1 2025:CGHC:54528-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 807 of 2025 Prakashchand Bhatia S/o Ram Kishan Bhatia Aged About 42 Years R/o 286 Jawahar Nagar Behind Agrasen Bhawan, Raipur, Po Main Branch 492001 Police Station K.K. Road Moudhapara Raipur CG. ...Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Department of Rev- enue, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur CG 2 - The Commissioner, Raipur Division Raipur CG 3 - The Collector And Ex-Officio, Deputy Secretary To Govt. of C.G. De- partment of Revenue Raipur, CG 4 - The Sub Divisional Officer Cum Land Acquisition Officer Arang/ab- hanpur, Raipur, CG 5 - The New Raipur Development Authority Naya Raipur, Through Its Chief Executive Officer, Raipur CG ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 10. 11 .2025 1. Heard Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate appearing for State/respondents on I.A. No.01, which is ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.11.10 17:04:49 +0530 2 an application for condonation of delay of 02 days in preferring the appeal. 2. For the grounds assigned in the application (I.A. No.01), the same is allowed. Delay of 02 days in filing the writ appeal is hereby condoned. 3. By way of this writ appeal, appellant/writ petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):- “It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this writ appeal and set aside the order dated 20.08.2025 passed by Hon'ble Single Bench of this court in Writ Petition (C) No. 649/2013 parties "Prakashchand Bhatia Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others" (Annexure-A/1) and further be please to allow the writ petition, is in the interest of justice.” 4. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 20.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No.649/2013 (Prakashchand Bhatia v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) and analogous cases whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge has been dismissed. 5. Brief facts of the case projected before the learned Single Judge, in nutshell, are that 6. Brief facts of the case, as projected before the learned Single 3 Judge, in nutshell, are as follows: the appellant along with other writ petitioners have challenged the award dated 01.03.2013 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, along with the Notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 08.08.2011 and 03.12.2009, and other consequential land acquisition proceedings. Notifications were issued on 08.08.2011 and 19.08.2011 proposing acquisition of 83 survey numbers admeasuring 29.98 hectares at Village Parsada, Tehsil Aarang, District Raipur, by invoking Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act of 1894 and dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A. These were published in newspapers on 19.08.2011 and in the Official Gazette on 26.08.2011. The declaration under Section 6 was published on 24.10.2011 in two newspapers and in the Gazette on 18.11.2011. The final award was passed on 01.03.2013. The present writ petitions were filed in May 2012 and May 2013. 7. The writ petitioners contend that the declaration under Section 6 was issued beyond the statutory period of one year and is therefore invalid. Earlier challenges in WPC No. 5794/2011 and WPC No. 5933/2011 were disposed of on 17.04.2012 with observations that possession had not been taken and that no payment of 80 percent compensation had been directed under Section 17. The writ petitioners submit that they were denied an opportunity of hearing under Section 5A, mandatory payment 4 under Section 17 was not made, and yet the Land Acquisition Officer proceeded to pass the award. They further contend that the Notification dated 03.12.2009 empowering the Commissioner, Raipur Division, was invalid for want of adaptation under Section 79 of the M.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000, and that the acquisition proceedings disclose no cogent reasons either for acquisition of the land or for invoking the urgency clause. 8. Being aggrieved by the award dated 01.03.2013 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, as well as the Notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 08.08.2011 and 03.12.2009 together with other impugned notifications and land acquisition proceedings, the appellant along with other writ petitioners filed writ petitions before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 20.08.2025, dismissed the said writ petitions. 9. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 20.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition being Writ Petition (C) No.649/2013 and other connected matters, the instant appeal has been filed by the appellant/writ petitioner in WPC No.649/2013 in the writ petition. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 20.08.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition is bad in law, perverse and erroneous, and therefore liable to be set aside. It is urged that the 5 conclusions recorded in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the impugned order are contrary to the material on record and inconsistent with the settled legal position. It is further submitted that although the respondent authorities invoked the urgency clause while issuing the acquisition notifications, the possession of the subject land has not been taken till date, which itself demonstrates that there was no urgency and that the land of the writ petitioners was never genuinely required. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner also contends that the respondents failed to disclose the issuance of order dated 11.03.2022 declaring that the land situated in Village Parsada is free from acquisition, which goes to the root of the matter. A copy of the said order has been filed as Annexure A/2. It is lastly submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider the mandate of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, thereby vitiating the impugned order. As such, the appeal be allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge be set aside. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/respondents submits that the impugned order calls for no interference, as the learned Single Judge has examined all relevant aspects and recorded well-reasoned findings. It is urged that the acquisition proceedings were initiated strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after due publication of Notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17, and that the plea 6 regarding absence of urgency or non-taking of possession is misconceived. Learned State counsel further submits that the appellants/writ petitioners were afforded adequate opportunity during the acquisition proceedings, the award has already been passed, and the challenge raised at this belated stage is devoid of merit. It is therefore contended that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and carefully considered their rival submissions. We have also perused the record of the case, including the impugned order dated 20.08.2025 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.649/2013 and analogous cases. 14. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties therein as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge while relying upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & Ors., 2011 AIR SCW 5047, has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “10. In these batch of writ petitions, preliminary Notification under Section 4 of the Act 1894 was published on 19.08.2011 and Notification under Sections 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act 1894 were published in the Official Gazette on 26.08.2011, whereas Notification under Section 6 of the Act 7 1894 was published on 24.10.2011 and it was published in the Official Gazette on 18.11.2011 and such Notification was issued before expiry of 01 years from the date of publication of Notification, therefore, the facts of the present matters and the case of Harichand (supra) are distinguishable. 11. In the matter of Nand Kishore Bhatiya & Anr. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. and connected matters passed on 17.04.2012 in WPC No. 5794 of 2011, the Notification issued under Sections 6 and 9 of the Act 1894 were declared illegal qua the petitioners and the Land Acquisition Officer was directed to issue fresh declaration under Sections 6 and 9 of the Act 1894 for those petitioners. It was also observed that in the Notification issued under Section 17(1) of the Act 1984, the nature of urgency was not specified. The facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts of case of Nand Kishore Bhatiya & other connected matters (supra). In that case award was not passed, therefore, direction was issued to issue fresh notice under Sections 6 and 9 of the Act 1894, but in the present batch of cases, award has already been passed and the petitioners approached this Court after 02 years from the date of issuance of notification under Section 17(1) of the Act 1894 and that judgment was passed in cited cases qua the petitioners of those petitions and it was not in rem. Therefore, the petitioners would not get any help from the orders passed in above referred cases. 12. With regard to Notification under Section 17(1) of the Act 1894, it was published on 24.10.2011 in 8 two daily Newspaper and it was notified in the Official Gazette on 18.11.2011 and according to said Notification, the land was acquired for public purpose for development of New Raipur. Thereafter award was passed on 01.03.2013 whereas these petitions have been filed in the month of May, 2012 and in the month May, 2013 without explaining delay. If the petitioners were agrieved with the Notification issued under Section 17(1) of the Act 1894, they should have approached this Court immediately after its publication. The area where the land in question are located, majorly constitutes the recreational land use for the planning and development of recreational activities. The area has been planned to be developed as sports hub adjoining the existing cricket stadium. The developmental activities which are being undertaken by the respondent NRANVP are being done as per the Nava Raipur Atal Nagar Development Plan, 2031, which was approved and came into force on 08.08.2008. The urgency clause was invoked pursuant to approval granted by the Commissioner, Raipur Division for development of New Capital. 13. With regard to Notification dated 03.12.2009, whereby power has been conferred with the Commissioner, the State of Chhattisgarh had abolished the posts of Commissioners of all Revenue Divisions vide Notification dated 03.09.2003 and power under Section 11 of the Act 1894 was conferred upon the District Collectors. The State Government again created the post of 9 Commissioners in all Revenue Divisions w.e.f. 14.04.2008 vide Notification dated 03.12.2009, therefore, the approval was granted by the Commissioner Raipur Division. Further the Notifications issued on 08.08.2011 and 03.12.2009 were within the knowledge of the petitioners, but they did not challenge it before passing of award and thus, this ground is also not available to the petitioners. 14. Now coming to the next ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to Section 5(A) of the Act 1894, which deals with hearing of objections. In these batch of cases, the petitioner could not establish that they were not afforded opportunity of hearing. The State in its return has categorically stated that opportunity was afforded to the petitioners and the said fact has not been rebutted. 15. Admittedly, the petitioners have challenged the various notifications after passing of award, whereas those Notifications were issued way back in the year 2009 and 2011 and they failed to explain the reasons for such delay. 16. In the matter of Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs no. 10 and 11 held as under:- 10. We see no reason for the land owners to wait for a few years for challenging the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act on the ground of delay. If the land owners had been really aggrieved, they ought to have challenged the 10 proceedings immediately after declaration made under Section 6 of the Act. 11. This Court has held in several judgments that if the land owners are aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings, they must challenge the same at least before an award is made and the possession of the land in question is taken by the Government Authorities. It has been held in Swaika Propeties (P) Ltd. & another v. State of Rajasthan & others [(2008) 4 SCC 695 : (AIR 2008 SC 1494 : 2008 AIR SCW 1574)] as under: “6. This Court has repeatedly held that a writ petition challenging the notification for acquisition of land, if filed after the p[possession having been taken, is not maintainable. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501 : (AIR 1997 SC 482 : 1996 AIR SCW 3871) where K. Ramaswamy, J. speaking for a Bench consisting of His Lordship and S.B. Majmudar, J. held (SCC p. 520, para 29) : (Para 29 of AIR, AIR SCW) : “29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors 11 into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.” Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. D.R. Laxmi & Ors. [(1996) 6 SCC 445 : (1996 AIR SCW 3970)] following the decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra) it was held : “… When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. …” To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & another v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. [(2000) 2 SCC 48 : (AIR 12 2000 SC 671 : 2000 AIR SW 197)] wherein this Court, following the decision of this Court in C. Padma and others v. Dy. Secy. To the Govt. of T.N. and others [(1997) 2 SCC 627] held (Shah Hyder case SCC p. 55, para 17) (Para 17 of AIR, AIR SCW) : “17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taking by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] …” 17. It is also pleaded that the acquired lands are in possession of respondent authorities and out of 28 land oustees, 16 individuals have already accepted the award amount and only 12 are left. It is also apparent that the amount of compensation has already been deposited with the Land Acquisition Officer immediately after passing of award. As out of 28 land oustees, 16 land oustees have already accepted the amount of compensation and thus, it would be very difficult to segregate the lands of the land oustees, who have accepted compensation and who have not accepted compensation. The most of part of the acquired land has already been developed. 18. Considering the above-discussed facts and the law laid down in the matter of Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao (supra), I do not find any good ground to entertain these writ petitions. 13 19. Consequently, these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. No cost(s)” 15. Having given anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, and upon a thorough scrutiny of the pleadings, documents and the reasoning assigned by the learned Single Judge, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out. The learned Single Judge has meticulously examined the validity of the acquisition proceedings, the applicability of the urgency clause, the issuance of the relevant notifications and the effect of the award already passed. The conclusions recorded therein are supported by the material on record and are in harmony with the settled principles governing judicial review in matters of land acquisition. 16. The appellant/writ petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any procedural irregularity of a substantial nature, nor have they shown any breach of mandatory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that would vitiate the proceedings. The contention regarding non-taking of possession, as also the reliance placed upon the subsequent order dated 11.03.2022, does not undermine the legality of the acquisition already concluded. 17. The plea founded upon Section 18 of the Act has likewise been rightly repelled, and we find no reason to take a different view. In the absence of any material to establish perversity, arbitrariness, 14 or violation of statutory mandate, the grounds urged in the writ appeal are unsustainable. The impugned order dated 20.08.2025 does not suffer from any error warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. 18. Consequently, the writ appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu