1 CRA No.553/2016 2025:CGHC:54682 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 553 of 2016 1 - Shivlal Yadav And Others S/o Late Chandrika Yadav Aged About 18 Years R/o Village Jonkapat, Police Station Shankargarh, Civil And Revenue District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh 2 - Rajendra Yadav S/o Heeralal Yadav Aged About 19 Years R/o Village Jagima, Police Station Shankargarh, Civil And Revenue District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Laxman Das Panika S/o Sukhu Das Panika Aged About 19 Years R/o Village Lodhi, Police Station Shankargarh, Civil And Revenue District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Jitendra Lakda S/o Vasudev Lakda Aged About 20 Years R/o Village Mankepi, Police Station Shankargarh, Civil And Revenue District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Shankargarh, Civil And Revenue District Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Aditya Dhar Diwan, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. U.K.S. Chandel, Dy.A.G. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge 10.11.2025 AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.11.12 16:35:34 +0530 2 CRA No.553/2016 In this case, there are five accused persons namely; Shivlal Yadav, Rajendra Yadav, Laxman Das Panika, Jitendra Lakda and Ajay Kumar Yadav. Out of said five accused, one accused namely; Ajay Kumar Yadav has been acquitted by the learned trial Court. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04-04-2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, C.G. in Sessions Case No.285/2009 whereby learned Court convicted and sentenced the appellants as under:- Conviction Sentence Section 386 read with Section 34 of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.500/- each with default stipulation Section 507 read with Section 34 of IPC R.I. for 2 years each 1. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant, Jairam Nagesia (Sarpanch), PW-3, lodged a report at Shankargarh Police Station that on 12.11.2008, at about 10:00 PM, alleging, inter alia, therein that some unknown persons came to his residence and shouted on him to open the door otherwise, they will set the house on fire by pouring kerosene. Out of fear, when the complainant opened the door, he saw four boys, aged approximately 19-20 years, 3 CRA No.553/2016 standing outside his house. The said persons threatened to shoot him and demanded mobile from him. One of the accused persons forcibly took his mobile phone along with cash amounting to ₹2,200/- from the pocket of his trouser. It is further alleged that one of the accused was demanding ₹2,00,000/-. The accused persons also wrote a letter in the name of Ambuj Yadav, Secretary, Gram Panchayat, PW-2, demanding Rs.3,00,000/-, and threatening to kill in case the said amount was not paid and also said to the complainant to deliver the said letter to Ambuj Yadav, and further instructed him to arrange Rs.50,000/- within a week. Thereafter, on 25.11.2008, at about 11:00 PM, the accused persons again came in front of the complainant's house and called him and to Kindru PW-8, asking them to open the door. When the complainant's wife did not open the door, the accused persons left the place. Subsequently, the complainant, along with Ambuj Yadav, upon questioning Ajay Yadav (acquitted accused), it was revealed that four other accused persons (present appellants) involved in the incident. During investigation, all the said accused persons were later confronted in presence of Neeraj Yadav, Bandesh Ram, Ambuj Yadav, and Sonsay Nagesia, where they confessed to commit the said robbery of the mobile phone and cash from the complainant. Memorandum statements of the appellants were recorded. Mobile phone and gun were 4 CRA No.553/2016 seized from the appellants. After completing the investigation, final report was prepared and a charge-sheet was submitted before the concerned Court. 2. In course of trial the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses to bring home the charges. The appellants abjured the guilt; pleaded innocence; and false implication. 3. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to convict the appellants herein for the aforementioned offence and sentenced them as mentioned herein-above against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellants- accused herein questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the appellants have been falsely implicated in the present case. He submits that Jairam Nagesia (Sarpanch) PW-3 in his deposition has specifically admitted that because of dark in the night, he could not identify the persons who were present at his door and further has also admitted that even his wife could not identified. Learned counsel submits that PW-3 has admitted in his cross examination that since all the appellants are the residents of the same village, therefore, he knows them, even then at the 5 CRA No.553/2016 time of commission of offence, the Jairam Nagesia (Sarpanch) PW-3 did not identify them. The seized mobile has not been identified by him and therefore, it cannot be said that any incriminating article has been seized. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed. 5. Per-contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. The learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for the aforesaid offence, thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 7. PW-3 Jairam Nagesia, Complainant stated in his evidence that on 12.11.2008 the appellants came to his house, knocked the door. They threatened that if the door was not opened, they would pour kerosene and set the house on fire. Thereupon, out of fear, he opened the door and they demanded ₹2,00,000/-. He stated that he could not pay such amount, to which, the appellants told him to keep ₹50,000/- ready within one week. Accused Shivlal Yadav 6 CRA No.553/2016 show a weapon like pistol and took mobile from his pocket and ₹2,000/-. The witness further states that thereafter they wrote a letter in the name of Ambuj Yadav (PW-2), who is the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, stating that ₹3,00,000/- must be given, otherwise his family would be killed. The accused asked that the said letter be delivered to Ambuj Yadav in the morning. In cross-examination, he stated that due to dark in the night, he could not recognize the persons who had come to open the door. He stated that his wife too could not recognize those persons. He deposed that in his presence, the police did not interrogate the accused nor record any memorandum statement. He does not remember the name of company of his mobile, as it has been a long time and he does not remember the number of that mobile phone. The accused persons are from his village, therefore, he knows them. He further stated that in his presence, the police did not seize any weapon from the accused persons. 8. PW-9 Bandesh Ram stated in his evidence that he has not went to house of appellants with Police. He further stated that, in his presence, the police has not seized any articles from the house of appellants. Manish Kumar Singh PW-5 stated in his evidence that in the site map, he did not mention the date on any document issued by the Tehsildar. 7 CRA No.553/2016 9. Kindru (P.W. 8), neighbour of complainant, stated in his evidence that on 25.11.2008, when the accused persons came and asked complainant Jayaram to open the door of his house, no one opened it, and then they brought this witness along with them. However, before the Court, this witness stated that when he had gone out at night to answer the nature’s call at that time, four persons called him, showed a pistol, and asked him to show the house of Jayaram. They also threatened him that if he did not tell them, they would shoot him. He also stated that he had identified Rajendra/accused. The witness further stated that he told the accused that he was going to sleep, after which, they ran away from there. He further stated that while giving statement before the Police, he has not deposed the name of accused persons. He categorically stated that there is a previous animosity between his family and accused persons regarding the election of Sarpanch. In cross-examination, he stated that when he went to the police station to give his statement, he did not describe the details of any person. He categorically stated that even after seeing the accused persons, he did not mention their names or physical descriptions. It is also correct that the police did not conduct any identification proceedings of the accused persons before him. 8 CRA No.553/2016 10. Ambuj Yadav (P.W. 2), who is the Secretary of Gram Panchayat, stated that on 13.11.2008, Sarpanch Jayaram gave him a letter and told him that four persons had come during the night, and had asked him to deliver that letter. He read the letter, which contained a demand for three lakh rupees and a threat to kill if the amount was not paid. In paragraph 3, he stated that the police had seized that letter, and the seizure memo is Exhibit P-6. Extortion : 11. It would be evident from the reading of Section 383 of the IPC that the ingredients of 'extortion' are; (i) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security; (iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. The terms 'dishonestly', 'illegally' and 'injury' used in "Section 383 of the IPC and in "Sections 24, 43 and 44 of the IPC respectively. On a careful consideration of the above definitions and ingredients what appears is that if someone puts the others intentionally in fear to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that person who has been put into fear to deliver to the person 9 CRA No.553/2016 any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted into valuable security shall be liable to be punished for 'extortion'. 12. Thus, what is necessary for constituting an offence of 'extortion' is that the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury, the victim was voluntarily delivered any particular property to the man putting him into fear. If there was no delivery of property, then the most important ingredient for constituting the offence of 'extortion' would not be available. Further, if a person voluntarily delivers any property without there being any fear of injury, an offence of 'extortion' cannot be said to have been committed. 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of R.S. Nayak Vs. A.N. Antulay and another, reported in 1986 (2) SCC 716, held in para 60 as under:- “60. Before a person can be said to put any person to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held out some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound to do in future. If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him he would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence of extortion. We 10 CRA No.553/2016 agree with this view which has been indicated in Habibul Razak v. King Emperor, A.I.R. 1924 All 197. There is no evidence at all in this case that the managements of the sugar co-operatives had been put in any fear and the contributions had been paid in response to threats. Merely because the respondent was Chief Minister at the relevant time and the sugar co-operatives had some of their grievances pending consideration before the Government and pressure was brought about to make the donations promising consideration of such grievances, possibly by way of reciprocity, we do not think the appellant is justified in his contention that the ingredients of the offence of extortion have been made out. The evidence led by the prosecution falls short of the requirements of law in regard to the alleged offence of extortion. We see, therefore, no justification in the claim of Mr. Jethmalani that a charge for the offence of extortion should have been framed". 14. The Supreme Court in case Isaac Isanga Musumba and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2014 (15) SCC 357, has held in para 3 and 4 which are extracted as under:- 11 CRA No.553/2016 “We have read the FIR which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-7 and we find therefrom that the complainants have alleged that the accused persons have shown copies of international warrants issued against the complainants by the Ugandan Court and letters written by Uganda Ministry of Justice & Constitutional Affairs and the accused have threatened to extort 20 million dollars (equivalent to Rs.110 crores). In the complaint, there is no mention whatsoever that pursuant to the demands made by the accused, any amount was delivered to the accused by the complainants. If that be so, we fail to see as to how an offence of extortion as defined in Section 383, IPC is made out. Section 383, IPC states that whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits 'extortion'. Hence, unless property is delivered to the accused person pursuant to the threat, no offence of extortion is made out and an FIR for the offence under Section 384 could not 12 CRA No.553/2016 have been registered by the police. 4. We also find on the reading of the FIR, there is also an allegation that on 18th April, 2013 between 1 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. the accused persons illegally entered into the Head Office of the Company at Fort and demanded 20 million dollars (equivalent to Rs.110 crores) saying that they have international arrest warrants against the complainants and upon failure to pay the said sum the complainants will have to face dire consequences. It is because of this allegation in the FIR, the offence under Section 441, IPC is alleged to have been committed by the accused persons. On reading Section 441, IPC we find that intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of property is a necessary ingredient of the offence of criminal trespass. It is not disputed that there was a business transaction between the accused persons and the complainants. Hence, if the accused persons have visited the premises of the complainants to make a demand towards their dues, we do not think a case of 'criminal trespass' as defined in Section 441, IPC is made out against the accused persons". 13 CRA No.553/2016 15. In the case at hand, witness T.R. Sahu (P.W. 9) stated that the Nokia mobile phone belonging to the complainant Jayaram, which contained SIM number 9406276435, was seized in the presence of witnesses as per the seizure memo Exhibit P-7. However, Manish Kumar (PW-5), a witness to the seizure memo Exhibit P-7, denied that the police had seized the said mobile phone in his presence. Similarly, Bandesh Ram (P.W.10), who was also a witness to the same seizure memo Exhibit P-7, denied in paragraph 2 of his testimony that the police had seized the mobile phone belonging to complainant Jayaram from the possession of the accused Shivlal. Thus, although the complainant stated that on 12.11.2008 the accused persons had snatched his mobile phone, there is a lack of reliable evidence to prove that the police recovered Jayaram’s mobile phone from the possession of the accused immediately after the incident. Therefore, the alleged recovery of the extorted property from the accused soon after the robbery is not established by trustworthy and conclusive evidence. The trial Court also observed the same in its judgment at para 38. However, the learned trial court convicted the appellants by relying upon the alleged letter which was seized by the appellants vide seizure memo Ex.P-6, the said letter was alleged to be written by the accused/appellants and the same was given to Jairam 14 CRA No.553/2016 Nagesia, Sarpanch/complainant to give Ambuj Yadav, Secretary, Gram Panchayat. The letter which has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P-6 has been proved by the opinion of handwriting experts, however, the conviction only on the basis of opinion of the experts regarding the handwriting in the so-called letter is not sufficient to convict the appellants for the commission of offence udner Section 386 r/w 34 of IPC and Section 507 r/w 34 of IPC. Handwriting 16. In the matter of Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad Isa reported in AIR 1963 SC 1728, the Supreme Court has held that evidence given by experts of handwriting can never be conclusive, because it is, after all, opinion evidence. 17. In the matter of Smt. Bhagwan Kaur v. Shri Maharaj Krishnan Sharma and others reported in 1973 (4) SCC 46, the Supreme Court has held that evidence of a handwriting expert, unlike that of a fingerprint expert, is generally of a frail character and its fallibilities have been quite often noticed. It was further held by Their Lordships that the courts should, therefore, be wary to give too much weight to the evidence of handwriting expert. 18. Thereafter, in the matter of Magan Bihari Lal Vs. The State of Punjab reported in 1977 2 SCC 210 their Lordships 15 CRA No.553/2016 held that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert. Further, following its earlier decision in the matter of Fakhruddin Vs. The Staet of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1967 SC 1326, their Lordships further held that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This type of evidence, being opinion evidence, is by its very nature, weak and infirm and cannot be itself form the basis for a conviction. 19. Similarly, in the matter of Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi) reported in 2003 (1) SCC 21 the Supreme Court has held that opinion of handwriting expert under Section 45 of the Evidence Act can be relied upon, but there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law that opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. 20. In the matter of Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) through legal representatives and another reported in 2019 (14) SCC 220, the Supreme Court relied upon the earlier judgments has held that court must be cautious while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and it is not substantive in nature. It was further held that it may not be safe to solely rely upon 16 CRA No.553/2016 such evidence, and court may seek independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a given case, as a general rule of prudence. Generally, mere expert evidence as to a fact is not regarded as conclusive proof of it. 21. From the above cited judgment, the evidence in the nature of a handwriting expert’s report is a weak piece of evidence and cannot be relied upon the absence of any further corroboration. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges against the accused/appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the complainant (PW-3) suffers from serious contradictions and inconsistencies, particularly the complainant himself admitted that due to darkness he and his wife could not recognize the persons who came to their house, thereby creating serious doubt regarding the identity of the accused. He further stated that in his presence the police neither interrogated the accused nor recorded any memorandum statement, and that no weapon was seized from them. The alleged recovery of the mobile phone, which forms an important link in the chain of circumstances, has also not been proved satisfactorily, as both seizure witnesses have denied witnessing any such recovery. The complainant also failed to recall the details of the allegedly 17 CRA No.553/2016 stolen mobile phone, which further weakens the prosecution case. The prosecution has not produced any cogent or reliable corroborative evidence to connect the appellants with the alleged offence. In these circumstances, the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the accused–appellants. Consequently, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court cannot be sustained in law and is liable to be set aside, and the accused–appellants are entitled to acquittal of all the charges levelled against them. 23. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case and the trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence are hereby set-aside. 24. In the result, the appeal is Allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The appellants are acquitted from all the charges levelled against them. 25. The appellants are on bail. Surety and personal bonds earlier furnished by them at the time of suspension of sentence shall remain operative for a period of six months in view of the provisions of Section 481 of the BNSS. The appellants shall appear before the higher Court as and when directed. 18 CRA No.553/2016 26. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/Amardeep