-1- NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 2085 of 2024 1 - Nizam Shekh S/o Nabeer Shekh Aged About 49 Years R/o Nimiyadih, Police Station- Garwa, District Garwa, Jharkhand. (Driver Of Offending Vehicle Trailer No. C.G.- 15 A.C.- 4409) (Non-Applicant No. 1). 2 - Mahtab Alam S/o Shekh Riyaz Ali, R/o Tirwarta Korba, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. (Owner Of Offending Vehicle Trailer No. C.G.- 15 A.C.- 4409) (Non-Applicant No. 2) ... Appellants versus 1 - Smt. Nisha Dubey W/o Late Amit Kumar Dubey Aged About 30 Years R/o Village- Chakraway, Police Station- Simga, Tahsil- Simga, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh. (Claimants) 2 - Minor Tanishk Dubey S/o Late Amit Kumar Dubey Aged About 5 Years Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Nisha Dubey, W/o Late Amit Kumar Dubey, R/o Village- Chakraway, Police Station- Simga, Tahsil- Simga, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Minor Tanishka Dubey D/o Late Amit Kumar Dubey Aged About 6 Years Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Nisha Dubey, W/o Late Amit Kumar Dubey, R/o Village- Chakraway, Police Station- Simga, Tahsil- Simga, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Shivkumar Dubey S/o Late Munnalal Dubey Aged About 61 Years R/o Village- Chakraway, Police Station- Simga, Tahsil- Simga, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Smt. Behula Dubey W/o Shivkumar Dubey Aged About 58 Years R/o Village- Chakraway, Police Station- Simga, Tahsil- Simga, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh. Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE -2- 6 - Branch Manager The New India Insurance Company Limited, Korba (D.O.) (460200). Sada Complex Transport Nagar Korba, District Korba, Chhattisgarh. (Insurer Of Offending Vehicle Trailer No. C.G.- 15 A.C.- 4409). ... Respondent(s) For Appellants : Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 5 : Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, Advocate For Respondent No.6 : Mr. Sudhir Agrawal, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 16/12/2025 1. Heard on I. A. No. 2, an application for condonation of delay. 2. Mr. Dhurandhar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/driver & owner submits that the present appeal has been preferred against the award passed by the learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bhatapara, District Bhatapara in Claim Case No.04/2020 dated 21.12.2022, whereby the learned Tribunal granted compensation to the tune of 12,04,000/- along with interest ₹ at the rate of 9% per annum on account of the death of Amit Kumar. 3. He would further submit that the award was passed on 21.12.2022, whereas the present appeal has been filed on 22.10.2024 with a delay of 570 days. He would contend that the delay occurred due to miscommunication between the appellants and their counsel who appeared before the learned Tribunal. He further argues that upon receipt of the execution notice, the appellants took steps, collected the necessary documents and thereafter filed the present appeal; thus, he prays that the application for condonation of the delay may be -3- allowed. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent(s) would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and submit that there is an inordinate delay of 570 days. It is contended that the appellants have failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the application and the documents on record. 6. In para-1 of the application, the appellants have stated that the award was passed on 21.12.2022. A perusal of the award would show that the appellants had participated in the proceedings before the learned Tribunal and award was passed in presence of both the parties. The specific ground taken for condonation of delay is that there was miscommunication between the appellants and their counsel and upon receipt of the execution notice, they approached their counsel. However, a perusal of the application reveals that the appellants have not mentioned the date on which the execution notice was received and when they approached their counsel. The appellants have failed to assign sufficient cause for the delay. 7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a -4- defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 8. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the -5- substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 9. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to -6- defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 10.In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” -7- 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12.Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the appellants could not explain the inordinate delay of 570 days properly in the application moved in this regard. 13. Accordingly, I.A. No.1, the application for condonation of delay, is hereby rejected. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by limitation, also stands dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nadim