- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION No. 12548 OF 2022 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, REP BY ITS REGISTRAR M.S BUILDING, BENGALURU 560 001. 2. ADDITONAL REGISTRAR OF ENQUIRIES -10 KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA M.S BUILDING, BENGALURU 560 001. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI ASHWIN S. HALADY., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND PANCHAYATHRAJ, M.S BUILDING, BENGALURU 560 001. 2. SRI. JADHAV S S/O PUNDLIK RAO JADAV, RETIRED PANCHAYATH DEVELOPMENT OFFICER R/AT E-11 -3183 Digitally signed by VALLI MARIMUTHU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 N.R COLONY, BHAGYASAGAR, NEW RAGHAVENDRA COLONY, BRAHMAPUR, KALBURGI 585 103 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI V. SHIVAREDDY, AGA FOR R1) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE HON'BLE KSAT BENGALURU IN APPLICATION No.971/2018 DATED 26.06.2019 (ANNEXURE-B). THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND) Heard Sri Ashwin S. Halady, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate for Respondent No. 1. 2. The Karnataka Lokayukta has approached this Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, impugning the order dated 26.06.2019 in Application No.971/2018 passed by the Karnataka State Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru (hereinafter ‘Tribunal’), whereby the Tribunal set - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 aside the enquiry initiated against Respondent No. 2 on the ground that he had retired from service prior to the issuance of the Articles of Charge. 3. Respondent No. 2, while serving as Panchayath Development Officer, Kusanur Grama Panchayath, Kalaburagi, had a complaint registered against him on 14.07.2014 before the petitioner, in respect of an alleged incident dated 20.03.2012. The Government entrusted the enquiry to the Lokayukta, and Articles of Charge were issued on 18.04.2017. Respondent No. 2 retired from service upon attaining superannuation on 31.04.2015. The complaint pertained to alleged inaction by Respondent No. 2 regarding the construction of a house without a licence on a public road. Respondent No. 2 submitted his reply on 27.04.2016. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer recorded the evidence of the complainant as PW1. However, the Enquiry Officer proceeded further without providing an opportunity for cross-examination of PW1 or to record defence evidence. These proceedings were subsequently brought before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after considering the grounds urged, held that since the Delinquent - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 Government Officer had retired on 31.04.2015, the Articles of Charge dated 18.04.2017, issued over two years after retirement, were not maintainable. It was further held that an enquiry cannot be initiated without the sanction of the Government. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the finding of the Tribunal, to the effect that the proceedings could not be continued by the petitioner-Institution after the retirement of the Delinquent Government Officer (DGO), is erroneous. It is further submitted that the petitioner-Institution retains jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry even after the retirement of the DGO, if the alleged incident pertains to the period during which he was in service. 5. Sri V. Shivareddy, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 1, supports the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners. 6. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners and of the learned Additional Government Advocate for Respondent No. 1. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 7. For the reasons discussed hereinafter, we are not inclined to entertain this writ petition. 7.1 Firstly, the order of the Tribunal is dated 26.06.2019, whereas the writ petition has been filed on 21.06.2022, nearly three years thereafter. The averments in the petition do not furnish any explanation for the delay. When queried by the Court, learned counsel for the petitioners has no justification for the same. While there is no statutory limitation for filing a writ petition, the exercise of this right must be within a reasonable time. A delay of nearly three years cannot, by any measure, be regarded as reasonable. 7.2 It is relevant to note the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others [2024 SCC OnLine SC 551] on delay in filing the writ petition at paragraphs 9 to 13, which read thus; “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution- makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 7.3 Secondly, the incident in question occurred in 2012, the complaint was filed on 14.07.2014 and respondent No.2 retired - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:35287-DB WP No. 12548 of 2022 on 31.04.2015 upon attaining superannuation. The Articles of Charge were issued on 18.04.2017. Rule 214(2)(b)(ii) of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (for short ‘KCSRs’) bars the initiation of departmental proceedings after retirement on an incident which had taken place 4 year prior to his retirement. Further, Rule 214(6) of the KCSRs provides that the date of institution of departmental proceedings shall be the date on which the Articles of Charge are issued to the government servant. In view of the foregoing, the initiation of proceedings against Respondent No. 2 in the present case is barred under Rule 214(2)(b)(ii) of the KCSRs. 8. For the foregoing reasons, we find no justifiable ground to entertain the present petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE MV/ List No.: 1 Sl No.: 11