Page No.# 1/8 GAHC010006012024 2025:GAU-AS:13425 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Cont.Cas(C)/34/2024 SARDARY BASPHORE S/O- RAMLAL BASPHORE, RAJAMAIDAM ROAD, JORHAT-01, ASSAM VERSUS JAYANT NARLIKAR AND 2 ORS THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY , DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, DISPUR, GUWAHATI-06 2:NARAYAN KONWAR THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM DISPUR GUWAHATI-06 3:DR. NIRADA DEVI THE DIRECTOR STATE COUNCIL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING ASSAM KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI 1 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N M DUTTA, MR. R BARUAH Advocate for the Respondent : MR. D SAIKIA.(R-3), MR. S BORA.(R-3) Page No.# 2/8 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN ORDER Date : 26.09.2025 Heard Mr. R. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent/contemnor No. 3. 2. Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this contempt petition has been preferred for wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court, dated 16.12.2022, passed in WP(C) No. 3812/2020, and that this contempt petition is preferred on 11.01.2024, after a period of one year from the date of the order alleged to have not been complied with. 2.1. The further contention of Mr. Baruah is that the petitioner has sought for invocation of the power of this Court, under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, and as such, delay in initiation of the contempt proceeding does not arise. Mr. Baruah has also referred to a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ranjit Kumar Dey vs. Siv Sankar Misra, reported in 1995 3 GLR 169, in support of his submission. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent/contemnor No. 3 submits that this contempt proceeding has not been initiated within the period of one year from the date of passing of the order. Taking this Court through the order, so passed by this Court in WP(C) No. 3812/2020, he submits that the said order was passed on 16.12.2022, and that the power conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India has to be read with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the inherent power of the Court has to be exercised in accordance with the prescription made by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Mr. Bora also submits that the present contempt petition, having been filed after Page No.# 3/8 elapse of one year, is not maintainable and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the same. 3.1. In support of his submission, Mr. Bora has referred to the following decisions: (i) Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian and Ors., reported in (2001) 7 SCC 549. (ii) Maheswar Peri and Ors. Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 251. (iii) Sangang Area Horticulture Farming Co-op Society vs. Commissioner/Secretary (Co-operation) Government of Manipur and Ors., reported in (2003) 3 GLR 464. 4. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record, and also gone through the decisions referred by learned counsel for both the parties. 5. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act provides for limitation for actions for contempt, which read as under:- “No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” 6. Article 215 of the Constitution of India provides for power of the High Court to punish for contempt, which read as under:- Page No.# 4/8 215. High Courts to be courts of record “Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.” 7. Though no time limit is prescribed in the Article 215 of the Constitution of India, yet it has to be read along with Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that the power of the High Court to initiate contempt proceeding has to be exercised within the period of one year from the date on which alleged contempt has been committed. And after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed, the proceeding cannot be initiated. 8. While dealing with the issue of limitation in contempt proceeding Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Tirupathi Rao vs. M. Lingamaiah and Ors., in Civil Appeal Nos. __ of 2024 [Arising out of SLP(Civil) Nos. 19647-48 of 2022], has held that: “Reverting to the point of limitation, even in case of a petition disclosing facts constituting contempt, which is civil in nature, the petitioner cannot choose a time convenient to him to approach the Court. The statute refers to a specific time limit of one year from the date of alleged contempt for proceedings to be initiated; meaning thereby, as laid down in Pallav Sheth (supra), that the action should be brought within a year, and not beyond, irrespective of when the proceedings to punish for contempt are actually initiated by the high court.” 8.1. In the aforementioned case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that: “The ‘procedure prescribed by law’ or a ‘validly Page No.# 5/8 enacted law’ referred to, in the aforementioned decisions is the one the Act envisages. Proceedings for contempt being quasi-criminal in nature, no punishment can be ordered by any court without strictly adhering to the stringent provisions therefor, however needless they may appear to be when a contempt is committed on the face of a high court and such court has no two opinions that following the course prescribed by the Act to punish for contempt would eventually turn out to be a useless formality.” 8.2. Also in the said case, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “In an appropriate case, it would be open to the party who has not petitioned the court within the period of one year, as stipulated in section 20 of the Act, to seek exemption from the law of limitation in line with the principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6, CPC, by showing the ground upon which such exemption is claimed. We have no hesitation to hold that in a case where a civil contempt is alleged by a party by referring to a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” and such allegation prima facie satisfies the court, the action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud merely on the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year as in section 20 of the Act.” 8.3. It has further been held in the said case that:- “At the same time, it must be remembered that the court cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship.” 9. It is to be noted here that in the case of Pallav Sheth (supra), a three- Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: Page No.# 6/8 “The power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law.” 10. Again, in the case of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal vs. Neeraj Kumar, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 602, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “High courts were obliged to examine whether procedure prescribed by law had been complied with when a petition under Article 215 was presented before the court. Such examination would also include a scrutiny of whether limitation, as prescribed by section 20, was attracted to the facts of the case.” 11. In the case of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad vs. Raj Kishore Yadav, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 11, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “A prayer for condonation of delay in presenting the petition/application alleging contempt would not be maintainable. The express negative phraseology used in section 20 of the Act, as a legislative injunction, places a fetter on the court’s power to initiate proceedings for contempt unless the petition/application is presented within the time- frame stipulated therein. However, since section 20 also uses the expression “date on which the contempt is alleged to be committed” as the starting point of the period of one year to be counted for reckoning whether the petition/application has been presented within the stipulated period, the high courts ought to be wary of crafty and skilful drafting of petitions/applications to overcome the delay in presentation thereof.” 12. In the case of Sangang Area Horticulture Farming Co-op Society Page No.# 7/8 (supra), referred by Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the respondent/contemnor No. 3, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had the occasion to deal with the issue and held that Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts, 1971 creates a statutory bar upon the Court for initiating any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In the said case, this Court had relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth (supra), especially in para No. 44, wherein it has been held as under: “44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” 13. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, I find that indisputably, the order in WP(C) No. 3812/2020, was passed by this Court on 16.12.2022. And this contempt petition was filed on 11.01.2024, and indisputably, it is beyond the period of one year. 14. On careful perusal of the contempt petition, I find that nowhere in the petition, the petitioner has made any statement regarding the delay or any Page No.# 8/8 explanation for the same. There is also no assertion in the petition that the contempt, being committed by the contemnors, is a continuous wrong giving raise to continuous cause of action. In absence of such averment and also relying upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, as discussed herein above, this Court is of the considered view that the present petition is not maintainable on account of delay in filing of the same. 15. I have also carefully gone through the decision referred by Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the petitioner, and I find that in the given facts and circumstances, the same would not come into his assistance. 16. Accordingly, this contempt petition stands dismissed for being not maintainable, on account of delay in filing of the same. JUDGE Comparing Assistant