and thereafter to the hospital, where he received primary medical treatment for injuries on his head, chest, and hands caused by lathi blows. He was later referred to the Government Hospital, Bilaspur, for further treatment. The witness further stated that the police seized from him the receipts of the ornaments vide seizure memo Ex. P-2 and that the Tahsildar conducted identification proceedings of the recovered ornaments, during which he identified the ornaments as belonging to him; the memorandum of identification is Ex. P-3. He admitted that he is a goldsmith by profession and used to prepare and sell ornaments in the market. During cross-examination, he admitted that at the time of identification both gold and silver ornaments were shown to him, but no gold ingot (“ulla”) was looted from him. He stated that a melted piece of gold was produced during identification, but he could not say whether it was part of the looted ornaments and further admitted that he was not present at the time of seizure of any ornaments. He stated that the identification proceedings took place in the office of the Tahsildar, Sukli, in his chamber, and except for him and the Tahsildar, no one else was present. He denied the suggestion that no identification of ornaments was conducted. The witness further stated that he knew accused Madan Soni but did not know whether he was also engaged in the jewellery business or whether he had accompanied him to the market on the date of the incident. He candidly admitted that he could not identify any of the assailants who 10 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 had attacked him and that even in Court he could not recognise any of the accused present. He further stated that at the time of lodging the report he had informed that four persons had stopped and assaulted him and had taken away his bag. He confirmed that during police examination he had mentioned that four to six persons were involved, but if such detail was not recorded in his statement, he could not explain the reason. He also admitted that another identification proceeding was conducted in Bilaspur Jail, but he could not identify any of the persons who had committed the offence. He added that on the next day of the incident, his statement was recorded at Bilaspur Hospital, which was read over to him and found correct. 17. PW-15 Birendra Singh categorically deposed that he could not identify any of the accused and that no interrogation or seizure was made in his presence. Although his signatures appear on several memoranda and seizure memos (Ex. P-10 to Ex. P-23) as well as arrest memos (Ex. P-24 to Ex. P-30), he clarified that he had signed those documents at the police station on police instructions without reading their contents. He explained that while returning from Bilha, he was stopped by the police near Chakarbhata Police Station, questioned about vehicle documents, and compelled to sign blank papers out of fear that his motorcycle might be seized. He firmly denied witnessing any recovery or confession by the accused. His statement recorded under Section 165 of the Evidence Act corroborates that he was merely a passer-by and not a recovery witness. 11 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 18. PW-16 Shashi Kumar’s deposition fully corroborates that of PW-15. He too denied identifying any of the accused or witnessing any interrogation or seizure. He admitted his signatures on the memoranda (Ex. P-11 to Ex. P-23) and arrest memos (Ex. P-24 to Ex. P-30) but stated that he had signed them at the police station on police instructions without knowing their contents. He narrated that while returning from Bilha, he and PW-15 were stopped near the police station, taken inside, and asked to sign some blank papers. He categorically stated that no accused persons or articles were present at that time and that he signed the papers around 6:30 to 6:45 p.m. at the police station. His testimony, therefore, completely demolishes the prosecution version that the memoranda and recoveries were made in their presence. 19. From the depositions of PW-15 and PW-16, it clearly emerges that both witnesses completely disowned the prosecution case and consistently maintained that their signatures were obtained on blank papers under pressure. Their evidence not only fails to support the alleged disclosure statements and recoveries but also casts a serious shadow of doubt on the authenticity of all documentary proceedings claimed to have been conducted under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 20. In absence of any other independent corroboration, the alleged recoveries and confessional statements cannot be relied upon. It is a settled principle of law that where the prosecution fails to prove that a disclosure was made voluntarily and properly attested by independent witnesses, the recoveries based on such statements lose their evidentiary value. 12 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 21. PW-5 S.K. Dubey, the then Station House Officer of Police Station Chakarbhatha, deposed regarding the investigation, including the disclosure statements and consequent recoveries. However, during cross- examination, he admitted material discrepancies such as different dates (02.11.2005 and 03.11.2005) appearing on documents, mismatch of amounts shown in the memorandum and seizure memos, absence of time or reference numbers, and the improbably short duration within which recoveries at multiple places were allegedly completed. Although he denied that the documents were prepared at the police station, his version stands contradicted by PW15 and PW16. These inconsistencies, coupled with the absence of any independent corroboration, render the entire recovery process unreliable. 22. In the considered view of this Court, the trial Court rightly held that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of circumstances connecting the accused with the alleged offence. The contradictions in PW-5’s testimony, the categorical denial by both independent witnesses, and the absence of identification of either the property or the accused collectively create grave doubt about the prosecution story. The view taken by the trial Court is both reasonable and plausible on the evidence available and cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to law so as to warrant interference under Section 378 CrPC. 23. Upon a comprehensive re-appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence, it clearly emerges that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The memorandum statements of the accused, 13 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 said to have been recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, suffer from serious infirmities. The independent witnesses to those memorandum and seizures i.e. PW15 & PW16 have categorically denied witnessing any such proceedings and have asserted that their signatures were obtained on blank papers at the police station under pressure. The alleged recoveries of gold and silver ornaments and cash, purportedly effected in their presence, thus remain uncorroborated. The Investigating Officer himself admitted material discrepancies such as inconsistent dates, missing particulars, and mismatch in the amount of money shown as recovered, which further erode the credibility of the entire recovery process. The prosecution has also failed to establish any nexus between the seized articles and the complainant or to prove ownership through reliable identification. In these circumstances, the evidentiary value of the memorandum and seizure memos stands seriously undermined, rendering the alleged disclosures and recoveries unsafe to rely upon. 24. In view of the above analysis, this Court finds that the trial Court has taken a reasonable and possible view based on the evidence on record. The appreciation of evidence by the trial Court does not appear to be perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to law. On the contrary, its findings are supported by material inconsistencies and by the complete lack of independent corroboration. Given that nearly two decades have passed since the incident and that the accused have already undergone the ordeal of a prolonged trial and appeal, this Court finds no compelling reason to 14 ACQA No. 144 of 2010 disturb the order of acquittal. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. 25. The Registry is directed to transmit a certified copy of this judgment along with the trial-court record to the court concerned for information and necessary compliance. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Rahul/Gowri