1 2025:CGHC:42545 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 8260 of 2025 1 - Rajesh Shukla Late Shri Ramshankar Shukla Aged About 58 Years R/o Rosewood 60, Housing Board Colony, Boriya Kala, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Department Of Higher Education Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Commissioner Department Of Higher Education Indrawati Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Under Secretary Department Of Higher Education Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Principal Government J Yoganandam Post Graduate College, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate For Respondent(s)/State : Ms. Smita Jha, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice R avindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 21/08/2025 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition against the order dated 06.06.2025 (Annexure P/1), order dated 24.02.2025 (Annexure P/3), VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.09.01 18:15:33 +0530 2 whereby the charge sheet has been issued for departmental enquiry against the petitioner and he has been suspended. He prayed the following reliefs in his writ petition:- “10.1 This Hon'ble Count may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate writ and quash the impugned order dated 6/6/25 (Annexure P-1) along with all consequential disciplinary proceedings in the interest of justice. 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate writ and quash the impugned suspension order dated 24/2/25 (Annexure P-3) along with order 4/6/25 and be pleased to grant the petitioner all the consequential benefits in the interest of justice. 10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records relating to departmental enquiry against the petitioner for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. 10.4 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner in the interest of justice. 10.5 This Hon'ble Court may also be pleased to grant the cost of the petition to the petitioner.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner is working as Assistant Professor (History) and is posted at Govt. J. Yoganandam Chhattisgarh Postgraduate College, Raipur. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 24.02.2025 alleging certain misconduct with respect to sexual harassment with his co-employee/Assistant Professor and Principal of the college contemplating the departmental enquiry, he has been suspended vide order dated 24.02.2025 (Annexure P/3). In the preliminary enquiry, it was found that the allegation against the petitioner was not correct. The Commissioner, 3 Department of Higher Education received an anonymous complaint on 20.01.2025, which was also inquired by the internal complaints committee/Vishakha committee of the Govt. J. Yoganandam Chhattisgarh Postgraduate College, Raipur and in the inquiry it was found that the complainant against the petitioner in the college as well as in the anonymous complaint was one and same. A report was submitted on 31.01.2025 by the committee. On 24.02.2025, the petitioner was suspended on the said allegation of sexual harassment with the co-employee/Assistant Professor and subsequently a charge sheet was issued on 06.06.2025, which are under challenge in the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, on the basis of anonymous complaint an inquiry was conducted, but no sufficient material was collected during the inquiry against the petitioner, yet he was suspended and charge sheet was issued. He would also submit that along with the charge sheet, the relevant documents have not been supplied to him. The petitioner was suspended on 24.02.2025 and his suspension is automatically revoked after 90 days in absence of any charge sheet. The charge sheet has been filed on 06.06.2025, which is beyond the period of 90 days. He would also submit that in the investigation report, the findings are clearly stated that there is no allegation against the petitioner and he is nowhere concerned with the alleged act of sexual harassment. The allegations against the petitioner are completely false and fabricated, which does not constitute any misconduct. As per the provision of Rule 9(5)(a) of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 4 1966 (in short ‘CCA Rules, 1966’), after expiry of 90 days, in absence of any charge sheet, the suspension of the petitioner stands revoked, yet his suspension has not been revoked by formal order by the authorities, therefore, the impugned orders of suspension and charge sheet are liable to be quashed. 4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that, on the allegation of sexual harassment to the co-employee/ Assistant Professor in the college, the petitioner was suspended vide order dated 24.02.2025 and a charge sheet was issued on 06.06.2025 contemplating the departmental enquiry against him and all the requisite documents have been supplied and annexed with the charge sheet. The petitioner is having an alternative remedy of filing the appeal under Rule 23 of the CCA Rules, 1966. He would also submit that the petition is at premature stage in view of the settled legal position with respect to interference in the departmental enquiry at the time of issuance of charge sheet, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 6. The scope of judicial review against a suspension order has been considered by Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan” reported in 1993 Suppl. 3 SCC 483, and in para 5 of its judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- 5 “5. The ground given by the High Court to stay the operation of the suspension order, is patently wrong. There is no restriction on the authority to pass a suspension order second time. The first order might be withdrawn by the authority on the ground that at that stage, the evidence appearing against the delinquent employee is not sufficient or for some reason, which is not connected with the merits of the case. As happened in the present case, the earlier order of suspension dated 22nd March, 1991 was quashed by the High Court on the ground that some other suspended officer had been allowed to join duties. That order had nothing to do with the merits of the case. Ordinarily, when there is an accusation of defalcation of the monies, the delinquent employees have to be kept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed only to keep the individual concerned out of the employment is a different matter. But even in such a case, no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in question-and hence it is always advisable to allow the disciplinary proceedings to continue unhindered. It is possible that in some cases, the authorities do not proceed with the matter as expeditiously as they ought to, which results in prolongation of the sufferings of the delinquent employee. But the remedy in such cases is either to call for an explanation from the authorities in the matter, and if it is found unsatisfactory, direct them to complete the inquiry within a stipulated period and to increase the suspension allowance adequately. It is true that in the present case, the charge-sheet was filed alter almost a year of the order of suspension. However, the facts pleaded by the appellants show that the-defalcations were over a long period from 1986 to 1991 and they involved some lakhs, of rupees. It also appears that the authorities have approached the police and in the police investigation, the amount of defalcation is found to be still more. Since the matter is of taking accounts which are spread over from 1986 to 1991 and of correlating the entries with 6 the relevant documents, and several individuals are involved, the framing of charges was bound to take some time. The Court has to examine each case on its own facts and decide whether the delay in serving the charge-sheet and completing the inquiry is justified or not. However, in the present case the High Court has not quashed the order of suspension on the ground of delay in framing of the charges. As stated earlier, it has set aside the order of suspension on the ground that the authority had no power to pass the second order of suspension in the same case. We are afraid that the High Court has misconstrued the nature and purpose of the power of suspension vested in the management. It is not disputed that at present all officers concerned are served with the charge-sheets and have been suspended. There is no discrimination between the officers on that account. The charges are also grave and the authorities have come to the conclusion that during the disciplinary proceedings, the officers should not continue in employment to enable them to conduct the proceedings unhindered. Hence, we are satisfied that the order in appeal was not justified.” 7. In the matter of “State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty” 1994 (4) SCC 126, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 13 that:- “13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and 5 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483: 1994 SCC (L&S) 67: (1993) 25 ATC commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an 7 employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.” 8. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that, whether charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive, cannot be gone into at the stage of examining the validity of suspension order. At the stage of suspension, the correctness of allegations is not required to be looked into. The public interest is also an element on the consideration of 8 which an employee can be placed under suspension. This is within the province of the Disciplinary Authority to decide, whether an employee is required to be suspended or not, because suspension is a step towards ultimate result of an investigation or an inquiry. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “M. Paul Anthoni v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited” 1999 (3) SCC 679 has held in para 26 that:- “26. To place an employee under suspension is an unqualified right of the employer. This right is conceded to the employer in service jurisprudence everywhere. It has even received statutory recognition under service rules framed by various authorities, including Govt. of India and the State Governments. (See: for example, Rule 10 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. Even under the General Clauses Act, this right is conceded to the employer by Section 16 which, inter alia, provides that power to appoint includes power to suspend or dismiss.” 10. Further, in the matter of “Union of India and another v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal” 2013 (16) SCC 147”, in para 22 and 27, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:- “22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public interest due to the employee’s continuation in office is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula of universal application can be laid down in this regard. However, suspension order should be 9 passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank etc. 27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of his position. More so, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as which version is true when there are claims and counter claims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it an appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review.” 11. Rule 23 of CCA Rules, 1966 provides for a departmental appeal against the order of suspension of the employee to the State Government, which reads as under:- “23. Orders against which appeal lies.- Subject to the provisions of Rule 22, a Government servant may prefer an appeal against all or any of the following orders, namely- (i) an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 10 whether made by the disciplinary authority or by any appellate or reviewing authority; (ii) an order enhancing any penalty, imposed under Rule 10; (iii) [an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9;] Explanation. - In this rule the expression "Government servant" includes a person who has ceased to be in Government service.” 12. In the matter of “Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others v. Prabhash Chandra Mishra” 2012 (11) SCC 565, the Hon'ble 10 Supreme Court has held that:- “10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a chargesheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a chargesheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide : State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943; Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh & Ors., (1996) 1 SCC 327; Ulagappa & Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2); Special Director & Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 1467; and Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906). 11. In State of Orissa & Anr. v. Sangram Keshari Misra & Anr., (2010) 13 SCC 311, this Court held that normally a chargesheet is not quashed prior to the conclusion of the enquiry on the ground that the facts stated in the charge are erroneous for the reason that correctness or truth of the charge is the function of the disciplinary authority. (See also: Union of India & Ors. v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357). 12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that chargesheet cannot generally be a subject matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the chargesheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the 11 grounds that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings.” 13. It is settled that, the suspension is not a punishment and in the present case, charge sheet has been issued to the petitioner, which is at initial stage of inquiry. The power of this Court of interference at the stage of issuance of charge sheet, is very limited unless it is found that charge sheet is without jurisdiction or authority. The petitioner’s claim for quashing of the charge sheet as well as suspension order is on merits of the allegations, which are to be decided by the competent authority and against the suspension order, the petitioner is having remedy to file an appeal under Rule 23 of CCA Rules, 1966. 14. In view of the foregoing analysis and facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find any mala fide or arbitrariness in passing the suspension order and further is of the opinion that the petitioner does not make out any exceptional case to interfere with the charge sheet dated 06.06.2025. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge his suspension order before the State Government as provided under Rules 23 of CCA Rules, if so advised. 15. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved