1 2025:CGHC:53695 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 238 of 2019 Safiyuddin @ Haji S/o Guhiyuddin Aged About 52 Years R/o Mandir Chowk Jarhabhata, Tahsil And District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh..................(Defendant) ... Appellant versus Hina Anjum D/o Late Haqimuddin Aged About 21 Years R/o Ramgopal Tiwari Ward, Mungeli, Tahsil And District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh..........(Plaintiff), District : Mungeli, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause Title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Sourabh Gupta, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board 03/11/2025 1. The instant Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908, against the impugned judgment and decree dated 30-01-2019 passed by learned 6th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Appeal No. 77-A/2013, whereby the first appeal filed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.02.07 11:48:49 +0530 2 the plaintiff is dismissed and judgment and decree passed by learned 2nd Civil Judge Class-II, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 25-A/2012 is affirmed. 2. The present appellant and one Mus. Shahida Bano, who were the plaintiffs, have filed the Civil Suit under Section 12 of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, against the defendant for vacant possession of the suit shop, situated at Jarhabhata, Mandir Chowk, Sheet No. 4, Plot No. 39/2, Bilaspur. It is pleaded in the plaint that the defendant is their tenant for the monthly rent of Rs. 1000/-, which was given to him on rent on 01-08-2003. The defendant has not paid the rent of suit shop since August 2006, and there are arrears of rent of Rs. 8000/- up to 31st March 2007. He also raised construction on the back side of the shop, which is a violation of the tenancy condition. The suit shop is bona fide required for themselves, and despite repeated requests made to him, he has not vacated the suit shop, and thus, the civil suit is filed. 3. The defendant contested the suit and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, and claimed title over the suit shop. The plaintiff No. 1 is the sister-in-law, and the plaintiff No. 2 is the niece of the defendant. On 23-05-1991, the brother of the defendant died; thereafter, the plaintiff No. 1 started residing at her parents’ house. She filed a Civil Suit No. 05-A/1997, before the Additional District Judge, Mungeli, which was decided on 19-12-2000, and a decree for partition was passed. In the said decree, the plaintiff No. 1 was held entitled to 1/32, and plaintiff No. 2 was held entitled to 1/8th share of the property of the family. The defendant is bound to obey the decree passed by the learned Civil 3 Court. The plaintiffs have executed the decree ex parte without the knowledge of the defendant and shown him as their tenant. The defendant is ready to give the property to the plaintiffs as per the decree, in accordance with the law, but he is not a tenant of the suit shop. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed. 4. The learned trial Court has framed issues and, after recording evidence of the parties, passed the judgment and decree on 28-09-2013 and dismissed the suit, holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has not been established, and there is no bona fide requirement of the plaintiffs. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff No. 1 Mus. Shahida Bano has died, and the suit was prosecuted by the plaintiff No. 2 alone. 5. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court was challenged by the plaintiff before the learned first appellate Court, which was allowed vide its judgment and decree dated 30-01-2019, and a decree of vacant possession and arrears of rent has been passed in favour of the plaintiff. Hence, this second appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the plaintiff has failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant and therefore, she is not entitled for decree of vacant possession. It is the admitted position in the case that a decree for partition was passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Mungeli, with respect to the property of the family, and the suit shop is also one of the properties of the joint family. Until the decree is legally executed in metes and bounds, the defendant cannot be termed as a tenant. The plaintiff, with the collusion 4 of the revenue authorities, has got the decree partitioned on papers and claimed that she is the exclusive title and possession holder of the suit shop, which is not correct. The solatium paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, after the death of her father, who was the brother of the plaintiff, cannot be counted as the rent of the suit shop. He would also submit that the tenancy and amount of rent have been wrongly considered by the learned first appellate court. He would further submit that the finding recorded by the learned first appellate court regarding arrears of rent is perverse to the facts and evidence available on record, and therefore, the substantial questions of law involved in the appeal for its consideration and the same may be admitted for hearing. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record of the trial court as well as the first appellate court. 8. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the CPC is confined to the substantial question of law. The finding of facts cannot be disturbed unless shown to be perverse or based on no evidence. 9. From perusal of the record, it would show that on 07-09-2011, the defence of the defendant was struck off, and he has not led any evidence, nor has he himself been examined. The plaintiff served a legal notice dated 20-02-2007 (Ex. P-3) to the defendant, asking for vacant possession of the suit shop and arrears of rent. The notice was replied to by the defendant on dated 22-03-2007 (Ex. P-4), the defendant admitted that the rent of the suit shop is regularly paid to them, but they have not issued any receipt for the same. In para 4 of 5 the reply to the notice (Ex. P-4), it is averred that “vkidks izfrekg esjk O;ogkjh fu;fer fdjk;k nsrs pyk vk jgk gS] ftldh dksbZ ikorh vki ugha nsrsA Lor% iSlk vki izkIr dj ysrs gSa”. Further, in para 7 of the same reply Ex. P-4, he averred that “7- ;g fd vkids uksfVl dh dafMdk 8 ds fo"k; esa dFku gS fd vki fu;fer fdjk;k izkIr dj jgs gSaA”. It is further averred in the reply of the notice that “vr% vkidks xkao izrkiiqj dh tehu caVokjs esa nh tk pqdh gSA tgka ij vkidk dCtk gSA vkidks vkidk gd] fof/kor fn;k tk pqdk gS] dgha ij Hkh vkids lkFk esjk O;ogkj ukbZUlkQh ugh dj jgk gSA ;fn vkidks fdjk;snkjh ds fo"k; esa fdlh rjg dk dksbZ lansg gS rks vki jlhn nsdj fdjk;k okyh ijaijk izkjaHk dj ysosa] rkfd fLFkfr Li"V gks tkosA”. 10. Further, from the documents Ex. P-7 and P-8, which are the document relates to the execution of the decree of partition, clearly demonstrate that the property of the family was partitioned in metes and bounds, and the suit shop was obtained by the plaintiff in partition. There is no evidence that such a partition was challenged by the defendant in any forum. The plaintiff establishes her title over the suit shop, and the defendant, by his reply, admitted the tenancy. Once the tenancy is admitted, the denial of title becomes irrelevant. The issue of the title of the suit shop cannot be raised in the landlord-tenant suit. The defendant has not claimed his title in any other suit, but has admitted that he is ready to give the share of the property to the plaintiff. 11. With respect to the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff, it is settled that the plaintiff is the judge of his/her own requirement, and the tenant cannot dictate the terms. 12. The first appellate court has independently examined the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the defendant is estopped by 6 the principle of estoppel against the reply to the notice dated 22-03- 2007 (Ex. P-4), and there is sufficient evidence to establish the landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, i.e. the document of Ex. P-7 and P-8, which are the documents related to the execution proceeding of the partition decree. It is well settled that in the second appeal, the court cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record unless finding are perverse or based on no evidence. No such circumstances exist in the present case. The learned first appellate court has rightly passed the decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(a) and (c) of the Act of 1961, which does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. 13. Accordingly, this court does not find any question of law, much less a substantial question of law, involved in the appeal. The present second appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. 14. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved