1 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 2025:CGHC:30488-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 738 of 2024 Manoj Rajput S/o Omprakash Rajput Aged About 18 Years R/o- Nagla Khimani Police Station Shunyagadi, District- Kasaganj ( U.P.) --- Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Station House Officer, Police Station Lawan, District- Baloda- Bazar (C.G.). --- Respondent CRA No. 791 of 2024 Kajal Rajput W/o Om Prakash Rajput, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Nagla Khimani, P.S. Sunngadhi, District Kasganj (U.P.) ---Appellant Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, P.S. Lavan, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (Cg.) Respondent For Respective Appellants : Mr. Sudhir Bajpai, Advocate and Mr. A.N. Pandey, Advocate For Respondent/State: Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2025.07.07 18:19:19 +0530 2 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 Per Bibhu Datta Guru, J. 04/07/2025 1. Since both the appeals arising out of same crime, and the facts and grounds as also relief is same, therefore, they are being considered and decided by this common order. 2. These appeals are directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 20/02/2024 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge(FTSC)(POCSOAct), Baloda Bazaar, C.G. in Special Case (POCSO) No.66/2023, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 363 of the IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years & fine of Rs.5000/- in default of payment of fine,additional R.I. for 3 months Under Section 366 of the IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years & fine of Rs.5000/- in default of payment of fine,additional R.I. for 3 months Under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 Life Imprisonment till the actual life & fine of Rs.10000/- in default of pay- ment of fine,additional R.I. for 3 months All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 3. Facts of the case, in brief, is that on 04.07.2023 a missing report was lodged by complainant(PW-3) i.e. brother of prosecutrix at P.S.Lawan stating that his sister(victim) without informing to any family members, has gone to somewhere since 10 O'clock morning and thereafter she did not return. On the basis of above 3 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 information, a crime was registered against unknown person and during investigation victim was recovered from the possession of the accused/appellants. Appellant-Manoj Rajput is the son of appellant-Kajal Rajput. It is alleged that appellant/Manoj and victim known to each other through Instagram(social networking website), thereafter, they became come in love relationship. Allegation is that the appellant- Manoj along with his mother-Kajal abducted the victim and on the pretext of marriage, the appellant-Manoj committed sexual intercourse with the victim at different places. On the basis of above fact the police has registered a crime against the accused/appellants for the aforesaid offence. Recovery panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P-1. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-12. The appellants were arrested vide Ex.P-25. Report of medical examination of victim is vide Ex.P-18. With regard to ascertain the age of the victim, Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P-15/C) was seized. After completing the investigation, the final report was prepared. 4. In order to bring home the above-stated offence, the prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses and exhibited 31 documents, whereas the accused/appellants have examined. Statement of the appellants under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein they have pleaded their innocence and false implication in the matter. 4 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants and sentenced them as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the appellants have been falsely implicated in the present case. They would submit that the victim herself went to the appellants/accused and stayed with him by her own will at different places. He further submits that the victim and the appellants are known to each other through social network and from their, both of them came in love relationship and the victim was ready to marry with the appellant-Manoj. The victim was a consenting party. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the actual age of the victim and it was also not proof from the dakhil-kharij register and Halafnama that on what basis, date of birth of victim was registered in both the register and the person who registered the date of birth of the victim in Halafnama, was not examined. It is submitted that the entire incident is highly doubtful, therefore, the conviction of the appellants is not sustainable and they may be acquitted of the charges framed against them. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants and has submitted that the statement of the victim and other witnesses are 5 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 fully reliable. There are sufficient evidence available on record to hold that the appellants are guilty for the alleged offence and the learned trial Court has absolutely justified in passing the judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellants which does not require for any interference. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The first and foremost question arose for the consideration would be whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not. 10. In order to consider the age of the victim, we have examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution has mainly relied upon statement of Anant Ram Sahu(PW-4), Principal of school, Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P-15/C) and Halafnama Register Ex.P- 16/C. 11. The victim and her parents did not stated the exact date of birth in their evidence. 12. Anant Ram Sahu (PW-4), Principal of the school has deposed in his statement that the Dakhil Kharij Register (Ex.P-15/C) was seized by the police from him. He deposed that the victim got admission in the school in K.G.-I and in the dakhil-kharij and Halafnama register, the date of birth of victim has been mentioned as 02.08.2006. In cross-examination, he has admitted that the entries in the said register with regard to date of birth of the victim 6 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 was not made by him. Further he has specifically admitted that on what basis the entry has been recorded in the said Dakhil Kharij Register, he did not know. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the 7 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to 8 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 14. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 9 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 33.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of 10 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 11 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 15. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim 12 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could 13 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three- judge bench, held that the burden of proving that 14 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 16. In the dakhil-kharij register and Halafnama register, victim’s date of birth recorded in the school is 02.08.2006, but the entries in both the register was not made by (PW-4), Principal of school. 17. No witnesses has been examined with respect to the fact that on what basis, the date of birth of the victim has been registered in the dakhil-kharij register Halafnama register. 18. Except for these evidences, no other evidence like ossification test report have been produced by the prosecution to determine her age that on the date of incident, she was minor or less than 18 years of age. Parents of victim did not know the exact date of birth of victim. The author of the registration of birth in Dakhil Kharij and Halafnama Register has not been examined. There is no evidence that on what basis the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the said register. There is every possibility that the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the Dakhil Kharij and Halafnama Register on assumption otherwise, the prosecution must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of birth recorded in the said register. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the victim are not of that sterling quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the victim. Therefore, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to 15 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 hold her minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor. 19. The next question for consideration would be whether the appellants have committed the said offences mentioned in para-1. 20. Victim (PW-2), stated in her evidence that she started talking with the appellant-Manoj and through Instagram. Thereafter, they started talking on whatsapp in mobile. She stated that the appellant-Manoj told her that his mother-Kajal was looking for a girl for his marriage. She stated in her evidence that the appellant- Manoj started loving her and regarding marriage, he will asked his mother. And one day, accused-Kajal, mother of the appellant called her directly on mobile and told her that she will get her married to Manoj and for which, she asked to bring money. Thereafter, the victim left the house on the 4th September, 2023 with a bag containing gold-silver, one thousand rupees and clothes. She took a bicycle from her house and reached the bus stand of another village. Then she went to Raipur by bus and from there came to Bilaspur by train. From Bilaspur, she went to Mathura by train. She stated that in Mathura, both the appellants met with the victim at railway station. She stayed with the appellants overnight at Mathura Railway Station. Thereafter, both the appellants took the victim to their village and accused-Manoj kept the victim in a separate house. When the victim asked regarding marriage, the appellant-Manoj told her to wait sometime 16 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 as her is less than 18 years. She further stated in her evidence that the accused Manoj stayed together with her whole night committed sexual intercourse with her and whenever accused Manoj got time, he come to her house and have physical relations with her and then after four days her father came to the spot and subsequently, Police prepared the recovery panchanama Ex.P-1. 21. As per medical examination report, no injuries were found over the internal part of the body of the victim and there is no exact opinion regarding any sexual intercourse happened with the victim. 22. As per FSL report, no human sperm was found in the vaginal slides of the victim, undergarments of the victim and appellant- Manoj. 23. From the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, it is clear from the statement of victim (PW-1) that she knew the appellant- Manoj through Instagram and made friendship with him. Thereafter, the victim started taking with the appellant in mobile and asked him to get married. On the date of incident, the victim herself, without informing her family members reached the Raipur by bus and then Bilaspur by train. Thereafter, the victim went Mathura by train, where she met with the appellants and stayed full night at Mathura. From there, she went to the village of appellants and stayed about 4-5 days with the appellants. She further stated in her evidence that the appellant-Manoj took her in 17 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 separate house stayed with him, where both of them made physical relation and whenever, the appellant-Manoj got time, he made physical relation with her. It is evident that the victim was consenting party because she never shout at the time when the appellant-Manoj committed physical relation with her and she herself reached Mathura by means of bus and train from her village and without informing her family members too. The victim herself started talking to appellant through Instagram and made love relationship while talking in mobile. Had she been forcefully raped her against her will or consent, she would definitely raised alarm or to make complaint to the anyone. Apart from that, there is no proof of exact date of birth of victim. Since, it is held that the victim is not below the 18 years of age, she is capable to give her consent and therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant-Manoj procured a minor girl with the intention to illicit intercourse or committed rape upon her. As far as the appellant-Kajal is concerned, she only talked in the mobile with the victim and when the victim reached the village of appellants by her own consent, she was not stayed with the victim and the appellant-Manoj. 24. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is 18 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 25. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants and the appellants are entitled for benefit of doubt. 26. In the result, the appeals are Allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 20/02/2024 is set aside. The appellants are acquitted from all the charges leveled against them. The appellants are in jail. They be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 27. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19 CRA Nos.738 of 2024 & 791/2024 28. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. SD/- SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Amardeep/Shoaib