1 2025:CGHC:30346-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1708 of 2024 Vikki Panika S/o Anil Panika, Aged About 20 Years R/o Mandalpara, Baikunthpur, Police Station, Baikunthpur, District-Koriya (C.G.) --- Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through- P.S.-Baikunthpur, District Koriya (C.G.) --- Respondent CRA No. 2014 of 2024 Smt.Sushila W/o- Late Heeralal Aged About 45 Years R/o Mahalpara Khalpara, Baikunthpur, P.S. Baikunth, District- Korea Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station Baikunth, District- Korea Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent For Appellant-Vikki Panika For Appellant- Smt.Sushila : : Mr.Rajesh Jain, Advocate in CRA No.1708/2024 Mr.Pawan Shrivastava, Advocate in CRA No.2014/2024 For Respondent : Mr.S.S.Baghel, Deputy Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.07.07 11:42:08 +0530 2 Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 3/7/2025 1. Since the aforesaid two criminal appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment dated 27.07.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Koriya in Sessions Case No.30/2023, they were clubbed & heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Appellant-Vikki Panika has preferred Criminal Appeal No.1708/2024 and Appellant-Smt.Sushila has preferred Criminal Appeal No.2014/2024 under Section 374(2) of the CrPC questioning the impugned judgment dated 27.07.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Baikunthput, District Koriya in Sessions Case No.30/2023, by which they have been convicted for offence under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.50/-, in default of payment o f fine to further undergo RI for 15 days and RI for three years and fine of Rs.50/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 15 days. 3. The prosecution story, in brief, is that deceased Thakur Prasad was a 60 years old man. He lived alone in Baikunthpur, his family lived in Bilaspur. The deceased was worked in Farooq Dhebar’s shop and also used to drink alcohol. He used to visit Sushila Harijan’s house. On 1.1.2023, he left home. On 2.1.2023 at about 11.30 A.M., his brother Nirmal Kumar Soni was informed by his 3 cousin Chandu Lal Soni that Thakur Prasad was lying dead in a pit near Mahalpara Khalpara canal. Nirmal Prasad Soni went and saw Thakur Prasad Soni lying dead. There was blood oozing out of his head and right leg. He informed the police station Baikunthpur, on the basis of which, police station Baikunthpur registered the merg intimation vide Ex.P-18. Inquest was prepared over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-2. Identification memo was prepared vide Ex.P-4. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-5. Memorandum statement of appellant-Smt.Sushila was recorded vide Ex.P-6. Memorandum statement of appellant-Vikki Panika was recorded vide Ex.P-7 and on the basis of his memorandum statement, bedsheet stains with blood, jacket stains with blood and bunch of keys were recovered from the house of appellant Smt.Sushila at the instance of appellant Vikki Panika vide Ex.P-8. Bloodstained soil, plain soil and other articles were recovered from the spot map vide Ex.P-9. Sari, petticoat and broom stains with blood were recovered at the instance of appellant Smt.Sushila vide Ex.P-10. Axe stains with blood was recovered at the instance of appellant Vikki Panika vide Ex.P-11. Jeans stains with blood, vest stains with blood and t-shirt stains with blood were recovered at the instance of appellant Vikki Panika vide Ex.P-12. Appellant Smt.Sushila was arrested on 4.1.2023 vide arrest memo Ex.P-13. Appellant Vikki Panika was arrested on 4.1.2023 vide arrest memo Ex.P-14. Patwari also prepared the spot map vide Ex.P- 4 17. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to the District Hospital, Baikunthpur where Dr.Imran Khan (PW-9) conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P- 19 and found following injuries:- “1. There was a 4cm x 1cm cut which was lacerated. It was in the front of the head in the brain which was red. The front bone of the skull was broken. 2. 3cm x 2cm x 2cm lacerated wound with redness in the left parietal region of the head. 3. 4 x 2.5 x 2 cm lacerated wound was red on the back side of the occipital part of the head. The part of the back skull bone that was broken was the occipital part. 4. 3 cm x 2 cm x 1 cm ripped wound was on the occipital region. 5. There was a redness of 8 x 5 cm on the back portion.” The doctor has opined that cause of death is cardiorespiratory arrest due to internal heamorrhage. (Hematoma) is present of severe head injury. Death was homicidal in nature. Axe was sent to the doctor for examination vide Ex.P-20A and the doctor has opined vide Ex.P-20 that head injuries which was mention in postmortem can be occur if forcibly hit by above mention weapon and death can occur. FIR was registered vide Exs.P-24 and P-25. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report (Ex.P-27), human blood was found on Articles F, 5 K, L-1, L-2, M-1, M-3, N-1, O-1, O-2, O-3, 0-4 & P. Samples F, K, L-1, L-2, M-3, N-1, O-1, O-2, O-4 and P have blood group AB. 4. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Sections 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) and after completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baikunthpur, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Baikunthpur, District Koriya, from where the Additional Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Koriya received the case on transfer for trial. 5. In order to prove the guilty of the accused/appellants, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the Code where they denied the circumstances appearing against them and claimed innocence and false implication in the crime in question. 6. After affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned above. Hence, this criminal appeals. 7. Mr.Rajesh Jain, learned counsel for appellant Vikki Panika in CRA No.1708/2024 submits that learned trial Court committed grave legal error by ignoring the fact that the article those are seized from memorandum statement of appellant Sushila are already been recovered by Dr.S.K.Singh (PW-11) (Senior Scientists Officer) on 2.1.2023, therefore, the property which was already in 6 possession of the investigation officer prior to recording memorandum not deemed to be recovered through the information given by the accused. He further submits that learned trial Court committed grave legal error to consider the statements of memorandum and seizure witnesses Dinesh Soni (PW-2) and Raj Soni (PW-4) who have not supported the case of the prosecution. He also submits that jacket has been seized from open place and as such, the evidence produced by the prosecution is not reliable. He contended that there is no evidence to show that there was an illicit relationship between the present appellant and appellant Sushila. Dead body of the deceased was found in the abandoned house, which belong to appellant Sushila, but no document of ownership of the house has been produced by the prosecution. He further contended that there is no direct evidence brought by the prosecution to connect the appellant in the alleged crime and aforesaid conviction rests on the circumstantial evidence and chain of circumstances not complete to hold guilt of the appellant. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment so far as it relates to appellant Vikki Panika deserves to be set aside. 8. Mr.Pawan Shrivastava, learned counsel for appellant Smt.Sushila in CRA No.2014/2024 submits that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court is illegal, incorrect and perverse as per the prosecution story and material available on record. He further submits that the trial Court ought to have 7 seen that there was no eyewitness in the present case and therefore, whole conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, however, there is no circumstantial evidence present in the case as the chain of circumstantial evidence has not completed. He also submits that learned trial Court ought to have seen that after receiving of postmortem report as the nature of death is homicidal the preliminary investigation was not done by police and only on the basis of sniffer dog went to the house of the appellant, the police made an accused to the appellant. He contended that the trial Court ought to have seen that the prosecution has failed to prove the motive of offence as the appellant having no reason/motive to commit murder of the deceased and the whole case is based on very weak circumstantial evidence. The trial Court ought to have considered that there was no dispute between the appellant and the deceased and the appellant has no motive to commit murder of the deceased and if the entire case of the prosecution is taken as it is no offence as alleged under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of the IPC are made out against the appellant and she has been falsely implicated by the prosecution. As such, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment so far as it relates to the appellant deserves to be set aside. 9. On the other hand, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and submits that 8 conviction of the appellant / accused is based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution during investigation recorded the statements of the prosecution witnesses in which they have categorically deposed in their statements regarding conduct and commission of offence by the accused / appellants, which is concurrent evidence against the accused / appellants and thus, learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused / appellants. Therefore, the instant appeals deserve to be dismissed. He further submits that learned trial Court has come to the conclusion regarding involvement of the accused / appellants in the crime in question under the concluding paras of the judgment in which learned trial Court has observed all incriminating circumstances against the accused / appellants, which connect them with the instant crime and chain of circumstances are fully linked and completed with each other. Thus, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the judgment of the trial Court is just and proper and does not call for any interference by this Court and as such, criminal appeals deserve to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9 11. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court was justified in holding that death of deceased Thakur Prasad Soni was homicidal in nature ? 12. The trial Court relying upon the statements of Dr.Imran Khan (PW-9), who has conducted postmortem on the body of deceased Thakur Prasad Soni vide Ex.P-19, has clearly come to the conclusion that death of deceased Thakur Prasad Soni was homicidal in nature. The said finding recorded by the trial Court is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. Even otherwise, it has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants. We hereby affirm the said finding. 13. It is the case of no direct evidence, rather conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. 14. We may also make a reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus: “In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of 10 the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence....”. 15. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 79, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 16. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ 1104), it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been 11 fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. 17. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book “Wills’ Circumstantial Evidence” (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted”. 18. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; 12 (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sailendra Rajdev Pasvan and Others vs. State of Gujarat Etc., AIR 2020 SC 180 observed that in a case of circumstantial evidence, law postulates two-fold requirements. Firstly, that every link in the chain of circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and secondly, all the circumstances must be consistent pointing out only towards the guilt of the accused. We need not burden this judgment by referring to other judgments as the above principles have been consistently followed and approved by this Court time and again. 20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Suresh and Another v State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 654 has observed that cases of circumstantial evidence, the courts are called upon to make 13 inferences from the available evidence, which may lead to the accused's guilt. The court at paras 41 and 42 has observed thus : “41. The aforesaid tests are aptly referred as Panchsheel of proof in Circumstantial Cases (refer to Prakash v. State of Rajasthan). The expectation is that the prosecution case should reflect careful portrayal of the factual circumstances and inferences thereof and their compatibility with a singular hypothesis wherein all the intermediate facts and the case itself are proved beyond reasonable doubt. 42. Circumstantial evidence are those facts, which the court may infer further. There is a stark contrast between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. In cases of circumstantial evidence, the courts are called upon to make inferences from the available evidence, which may lead to the accused's guilt. In majority of cases, the inference of guilt is usually drawn by establishing the case from its initiation to the point of commission wherein each factual link is ultimately based on evidence of a fact or an inference thereof. Therefore, the courts have to identify the facts in the first place so as to fit the case within the parameters of “chain link theory” and then see whether the case is made out beyond reasonable doubt. In India we have for a long time followed the “chain link theory” since Hanumant case, which of course needs to be followed herein also.” 21. In the present case, the prosecution has proved the following circumstantial evidence against the appellants:- 14 (i) Death of the deceased was caused due to serious injury on his head which is found to be in the nature of culpable homicide. (ii) Body of the deceased was found lying in the field at the instance of 300-400 meters from the house of appellant Sushila. (iii) On 2.1.2023 the sniffer dog came near the house of appellant Sushila while smelling the dead body of the deceased. (iv) Blood was found at various places on the way from the house of appellant Sushila to the dead body. Blood was found on walls, water tank and doors of the house of appellant Sushila. (v) An old bedsheet, slippers of the deceased, a bunch of keys, a jacket cap with blood on it were seized from the house of appellant Sushila in a cement bag. (vi) On the basis of memorandum statement of appellant Vikki Panika, bloodstained axe used in the incident has been seized. (vii) On the basis of memorandum statement of appellant Sushila, broom used for cleaning the bloodstains, petticoat and sari worn by her at the time of incident which had blood on it have been seized. (viii) Blouse of appellant Sushila was found stuck in the jacket worn by the deceased. (ix) On the basis of memorandum statement of appellant Vikki Panika, clothes worn at the time of incident i.e. old jeans, vest, t-shirt on which blood was found have been seized from him. (x) Human blood was found in the seized articles from the house of appellant Sushila on the basis of 15 memorandum statement of the appellant, in which blood group was found to be the same and blood sample of the deceased was found to have blood group AB. 22. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. 23. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 16 24. Nirmal Kumar Soni (PW-1) has stated in para 2 of his evidence that the police took a sniffer dog with them. The sniffer dog went to the house of appellant Sushila, he also went there, there was blood. 25. Sushil Soni (PW-3) has stated that body of deceased Thakur Prasad was lying in the field. At that time, he did not know about the injury etc. Police officers were also there. After some time, the police sniffer dog came, it sniffed the body and went to the house next door. 26. Raj Soni (PW-4) has stated that the incident is of 2.1.2023 Dinesh and Nirmal had called him for panchnama, then he went there, Thakur Prasad was being taken out of the pit. Police had come with a dog, the dog was licking the house of the female accused from outside, the house was locked. The female police brought the accused woman and opened the door, there was blood in the house, there was blood in the steel drum, there was blood in the bedsheet, there was blood in the broom and there was blood on the wall. 27. Mukesh Kumar Chaturvedi (PW-12) has stated in para 2 of his evidence that he brought the sniffer dog to Baikunthpur Police Station and from there went to the crime scene with the police. The sniffer dog went to the house located 3-400 meters away from the crime scene where the body was kept and found nothing in that house. 17 28. Thus, with the above discussion of evidence, the prosecution has been succeeded in proving that deceased Thakur Prasad Soni was murdered. This act of murder was committed by causing injuries to the head of the deceased. According to the FSL report (Ex.P-27) of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Ambikapur in the case, the seized items are sample B blood-soaked soil D, blood-soaked soil F, leaf GH, blood residues found from the house of appellant Sushila, J utensil, K axe, L-1, bed sheet, L-2 cap, L-3 slippers, L-4 key, M-1 appellant Vicky’s pant, M-2 appellant’s vest, M-3 jacket, N-1 appellant Sushila sari, O-1 deceased Thakur Prasad’s pant, O- 2 his shirt, O-3 his jacket and P-deceased blood sample. Blood was found in sample F, K, L-1, L-2, M-1, M-3, N-1, O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4, and P. Samples F, K, L-1, L-2, M-3, N-1, O-1, O-2, O-4 and P have blood group AB. The deceased blood group is also AB. This makes it clear that the blood found in the above items is the deceased blood. 29. It is clear from the observation of the case that as stated by the witnesses in the case, after the body was found, a sniffer dog was called and investigation was started. Till that time, nothing was known as to where the incident took place and by whom it was committed. Regarding the sniffer dog, Nirmal Kumar Soni (PW-1), Sushil Soni (PW-3), Raj Soni (PW-4) and dog handler constable Mukesh Kumar Chaturvedi (PW-12) have clearly stated that after sniffing the body, dog went to the house of appellant Sushila. At 18 that time, house was closed and it was opened. The said statement is completely unrefuted in cross-examination. 30. In the case in hand, apart from the above mentioned items, a axe was seized from the bushes behind Pappu’s house at the pointing out of appellant Vikki Panika as per seizure memo Ex.P-11. Human blood was found in the said axe and human blood found in the said axe is of the same blood group as that of the deceased. In such circumstances, there is no doubt that the said axe was used to cause death of the deceased. The axe used in causing death of the deceased has been seized at the pointing out of appellant Vikki Panika. It is also a fact that jeans, vest and t-shirt have been seized from appellant Vikki Panika as per seizure memo (Ex.P-12). This has been supported by the witnesses of the proceedings and human blood has been found in the said clothes. No explanation has been given by appellant Vikki Panika in this regard. Human blood was found in sari seized from the house of appellant Sushila as per seizure memo (Ex.P-10). Sushila’s house was opened and human blood was found at many places there too. In such a case, there is no doubt that the incident took place in Sushila’s house and appellants Sushila and Vikki Panika were present at the time of the incident and committed the said incident and to hide the evidence, they picked up the dead body and threw it in the field. 31. In this case, circumstantial evidence has been fully proved by the prosecution and its link firmly connect each other and the 19 circumstances are such that they clearly indicate that the incident was committed by the appellants alone. 32. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: - “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” Obje 33. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. 34. The Supreme Court in the matter of Asar Mohammad and others v. State of U.P., AIR 2018 SC 5264 with reference to the word “fact” employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has held that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. It has been further held that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. Their Lordships relying upon the decision of the Privy 20 Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 observed as under: - “13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra1, in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus: “23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (supra) has held thus: (IA p. 77) “… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible 1 (2015) 1 SCC 253 21 since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” 35. The Supreme Court in the matter of Perumal Raja alias Perumal v. State, Rep. By Inspector of Police, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 12 has defined the ‘custody’. It held that the expression “custody” under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police. 36. The Supreme Court in the matter of Boby v State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 held that the basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. Section 27 puts a bar to use the confessional statement, but the fact that discovery and information which proved to reliable would be a circumstantial evidence. 22 37. Applying the aforesaid well settled principles of law and taking into the facts in totality and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in our considered view the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial Court has observed all incriminating circumstances against the appellants, which connect them with the instant crime and chain of circumstances are fully linked and completed with each other. Thus, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the judgment of the trial Court is just and proper and does not call for any interference by this Court. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is just and proper warranting no interference of this Court. 38. In the result, the appeals being devoid of merit are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. 39. It is stated at the Bar that the the appellants are in jail, they shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 40. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. 41. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail term, to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble 23 Supreme Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu