1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 577 of 2008 1 - Abhay Dhruv S/O Shri Phirath Ram Dhruv, Aged About 38 (36) Years, S/O. Shri Phirath Ram Dhruv, Occupation Private Service,R/O Village Kanakot, P.S.-Palari, Distt.-Raipur, Presently Residing At Saktipara,Balodabazar,Distt.-Raipur Cg ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate Raipur C.G. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Rakesh Kumar Thakur, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Shashi Bhushan Tiwari, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Kishan Lal Sahu, Dy. G.A. Single Bench: Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Judgment on Board 19.12.2025 VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant herein under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.05.2008 passed in Sessions Trial No.203/2006 by the Second Additional District (Sessions) Judge, Balodabazar, District Bhatapara (C.G.) by which the appellant stands convicted & sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 304 Part-I of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one month. Under Section 304 Part-I of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one month. (Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently) 2. The prosecution case is that the accused and deceased Toran Yadav were close friends. Toran Yadav frequently visited the accused’s house, shared meals, and stayed there at times. Over a period, the accused developed a suspicion that Toran Yadav was having an illicit relationship with his wife, Dukaleen. On the night of the incident, Toran Yadav 3 came to the accused’s house. The accused, Toran Yadav, and others consumed alcohol and had food. Thereafter, the accused went to sleep in a downstairs room along with his children, while his wife remained in the kitchen area upstairs. At about 2:00 a.m., the accused woke up and went upstairs. There, he allegedly saw Toran Yadav and his wife sleeping together under a blanket in the kitchen. Enraged and unable to tolerate the sight, the accused allegedly poured kerosene on both of them and set them on fire using a matchstick. After committing the act, he returned to the downstairs room and went back to sleep. When the fire broke out, Dukaleen and Toran Yadav woke up and ran in an attempt to save themselves. The children of the accused raised an alarm and attempted to extinguish the fire on their mother and Toran Yadav. Both victims sustained severe burn injuries. They were covered with clothes and taken by rickshaw to the Government Hospital, Baloda Bazar. Due to the seriousness of the injuries, Dr. Pramod Tiwari referred them to Mekahara Hospital, Raipur. At Mekahara Hospital, Toran Yadav succumbed to his burn injuries, while Dukaleen survived after undergoing treatment for several days. After her discharge, she returned to the accused’s house at village Kanakot, where her dying declaration was recorded. In her statement, 4 she claimed that the fire occurred accidentally when a lamp was lit. 3. The police conducted the investigation, recorded statements of witnesses, and prepared a panchnama of the burnt articles found at the place of occurrence. Relying upon the material collected during investigation, including an alleged confession made by the accused to journalists, the Station House Officer registered an FIR vide Ex.P/07 against the accused under Section 302 of the IPC on 18.01.2006. 4. After due investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 27.03.2006 against the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baloda Bazar. The case was subsequently committed to the Court of Sessions, received by the Sessions Judge, Raipur on 31.05.2006, and later transferred to the Court of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Baloda Bazar for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defence by stating that he has not committed the offence. 5. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 15 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 24 documents Exs.P-1 to P-24. However, the appellant in support of his defence has examined 2 witnesses and exhibited two documents. 5 6. The trial Court, after completion of trial and upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, by its impugned judgment, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which he has preferred the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court was wholly unjustified in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the aforesaid offence, as the prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that there is no cogent, reliable or clinching evidence available on record connecting the appellant with the commission of the alleged offence. Consequently, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence deserve to be set aside and the appellant is entitled to be acquitted of the said charges. Learned counsel further submits that the allegation against the appellant of having poured kerosene oil upon his deceased wife, Dukaleen Bai, and Toran Lal Sahu has not been proved in accordance with law. It is contended that in the alleged dying declaration of deceased Dukaleen Bai, the reasons attributed to the incident are not incriminating and, in any case, the said document, which is stated to be an improved 6 version, has not been duly proved by the prosecution in accordance with law. It is further argued that the incident was accidental in nature, having occurred when the bed and clothing caught fire while the deceased were sleeping under a blanket. There is not even an iota of evidence to suggest that the appellant had found his wife with the other deceased, namely Toran Lal Sahu, in any objectionable position or that, due to such alleged provocation, he set the deceased persons ablaze. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is bad on law and is liable to be set-aside by allowing the present appeal. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has successfully proved the charges against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and, therefore, the appellant has been rightly convicted and sentenced for the aforesaid offence. It is contended that the present case is one of double murder and the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant by cogent and reliable evidence. Learned State counsel further submits that there is no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and, as such, no case for interference is made out. 7 9. I have heard learned State counsel and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature which has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem reports (Ex.P-18) proved by PW-14 Dr. Vikas Kumar Dhruv, which is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now, the question would be whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question? 12. From a perusal of the record, it appears that on the date of the incident, i.e., 04.01.2006 at about 2:00 p.m., the wife of the appellant, namely deceased Dukaleen Bai, and another person, namely Toran Lal Sahu, died as a result of burn injuries allegedly caused by pouring of kerosene oil by the appellant. 13. PW-1 Sant Ram Sahu, who is a dresser at the Government Hospital, Balodabazar and also a neighbour of the appellant, has stated that when he reached the spot, the wife of the appellant as well as another person were crying “bachao-bachao”; however, they did not name or state that any person was responsible for the incident. 8 14. PW-2 Daulal Chandrakar has stated that although the deceased were shouting “bachao-bachao”, they did not disclose the name of any person who had set them ablaze. 15. PW-3 Raju Sahu has stated that in his presence the deceased did not state or name any person as having set her or the other deceased ablaze, and no one disclosed the identity of any assailant. 16. PW-9 Chhannulal, aged about 11 years, son of the accused and deceased Dukaleen Bai, stated that on the night of the incident Toran Yadav had come to their house and thereafter Toran and Dukaleen went to the upper room, while the accused later went downstairs with the children. He further stated that a fire broke out in the upper room where Dukaleen and Toran were present, resulting in both sustaining burn injuries. In his cross-examination, he denied that the fire was accidental and also denied that he or his sister had set fire to the deceased. 17. PW-10 Parika, aged about 10 years, daughter of the accused and deceased Dukaleen Bai, stated that on the night of the incident Toran Yadav had come to their house and thereafter Toran and her mother went to sleep in the upper room, while her father remained downstairs with the children. She further stated that during the night a fire broke 9 out in the upper room. In her cross-examination, she denied the suggestion that the fire was accidental or that she or her brother had set the deceased on fire. 18. PW-13 Sukalu stated that upon learning of the incident he went to the house of the accused, informed the police and Toran’s family, and later took the injured to the hospital. He admitted that Dukaleen Bai never told him that the accused had set her on fire and further admitted that several facts stated by him before the Court were not stated to the police. 19. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, has categorically stated that he has been falsely implicated and that the incident occurred accidentally when a burning oil chimney caught fire to the blanket and other articles on the bed. 20. From a perusal of the dying declaration (Ex. D/6), it is evident that the cause of the fire has been stated to be an oil chimney, which has not been disputed in the evidence on record. The learned trial Court convicted the appellant mainly on the ground that he was present at the time of the incident and that he did not make sufficient efforts to save the deceased or extinguish the fire. However, from a perusal of the entire evidence on record, including the dying 10 declaration, it appears that the fire was accidental in nature, though an FIR was lodged on the basis of a marg enquiry. 21. The doctor has admitted that in the post-mortem report, the nature of death has not been specifically opined. No FSL report has been placed on record, and there is no forensic corroboration to support the prosecution case. It has also come on record that there were other enmities within the family. The defence witness examined in the case has supported the version of accidental fire. 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nandu Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh) reported in (2022) 19 SCC 301 has held in para 9 which reads as under:- “9.In a case based on substantial evidence, motive assumes great significance. It is not as if motive alone becomes the crucial link in the case to be established by the prosecution and in its absence the case of prosecution must be discarded. But, at the same time, complete absence of motive assumes a different complexion and such absence definitely weighs in favour of the accused.” 11 23. It is a settled principle of criminal law that suspicion, howsoever grave, cannot take the place of proof. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing only towards the guilt of the accused. 24. In the present case, key witnesses have not attributed any role to the appellant, there is no recovery, no forensic evidence, and no consistent medical or ocular evidence to conclusively establish the guilt of the appellant. Further, no allegation was ever made by the deceased against the appellant, and the conviction cannot be sustained merely on the basis of suspicion or the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence. 25. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, this Court does not consider the present case to be a fit one for affirming the judgment passed by the learned trial Court convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. 26. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court is hereby set- aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 304 Part I of IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt. 12 27. The appellant is reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Cr.P.C. of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the trial Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Vishakha