1 2025:CGHC:2608 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 158 of 2021 1 - Pappu Gaikwad S/o Maya Ram Gaikwad Aged About 24 Years R/o Chorbhathi, Police Station - Kharora District - Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through, The Station House Officer, Police Station - Kharora District - Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Ms. Monika Dey, Advocate For Respondent/State : Ms. Pragya Shrivastava, Dy.GA (Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma) Judgment on Board 15/01/2025 This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.03.2020 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Fast Track Special Judge, Raipur District Raipur(CG) in Special Sessions Trial No.125/2017 whereby and whereunder the appellant has been held guilty for the commission of offence as described below: 2 Conviction Sentence U/s. 363 IPC RI for 2 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 15 days U/s. 366 of IPC RI for 3 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 1 month U/s. 376(2)(n) of IPC RI for ten years and fine of R. 5,000/-, in default of fine to further undergo RI for 3 months All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2. Prosecution case in brief is that on 21.03.2017, at about 6.00 pm, victim was allured by the appellant. Search was made on 23.03.2017, she was recovered from the custody of the appellant at village Navgaon. On being enquired, she informed that the appellant took took her in a motorcycle to the house of one Rajkumar Gayakwad and from 21.03.2017 to 22.03.2017, committed sexual intercourse with her. On the basis of written report, FIR was registered against the appellant and co-accused for the offence under Sections 363,366,368 and 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO. After committal of the case, the learned trial court framed charges under Sections 363,366 and 376 (2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 read with Section 17 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act against the appellant. 3. The case was committed for its trial to the learned Seventh Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Raipur, The appellant abjured his guilt and claimed for trial. 4. In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. Statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. of the appellant had been recorded in which he denied the material appearing against him and pleaded his 3 innocence and false implication in the case. Two defence witnesses have been examined on behalf of the appellant. 5. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the case. He submits that the appellant and the prosecutrix were known to each other and that they were having love affair from last 2-3 years and wrote letters to each other as also used to talk in mobile. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant that as per case of the prosecution, victim was minor on the date of incident, but this fact has not been proved by adducing lawful evidence. In this regard, the school admission and discharge register (Ex. P-12) of the victim has been seized, which shows that date of birth of victim is 10.08.2002 but there is no legally admissible evidence with regard to the age of the prosecutrix that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. In absence of examination of the author of the school admission and discharge register the same cannot be taken into consideration for determination of the age of the prosecutrix. He further submits that except victim, there is no credible evidence in support of her statement and therefore, only on the basis of deposition of victim holding the appellant guilty by the learned trial Court is not sustainable and the alleged offence of the IPC and the POCSO Act are not made out against the appellant, hence, he is entitled for acquittal. 4 7. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the victim was minor and there is no reason to disbelieve her testimony since there was no reason for her to falsely implicate the appellant. He further submits that the law enunciated with regard to the conviction of the accused for the offence as mentioned above on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim is a well settled proposition in view of the various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Lastly, he submits that the clear creditworthy and unshattered testimony of the victim/prosecutrix is sufficient to establish the case of the prosecution and the same is reliable. The contradictions pointed out on behalf of the appellant are stated to be immaterial to discredit the testimony of witnesses. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned trial court was sound and did not warrant any interference. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 9. In order to consider the age of the prosecutrix, we have examined the evidence available on record produced by the prosecution. 10. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school admission and discharge register in which the date of birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned as 10.08.2002. (PW-1) Prosecutrix has stated that she knew the appellant and co-accused and they were friends of her brother therefore they often used to visit their house. Her date of birth is 10.08.2002 and on the date of incident ie. 21.03.2017, she was aged bout 14 years. She has stated that at about 6.00 p.m.in the evening she had talked to the appellant in 5 her mobile and thereafter he came near the field and asked her to sit in his bike and when she refused to sit he threatened her. She sat on the bike and the appellant took her to village Navagaon to the house of his brother Rajkumar Gaikwad where she was subjected to rape by the appellant several times. On 23.03.2017, her father and brother came in search of her at that time, his brother Rajkumar denied that she is not there however, later on she was recovered from there. The police persons took them to police station Kharora where her consent was taken vide Ex.P-1 and spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-2. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-3. Statement was recorded vide Ex.P-4 and P- 5 by the Child Welfare Committee and Judicial Magistrate, her undergarment was seized by the police vide Ex.P-6. 11. (PW-2) father of the prosecutrix has stated in his deposition that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 10.08.2002. he has stated that on the date of incident ie. 21.03.2017, when his daughter was not found, he informed the Sarpanch and thereafter, she was recovered. He further submits that when he asked his daughter about the incident, she informed that the appellant had committed rape on her several times. 12. Dr. Smt. Pushpa Sonteke (PW-6) is the doctor who had medically examined the prosecutrix and she has opined that recent sexual intercourse has been done. She opined that the hymen was found ruptured and she referred the prosecutrix to Radiologist for age determination. 13. Bharat Lal Banjare (PW-3) is the Assistant Teacher of Govt. Primary School, Chorbhatti, Raipur. He has stated that the police has seized the school admission and discharge register Ex.P-12 from him with respect to the date of birth of the prosecutrix. In the said register, 6 the date of birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned as 10.08.2002 and her admission to the school is 07.07.2008 in class 1. In cross-examination he has stated that the entry of date of birth of the prosecutrix in the school admission register has been mentioned by the In charge Teacher Ashok Kumar Sahu who was posted at the relevant time, on assumption. Admittedly, this witness is neither author of the date of birth of the prosecutrix nor the school admission and discharge register. 14. Thus, from the evidence available on record with respect to the age of the prosecutrix i.e. in the school admission and discharge register, the author of the same has not been examined. On perusal of impugned judgment and the statements of the above witnesses, it reflects that there is no dispute as to the age of the victim which has been duly proved on record and, as such, the findings of the learned Trial Court that victim was aged about 14 years on the basis of date of birth certificate (Ex.P-12), requires no interference. 15. The principle is well settled that the Court can base conviction on the testimony of a child victim, if the same is credible and truthful. Corroboration is not a must on record but is a rule of prudence. The precaution which the Court should bear in mind while relying upon the testimony of a child victim is that the witness must be reliable, consistent and there is no likelihood of being tutored or under an influence. The version put forth has to be unassailable, trustworthy and of sterling quality, capable of holding appellant guilty on the basis of solitary evidence. 16. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of the victim is significant and essential ingredients to prove such charge 7 and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means any person below the age of eighteen years. 17. Section 29 of POCSO Act provides that Court shall presume that the accused has committed the offence for which he is charged with, until contrary is proved. However, the presumption would operate only when the prosecution proves the foundational facts in the context of allegation against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After the prosecution establishes the foundational facts, the presumption raised against the accused can be rebutted by discrediting the prosecution witnesses through cross-examination and demonstrating the gaps in prosecution version or improbability of the incident or lead defence evidence in order to rebut the presumption by way of preponderance of probability. 18. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles for determining the age of a child, which read as follows : “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age ofsuch juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be 8 the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school(other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or(iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a) (i),(ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or 9 the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3)of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW- PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3),matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that 10 Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion.” 19. With regard to the age of the prosecutrix, the prosecution has mainly relied upon the School admission and discharge register (Ex.P- 12) of the prosecutrix which is seized by the police from the school and proved by the Assistant Teacher Bharat Lal Banjare (PW-3) in which the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 10.08.2002. In the cross- examination, though he has admitted that he was not present in the victim’s school at the time of her admission. Dakhil Kharij Register is a public document maintained by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. The entry made in the filing/dismissal register has been made by a public servant, which has been given in proper custody by one public servant to another public servant. As per Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, the Dakhil Kharij Register is a document issued by the school, which comes under first class documents. The defence has not presented any oral or documentary evidence to refuse the said date of birth,therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the date of birth of the victim, as 10.08.2002 hence, the trial Court has rightly held that the date of birth of the victim as 10.08.2002 and on the date of incident, she was minor below the age of 16 years and her age was around 14 years. 20. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is - whether the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix deserves acceptance and whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 11 21. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments and has held that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if found reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature deserves acceptance. 22. Insofar as, age of the victim on the date of the commission of the offence is concerned, she was admittedly 14 years old at the time of the unsavory incident. The prosecution has subsequently proved that the victim was a minor at the time of alleged sexual assault and that victim was less than 16 years of age, when she was sexually assaulted by the accused. 23. Further, upon perusal of the testimony made by the victim, in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C it is observed that she has clearly stated that she was ravished by the appellant with his devilish act. In her deposition before the court too, she has been consistent and stated that the appellant took her in his bike after giving threat, to the house of his brother at village Nawagaon and subjected her to rape several times. There is, therefore, no reason to disbelieve the testimony of victim which is consistent and reliable and has a ring of truth in it. The victim was only 14 years old when she was examined and the subtle variation that exists is understandable in the testimony of a 14 year old child, who is grappling to comprehend the complexity and enormity of what has actually happened with her. 12 24. From perusal of the testimony made by the prosecutrix which has remained unshattered in cross-examination unequivocally reveals that the commission of the offence by the appellant is described in clear and unambiguous words and her testimony has remained consistent during cross examination. The prosecutrix has clearly stated that the appellant had committed rape on her and thereafter threatened her not to disclose it to anyone about the incident. Further, upon a plain appraisal of the testimony of the victim/prosecutrix, the contention raised on behalf of the appellant to the effect that the prosecutrix is a tutored witness, cannot be accepted and is dehors any merit. The appellant has failed to controvert the testimony of the prosecutrix, which has remained unchallenged despite being subjected to thorough cross examination. Now if we peruse the statements of the witnesses, it would be clear that the offence as alleged against the appellant establishes that the appellant has committed the offence. 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of Rajasthan Vs. Om Prakash, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 745, dealt with a similar question in the case of a child rape, while upholding the conviction of the appellant therein and reversing the decision of the High Court in that behalf, relied upon earlier decisions and made the following observations: "13. The conviction for offence under Section 376 IPC can be based on the sole testimony of a rape victim is a well-settled proposition. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC384], referring to State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain [(1990) 1 13 SCC 550] this Court held that it must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. It has also been observed in the said decision by Dr Justice A.S. Anand (as His Lordship then was), speaking for the Court that the inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. 14. In State of H.P. Vs. Gian Chand[(2001) 6 SCC] Justice Lahoti speaking for the Bench observed that the court has first to assess the trustworthy intention of the evidence adduced and available on record. If the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on, then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though there may be other witnesses available who could have been examined but were not examined." 26. Justice Krishna Iyyer, whilst documenting his observations on absence of injuries on the victim, as well as, importance of corroborative evidence in rape cases, in his celebrated judgment in 14 Rafiq Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported as (1980) 4 SCC 262 has very eloquently observed as follows: "5. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of a prosecutrix is not a matter of law, but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. Indeed, from place to place, from age to age, from varying life- styles and behavioural complexes, inferences from a given set of facts, oral and circumstantial, may have to be drawn not with dead uniformity but realistic diversity lest rigidity in the shape of rule of law in this area be introduced through a new type of precedential tyranny. The same observation holds good regarding the presence or absence of injuries on the person of the aggressor or the aggressed. 6. When rapists are revelling in their promiscuous pursuits and half of humankind -- womankind -- is protesting against its hapless lot, when no woman of honour will accuse another of rape since she sacrifices thereby what is dearest to her, we cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist on corroborative testimony, even if taken as a whole, the case spoken to by the victim strikes a judicial mind as probable." 27. The Apex court in B.C.Deva Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 12 SCC 122, in spite of the fact that no injuries were found on the person of the prosecutrix, yet finding her version to be reliable and trustworthy, the Apex Court upheld the conviction of the accused. The Court observed that: "18. The plea that no marks of injuries were 15 found either on the person of the accused or the person of the prosecutrix, does not lead to any inference that the accused has not committed forcible sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix. Though the report of the gynecologist pertaining to the medical examination of the prosecutrix does not disclose any evidence of sexual intercourse, yet even in the absence of any corroboration of medical evidence, the oral testimony of the prosecutrix, which is found to be cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy has to be accepted." 28. Thus, it is needless to state that, corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix, is not an essential requirement in a case of rape, and the same is not a sine qua non to bring home the guilt of the accused. The testimony of the prosecutrix, if well founded & trustworthy, is by itself sufficient to convict the accused. 29. It is trite to state that it is necessary for the Courts to have a sensitive approach when dealing with cases of child rape. The prosecution meticulously laid out the charges against the man, invoking the stringent provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Additionally, he was also charged under the penal laws for rape, reflecting the severity and gravity of his actions. 30. In the case of Alakh Alok Srivastava Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2018) 17 SCC 291, in para 14 and 20, it is observed as under: “14. At the very outset, it has to be stated with authority that the Pocso Act is a gender neutral legislation. This Act has been divided into various chapters and parts therein. Chapter II of the Act titled “Sexual Offences Against Children” is segregated into five parts. Part A of the said Chapter contains two sections, namely, Section 3 and Section 4. Section 3 defines the offence of 16 “Penetrative Sexual Assault” whereas Section 4 lays down the punishment for the said offence. Likewise, Part B of the said Chapter titled “Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault and Punishment therefor” contains two sections, namely, Section 5 and Section 6. The various subsections of Section 5 copiously deal with various situations, circumstances and categories of persons where the offence of penetrative sexual assault would take the character of the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Section 5(k), in particular, while laying emphasis on the mental stability of a child stipulates that where an offender commits penetrative sexual assault on a child, by taking advantage of the child's mental or physical disability, it shall amount to an offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault.” “20. Speaking about the child, a three Judge Bench in M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N. (1996) 6 SCC 756 “1. … “child is the father of man”. To enable fathering of a valiant and vibrant man, the child must be groomed well in the formative years of his life. He must receive education, acquire knowledge of man and materials and blossom in such an atmosphere that on reaching age, he is found to be a man with a mission, a man who matters so far as the society is concerned.” 31. It has been further held that “Children are precious human resources of our country; they are the country’s future. The hope of tomorrow rests on them. But unfortunately, in our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position. There are different modes of her exploitation, including sexual assault and/or sexual abuse. In our view, exploitation of children in such a manner is a crime against humanity and the society.” 32. Therefore, the children and more particularly the girl child deserve full protection and need greater care and protection whether in the urban or rural areas. As observed and held by this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745, children need special care and protection and, in such cases, 17 responsibility on the shoulders of the Courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. In the case of Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703, it is observed by this Court that a minor who is subjected to sexual abuse needs to be protected even more than a major victim because a major victim being an adult may still be able to withstand the social ostracization and mental harassment meted out by society, but a minor victim will find it difficult to do so. Most crimes against minor victims are not even reported as very often, the perpetrator of the crime is a member of the family of the victim or a close friend. Therefore, the child needs extra protection. Therefore, no leniency can be shown to an accused who has committed the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 and particularly when the same is proved by adequate evidence before a court of law. 33. In the present case it is to be noted that the accused who was ravished a minor who was aged about 14 years which demonstrates the mental state or mindset of the accused. Therefore, the accused as such does not deserve any sympathy and/or any leniency. 34. Further it has laid down that although the victim's solitary evidence in matters related to sexual offences is generally deemed sufficient to hold an accused guilty, the conviction cannot be sustained if the prosecutrix's testimony is found unreliable and insufficient due to identified flaws and lacunae. It was held thus: “31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence 18 of the prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have already been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of the said offences. 32. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section 161 statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court. Thus, it was necessary to get her evidence corroborated independently, which they could have done either by examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were present in the house at the time of her alleged abduction. The record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has been won over by the appellant.” 35. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, {(2019) 11 SCC 575}, it was observed and held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed and held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it was observed and held as under: “29. It is now well- settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283]. It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000) 5 SCC 30]. 19 36. The Supreme court in the matter of State of UP Vs. Sonu Kushwaha (2023) 7 SCC 475 has held as under : 12. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6,on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim/child will be lifelong. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court’. 37. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. In State of H.P. vs. 20 Shree Kant Shekar (2004) 8 SCC 153 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows:“ “21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice.” 38. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed as follows: ““17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 39. In the instant case, the victim was consistent in her statement and has asserted that the appellant after taking her on a ride, finding her alone, committed sexual assault on her. The statement of the prosecutrix has been consistent from the beginning to the end, from 21 the initial statement to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution’s case. Thus, in the case in hand, there was no doubt that being in a position of authority and trust, the accused had committed rape on the victim who is a minor aged about 14 years. The oral testimonies of the victim on the culpability of the convict got credence unerringly pointing to his guilt. On appreciating the evidence on record and coming to the conclusion that the guilt of the appellant under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(n) IPC has been conclusively proved. 40. In view of the foregoing discussion, in our considered view, the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There is no contravention in the position of law and there can be no dispute with the proposition that when the testimony of the prosecutrix is creditworthy, trustworthy, unimpeached and inspires confidence; the conviction of the appellant can be sustained based solely on it. 41. The prosecution presented compelling evidence to establish beyond doubt the culpability of the accused, leaving no room for ambiguity regarding his guilt. Consequently, the sentence awarded to the appellant by the Learned Trial Court also does not warrant any interference. Therefore, the judgment and order of conviction dated 02.03.2020 is hereby upheld. The trial court has awarded minimum sentence to the appellant, ie. 10 years therefore no interference is called. The appeal accordingly, stands dismissed. 22 42. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 23.03.2017 being the date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as awarded to him by the trial court. 43. Let the trial court record and copy of this judgment be sent to the trial court forthwith for necessary information and its compliance. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2025.04.16 15:38:15 +0530