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2025 DAILYLAW 56708 (KAR)

RANJITH BALAKRISHNAN v. THE STATE BY BIAL POLICE STATION

WP/32231/2024 · 2025-07-04

S R Krishna Kumar

body2025

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 32231 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: RANJITH BALAKRISHNAN, S/O M BALAKRISHNAN NAIR, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, RESIDING AT "KARUMALA", CHALAPPURAM, P.V. SAMI ROAD, KOZHIKODE - 673 002. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. PRABHULING NAVADGI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. JOSEPH ANTHONY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE BY BIAL POLICE STATION KEMPEGOWDA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT RD, HUNACHUR, KARNATAKA - 560 300, INDIA, BANGALORE - 560 300. 2. SAJEER CHOLAYIL S/O MAJEEDH AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, CHOLAYIL HOUSE, POKKUNNU (PO) MANKAVU, KINASSERI, KOZHIKODE CITY, KERALA - 673 002. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SOWMYA R, HCGP FOR R1; R2 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SEC. 528 OF THE BNSS, 2023 Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 PRAYING TO I. QUASH THE FIR DATED OCTOBER 26, 2024 BEARING CR.NO.64/2024 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 FOR THE OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 377 OF IPC AND SECTION 66E OF THE IT ACT, 2000, REGISTERED AT BIAL POLICE STATION AND ALL CONSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS/ACTIONS THERETO (ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC., THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR ORAL ORDER In this petition, petitioner seeks for the following reliefs:- “ i) Quash the FIR dated: October 26, 2024 bearing Crime No.0064/2024 filed by the Respondent No.1 for the offences punishable under Section 377 of IPC and Section 66E of the IT Act, 2000, registered at BIAL Police Station and all consequent proceedings/actions thereto (Annexure-A); ii) Quash the Complaint dated august 30, 2024 filed by the Respondent No.2 before the Kasaba Police Station, Kozhikode, Kerala (Annexure-C0; and iii) Pass any other order as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interest of justice.” 2. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner and learned HCGP for 1st respondent and perused the material on record. The service of notice to 2nd respondent has been held to be - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 sufficient and he remains unrepresented and has not contested the petition. 3. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the memorandum of petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned complaint is contrary to law and facts and the same deserves to be quashed. In support of his submissions, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) Palani vs. State of Tamil Nadu – (2020) 16 SCC 401; (ii) Parkash Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh – (2019) 5 SCC 628; (iii) State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal – 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; (iv) Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor – (2013) 3 SCC 330; (v) Padal Venkata Rama Reddy vs. Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy – (2011) 12 SCC 437; (vi) Chanchalapathi Das vs. State of West Bengal – 2023 SCC OnLine SC 650; (vii) Imran Siddiqui vs. The State of Karnataka & Anr.- W.P.No.10023/2022 Dated 26.07.2022. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 4. Per contra, learned HCGP for 1st respondent submits that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that on 30.08.2024, the 2nd respondent – de facto complainant filed the instant complaint which was registered as an FIR in Crime No.689/2024 against the petitioner – sole accused before the Kasaba Police Station, Kozhikode city, Kerala, for alleged offences punishable under Section 377 IPC and 66(E) of the Information Technology, Act, 2000. The said complaint was transferred to the 1st respondent – Police authorities on 12.09.2024 and an FIR in Crime No.64/2024 was registered against the petitioner for the alleged offences, aggrieved by which, petitioner is before this Court by way of the present petition. 6. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that it is specifically alleged by the 2nd respondent that the alleged offences were alleged to have been committed in Taj Hotel, Near Bangalore International Airport, in December, 2012. The said complaint is in Malayalam language and its translation is as under:- - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 “Today (30/08/2024) at 1.45 PM, the statement of Sajeer Cholayil, aged 31, S/o Majeed, Cholayil House, Pokkunnu (P.O), Mankavu, Mob.9014961906, was recorded by Sub-Inspector of Police Station from Kozhikode City DHQ Training Centre (DOB 11/07/1993). I am currently working as a Lobby-in-Charge at Hotel Tripenta. I have been working here for 4 months. In the year 2006, I acted in a movie called ‘Notebook’. This is the only movie I have acted in. In December 1012, the movie ‘ Bavuttiyude Namathil’ was shot at East Hill. I went there to watch the shooting because I knew Mammootty was at the location. It was there that I learned Renjith, the director, was also present there. It was a shooting location filled with a crowd of people. While I was waiting to watching Mammootty out of curiosity, one of the film crew members noticed me and kept looking me. He came over and asked if I wanted to see Mammootty. He then took me from the crowd and brought to the bungalow where the shooting was happening. After we went inside, Renjith came in, sat on a sofa. The other person left after seating me on the sofa. Renjith asked me for my name and where I was from. He mentioned that he was busy at the moment and would talk later, then wrote his number on a tissue paper, saying not to call and it was okay to message. Two days later, I sent a message to the number he provided. I don’t remember my number or Renjith's number now. When I sent message, Renjith mentioned that he was going to Bangalore and asked me to come there. The next day, I arrived in Bangalore and went to the Taj Hotel near Bangalore Airport, as directed by Renjith. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 When I reached the reception and asked to see Renjith, I was told that visitors were not allowed at the time. I informed Renjith about this, and he asked me to come outside the hotel. He then instructed me to enter through the fire exit of the hotel. I followed his directions and reached the room on the 4th Floor Renjith opened the door and let me in. When I entered the room, there was no one else but Renjith. As soon as I entered, he hugged me and made me sit in the room. At that time Renjith was consuming alcohol and offered me some as well. After consuming the alcohol, I became somewhat unconscious. In this state, he told me to remove my clothes. After I undressed, he made me stand in from of the mirror. He touched my entire body and kissed my private parts. After that, he asked me to take a shower. When I returned from the shower , he told me that he had never felt such desire for any other boy before. He took met to the bedroom and touched my body inappropriately. Then, he made me drink more alcohol and forced me to perform oral sex on him. After that, he asked me to lie on the bed, and he took several nude photos of me. H e shared by photos with another actress on his phone, saying her name was Revathi. Later, he engaged in physical relations with me. I spent the entire night with him. The next morning, his behaviour towards me was different. He asked if I needed any money. I replied that I dint’ need money and that I had come for an opportunity in the film industry. He then said that we could communicate the rest through messages and left the hotel. The next day, after I returned to Calicut, messaged him, asking him to give me a chance to act and mentioned at - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 I was completely devastated after the incident. Since I didn't receive a response, I messaged again. This time, I received a reply wing "I am Ranjith's wife, should not message to this number" After that, my number was blocked. Out of fear, I din’t report the incident. In 2012, while my house owner, Haseena Mansoor, noticed the change in my behaviour and asked me about it, I told her what has happened at that time.” I have now decided to file a complaint, encouraged by the recent revelations related to the film industry. I sent an email to the DIG on August 28 regarding this matter. I have not yet filed a complaint with the AMMA organization. I have complaint against Renjith for using me physically. Read over the entire statement and found that everything mentioned is correct.” 7. According to the complainant, the alleged incident is alleged to have taken place in Taj Hotel, near BIAL, Bangalore, which is factually / physically impossible in view of the material on record which clearly establishes that the said Hotel was inaugurated only on late 2015 and became operational only in 2016. This irrefutable fact renders the entire narrative of 2nd respondent as fabricated and impossible, especially when this glaring factual inconsistency fundamentally undermines the credibility of the allegations and demonstrates malafide intent behind the complaint. In the celebrated judgment of the Apex Court - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 in Bhajan Lal’s case supra, the Apex Court held that inherent powers can be exercised by this Court to quash the FIR if the allegations made therein are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which, no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 8. In Rajiv Thapar’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- “24. We have considered the submissions advanced at the behest of the rival parties. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court had before it an exhaustive and detailed order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, it ought to, therefore, have examined the controversy, while keeping in mind the inherent power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC specially because the Additional Sessions Judge in his order dated 7- 8-1999 had concluded, on the basis of the material relied upon by the accused, that no case was made out against the accused. This, according to the learned counsel, was permissible in view of the inherent jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. 25. Section 482 CrPC is being extracted hereunder: “482.Saving of inherent powers of High Court.— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” The discretion vested in a High Court under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised suo motu to prevent the abuse of process of a court, and/or to secure the ends of justice. 26. This Court had an occasion to examine the matter in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] (incidentally the said judgment was heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent complainant), wherein it was held thus: (SCC p. 581, para 29) “29. Regarding the argument of the accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Courtunder Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of the Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .” 27. Recently, this Court again had an occasion to examine the ambit and scope of Section 482 CrPC in Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar [(2008) 14 SCC 1 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 721] wherein in the main order it was observed that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was unlimited. In the said judgment, this Court held that the High Court could make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In a concurring separate order passed in the same case, it was - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 additionally observed that under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court was free to consider even material that may be produced on behalf of the accused, to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained. The aforesaid parameters shall be kept in mind while we examine whether the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC in the facts and circumstances of this case. 28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held. 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1.Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2.Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3.Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 30.4.Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. 31. The complaint made by Madan Lal Kapoor (the respondent complainant) proceeds on the assumption that his daughter Dr Monica Thapar was administered poison. The said assumption was based on the fact that the respondent complainant (as also the members of his family), found that the body of their daughter had turned blue when they laid their eyes on it for the first time after her death. The motive disclosed in the complaint is non-cordiality of relations between the deceased Dr Monica Thapar, and the family members of her husband (the appellants herein) on account of non-fulfilment of dowry demands. Insofar as the allegation that the appellants had poisoned Dr Monica Thapar to death is concerned, the appellants have placed reliance on the post-mortem report dated 28-9-1992, chemical analysis findings recorded in the Central Forensic Science Laboratory's report dated 9-2-1993, the inquest report dated 6-7-1993, and the order passed by the Additional Sessions - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 Judge, Delhi, dated 7-8-1999. It is clear that Madan Lal Kapoor (the respondent complainant) was associated with the investigative process from the very moment the body of Dr Monica Thapar arrived at Delhi. It was at his instance that the post-mortem examination was conducted. The body of the deceased, after the same was subjected to the post- mortem examination, was handed over jointly to Madan Lal Kapoor (the father of the deceased) and to Rajiv Thapar (the husband of the deceased). The cremation of the body of Dr Monica Thapar was carried out jointly by the two families. A high level Medical Board, constituted for conducting the post- mortem examination, in unequivocal terms returned a finding that “cardiac decompensation due to enlarged atrial septal defect and pulmonary hypertension” was the cause of Dr Monica Thapar's death. It would be pertinent to notice that samples from the stomach, intestine, liver, spleen, kidney and blood of the deceased's body were taken for forensic examination in order to verify the allegation of poisoning levelled by Madan Lal Kapoor. Central Forensic Science Laboratory, New Delhi, in its report dated 9-2-1993 negatived the aforesaid allegation by concluding, that the samples did not indicate the presence of any common poisoning substance. Relying on the inquest report dated 6-7-1993 rendered by the SDM, Delhi, it was sought to be asserted that echocardiography conducted at Urmil Heart and Lung Centre, Surat, disclosed the presence of a large hole in Dr Monica Thapar's heart. Even according to Urmil Heart and Lung Centre, Surat, Dr Monica Thapar had suffered a massive heart attack, and had died at the said hospital on - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 26-9-1992. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the aforesaid material is evidence of sterling quality which was sufficient to demonstrate that there was not the remotest possibility that the trial against the appellants would lead to their conviction. 32. The evidence relied upon by the appellant has not been contested or refuted by Madan Lal Kapoor (the respondent complainant), even though he was aware of the same when he filed the complaint. During the course of the proceeding before the committing Magistrate, and even before the Sessions Court and the High Court, the appellants had placed emphatic reliance on the material referred to above. The same remained unrefuted in the pleadings filed on behalf of Madan Lal Kapoor. During the course of hearing at the stages referred to above, the veracity of the documents/material referred to above was not contested. The aforesaid position has subsisted even before this Court. It was accordingly submitted on behalf of the appellants that even if trial is allowed to proceed against the appellants, at the culmination thereof, it would be impossible to return a finding of guilt against any of the accused.” 9. In Padal Venkata Rama Reddy’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- Discussion about Section 482 CrPC “ 8. Section 482 of the Code deals with inherent power of the High Court. It is under Chapter 37 of the Code titled “Miscellaneous” which reads as under: - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 “482.Saving of inherent powers of High Court.— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” This section [Ed.: The reference is to S. 561-A of the 1898 code which found place in the new CrPC of 1973 as S. 482 thereof. S. 561-A was inserted in the 1898 Code in 1923.] was added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1923 as the High Courts were unable to render complete justice even if in a given case the illegality was palpable and apparent. This section envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: 1. to give effect to any order under CrPC, 2. to prevent abuse of the process of any court, 3. to secure the ends of justice. 9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239 : (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court laid down the following principles: (AIR p. 869, para 6) (i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding e.g. want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 10. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 : AIR 1977 SC 1489] this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 703, para 7) “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 11. Though the High Court has inherent power and its scope is very wide, it is a rule of practice that it will only be exercised in exceptional cases. Section 482 is a sort of reminder to the High Courts that they are not merely courts of law, but also courts of justice and possess inherent powers to remove injustice. The inherent power of the High Court is an inalienable attribute of the position it holds with respect to the courts subordinate to it. These powers are partly administrative and partly judicial. They are necessarily judicial when they are exercisable with respect to a judicial order and - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 for securing the ends of justice. The jurisdiction under Section 482 is discretionary, therefore the High Court may refuse to exercise the discretion if a party has not approached it with clean hands. 12. In a proceeding under Section 482, the High Court will not enter into any finding of facts, particularly, when the matter has been concluded by concurrent finding of facts of the two courts below. Inherent powers under Section 482 include powers to quash FIR, investigation or any criminal proceedings pending before the High Court or any court subordinate to it and are of wide magnitude and ramification. Such powers can be exercised to secure ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of any court and to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, depending upon the facts of a given case. The Court can always take note of any miscarriage of justice and prevent the same by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code. These powers are neither limited nor curtailed by any other provisions of the Code. However, such inherent powers are to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. 13. It is well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not in a situation where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. It cannot be used if it is inconsistent with specific provisions provided under the Code (vide Kavita v. State [2000 Cri LJ 315 (Del)] and B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] ). If an effective alternative remedy is available, the High Court - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 will not exercise its powers under this section, specially when the applicant may not have availed of that remedy. 14. The inherent power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, to do real and substantial justice, for administration of which alone courts exist. Wherever any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent the abuse. It is, however, not necessary that at this stage there should be a meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case ends in conviction or acquittal. (Vide Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142 : AIR 1990 SC 494] ; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [(1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 2005 SC 9] .) 15. It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised. But some attempts have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] , Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] and Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. [(2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] 16. In the landmark case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] this Court - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 considered in detail the provisions of Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. This Court summarised the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by the High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 17. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. [(2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] a petition under Section 482 was filed to quash two criminal complaints. The High Court by a common judgment allowed the petition and quashed both the complaints. The order was challenged in appeal to this Court. While deciding the appeal, this Court laid down the following principles: (SCC p. 748, para 12) 1. The High Courts should not exercise their inherent powers to repress a legitimate prosecution. The power to quash criminal complaints should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. 2. The criminal complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the alleged offence. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the criminal complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the criminal proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the alleged offence. 3. It was held that a given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. 18. In State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] it has been held that probabilities of the prosecution version cannot be analysed at - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 this stage. Likewise, the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of secondary importance. The relevant passage reads thus: (SCC p. 550, para 11) ‘ 11. … It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.” 19. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 SC 709] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 695, para 7) “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” 20. This Court, while reconsidering the judgment in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 SC 709] , has consistently observed that where matters are also of civil nature i.e. matrimonial, family disputes, etc., the Court may consider “special facts”, “special features” and quash the criminal proceedings to encourage genuine settlement of disputes between the parties. - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 21. The said judgment in Madhavrao case [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 SC 709] was reconsidered and explained by this Court in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260] which reads as under: (SCC p. 271, para 70) “70. Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 SC 709] also does not help the respondents. In that case the allegations constituted civil wrong as the trustees created tenancy of trust property to favour the third party. A private complaint was laid for the offence under Section 467 read with Section 34 and Section 120-B IPC which the High Court refused to quash under Section 482. This Court allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings on the ground that even on its own contentions in the complaint, it would be a case of breach of trust or a civil wrong but no ingredients of criminal offence were made out. On those facts and also due to the relation of the settler, the mother, the appellant and his wife, as the son and daughter-in-law, this Court interfered and allowed the appeal. … Therefore, the ratio therein is of no assistance to the facts in this case. It cannot be considered that this Court laid down as a proposition of law that in every case the court would examine at the preliminary stage whether there would be ultimate chances of conviction on the basis of allegation and exercise of the power under Section 482 or Article 226 to quash the proceedings or the charge- sheet.” 22. Thus, the judgment in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 SC 709] does not lay down a law of universal application. Even as per the law laid down therein, the Court cannot examine the facts/evidence, etc. in every case to find out as to whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in conviction. The ratio of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 SC 709] is applicable in cases where the Court finds that the dispute involved therein is predominantly civil in nature and that the parties should be given a chance to reach a compromise e.g. matrimonial, property and family disputes, etc. etc. The superior courts have been given inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of court; where the Court finds that the ends of justice may be met by quashing the proceedings, it may quash the proceedings, as the end of achieving justice is higher than the end of merely following the law. It is not necessary for the Court to hold a full-fledged inquiry or to appreciate the evidence, collected by the investigating agency to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.” 10. As stated supra, the allegations made in the complaint are factually impossible, given the fact that the alleged venue did not exist at the time of the purported incident coupled with complete and total lack/absence of any corroborative evidence which clearly undermines the credibility of the allegations. In the instant case, in the light of the material on record which discloses that Taj Hotel at BIAL, started functioning only in 2016, it was physically / factually impossible for commission of the alleged offence by the petitioner in the year 2012 as falsely alleged by the respondents and consequently, the impugned complaint and FIR being inherently improbable and false, deserves to be quashed. - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 11. It is an undisputed fact borne out from the material on record that though the offence is alleged to have been committed in December, 2012, the impugned complaint and FIR registered only on 30.08.2024 by the respondents; in Chanchalapathi Das’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- “14. It is again pertinent to note that, even as per the case of the complainant, the alleged incident of bus theft had taken place in the year 2001, and it was only in 2009 that the substantial complaint was made in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore. It is just not believable that the Ballygunge Police Station concerned, Kolkata would not have taken any action on the report made in 2002 on behalf of the powerful body like ISKCON, Kolkata, or on the letter dated 30-9-2006 written by the Branch Manager of ISKCON, Kolkata. Respondent 2 complainant also did not take any concrete action for getting the said complaint registered with regard to the alleged theft of bus for a long period of eight years, till the complaint in the court was filed in the year 2009. 15. In the opinion of the Court such an inordinate delay of eight years in filing the complaint in the court itself would be a sufficient ground to quash the proceedings. If the luxury bus owned by ISKCON, Kolkata Branch in 1998 was so precious to them, they would not have sat silent for such a long time of eight years. In our opinion, the criminal machinery set into motion by filing the complaint for the alleged incident which - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 had taken place eight years ago, that act itself was nothing but a sheer misuse and abuse of the process of the court. xxxx 21. As regards inordinate delay in filing the complaint it has been recently observed by this Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N. [Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N., (2022) 15 SCC 164 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 632] that though inordinate delay in itself may not be a ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, however unexplained inordinate delay must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor and ground for quashing a criminal complaint. 22. In the light of the aforestated legal position, if the facts of the case are appreciated, there remains no shadow of doubt that the complaint filed by the respondent complainant after an inordinate unexplained delay of eight years was nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the process of law to settle personal scores with the appellants, and that continuation of such malicious prosecution would also be further abuse and misuse of process of law, more particularly when neither the allegations made in the complaint nor in the charge-sheet, disclose any prima facie case against the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants are so absurd and improbable that no prudent person can ever reach to a conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the appellants-accused.” 12. In Palani’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 “ 19. Delay in setting the law into motion by lodging the complaint is normally viewed by the courts in suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against the accused. In such cases, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay in registration of FIR. But there may be cases where the delay in registration of FIR is inevitable and the same has to be considered. Even a long delay can be condoned if the witness has no motive for falsely implicating the accused. In the present case, PW 1 had no motive to falsely implicate the accused. As pointed out earlier, PW 1 seeing her own son being brutally attacked, the effect of the incident on the mind of the mother cannot be measured. Being saddened by the death of her son, it must have taken sometime for PW 1 to come out of her shock and then proceed to police station to lodge the FIR. The delay of two-and-a-half hours in lodging the complaint and registration of FIR and the delay in receipt of the FIR by the Magistrate was rightly held as not fatal to the prosecution case.” 13. In Parkash Chand’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- “ 20. There is admittedly a delay of 7 months in lodging the FIR in the case of alleged rape. If the case is reported immediately apart from the inherent strength of the case flowing from genuineness attributable to such promptitude, the perceptible advantage would be the medical examination to which the prosecutrix can be - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 subjected and the result of such examination in a case where there is a resistance. It is the case of the prosecution that she raised hue and cry and therefore apparently she would have resisted. Possibly, a medical examination may have revealed signs of any resistance or injuries. In this case the High Court has proceeded on the basis of testimony of the prosecutrix and sought to fortify it by the extra-judicial confession made before PW 4 and PW 5.” 14. In Imran Siddiqui’s case supra, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court held as under:- “10. What merits consideration is the contention of the learned senior counsel that the complainants are ghost complainants as the allegation in the complaints is that extortion has taken place about 9 months before registration of the complaints. There is no explanation except saying that due to fear there is delay in registration of complaints. If extraction had taken place on 13-09-2021, complaint could not have been registered on 05-05-5022. Similar goes with the earlier complaint and if complaints are read in juxtaposition they are verbatim similar. In fact, a few paragraphs are copied and pasted between the complaints registered on 01-05-2022 and 05-05-2022. Therefore, the very registration of crime or the happening of the incident becomes doubtful, as delay in registering the complaints gives rise to embellishment to a particular complaint as is held by the Apex Court in the case of MANOJ KUMAR SHARMA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 AND ANOTHER - (2016) 9 SCC 1, wherein the Apex Court considering the delay in registration of FIR has held as follows: “30. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. In our opinion, such extraordinary delay in lodging the FIR raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations made by Respondent 2 herein against the appellants, which are, in any case, general in nature. We have no doubt that by making such reckless and vague allegations, Respondent 2 herein has tried to rope the appellants in criminal proceedings. We are of the confirmed opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellants pursuant to this FIR is an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the FIR deserves to be quashed. In this context, it is apt to quote the following decision of this Court in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar [Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 468] wherein it was held as under : (SCC p. 383, para 12) “12. The FIR in a criminal case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence though may not be substantive piece of evidence. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of the eyewitnesses present at the scene of occurrence. If there is a delay in lodging the FIR, it loses the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of large number of - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 consultations/deliberations. Undoubtedly, the promptness in lodging the FIR is an assurance regarding truth of the informant's version. A promptly lodged FIR reflects the first-hand account of what has actually happened, and who was responsible for the offence in question.” 31. Whether an offence has been disclosed or not, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If on consideration of the relevant materials, the court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, it will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed in order to collect materials for proving the offence. 32. In the above backdrop, it is also imperative to discuss the scope of inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The appellants before us filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the FIR on the ground that the FIR was filed after a delay of 5 (five) years and is barred by territorial jurisdiction. The High Court, on the other hand, after taking note of the fact that the investigation is in the final stage in the matter and a charge-sheet is ready to be filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, ordered for its continuance without taking into consideration that it is barred by law. The court at Durg did not take notice of the fact that there is a legal bar engrafted in the matter for its continuance and the proceedings have been maliciously instituted after a delay of five years with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the appellants.” The other judgments relied on by the learned SPP-II and the learned counsel representing the 2nd respondent, were all considering delay and explanation thereto. In the case of SHANTABEN BHURABHAI BHURIYA v. ANAND ATHABHAI CHAUDHARI AND OTHERS – Criminal Appeal No.967 of 2021 decided - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 on 26th October, 2021, the Apex Court has held that it was the specific case of the victim that an attempt was made in getting the FIR registered on the very next day of the incident. That was not registered and a private complaint was filed four days thereafter. In those circumstances, the Apex Court held that delay was not fatal as the complainant had demonstrated that a sincere effort was made to register a complaint on 7- 09-2013 which was refused to be registered and as such a private complaint was registered on 13-09- 2013. Therefore, the delay therein was explained and it was only 4 days delay from the date of the incident. 11. Insofar as the judgment relied on by the learned counsel representing the 2nd respondent/complainant in the case of RAVINDER KUMAR AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF PUNJAB – 2001 Crl.L.J. 4242 the same would become distinguishable on the facts in the case before the Apex Court. In the said case the Apex Court was considering whether the FIR was registered after a delay of two days and whether those two days would be fatal to the case of the victim or the prosecution later. The Apex Court in the said judgment also holds that complaint should be registered without any loss of time and was declared that it was not to be fatal on the ground that it was only two days and the delay of two days in lodging the FIR cannot become a ground to quash the proceedings at the stage of investigation. - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 12. As observed hereinabove, in the case at hand, the delay is not two days or four days. The delay is 9 months. In the complaint registered on 1-05-2022 the period indicated is about 7 to 8 months ago and in the verbatim similar complaint registered which is second in line, the date of the incident is 13-09-2021 and the complaints admittedly are registered after about 9 months i.e., on 01-05-2022 and 05-05-2022. It is here the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MANOJ KUMAR SHARMA (supra) would be applicable, as the complaints so registered after 9 months are full of embellishments that too vague embellishment. In the teeth of the aforesaid complaints if further investigation or proceedings are permitted to continue, it would degenerate into harassment and result in abuse of the process of law. 13. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL - 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down postulates of interference and the same is followed to this day by the Apex Court in plethora of judgments. The Apex Court at paragraph 102 holds as follows: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis supplied) Postulates 1 and 5 would become applicable to the case at hand, as at the perusal of the complaints it would demonstrate two factors i.e., improbability and mala fide intention. Therefore, as observed by the Apex Court, in such cases, further proceedings should not be permitted to continue. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following: O R D E R (i) Writ Petitions are allowed. (ii) Registration of crimes in Crime No.68 of 2022 before the Harihara Rural Police and in Crime No.143 of 2022 before Davanagere Rural Police Station are quashed.” 15. In the instant case, the complaint was filed merely 12 years after the alleged incident without any plausible explanation for this extraordinary delay and this temporal gap not only weakens the credibility of the allegations but also raises serious questions - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 about the motives of 2nd respondent, particularly when the absence of any contemporaneous material, medical records or other corroborative evidence from 2012 onwards further erodes the veracity of the claims of the 2nd respondent. Under these circumstances, in the light of the undisputed fact that the alleged offence is purported to have been committed in December, 2012 and the impugned complaint and FIR having been registered after almost 12 years on 26.10.2024, the long inordinate and unexplained delay and latches on the part of the 2nd respondent in filing the complaint and FIR is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the same deserves to be quashed on this ground also. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the view that continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner would amount to an abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the present petition. 17. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER (i) Petition is hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned FIR dated 26.10.2024 in Crime No.64/2024 registered by the 1st respondent – Police, pending on - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:24550 WP No. 32231 of 2024 the file of Civil Judge & JMFC, Devanahalli, insofar as the petitioner is concerned is hereby quashed and consequently, the complaint dated 30.08.2024 filed before the Kasaba Police Station, Kozhikode, Kerala, vide Annexure-C is also hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE SD/SRL