1 2025:CGHC:61949 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR (Order Reserved on 22/09/2025) (Order Delivered on 19/12/2025) (Order Uploaded on 02/01/2026) WPC No. 3629 of 2025 Smt. Soni Ajay Banjare W/o Shri Ajay Banjare, Aged About 34 Years R/o House No. 14, Ward No. 14 Ambedkar Nagar, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Joint Secretary, Urban Administration and Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Collector, Sarangarh Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh 4 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Sarangarh, Distrct Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh 5 - Municipal Council Sarangarh, Through The Chief Municipal Officer, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh Bilaigarh Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Praveen Das, Dy. AG For Respondent No.5: Mr. R.S. Patel, Advocate ASHUTOSH MISHRA Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH MISHRA Date: 2026.01.02 15:03:44 +0530 2 Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge C A V Order 1. The present petition has been filed assailing the impugned order dated 02/07/2025 issued by the Respondent authorities on the ground that the said order has been passed without adhering to the mandatory procedure contemplated under the proviso to Section 41A of the Act C.G. Municipalities Act, 1961. 2. By way of the present petition, the petitioner is praying for the following reliefs: i. To kindly call for the record of the case. ii. To kindly set aside the impugned order dated 02/07/2025 (ANNEXURE P/1) for being illegal, arbitrary and contrary to law. iii. To kindly direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to complete her tenure as President of the Municipal Council Sarangarh without any illegal interruption. iv. Any other relief/s may be granted to the petitioner, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the present fact and circumstances of the case including the cost of the petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the impugned order dated 02.07.2025, passed under Section 41-A of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961, removing the petitioner from the office of President of the Municipal Council, Sarangarh, is arbitrary, illegal, and unsustainable in law. He would next contend that Section 41-A is an 3 extraordinary and drastic provision, meant to be invoked only in grave and exceptional circumstances. He would next contend that the impugned order does not disclose any such circumstance on the contrary, the alleged lapses, even if assumed, are at best procedural or technical and do not justify the extreme penalty of removal of an elected President. He would place reliance upon the law laid down by this Court in Mahesh Agrawal v. State of Chhattisgarh, and would submit that removal of an elected municipal head must be founded on strong, cogent and weighty reasons, and not on trivial or technical lapses. In support of his contentions he placed reliance upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector, Raigad & Oterhs {(2012) 4 SCC 407}; Sharda Kailash Mittal Vs. State of M.P. {(2010) 2 SCC 319}; Chief Informatiion Commissioner Vs. State of Manipur {(2011) 15 SCC 1}; and Dayal Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others {(2003) 2 SCC 593}. and would submit that the findings of inquiry report cannot be made applicable in the case of the petitioenr as the report attributes responsibility to the President for a decision which was taken collectively by the entire Council and the decision to grant small adjoining parcels on lease was taken in public interest to enhance municipal revenue and provide adequate space to shopkeepers. Even a bona fide misinterpretation of law, if any, could have been corrected administratively and did not warrant removal. 4. Per contra, learned State counsel would contend that that the impugned order dated 02.07.2025 has been passed strictly in exercise of powers 4 conferred under Section 41-A of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961, which is a statutory safeguard intended to ensure accountability, transparency and good governance at the municipal level and the power has been exercised only after satisfying all statutory pre-conditions. He would next contend that the petitioner, while holding the post of President, Municipal Council Sarangarh, was instrumental in allotment of four pieces of municipal land to private persons, namely: Nand Baretha, Mohammad Israil Ansari, Smt. Sharda Devi Jaiswal, Satyendra Singh Thakur and the said allotments were made in gross violation of the Chhattisgarh Nagar Palika (Achal Sampatti Antaran) Niyam, 1996, particularly Rules 3 and 4. He would next contend that prior sanction or approval of the State Government was obtained before making direct allotments. He would next contend that a show cause notice dated 12.03.2025 was issued followed by further notices dated 22.05.2025 and 02.06.2025 were served and the petitioner was afforded personal hearings on 05.06.2025 and 17.06.2025. He would next contend that the petitioner appeared with counsel and filed replies and on the basis of the same an enquiry report dated 20.03.2023 was prepared and made available. Learned State counsel placed reliance upon the law laid down bythe Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Election Commission of India Vs. Bajrang Bahadur Singh & Others {(2015) 12 SCC 570}. He would lastly contend that in view of the admitted statutory violations, due compliance of natural justice, and lawful exercise of power under Section 41-A, learned counsel submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold, being bereft of merit and substance 5 5. Learned counsel for Respondent No.5 would also oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the instant petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents with utmost circumspection. 7. Perusal of the documents would show that the petitioner assails the order dated 02.07.2025 passed under Section 41-A of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961, whereby she has been removed from the post of President, Municipal Council, Sarangarh, primarily on the ground that the action is arbitrary, disproportionate, violative of principles of natural justice and based on alleged procedural irregularities. 8. Rule 41A of the C.G. Municipalities Act, 1961 reads as under:- 41-A. Removal of President or Vice-President or Chairman of a Committee.-(1) The State Government may, at any time, remove a President or Vice-President or a Chairman of any Committee, if his continuance as such is not in the opinion of the State Government desirable in public interest or in the interest of the Council or if it is found that he is incapable of performing his duties or is working against the provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder or if it is found that he does not belong to the reserved category for which the seat was reserved. (2) As a result of the order of removal of Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee, as the case may be, under sub- section (1) it shall be deemed that such Vice-President or a 6 Chairman of any Committee, as the case may be, has been removed from the office of Councillor also. At the time of passing order under sub-section (1), the State Government may also pass such order that the President or Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee, as the case may be, shall be disqualified to hold the office of President or Vice-President or Chairman, as the case may be, for the next term: Provided that no such order under this section shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard is given. 9. Section 3 of the Chhattisgarh Municipalities (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1996 reads as under:- 3. No immovable property which yields or is capable of yielding an income shall be transferred by sale, or lease or otherwise conveyed except to the highest bidder at a public auction or offer in a sealed cover: Provided that if the Council is of the opinion that it is not desirable to hold a public auction or to invite offers in sealed covers for such transfer, the Council may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, effect such transfer without public auction or inviting offers in sealed covers : Provided further that the Council may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, transfer such immovable property to a 7 bidder other than the highest bidder, with the previous sanction of the State Government: Provided also that in any such transfer by lease, a reasonable premium shall be payable at the time of granting lease and annual rent shall also be payable during the whole term of the lease. 10. The State Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2015) 12 SCC 570, which this Court finds to be applicable and correctly relied upon. The said decision authoritatively reiterates that statutory consequences follow by operation of law once illegality is established, and that equitable or personal considerations cannot override a mandatory statutory scheme governing public office and public property. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court holds that municipal land and shops are public assets, and their allotment is regulated by mandatory statutory rules. No President, Chairperson, or elected representative has any authority or discretion to grant or allot shops or land to persons of his or her own choice, merely on the basis of applications, preferences, or subjective satisfaction. Any such allotment, made without following the prescribed procedure of transparency, public notice, competition, and equality, is per se illegal and arbitrary. 11.The Supreme Court judgment relied upon by the respondent reinforces the doctrine that public office is a public trust, and actions taken in breach of statutory provisions invite lawful corrective measures by the competent authority. Once such illegality is found, the State is justified in exercising its statutory power, and the Court cannot interfere on 8 speculative or equitable considerations. Accordingly, the reliance placed by the respondent on (2015) 12 SCC 570 is followed, and the legal position is affirmed that public property cannot be distributed by choice, favour, or discretion of an elected functionary. 12.The State, on the other hand, justifies the impugned order contending that the petitioner was instrumental in allotment of municipal land to private individuals in gross violation of the mandatory provisions of the Chhattisgarh Nagar Palika (Achal Sampatti Antaran) Niyam, 1996, and that the statutory power under Section 41-A was exercised after due compliance with law. From a bare perusal of the record, it emerges unequivocally that the allotment of four parcels of municipal land was made without following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1996, i.e. absence of public auction or sealed bids, absence of fixation of date for auction/bid, absence of publication in newspapers inviting public participation, and absence of allotment to the highest bidder. 13.The resolution dated 05.08.2022, passed by the President-in-Council and presided over by the petitioner, does not disclose compliance with any of the above statutory requirements. The Rules being mandatory in nature, any deviation therefrom strikes at the root of legality of the transaction. The record further discloses that no prior sanction of the State Government was obtained for direct allotment of municipal land, nor does the resolution or the petitioner’s replies disclose any exceptional circumstance justifying departure from the statutory procedure. The 9 petitioner has failed to demonstrate either statutory authority or administrative approval permitting such deviation. 14.Though the petitioner has sought to contend that the decision was collective, it cannot be overlooked that she was the President of the Municipal Council, presided over the meeting and was duty-bound to ensure compliance with law. The office of President carries with it a higher degree of statutory responsibility, and collective decision-making cannot be invoked as a shield to legitimise an action which is ex facie contrary to mandatory statutory provisions. Further, the record clearly establishes that show cause notice dated 12.03.2025 was issued, further notices dated 22.05.2025 and 02.06.2025 were served, personal hearings were afforded on 05.06.2025 and 17.06.2025, replies were submitted by the petitioner with the assistance of counsel; and the enquiry report dated 20.03.2023 formed part of the decision-making process. Thus, the proviso to Section 41-A and the principles of natural justice stand duly complied with. The contention of denial of hearing or procedural unfairness is, therefore, without substance. 15.Even assuming that there is any loose or incorrect expression in the impugned order, the same does not affect the substance, reasoning or legality of the decision. It is well settled that an order must be read as a whole, and a mere inadvertent or clerical misdescription cannot vitiate an otherwise lawful and reasoned administrative order. 16.In view of the admitted non-compliance with mandatory statutory provisions, absence of prior sanction, due observance of principles of natural justice, and lawful exercise of power under Section 41-A of the 10 Act, this Court finds no illegality, perversity or arbitrariness in the impugned order warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17.Accordingly, the present writ petition stands dismissed. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE ashu