2025:CGHC:61974 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 194 of 2018 Kulwant Singh Raina S/o Late Guruvachan Singh Aged About 62 Years R/o Ward No.17 Manendragarh District Koriya, Chhattisgarh (Defendant No.1), District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Appellant/defendant-1 versus 1 - Ramnaresh Patel S/o Rampati Patel Aged About 39 Years R/o Joda Talaab, Near Shiv Mandir, Manendragarh, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh (Plaintiff) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Baikunthpur District Koriya, Chhattisgarh (Defendant No.2) 3 - Amarnath Vishwakarma S/o Jhalluram Vishwakarma R/o Ward No.4 Tehsil Manendragarh District Koriya, Chhattisgarh (Defendant No.3) ... Respondents /Defendants (Cause title is taken from the CIS) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For Appellant : Shri Shakti Raj Sinha, Advocate For Respondent/State : Shri Ajay Kumrani, PL For Respondent-1 : Shri Vivek Kumar Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent-3 : Shri Parag Kotecha, Advocate ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board 15.12.2025 1. This appeal under Section 96 of the CPC has been filed by defendant-1 against the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.02.2018, passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Manendragarh, District-Koriya in Civil Suit No.3A of 2012, whereby, the Digitally signed by V PADMAVATHI Date: 2026.02.17 17:21:58 +0530 Fa 194 of 2018 2 Civil Suit for specific performance of the contract dated 15.12.2009 has been decreed in favour of the plaintiff. 2. The plaintiff has filed a suit for specific performance of the contract dated 15.12.2009 with the pleading that defendant-1 entered into contract to sell his land bearing Khasra No. 217/10, area 2100 Sq.ft (30x70) out of total area 1.062 Hectare situated at Ward No.17, Municipal Council, Manendragarh, District Koriya, having four corners of land of Mittal in north side, remaining land of seller on southern side, common access road on eastern side, and the land of Amir Chand Dhingra on western side, @ Rs.70 per sft., and an agreement was executed on 15.12.2009 and paid Rs.10,000/- as advance amount against the total sale consideration. The remaining amount of sale consideration was to be paid within 16 months from the date execution of the agreement. It is also pleaded that the suit land was recorded in name of co-owners jointly, and it was the defendant burden to obtain no objection from the co- owners, and then to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff was regularly in touch with the defendant-1 and requested to execute the sale deed but he evaded the same. In the month of January, 2011 the plaintiff came to know that the out of total land of khasra no. 217/10 defendant-1 is either registered or going to register the sale deeds in favour of the some other persons, then he again contacted defendant-1 for execution of sale deed under agreement dated 15.12.2009, but the plaintiff denied to execute the sale deed @ Rs.70 per Sq.ft but the defendant further quoted the rate of Rs.110 per Sq.ft Since defendant-1 has not executed the sale deed in Fa 194 of 2018 3 his favour as per the agreement, he served a legal notice on 08.03.2011, despite that defendant-1 has not executed the sale deed. Subsequently, plaintiff came to know that the defendant-1 has sold the suit land to one Amarnath Vishwakarma, and therefore, he has also been made as a party defendant, and filed suit for specific performance of the contract dated 15.12.2009, and for declaration of the sale deed dated 12.12.2011, executed in favour of defendant-3 as null and void. 3. Defendant-1 contested the claim of the plaintiff, and filed his written statement in which he denied the plaint averment and pleaded that though there was an agreement to sell the land @ Rs.70 per sft with respect to land of 2100 sft (30 x 70) sft , which was the prevailing rate in the year 2009, but the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The defendant has also denied the four corners of the subject land and stated that there was no boundary fixed with respect the 30 x 70 ft of land. Defendant-1 was the sole title and possession holder of the suit land and six months time was provided in the agreement for registration of the sale deed. The plaintiff was not in the position to pay the entire sale consideration and was not competent to purchase the land, even no amount was paid on the date of execution of the agreement, though it was formally written in the agreement that an amount of Rs.10,000/- has been paid as advance. Defendant-1 has signed the agreement on 03.10.2009 itself, as he had trust upon the plaintiff. It is also pleaded that there is manipulation in the agreement by making the time of six months as 16 months. In fact, the agreement was Fa 194 of 2018 4 scribed on 03.10.2009, in which, defendant-1 has signed without obtaining any amount towards advance. During existence of the agreement, the plaintiff has not shown his readiness and willingness to get the sale deed registered in his favour, and now the defendant-1 has sold the suit land to defendant-3 and handed over the possession to him. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled for any decree of specific performance of the contract and his suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. Defendant-3 has also filed written statement and pleaded that he purchased 1770sft of land from khasra no.217/8 from defendant-1 through registered sale deed dated 12.12.2011 for a total consideration of Rs.2,64,000/- and after constructing a house there upon he is in possession of the same. The suit land of the present suit is different than the land of defendant-3, which he purchased from defendant-1, and its four corners also different. Therefore, there is no cause of action arise against defendant-3 and the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed. 5. Based on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial court has framed issues and proceeded for recording evidence of the parties. 6. In support of their claim, the plaintiff has examined himself as PW1, Gangaram as PW2, Rajkjmar as PW3 and relied upon documents Ex.P1 sale agreement dated 15.12.2009, and postal acknowledgment Ex.P2. 7. Defendant-1 examined himself as DW1 and Amarnath Vishwakarma as DW2, and relied upon the documents of sale agreements dated Fa 194 of 2018 5 28.01.2010 as Ex.D1, the sale agreement dated 29.1.2010 as Ex.D2, and copy of Sale Deed dated 18.06.2010 as Ex.D3, and copy of sale deed dated 08.12.2011 as Ex.D4, and copy of diversion certificate as Ex.D5. 8. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties the learned trial court decreed the suit in favour the plaintiff holding that there was an agreement to sell the land between the plaintiff and defendant-1 on 15.12.2009, and the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he is entitled for a decree for specific performance of the contract. The said judgment and decree are under challenge in the present first appeal. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant / defendant-1 would submit that the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff was executed on 15.12.2009, in which the time for registration of the said sale deed was given as 6 months, whereas, he manipulated the time limit in the said agreement and made it as 16 months, which makes the agreement void and it looses its validity. The agreement is executed on 15.12.2009 and the suit has been filed on 05.04.2012, which is after more than 2 years and in between that period, the plaintiff did nothing to get the sale deed registered in his favour. Even before the expiry of time limit he did nothing. There is no evidence produced by the plaintiff that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, or he was having sufficient amount of balance sale consideration. There is no proper pleading in the plaint with respect to readiness and willingness as required under section Fa 194 of 2018 6 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short, “Act of 1963”) to get the relief of specific performance of the contract, the plaintiff should be continuously ready and willing from the date of execution of agreement till the filing of the suit, which is lacking in the present case. Since the plaintiff has failed to get the sale deed registered, defendant-1 sold the suit land to defendant-3. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court is erroneous and the same is liable to be set aside. 10. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for respondent-1 / plaintiff would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant/defendant-1, and submitted that after execution of the agreement on 15.12.2009, plaintiff was regularly in touch with the defendant-1 and requested for registration of the sale deed, but he evaded on the assurance that he will get the consent of the co-owners of the suit land, and the plaintiff was waiting for consent by other co-owners. When he came to know that defendant-1 sold the suit land to other person, he served a legal notice and then filed the suit. He further submitted that execution of the agreement on 15.12.2009 is admitted by defendant-1, and there is sufficient pleading and evidence produced by the plaintiff that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If the plaintiff was having sufficient amount of remaining sale consideration with him but it is the defendant-1 who has not performed his part of the contract and sold the suit land to defendant-3. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court is based on Fa 194 of 2018 7 proper appreciation of evidence, and the appeal of the defendant-1 is liable to be dismissed. 11. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent-3, who is subsequent purchaser of the land though submitted that his land is different than the suit land, however, he would support defendant-1 that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and then defendant-1 sold the suit land to other persons. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial court. 13. Execution of agreement dated 15.12.2009 is admitted by defendant-1 though he pleaded that time of six months for registration of sale deed was provided in which the plaintiff, by manipulation made it as 16 months. From the agreement dated 15.12.2009, it reveals that defendant-1 had entered into an agreement to sell 2100 sft of land from khasra no.217/10 to the plaintiff @ Rs.70 per Sq.ft, and out of the total sale consideration Rs.10,000/- has been obtained by him as an advance amount, and the remaining amount was to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed. The four corners of the suit land were also mentioned in the agreement Ex.P1, though defendant-1 pleaded that there was manipulation by conversion of 6 months time into 16 months, but from perusal of agreement ExP1, it does not appear that any manipulation was being done by overwriting or by any other process. Even the defendant-1 could not get examined the agreement by any Fa 194 of 2018 8 expert to prove any manipulation in it. The agreement was executed on 15.12.2009, and sale deed was to be registered within 16 months from the date of the execution of the agreement. 14. In order to consider the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties with respect to readiness and willingness to perform their respective part of the contract, it would be appropriate to notice Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 which bars the specific performance of the contract in favour of plaintiff. Section 16 (c) of the Act of 1963, prior to its amendment dated 01.10.2018 stated as under: Section 16(c) in The Specific Relief Act, 1963 (c)who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. 15. Hon’ble Division Bench of this court in case of Rama Shankar Rao and another Vs. Nandlal Occhwani decided on 08.08.2025 in the First Appeal- 88 of 2022, has considered the requirement of pleading as per Section 16 ( c ) of the Act of 1963 and held that: “13. Thus, in terms of Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) as unamended in a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff should not only plead and prove the terms of the contract, but also plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract, in terms of the contract. Fa 194 of 2018 9 14. Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the CPC prescribe the manner in which the averments are required to be made by the plaintiff. For ready reference Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the CPC have been reproduced as under:- No. 47 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.1) A. B., the above–named plaintiff, states as follows:– 1. By an agreement dated the ……… day of …….. and signed by the defendant, he contracted to buy of [or sell to] the plaintiff certain immovable property therein described and referred to, for the sum of …… rupees. 2.The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on is part, but the defendant has not done so. 3. The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice. [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 6. The plaintiff claims that the Court will order the defendant specifically to perform the agreement and to do all acts necessary to put the plaintiff in full possession of the said property [or to accept a transfer and possession of the said property] and to pay the costs of the suit. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ No. 48 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.2) A. B., the above – named plaintiff, states as follows :– Fa 194 of 2018 10 1. On the ……… day of ……. 19…../20……., the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, in writing, and the original document is hereto annexed. The defendant, was absolutely entitled to the immovable property described in the agreement. 2. On the …….. day of ……. 19…. /20……, the plaintiff tendered ……… rupees to the defendant, and demanded a transfer of the said property by a sufficient instrument. 3. On the …… day of …….. 19….. /20…., the plaintiff again demanded such transfer. [Or the defendant refused to transfer the same to the plaintiff.] 4. The defendant has not executed any instrument of transfer. 5. The plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay the purchase–money of the said property to the defendants [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 8. The plaintiff claims– (1) that the defendant transfers the said property to the plaintiff by a sufficient instrument [following the terms of the agreement]; (2) …… rupees compensation for withholding the same. 15. The mandatory provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley1 in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that a suit for specific performance has to conform to 1(1969) 2 SCC 539 Fa 194 of 2018 11 the requirement prescribed in Forms 47 & 48 of the 1st Schedule in the CPC and observed as under:- “9. ……...The plaintiff did not plead either in the plaint or at any subsequent stage that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement pleaded in the written statement of defendant. A suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. Neither in the plaint nor at any subsequent stage of the suit the plaintiff has taken those pleas. As observed by this Court in Prem Rai v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) (Ltd.) [1968 SCC OnLine SC 151] that it is well-settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable.” 16. Taking into consideration the principles of law laid down in Ouseph Varghese (supra) the Supreme Court in the matter of Manjunath Anandappa urf Shivappa v. Tammanasa and others2 has held that the plaintiff should not only plead that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from date of filing of the suit, but also prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract and held as under:- 2(2003) 10 SCC 390 Fa 194 of 2018 12 “27. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. Only in certain exceptional situation where although in letter and spirit, the exact words had not been used but readiness and willingness can be culled out from reading all the averments made by the plaintiff as a whole coupled with the materials brought on record at the trial of the suit, to the said effect, the statutory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act may be held to have been complied with.” 17. Recently, in the matter of P. Ravindranath and another v. Sasikala and others3, the Supreme Court has held that the suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleading must necessarily be rejected. It was further held by their Lordships that Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract and said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. Relying upon the earlier decisions, it has been held that it is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract by adducing evidence and this crucial facet has to be determined by adducing all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in the plaint of readiness and willingness would not suffice, and held as under:- 22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. 32024 SCC OnLine SC 1749 Fa 194 of 2018 13 As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(c) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. (a) xxx xxx xxx xxx (b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy4, following was held in paragraph 46:- “46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” 42022 SCC OnLine 840 Fa 194 of 2018 14 (c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar5, it was held under paragraph 2:- “2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. (ii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit. (v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 5(1196) 4 SCC 526 Fa 194 of 2018 15 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed. 18. Furthermore, in the matter of Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agrawal6 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 have held as under:- “8. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, mandates that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff are to be determined from their conduct prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, as well as from the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure that a party seeking equitable relief has acted equitably themselves. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. The importance of readiness and willingness for enforcement of specific performance has been summarized by this Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy7, as follows: “23. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a 62024 SCC OnLine SC 2937 7(2023) 11 SCC 775 Fa 194 of 2018 16 person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (i) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, Explanation (ii) says the plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money. xxxxxxxxx Fa 194 of 2018 17 45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” 9. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. The agreement dated 06.06.1993 explicitly required the plaintiffs to ensure that Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 would come to Baripada within three months to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs, however, did not take any concrete steps to secure the consent or presence of the sisters within the stipulated period. They relied solely on Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra to procure the sisters, despite knowing that the sisters were not signatories to the agreement and held a significant share in the property. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs did not issue any notices or correspondence to Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 during the three-month period, nor did they make any efforts to communicate with them directly to expedite the execution of the sale deed. This inaction on the part of the plaintiffs indicated a lack of diligence and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued to operate their petrol pump on the suit land without taking Fa 194 of 2018 18 proactive steps to complete the purchase, suggesting complacency and a lack of urgency. 10. The High Court, in contrast, summarily concluded that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It stated that there was an abundance of evidence on record to establish the plaintiffs' financial capacity and willingness. However, the High Court did not delve into the specifics of the plaintiffs' conduct or address the Trial Court's findings regarding their inaction. The High Court's assessment on this crucial aspect was cursory and lacked a thorough examination of the evidence and circumstances that demonstrated the plaintiffs' lack of readiness and willingness.” 19. In the matter of Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai8 the Supreme Court in paragraph No.11 has held as under:- “11. ….. His plaint does not contain the requisite pleadings necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. This equitable remedy recognised by the Specific Relief Act cannot be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence.” 16. In the matter of Kamal Rani Rajaram Guru and others Vs Ku.Pinky 1999 Sec online MP356, Hon’ble MP High Court has held as under: “14. As to the plea about ready and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the essential terms of the contract. The continuous readiness and willingness at all stages from the date of the agreement till the date of hearing of the suit need to be proved. The substance of the matter and 8(1989) 4 SCC 313 Fa 194 of 2018 19 surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the plaintiff must be taken into consideration in adjudging the readiness and willingness to perform the plaintiffs part of the contract. This is reiterated in the case of Jugaraj Singh and another vs. Labh Singh and others, AIR 1995 SC 945. Reference to Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama vs. Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 PC 208 has been made in which it has been laid down that “in a suit for specific performance the averment of readiness and willingness on plaintiffs part upto the date of the decree is necessary." The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff can be gathered not only from his averment in plaint, but also by his conduct of sending a registered notice to execute the sale-deed. In the instant case, the plaintiff has not placed on record any of the notice in the shape of reply, which he is stated to have sent to the defendant. 15. It is also pertinent to note here that to judge whether the plaintiff is ready to perform his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. The said requirement has been laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by L.Rs., Vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others, AIR 1996 SC 116. 16. In another case of Abdul Khader Rowther vs. R.K. Sara Bai, AIR SC 682, it has been laid down by following the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ouseph Varghese Vs. Joseph Aley and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 539 (Para 11) to the effect that ‘the plaint does not contain the Fa 194 of 2018 20 requisite pleadings necessary toobtain a decree for specific performance. This equitable remedy recognised ;by the Specific Relief Act cannot be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence.’ Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 runs as under: 16. Personal bars to relief. -- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person -- (a) ............. (b) ............. (c) Who fails to aver and proved that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Hence it is mandatory for the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. In other words, if the plaint does not contain this averment, it can well be said that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action. Such averments are in accordance with Forms 47 and 48 of Civil Procedure Code. In the suit for specific performance, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. In the instant case, the pleading which has been made in the plaint in Para 2 is as under: ‘ यह की वादीगण की पि ता उ्ሹ सौदी की तारीख की बादी सौ हमेशा कीमेता की बाकी रु य ्ቚपितावादी नंबारी १ (एकी) फ २ (दी ) की दीनं वा उनंसौ पिबाቅኍ ्ቔ Fa 194 of 2018 21 पि#खनं की ता$यरी रीह वा ता$यरी ह$। रीता& ्ቚपितावादी नंबारी १ (एकी) फ २ (दी ) की दिदी# मे( बादीयनंता आ गई ह$ औरी वाह अ नं इकीरीरी सौ मे&कीरीनं ‘ चाहता ह$ In the Paragraph No. 3 of the plaint, the plaintiff has further averred to the effect that "defendants 1 and 2 served a notice on 19-10-1989 averments of which were not correct. The said notice was replied by the plaintiff through counsel and it was informed in the reply to the said notice that the plaintiff was ready to purchase on Fagun Sudi Puno year 1990 the property on payment of remaining consideration and in case the defendants want to execute the sale-deed earlier, 15 days'' time should be given to the plaintiff so that the, plaintiff should pay the remaining amount to get the sale-deed executed." It is clear from the pleading that the plaintiff was not immediately ready to perform his part of the contract but asked for 15 days notice. The plaintiff has further nowhere pleaded or proved that he was ready to bear the requisite expenses for the purchase of the stamps and also to bear the registration charges. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it is stated that he was ready to pay balance of the contract price only and nothing beyond that. Section 29(c) of the Indian Stamp Act runs as under:-- 29. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the expenses of providing the proper stamp shall be borne .. ... ... ... (c) in the case of a conveyance (including a reconveyance of mortgaged property) by the grantee, in the case of a lease or agreement to lease by the lessee or intended lessee; Fa 194 of 2018 22 It is apparent from Section 29(c) of the Stamp Act that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the expenses of providing the proper stamp shall be borne by the purchaser. Section 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act provides as under:-- 55. In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immovable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold: (1) the seller is bound -- XXX XXX XXX XXX (d) on payment or tender of the amount due in respect of the price, to execute a proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders it to him for execution at a proper time and place. It is clear from the above cited Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act- that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, it is the duty of the buyer to bear the expenses for the purchase of the proper stamps for the conveyance and to tender the proper conveyance of the property to execute at a proper time and place. These are the statutory obligations of the buyer and, therefore, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, they inhere in every contract. In the case of Smt. Dhanbai vs. Pherozshah, ILR (1971) 21 Raj. 1099, it has been held that in the absence of the contract to the contrary, it is imperative for the plaintiff to bear the expenses of the stamps and tender the conveyance for execution to the defendant-purchaser and his willingness to do this is Fa 194 of 2018 23 essential ingredient of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The relevant observations are as under:-- Now it has to be remembered that as no contract to the contrary was pleaded in the plaint, it was the duty of the buyer, u/s 55(1)(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, to tender a proper conveyance of the property to the seller for execution at a proper time and place. So also it was his duty u/s 29(c) of the Stamp Act to bear the expenses for the purchase of the proper stamp for the conveyance. These statutory obligations of the buyer inhere in every such contract, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. As it is admitted that there was no agreement to the contrary, it was the plaintiffs duty to make a general averment of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, or to plead specifically that he was, inter alia, ready to tender the conveyance and pay the expenses for the purchase of the stamp. Reference in this connection may be made to Ma Hnit vs. Maung Popu, AIR 1919 PC 124 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that it is the duty of the purchaser to tender a conveyance, and he would then, and not before such a tender was either made or waived, have the right to the deed of transfer. Then it has been held in Dau Alakhram vs. Mt. Kulwantin Bai, 1950 NLJ 456 : AIR 1950 Nag 238 that the expenses for the deed of sale have to be incurred by the purchaser and it was thus for the plaintiff to express his readiness and willingness to pay the money for the stamp paper and to call upon the other side to execute the sale- deed. The other decisions on the point are Saral Kumar Chatter fee vs. Madhusudan Auddy, AIR 1964 Cat. 556 and Mst. Suraj Bai vs. Nawab Mohammad Mukarram Alt Khan, ILR (1969) 19 Raj. 508. Fa 194 of 2018 24 The averments referred to by Mr. Gupta in the plaint are therefore quite inadequate. xxx xxx xxx There is therefore no force in the argument of Mr. Gupta and it was necessary for the plaintiff to make an averment of his readiness and willingness to perform "all acts" and it was not open to him to leave out, or to refuse to comply, with the requirement regarding the tender of the conveyance or the purchase of "the stamp” xxx xxx xxx It will thus appear that the plaintiff has not made an averment in the plaint regarding his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The plaint does not therefore disclose a cause of action for the suit and there is justification for the argument that it should be dismissed for that reason. This decision has been cited with approval by the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 13 of 1973 in the case of Firm Gangaram Ram day al and others vs. Firm Patiram Nahaneram decided on 30-11-1981. In the said case, in the similar set of pleadings, it was held that the plaintiff was unable to prove his plea about his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Hence, the suit for specific performance was dismissed for want of pleading. The requisite readiness to bear registration charges and to bear the expenses of stamp duty. The only averment made was to bear the remaining part of the consideration. By virtue of denial of the written contract, the plaintiff cannot escape its Fa 194 of 2018 25 liability to aver in the plaint his readiness and willingness and to prove the provisions of section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 17. Referring to the facts of the present case, plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint that: " वादी /ण0ता1 ्ቚपितावादी सौ जीकी3ता पिवाቅኍय ्ቔ हता& पिवाቅኍयमे/ल्य एवा अन्य आवाश्यकी खचा0 की ्ቤवास्था कीरीकी पिवाቅኍय ्ቔ की पिनंष् दीनं हता& हरी सौमेय तात् री रीहता रीह ह$। " 18. A careful perusal of the plaint averment would show that with regard to readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract is not in conformity with Section 16 ( c ) of the Act of 1963 read with Section 47 and 48 of the Appendix A of the CPC. There is no pleading on behalf of the plaintiff that he is still ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and to make payment of remaining balance sale consideration, or he has sufficient fund in his possession. He has only pleaded that he was ready to perform his part of the contract after arranging the remaining sale consideration but he did not aver that he is still ready to perform his part of the contract. He also did not specify any date on which he tried to tender the amount and asked defendant-1 to execute the sale deed in his favour, and also did not specifically stated about the date on which he contacted defendant-1 for registration of sale deed. Though the plaintiff has pleaded that he served a legal notice on 08.03.2011 to defendant-1 but there is no copy of the same which he Fa 194 of 2018 26 allegedly served upon defendant-1, and only a postal acknowledgment has been placed on record as Ex.P2 by the plaintiff. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pydi Ramana @ Ramulu v. Davarasety Manmadha Rao9 while considering the question of continuous “readiness” and “willingness” relying upon the decision of Vijay Kumar v. Om Prakash10 held that the continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant specific relief and held that the steps taken by the plaintiff during the date of agreement till the date of filing of suit will have to be explained in the plaint and proved in the evidence, and held in paragraph-20 of the judgment as under:- 20. The long unexplained delay and silence on the part of the plaintiff in this regard while in the witness box would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree of specific performance and it is for this precise reason, the trial court as noticed supra has refused to grant the equitable relief which has been reversed by the appellate court without assigning proper and cogent reason and the one assigned are at tangent or in other words contrary to the facts. The resultant effect of filing the suit for specific performance on the verge of limitation coming to an end came to be examined by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar [Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 981] and held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the equitable relief (vide paras 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18).” 9(2024) 7 SCC 515 10(2019) 17 SCC 429 Fa 194 of 2018 27 20. PW1-Ram Naresh has stated in his deposition that remaining sale consideration is kept in his bank account but he did not state as to what was the amount in his account just before filing of the suit. He further admitted that he has not produced any document or bank passbook in support of his claim that he is having sufficient sale consideration with him. 21. Another submission raised by learned counsel for the defendant-1 that the plaintiff has not proved by producing evidence that he was having sufficient fund for remaining sale consideration and was having capacity to pay the balance sale consideration. The plaintiff has not produced his account books, pass book or other statement of the account to establish that he was having sufficient fund to pay the remaining sale consideration. 22. In the matter of Vijaykumar Vs Om Prakash, (2019)17 SCC 429, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown through out and has to be established by the plaintiff. In the case in hand, though the respondent-plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance on 29th April, 2008, the respondent-plaintiff has not shown his capacity to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.22,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs). In his evidence, the respondent- plaintiff has stated that he has borrowed the amount from his friends and kept the money to pay the Fa 194 of 2018 28 balance sale consideration. As rightly pointed out by the Trial Court, the respondent-plaintiff could not produce any document to show that he had the amount of Rs.22,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs) with him on the relevant date; nor was he able to name the friends from whom he raised money or was able to raise the money. Further more, as rightly pointed out by the Trial Court, the respondent-plaintiff could have placed on record his Accounts Book, Pass Book or the Statement of Accounts or any other negotiable instrument to establish that he had the money with him at the relevant point of time to perform his part of the contract. We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the Trial Court that the respondent-plaintiff has not been able to prove his readiness and willingness on his part. 7. The relief for specific performance is purely discretionary. Though the respondent-plaintiff has alleged that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the First Appellate Court ought to have examined first whether the respondent-plaintiff was able to show his capacity to pay the balance money. In our considered view, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court has not properly appreciated the evidence and the conduct of the parties. The First Appellate Court as well as the High Court, in our view, was not right in reversing the judgment of the Trial Court and the impugned order cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside.” 23. In the case of “Shenbagam and others v. K.K. Rathinavel” 2022 SCC Online SC 71, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has analysed the readiness and willingness to perform the obligation under the contract, and in para 16, it has been held that:- Fa 194 of 2018 29 “16. Similarly, in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, a two-judge Bench of this Court observed that 'readiness' means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which would include the financial position to pay the purchase price. To ascertain 'willingness', the conduct of the plaintiff has to be properly scrutinised. The Court noted: "2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. [….] The factum of readiness and willingness to perform the with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. the plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.” 24. Learned trial court while considering the readiness and willingness, relied upon the document Ex.P2, which is postal acknowledgment of the alleged notice served upon defendant-1 on 10.03.2011. No any notice or Fa 194 of 2018 30 its copy has been produced by the plaintiff as to what was the content of the said notice, whether the plaintiff was ready and willing and had contacted the defendant-1 for registration of the sale deed or what actually was there in the said notice. In absence of any copy of notice, it cannot be said that it was the legal notice for performance of the contract. Further, the agreement was executed or 15.12.2009, and the said notice was allegedly said to have been sent on 08.03.2011, which is served upon defendant-1 on 10.03.2011. What the plaintiff did in between that period has not been substantiated by him. By the postal acknowledgment, it cannot be inferred that the plaintiff served a legal notice to defendant-1 showing his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Further, though defendant-1 has denied time limit of 16 months and pleaded that the time of 6 months only was given to the plaintiff for registration of sale deed in his favour, which is manipulated and made as 16 months, however, defendant-1 could not prove any manipulation in the agreement Ex.P1. Even if it is found that the period of 16 months for registration of the sale deed was fixed in the agreement, Ex.P1, the plaintiff was required to plead and prove his readiness, and willingness throughout from the date of execution of agreement till filing of the suit in which he failed to do so. Learned trial court has considered that defendant-1 has denied that any time limit was fixed for registration of the sale deed but in his evidence, he admitted that time limit of 6 months was fixed, which is self contradictory. It is the settled law that the plaintiff has to prove his case on his own strength and Fa 194 of 2018 31 he cannot take benefit of weakness of the defendant, if any. Firstly, the plaintiff has to prove his case and then the burden shifts upon defendant to prove his case. 25. So far as the pleading of plaintiff in the plaint with respect to assurance given by defendant-1 that the suit land is recorded in name of other co-owners also and after obtaining their no objection, and consent he will get the sale deed registered in favour of the plaintiff but from perusal of agreement Ex.P1, it transpires that there is no averment that the suit land is recorded in the name of other co-owners also, and after obtaining their no objection, or permission, defendant-1 will register the sale deed in favour of plaintiff. The learned trial court has considered the evidence of defendant-1 at the same time defendant-1 has entered into an agreement to sale adjoining land to one Indrajeet Singh Kalra and Avtar Singh Kalra, he registered the sale deed in their favour even after the fixed period for registration of the sale deed and in evidence defendant-1 has stated that the authorization letter from the co-owner of the suit land was required before executing the sale deed in favour of respective purchasers and therefore, after obtaining the authorization from the co-owners he executed the sale deed in favour of other purchasers, and thus, defendant-1 was not competent to execute the sale deed on the date of registration of the agreement. However, he obtained the power of attorney from other co-owners to register the sale deed on 01.10.2010 and therefore, it can be held that defendant-1 could not perform his part of the contract. The consideration of the learned trial Fa 194 of 2018 32 court appears to be incorrect, as in the present case the plaintiff is required to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, which he failed to prove the same as has been discussed herein above. 26. Since the plaintiff himself has failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, he is not entitled for relief of specific performance of the contract. Although, the learned trial court has considered the availability of remaining land with defendant-1 from the total land of Khasra no. 217/10 however, this court does not consider it to go into question of availability of land with defendant-1. 27. From the aforesaid considerations, this court does not find any supporting evidence to uphold the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, and accordingly, the first appeal filed by the appellant /defendant-1 is allowed, the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.2.2019 passed by the learned trial court is set aside, and consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. 28. Parties shall bear their own cost. 29. Appellate court decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE padma