1 2025:CGHC:7170-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 100 of 2025 1 - Coal India Limited Through Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Coal Bhawan, 10 Netaji Subhash Road, Kolkata 700001, West Bengal 2 - Appellate Authority Board Of Directors Coal India Limited Through Company Secretary, Coal India Ltd, Coal Bhawan, 10 Netaji Subhash Road, Kolkata 700001, West Bengal 3 - Chairman Cum Mangaing Director Coal India Limited, Coal Bhawan, 10 Netaji Subhash Road, Kolkata 700001, West Bengal 4 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited Through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director, South Eastern Coalfields Limited Head Quarters, Seepat Road, Bilaspur, Distt.- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus Basant Pandey S/o Nand Kishre Pandey Aged About 52 Years 0-22, Ii Floor, Lajpat Nagar-Ii, Ps Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi-110024, Delhi ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.02.10 17:16:31 +0530 2 10.02.2025 1. Heard Mr. Pankaj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Chandresh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent on I.A. No.02/2025 is an application for condonation of delay of 115 days in filing the instant appeal. 2. For the reasons mentioned in the application I.A. No.02/2025 i.e. application for condonation of delay, the same is allowed and delay is condoned. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard finally. 3. The appellants have filed this writ appeal against the order dated 14.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S). No. 3049/2014 (Basant Pandey vs. Coal India Limited and Others) whereby the learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / respondent herein, quashing the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority and remitted the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority to impose any minor penalty strictly in accordance with the rules holding that since the writ petitioner was practicing as a Chartered Accountant in New Delhi, therefore, he would not be entitled to claim back-wages or arrears of salary. 4. Brief facts of the case are that the writ petitioner was appointed to the post of Accountant in the office of Chairman Cum Managing Director, South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Head Quarters, Seepat 3 Road, Bilaspur in non-executive cadre on 17.07.1989. On 13.07.1998, the writ petitioner applied for the grant of 30 days' earned leave and the same was sanctioned by the appellant authorities. On 13.11.1998, the writ petitioner moved an application for the extension of leave on medical grounds and in this regard, medical certificates were also produced. Thereafter, the writ petitioner intimated to appellant authorities that his wife had fallen sick in New Delhi therefore he again sought an extension of leave on 10.12.1998. The writ petitioner moved a representation on 12.12.1998 and sought information from the department as follows:- i) Is there any procedure as to lien or extra-ordinary leave without pay for a substantial period when the purpose involves serving the nation also. (I am assisting a relative to set up a software subsidiary company as per Government policies, which can be an ideal model for other NRIs. This shall enable the inflow of foreign currency). (ii) Can I be transferred to Delhi so that I may continue my support to them as a part-time consultant for some period which I have to do ethically. (iii) As I am not completely cured and I am advised not to physically exert much for some time more. I shall resign when I am completely fit so that I can look for some other alternative work in Delhi. (I want to avail all the terminal benefits as per rule and leave the organisation in a dignified manner). 4 5. A reminder was sent by the writ petitioner when no response was given by the appellant authorities on 15.11.1999 and a communication was made by appellants on 30.11.1999 and 02.12.1999 by which the writ petitioner was informed that there is no provision for extraordinary leave without pay unless the same is approved by the competent authority; tendering resignation is an administrative decision and the writ petitioner may apply accordingly and the benefit of VRS can be availed, if applicable. On 11.06.2000, the appellant authorities directed the writ petitioner to reply to the earlier letter and threatened to initiate a departmental inquiry vide letter dated 03.03.2000. The letter was replied to on 24.06.2000. The appellant authorities vide letter dated 20.07.2000 stated that the writ petitioner remained unauthorizedly absent from services with an implication that absenteeism of the writ petitioner was liable for disciplinary action and further directed the writ petitioner to deposit three months' salary in lieu of the notice of resignation. The writ petitioner denied the allegations of unauthorized absence and requested appellant No. 4 to review its decision with regard to the deposition of three months' salary. The article of charges was issued on 22.05.2001 according to Rule 29 of the Conduct, Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1978, On 01.07.2001, the writ petitioner tendered his resignation but the same was not considered by the department. On 22.10.2001, the writ petitioner was called for a meeting to discuss the issues but no decision was taken. The writ petitioner moved an 5 application on 16.11.2001 showing his intention to join the services and requested the appellants to sanction leave to him so that he could wind up his establishment in New Delhi. On 19.02.2001, appellants instead of allowing the writ petitioner to join the services issued a letter directing him to make payment of Rs. 49,788/- towards three months' salary for acceptance of resignation. On 26.06.2002, the writ petitioner informed appellant No. 4 that he was ready to serve in lieu of the notice but the appellants did not allow the writ petitioner to join the duty. The New Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed on 28.10.2002. The writ petitioner submitted his reply before the Inquiry Officer. The inquiry was conducted on 20/21/22.01.2003 and the report was submitted before the disciplinary authority. In the report, the writ petitioner was found guilty of the charge of misconduct. A second show- cause notice was issued and the same was replied to by the writ petitioner on 06.11.2003 and an order of removal from services was passed. Thereafter, the writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors, Coal India i.e. appellant No. 2 and the same was rejected. Subsequently, the writ petitioner preferred W.P. No. 5083/2004 which was disposed of and the matter was remitted back to the appellate authority for deciding the appeal of the writ petitioner afresh in accordance with law vide order dated 26.08.2013. The appellate authority vide order dated 04.03.2014 upheld the order passed by the disciplinary authority. The writ petitioner assailing the orders passed by the disciplinary authority 6 as well as the appellate authority, preferred Writ Petition (S). No. 3049/2014 (Basant Pandey vs. Coal India Limited and Others) whereby the learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / respondent herein, quashing the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority and remitted the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority to impose any minor penalty strictly in accordance with the rules holding that since the writ petitioner was practicing as a Chartered Accountant in New Delhi, therefore, he would not be entitled to claim back-wages or arrears of salary. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein have preferred this present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the quashment/purge of the order dated 06.11.2008 passed by the Appellant No. 3/Disciplinary Authority as also of the order dated 04.03.2014, passed by the Appellant No. 2/Appellate Authority and, remittance of the subject in hand to the Appellant No. 2/Disciplinary Authority with a specific mandate/direction that a minor penalty be imposed upon the Respondent falls contrary to the settled principles of law as also judicial precedents. The contention of Respondent that, upon expiry of initially sanctioned leave of 30 days, he had sought for extension which was, arbitrarily and illegally, not considered by the Appellant is but a blatant eye wash and a concoction. It is submitted that the extension was sought by the Respondent without specifying the 7 period of leave and the same was vague and appeared to be ad infinitum, hence, the same could not be considered. Furthermore, the grievance raised by the Respondent that the Appellants failed to support his desire for an amicable settlement is but a figment of his imagination as Appellants had succinctly explained him the option of retirement and the attending formalities/procedure thereof and had further explained the non-application of Voluntary Retirement Scheme to him. The Appellants were constrained to initiate and undertake disciplinary action against the Respondent for his continued unauthorized/unsanctioned leave since 13.08.1998 and, while conducting the Disciplinary Enquiry, no procedural irregularities of any kind were committed. The concerned Departmental Enquiry was conducted as was mandated by the applicable law/rule and, during the course of enquiry, fullest opportunity was provided to the Respondent to submit and pursue his case. The ground of non-observance of principles of natural justice raised by the Respondent is but a shoddy attempt on his part to wriggle out of the penalty so imposed upon him. The learned Single Judge has committed a mistake of fact while arriving at the conclusion that Respondent did not remain absent from duties without permission of the Appellants. As has been elucidated hereinabove and as it is apparent from a perusal of record, Respondent was sanctioned leave only for 30 days and post that period, he remained absent from duties without sanction or approval from the Appellants, 8 hence, there could be no second opinion that absence of Respondent from duties was unauthorized and unsanctioned. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the Respondent being a responsible Officer of the Appellant Company was expected to demonstrate clarity in his intention and firmness of his mind whether to abide by the extant employment terms and continue as an employee with the appellant company or otherwise, when he was fairly advised by the appellant company in 2001 to comply the standard norm of notice pay in connection with his resignation. The role of any Executive in the appellant company is very vital and absence from duty for an indefinite period is unsustainable as the very strength of the Management in discharging its duties and responsibilities to numerous stakeholders gets jeopardized, which the Appellants could never afford. The Respondent through his casual approach towards given employment opportunity in the Appellant Company created a compulsive circumstance for the Appellants to decide regarding his removal from services through a fair and just procedure and any penalty lesser than that would not have met the ends of justice and law. Furthermore, the learned Single Judge has committed a mistake of fact as also of law while remitting the subject case to Appellant No. 3/Disciplinary Authority with a specific mandate that a minor penalty be imposed upon the Respondent. By doing so, the learned Single Judge has sealed the fate of Disciplinary Enquiry and has determined the outcome of the said enquiry. 9 7. Learned counsel for the appellants relies upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612, wherein it was held as follows:- "22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan [State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302: 1994 SCC (L&S) 1385] and later in State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian [State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216: 1995 SCC (L&S) 292] and further examined by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749: 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under: (B.C. Chaturvedi case [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749: 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], SCC pp. 759-60, para 13) "13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not 10 relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718: AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued." 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is evaluation of the decision- making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the concere there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained." lusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope 11 of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained." 8. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India vs. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617, wherein it has held as follows:- “14. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence... 21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary 12 Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in P. Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor...” 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly disposed of the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / respondent herein, in which no interference is called for. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 11. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that the learned 13 Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner has observed that in the present case, earned leave of 30 days was sanctioned and granted to the writ petitioner on 13.07.1998. On 13.11.1998, the writ petitioner moved an application for the extension of leave. It is not denied by the respondents/appellants herein that the application dated 13.11.1998 was moved before the respondent/appellant authorities herein but it is also evident from the return that no response was given to it. Another application was moved by the writ petitioner on 10.12.1998 on account of the ill health of his wife and the same was not replied to by the appellant authorities for the reasons best known to them. When no reply was given by the appellants, the writ petitioner moved an application inquiring about the clarification of the procedure for retirement, extraordinary leave and VRS. Again, the appellant authorities kept mum for a considerable period and after the lapse of one year, the application was replied to and the writ petitioner was informed that extraordinary leave can be sanctioned by the competent authority; the writ petitioner may tender his resignation in accordance with the rules and the issue of VRS would be considered according to the employee's liability. An article of charges was issued to the writ petitioner on 22.05.2001 initiating a departmental inquiry against him under Rule 29 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978. It is also not in dispute that the writ petitioner had shown his willingness to tender resignation and he was advised to deposit 14 three months' salary but the writ petitioner failed to do so and also failed to join the services. With regard to VRS, the writ petitioner was not eligible in the absence of completion of 20 years of service or 50 years of age and therefore, his absence from duties w.e.f. 13.08.1978 was considered as misconduct by the appellant authorities. Learned Single Judge further held that implication of charges would show that the writ petitioner offered the department either to sanction/grant extraordinary leave or to accept his resignation or to allow him to avail the benefits of VRS. Though the writ petitioner was informed by the appellant authorities on how to avail of the three options, there was some miscommunication between the writ petitioner and the department; therefore, these options were not acted upon. The correspondence made between the writ petitioner and the appellants makes it clear that the writ petitioner made continuous representations before the appellant authorities, who were aware of the facts and situation; even though the inquiry was conducted. The writ petitioner has disobeyed the orders and instructions issued by the appellant authorities but it cannot be said that he remained absent without permission. 12. Learned Single lastly held that in the present case, since the writ petitioner continued making representations/applications for the extension of the leave period and also tendered resignation or requested the authorities to permit him to complete the formalities 15 regarding sanctioning of extraordinary leave, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner remained out of the radar for continued leave for a considerable period, therefore, the punishment inflicted upon the writ petitioner appears to be disproportionate and shocking. As such, the learned Single Judge while exercising the power conferred upon it under Article 226 of The Constitution of India quashed/set-aside the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority and remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority to impose any minor penalty strictly in accordance with the rules. 13. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and upon perusing the impugned order, we notice that the same has been rendered by the learned Single Judge with cogent and justifiable reasons. In an intra-court appeal, no interference is usually warranted unless palpable infirmities are noticed on a plain reading of the impugned order. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on a plain reading of order, we do not notice any such palpable infirmities or perversities, as such we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. 14. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet