THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 892/2025 ORDER: The Criminal Revision Case has been filed under Sections 438 read with 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20231 challenging the order dated 25.07.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.79/2025 in S.C.No.218/2020 passed by the learned Special Sessions Judge for Trial of Offences against Women-cum- VII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kadapa2 in refusing to discharge the Petitioner/Accused No.11 from the case registered for the alleged offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302, 149, 120-B, 201 and 212 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603. 2. The learned Trial Court in Crl.M.P.No.79 of 2025 in S.C.No.218 of 2020 on 25.07.2025 passed the impugned order refusing to discharge the Petitioner. 3. Sri Rama Lakshmana Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submits that Respondent No.2, chapati Rama Gangi Reddy died on 01.04.2022. Hence the case against him is abated. 4. Contents in brief of the petition filed for discharge of the Petitioner before the learned Trial Court are that the complaint given by the L.W.1, Chapati Rama Gangi Reddy, specifically stated only the names of Accused Nos.1 to 10 as participants in the commission of alleged offence. It is not even stated that some other person or persons participated in the offence. Further 1 the BNSS 2 the Trial Court 3 the I.P.C., 2 neither the L.W.1/complainant nor the L.W.2 to L.W.7 alleged eyewitnesses to the murder of the deceased, did not speak the presence of the Petitioner/Accused No.11 in their statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734. Except the alleged confession said to have been made by Accused No.4 before the L.W.45, Inspector of police in which the Accused No.4 confessed the presence of Accused No.11, there is no other material to show that the presence and participation of the Petitioner/Accused No.11 in the commission of offence. The alleged confession made by Accused No.4 is inadmissible in evidence. It is further submitted that the name of the Petitioner is added in the chargesheet only on the basis of the alleged confession given by Accused No.4 which is inadmissible in law. 5. Sri Rama Lakshmana Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner while reiterating the grounds of the revision argued that the name of the Petitioner was not shown in the FIR lodged by L.W.1; LWs.1 to 7 were not eye witnesses to the alleged killing of the deceased; they did not speak the presence of the Petitioner in their statements recorded under Section 161 of ‘the Cr.P.C’; except the confession of the Accused No.4 there is no other material to show the participation of the Petitioner in the alleged murder of the Petitioner and the alleged confession of Accused No.4 is not admissible in the eye of law and it is urged to set aside the impugned order by allowing the Criminal Revision Case. 4 the Cr.P.C., 3 6. Per contra, Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor strenuously opposed the Revision Case contending that the case requires a full-fledged trial as the confession by Accused No.4 cannot be easily thrown out as per Section 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18725 at the stage of inquiry. Whether the confession of Accused No.4 is valid under Section 27 of ‘the Act’ is required to be seen only after a full-fledged trial is concluded. Therefore, at this stage, the Petitioner cannot be discharged, and it is urged to dismiss the Criminal Revision Case. 7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 8. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the order in Crl.M.P.No.79/2025 in S.C.No.218/2020 dated 25.07.2025 passed by the learned Special Sessions Judge for Trial of Offences against Women-cum-VII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kadapa, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal6, at para Nos.7 to 10 it is held as under: “7.Section 227 of the Code runs thus:-"If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." The words 'not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post-office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to 5 the Act 6 AIR 1979 SC 366 4 determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 8.The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1978) 1 SCR 257 : (AIR 1977 SC 2018) where Untwalia J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 2019):-"Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stages is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial." This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out. 9.In the case of K. P. Raghavan v. M. H. Abbas, AIR 1967 SC 740 this Court observed as follows (at p. 742):-"No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under S. 209, Cr. P. C. is not to act as a mere Post Office, and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session".To the same effect is the later decision of this Court in the case of Alamohan Das v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 520 : (AIR SC 863) where Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 866) :-"A Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused : if there is some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case."In the aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope and ambit of Section 209 of the Code of 1898. 5 10.Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out;(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.(3) The test of determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala7, at para No.11 it is held as under: “11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao8, at para Nos.7 & 10 it is held as under: “Discussion and findings 7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial Judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge-sheet material. The nature of the 7 (2010) 2 SCC 398 8 (2023) 17 SCC 688 6 evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. 10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.” 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap9, at para No.11.1 it is held as under: “11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.” 13. Indeed, LW.1, Chapati Rama Gangi Reddy, did not state the name of the Petitioner/Accused No.11. He stated only the names of Accused Nos.1 to 10 as participants in the commission of the offence. Of course, he also did not even state the role of some other person or persons indulged in the 9 (2021) 11 SCC 191 7 commission of the offence. The role of the Petitioner was neither spoken by LW.1 or LWs.2 to 7 in their statements recorded under Section 161 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ As seen from the record there was an alleged confession of Accused No.4 recorded by the Investigating Officer, wherein Accused No.4 revealed the role of the Petitioner. Undoubtedly, a confession given by an Accused involving the role of the other accused before the Police is inadmissible under Section 25 of ‘the Act.’ However, whether such confession is valid or not, admissible or inadmissible can only be looked into after a full-fledged trial is taken up. The Investigating Officer filed a chargesheet against the Petitioner and other Accused alleging that they had committed offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 201 and 212 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ also. The prosecution alleged that due to animosity between the Accused No.1 and the deceased the alleged offence was committed with the help of Accused Nos.2 to 14. Accused Nos.1 to 12 had allegedly directly participated in the murder of the deceased by hacking hunting sickles. 14. In the course of investigation LW.45, Inspector of Police, along with LWs.43 and 44, the police personnel and Panchayathdars apprehended Accused Nos.1 to 14 and seized sickles which were used for the commission of the offence from the possession of the Accused including the Petitioner under the cover of weapon seizure panchanama and arrest panchanama. 15. Of course, in the presence of LW.45, the Investigating Officer and other Panchayathdars, Accused No.4 confessed his alleged participation and also Accused Nos.1 to 11 and also the conspiracy of Accused No.12 in doing away 8 the life of the deceased by hacking. At this stage either this Court or the Sessions Court cannot appreciate the contention of the Petitioner that the confession given by Accused No.4 before the Investigating Officer cannot be looked into as it is hit by Section 25 of ‘the Act’, inasmuch as there is also recovery of the weapons under the cover of mahazarnama from the possession of the Petitioner and other Accused and whether it is relevant under Section 27 of ‘the Act’ or any other provisions of ‘the Act’ cannot be determined at this juncture. As rightly pointed out by the learned Trial Court, it is a matter of full-fledged trial to appreciate the contentions of the Petitioner. Moreso, the Petitioner was, on earlier occasion, involved in commission of an offence in FIR No.81 of 2011 of Vempalli Police Station registered for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 379 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section 29 (4) (a) (i) of AP Red Sandal and Sandal Wood Act. The Petitioner is a suspect sheet holder vide suspect sheet No.364. He is son of Accused No.12, who had purportedly conspired to kill the deceased. 16. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the request of the Petitioner to discharge him is not found convincing and reasonable. Hence, the Criminal Revision Case is liable to be dismissed as the Petitioner has not made out prima facie case for his discharge. 17. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. 9 ________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 09.10.2025 VTS