1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 26th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN AND THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.4035 OF 2022 C/W MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.1847 OF 2021 AND MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.1848 OF 2021 IN MFA NO.4035/2022 BETWEEN: SHRI JAIPAKASH KRISHNASWAMY NAIDU S/O KRISHNASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, OCCUPATION RETIRED PREVIOUSLY R/O B1-1302, SUN COAST, SECTOR 15, CBD BELAPUR, NAVI MUMBAI-400 614. PERMANENTLY RESIDING AT A 1601, LAKE LUCERNE, LAKE HOMES PHASE III, OFF ADI SHANKRACHARYA MARG, POWAI, MUMBAI 400 076. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. JAIPRAKASH KRISHNASWAMY NAIDU - PARTY-IN-PERSON) ® 2 AND: 1. M/S. NORTHERN OPERATING SERVICES PVT. LTD., A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY WITH ITS OFFICE AT 2ND FLOOR, RMZ ECO SPACE CAMPUS IC SARJAPUR OUTER RING ROAD, BELLANDUR VILLAGE, VARTHUR HOBLI, BENGALURU-560 037. REP. BY MR. MOSUR SAI SHEKAR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER. 2. SHRI B SHIVALINGE GOWDA, ARBITRATOR, DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE (RETD.,) ARBITRATION CENTER – KARNATAKA KHANIJA BHAVAN, III FLOOR, EAST WING, RACE COURSE ROAD, BENGALURU-560 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. C.K.NANDAKUMAR, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W MS. LEKHA CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-1; NOTICE TO R-2 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O DATED 11.07.2023) THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1)(C) OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, PRAYING TO A) TO CALL FOR ENTIRE RECORD IN A.S.NO.55/2017 ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF V ADDL. CITY CIVIL JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH NO.13) B) ALLOW THE CLAIM PETITION OF THE APPELLANT IN ARBITRATION CASE NO.117/2015 AND MODIFY THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 11-08-2020 IN A.S.NO.55/2017 ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF V ADDL. CITY CIVIL JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH NO.13) AND DIRECT THE RESPONDENT NO.1 TO PAY TO THE APPELLANT AS DAMAGES THE COMPENSATION OF RS.3,81,33,765/- WITH INTEREST OF 12% PER ANNUM FROM DATE 3 OF CLAIM PETITION I.E. 29.10.2015 TILL THE DATE OF REALIZATION AND ETC. IN MFA NO.1847/2021 BETWEEN: NORTHERN OPERATING SERVICES PVT. LTD., A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY WITH ITS OFFICES AT 2ND FLOOR, RMZ ECOSPACE CAMPUS IC SARJAPUR OUTER RING ROAD, BELLANDUR VILLAGE, VARTHUR HOBLI, BENGALURU-560 037. REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY MR. RAVI ANAND GAUTHAM. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. C.K.NANDAKUMAR, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W MS. LEKHA CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. MR. JAIPRAKASH KRISHNASWAMY NAIDU S/O B.R.KRISHNASWAMY NAIDU, NO.7/801 SEA BREEZE TOWERS, SECTOR 16, NERUL WEST, NAVI MUMBAI-400 706. 2. SRI B SHIVALINGE GOWDA, ARBITRATOR, DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE (RETD.,) ARBITRATION CENTRE – KARNATAKA KHANIJA BHAVAN, III FLOOR, EAST WING, RACE COURSE ROAD, BENGALURU-560 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. JAIPRAKASH KRISHNASWAMY NAIDU - PARTY-IN-PERSON; NOTICE TO R-2 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O DATED 23.04.2021) 4 THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1)(C) OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, PRAYING TO A) TO CALL FOR THE COMPLETE RECORDS OF THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS AND A.S.NO.56/2017 FROM THE HON’BLE V ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU AND ETC. IN MFA NO.1848/2021 BETWEEN: NORTHERN OPERATING SERVICES PVT. LTD., A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY WITH ITS OFFICES AT 2ND FLOOR, RMZ ECOSPACE CAMPUS IC SARJAPUR OUTER RING ROAD, BELLANDUR VILLAGE, VARTHUR HOBLI, BENGALURU-560 037. REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY MR. RAVI ANAND GAUTHAM. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. C.K.NANDAKUMAR, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W MS. LEKHA CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. MR. JAIPRAKASH KRISHNASWAMY NAIDU RESIDING AT B1-1302, SUNCOAST, SECTOR 15, CBD BELAPUR, NAVI MUMBAI-400 614. 2. SRI B SHIVALINGE GOWDA, ARBITRATOR, DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE (RETD.,) ARBITRATION CENTRE – KARNATAKA KHANIJA BHAVAN, III FLOOR, EAST WING, RACE COURSE ROAD, BENGALURU-560 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. JAIPRAKASH KRISHNASWAMY NAIDU - PARTY-IN-PERSON; NOTICE TO R-2 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O DATED 23.04.2021) 5 THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1)(C) OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, PRAYING TO A) TO CALL FOR THE COMPLETE RECORDS OF THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS AND A.S.NO.55/2017 FROM THE HON’BLE V ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU AND ETC. THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 11.07.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY, DR. K.MANMADHA RAO, J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN and HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO CAV COMMON JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO) The MFA No.4035/2022 is filed to modify the Judgment and Order dated 11.08.2020 in A.S.No.55/2017 on the file of V Additional City Civil Judge (CCHNo.13) at Bengaluru in so far as not granting the reliefs sought for in Arbitration Case in A.C.No.117/2015 and allow A.C.No.117/2015. The MFA No.1847/2021 is filed challenging the Judgment and Order dated 11.08.2020 in A.S.No.56/2017 on the file of V Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru. 6 The MFA No.1848/2021 is filed challenging the Judgment and Order dated 11.08.2020 in A.S.No.55/2017 on the file of V Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru. 2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side in all the appeals. 3. Appellant in MFA No.4035/2022 is the plaintiff in A.S.No.55/2017 and Claimant before A.C.No.117/2015 and defendant No.1 in A.S.No.56/2017. Respondent No.1 in MFA No.4035/2022 is the defendant No.1 in A.S.No.55/2017, respondent in A.C.No.117/2015 and plaintiff in A.S.No.56/2017 and respondent No.2 in MFA No.4035/2022 is the defendant No.2 in A.S.No.55/2017. 4. The appellants have sought for the following reliefs: In MFA NO. 4035/2022 a) to call for entire record in A.S.No.55/2017 on the file of the Court of V Addl. City Civil Judge at Bengaluru (CCH No.13) b) allow the claim petition of the appellant in arbitration case No.117/2015 and modify the judgment and decree dated 11-08-2020 in A.S.No.55/2017 on the file of the court of V Addl. City Civil Judge at Bengaluru (CCH No.13) and direct the respondent No.1 to pay to the appellant as 7 damages the compensation of Rs.3,81,33,765/- with interest of 12% per annum from date of claim petition i.e. 29.10.2015 till the date of realization and c) to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. d) costs of the proceedings. In MFA No.1847/2021 a) to call for the complete records of the arbitral proceedings and a.s.no.56/2017 from the Hon’ble V Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru and b) set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 11.08.2020 in A.S.No.56/2017 in entirety; and grant such other and further reliefs as are just, including costs. In MFA No.1848/2021 a) to call for the complete records of the arbitral proceedings and A.S.No.55/2017 from the Hon’ble V additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 11.08.2020 in A.S.No.55/2017 in entirely and grant such other and further reliefs as are just, including costs. 5. In view of the common issues arising in all these appeals between the same parties, this Court proceeds to pass a common Judgment. 6. In order to substantiate their case, the parties have relied on the evidence of PW1 and documents marked at Ex.P1 to P29 and evidence of RW1 and the documents marked at Ex.R1 to 8 Ex.R26. The said material evidence was placed on record by the parties to the Arbitration proceedings. 7. Having perused the pleadings of the parties, learned Arbitrator raised following issues for consideration: 1. Whether the claimant proves that the officials of the respondent in collusion had criminally conspired to oust him from the company and further in that endeavour had taken false statement of some of his members as alleged? 2. Whether the claimant proves that he was intimidated and compelled to write and re-write letter for resignation under duress, coercion and undue influence and therefore, his termination from service is illegal, void-ab-initio as alleged? 3. Whether the claimant proves that the respondent humiliated him in full view of other staff members as alleged? 4. Whether the claimant proves that he is entitled to a compensation of Rs.60 lakhs towards damages as claimed? 5. Whether the claimant proves that he is entitled to Rs.40 lakhs towards financial loss as claimed? 6. Whether the claimant proves that he is entitled for re-instatement and with back wages as prayed for, vis-à-vis whether the claim for reinstatement is barred by res-judicata or is hit by the provisions of section 14 of Specific Relief Act? 9 7. Whether the claims of the claimant are beyond the purview of Arbitration? 8. Whether the respondent proves that the claimant committed breach of agreement and consequently, it has suffered loss in business to the extent of Rs.1 crore as contended? 9. Whether the respondent proves that the claimant has abused grossly the judicial process and so it is entitled to recover from him a sum of Rs.2 crores as contended? 10. What award?” 8. The Arbitrator based on the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, passed the following Award:- (i) The claim petition of the claimant is dismissed. (ii) The Claimant shall pay the respondent all the costs of the proceeding, so far it relates to his claim. (iii) The counter-claim of respondent is dismissed. (iv) The parties shall bear their own costs of the proceeding, so far it relates to the counter claim. 9. For convenience of reference, the parties herein are referred to as arrayed before the City Civil Court in A.S.No.55/2017. 10 10. The plaintiff - Employee has filed A.S.No.55/2017, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with a prayer to set aside the Award passed by the defendant No.2 – sole Arbitrator in A.C No.117/2015 dated 31.01.2017. 11. It is the specific case of the plaintiff - employee that during his tenure with the respondent - Company, he discharged his duties with utmost integrity and proficiency in accordance with the Company’s policies and the prescribed job description, and also made notable contributions towards process improvements. However, one Mr. Angel Arroyo, the then Vice President and Manager – Client Accounting Practice, consistently sidelined the process improvements introduced by the plaintiff –employee for reasons best known to him and further failed to duly recognize the plaintiff’s contributions during the appraisal process. This conduct led to a breakdown in communication and a misunderstanding between the plaintiff and Mr. Arroyo. It is the case of the plaintiff that Mr.Arroyo expressed his dissatisfaction regarding the appraisal in the appraisal form submitted in January 2012, which, according to him, served as the trigger point for the chain of events that subsequently led to his forced termination from service, without affording him any opportunity to be heard 11 or to present his defence. The plaintiff also alleges that he was subjected to threats of dire consequences. 12. Per contra, it is the specific case of Defendant No.1- Company that the plaintiff joined the organization on 30.05.2010 in the capacity of Divisional Manager and by the time of cessation of employment, held the position of Vice-President. During the course of his employment, multiple complaints were allegedly received from team members concerning the plaintiff’s work performance, attitude, and behaviour. The company further contends that there were several noted instances of breach of confidentiality by the plaintiff. Despite being given multiple opportunities to improve, the plaintiff allegedly failed to show any progress. Consequently, a meeting was convened on 16.02.2012, during which the plaintiff was informed about the various complaints received against him from his team. In response, the plaintiff is stated to have expressed his unwillingness to continue working with such a team and voluntarily tendered his resignation, which was immediately accepted by the company. 13. Brief facts of the case in all the appeals before this Court are as under: 12 The appellant in MFA No.4035/2022 is the respondent No.1 in MFA No.1847/2021 and MFA No.1848/2021 and the respondent No.1 in MFA No.4035/2022 is the appellant in MFA No.1847/2021 and MFA No.1848/2021 and respondent No.2, Arbitrator is a formal party in all the appeals. The appellant in MFA No.1847/2021 and MFA 1848/2021 is a wholly owned subsidiary of Northern Trust Corporation, a global leader in asset servicing, fund administration, asset management, fiduciary and Banking solutions. The respondent No.1-Shri Jaiprakash Krishnaswamy Naidu/employee joined the appellant’s Company on 03.05.2010 as a Divisional Manager in the Operations Department and was later promoted to Vice President, UVRS Division, before resigning on 16.02.2012. During the tenure of respondent No.1’s employment, multiple complaints were received from his team regarding his work performance, behavior and attitude. These issues were consistently addressed through internal channels, including intervention by the Manager of the respondent No.1 and other senior officials. Further, the respondent No.1 was repeatedly cautioned regarding breaches of confidentiality, but despite ample opportunities, he failed to rectify his conduct. 13 Owing to the respondent’s persistent failure to resolve internal conflicts, the appellant-Company convened a meeting on 16.02.2012 to discuss the numerous complaints received from his subordinates. Upon being confronted, the respondent No.1 voluntarily tendered his resignation, expressing his unwillingness to continue working with the team. The resignation was immediately accepted by the appellant-Company. However, on the very next day, the respondent No.1 sought reinstatement into service, which was declined by the appellant-Company in the light of his prior conduct and the finality of acceptance of resignation. Dissatisfied with the same, the respondent No.1 initiated a series of legal actions including issuing legal notices to employees of the appellant-Company and its parent company in the USA, and initiated multiple legal proceedings across forums, primarily seeking reinstatement. His first approach was before the Labour Commissioner, Bangalore, where he prayed for reinstatement. The Labour Commissioner dismissed the reference, holding that the respondent No.1 had voluntarily resigned and had received three months’ salary in lieu of notice. Suppressing the Order of the Labour Commissioner and the receipt of salary, the respondent No.1 subsequently filed 14 O.S.No.1440/2013 before the City Civil Court, Bangalore, seeking declaration, reinstatement, and future wages till his reinstatement. The appellant-Company entered appearance and filed applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and for rejection of plaint. The Civil Court allowed the Section 8 application, and the parties were referred to Arbitration. In view of the persistent non-cooperation of the appellant-Company in appointing an Arbitrator, the respondent No.1 approached this Court under Section 11 of the Act of 1996, by filing CMP.No.203/2014. However, this Court by order dated 18.09.2015, appointed the respondent No.2 herein as the Sole Arbitrator and referred the matter for Arbitration. a) To declare that the forced resignation on 16.02.2012 was illegal null and void; b) To reinstate the plaintiff with back date wages with full honours or in the alternative to pay full compensation of pay (CTC) from the date of forced resignation till the remaining part of the services i.e., until the date of retirement (superannuation) after factoring the annual increment in accordance with the average increase paid by the Defendant Company to the Plaintiff’s grade; c) That to pay a compensation sum of Rs.60,00,000/- towards damages for illegal termination, victimization, reputational damage, humiliation, defamation discrimination and acts of racism and 15 d) To pay compensation sum of Rs.40,00,000/- incurred in liquidating the assets to make ends meet and towards counsel fees, mental agony, torture and trauma. The appellant-Company filed its Statement of Objections and a Counterclaim, asserting breach of contract by the respondent No.1 and gross abuse of judicial process. The appellant sought for the following reliefs: a. Direct the claimant to pay the respondent a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crores only) towards gross abuse of judicial process including filing of multiple cases against the respondent. b. Direct the Claimant to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore only) towards damages suffered by the respondent towards breach of agreement, policy of respondent company and time spent by respondent in the above proceedings. The respondent No.1 submitted his objections and a rejoinder to the appellant’s counterclaim. Based on the pleadings, the Learned Arbitrator framed ten issues, including allegations of criminal conspiracy, coercion in resignation, humiliation, entitlement to compensation, reinstatement, arbitrability of disputes, breach of agreement, and abuse of judicial process. By a detailed Award dated 31.01.2017, the learned Arbitrator decided Issues 1 to 5 against the respondent No.1 16 herein, holding that there was no material to support the claim that the resignation was forced. Relying on documents (R-12 to R-14, R-17 and R-20) and cross-examination, the Arbitrator found the allegations of the respondent No.1 is unsubstantiated and held that it was the respondent No.1 who lacked bona fides. On Issue No. 6 regarding reinstatement, the learned Arbitrator held that the respondent was not entitled to such relief. It was observed that while res judicata did not apply, the relief was barred under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the contract was one of personal service and could not be specifically enforced. As regards Issue No. 7, the Arbitrator held that the arbitration clause ceased to survive once the employment agreement was terminated. For Issues No.8 and 9, despite the appellant proving a breach of agreement and abuse of process, the Arbitrator declined to grant compensation, holding that such claims could not be decided in Arbitration after termination of contract. Consequently, both the claim and counterclaim were dismissed. Aggrieved by the Award passed by the Sole Arbitrator, the respondent No.1 preferred A.S.No.55/2017 before the Civil Court 17 under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 challenging the Award, while the appellant-Company filed A.S.No.56/2017. On 11.08.2020, the Civil Court decreed A.S.No.55/2017 and set aside the Award to the extent it dismissed the respondent No.1’s claim, while A.S.No.56/2017 filed by the appellant-Company was dismissed on merits and also on the ground of limitation. Being aggrieved by non-granting of the monetary reliefs as sought by the employee, he preferred MFA No.4035/2022 However, the appellant-Company has preferred MFA No.1847/2021 under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act of 1996 in respect of A.S.No.56/2017, challenging the impugned Judgment dated 11.08.2020, while also filed a separate appeal, MFA No.1848/2021 in respect of A.S.No.55/2017. 14. The learned Civil Judge in A.S.No.56/2017 has passed the following Order:- The arbitration suit filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the plaintiff/respondent company is hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Office is directed to return the common records in A.C.No.117/2015 to the concerned arbitral tribunal forthwith. Draw decree accordingly. 18 15. The learned City Civil Judge in A.S.No.55/2017 has passed the following Order:- The arbitration application/suit filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Claimant/plaintiff is hereby allowed/decreed. Consequently, the award passed by the learned arbitrator tribunal in A.C.No.117/2015 dated 31/01/2017 to the extent of dismissal of plaintiffs claim is hereby set aside. Parties to bear their own costs. Draw decree accordingly. Office to return common records in A.C.No.117/2015 to the concerned Tribunal forthwith. 16. It is contended by the appellant-employee appearing in person in MFA No.4035/2022 that he was compelled to resign from service by the respondent no.1 - Company on 16.02.2012 without justification or adherence to due process of law. The resignation was neither preceded by a show cause notice nor a departmental enquiry, nor was the appellant afforded an opportunity of being heard. The same amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice. Despite initially denying the appellant the salary for the three-month notice period, the respondent No.1-Company subsequently remitted the said salary 19 along with bonus and increments after resignation, contending the same to be a 'goodwill gesture' even while levelling false and serious allegations against the appellant. 17. It is contended that the Civil Court by allowing the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in A.S. No.55/2017 and setting aside the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator in A.C.No.117/2015, committed a grave error in not extending the consequential monetary reliefs to the appellant. Despite the appellant having attained the age of superannuation on 30.04.2018, the Civil Court failed to quantify or grant the monetary benefits flowing from the favourable order, thereby rendering the decree infructuous and inexecutable. This omission has deprived the appellant of the fruits of litigation despite a favourable verdict. 18. It is further contended that the Civil Court, having set aside the Award on major issues, failed to adjudicate upon the specific reliefs sought under prayer (b), namely reinstatement with back wages or, in the alternative, compensation equivalent to full CTC from the date of forced resignation till retirement. The failure to consider these prayers has resulted in an arbitrary and 20 capricious judgment. Further, the Civil Court ignored the mental agony, pain, and injustice suffered by the appellant owing to the illegal termination, which warranted compensation. 19. It is also contended that the impugned judgment suffers from material infirmities, including failure to assign reasons for denial of reliefs, improper appreciation of facts, and rendering of an inexecutable decree. The Civil Court failed to evaluate the monetary loss and income deprivation suffered by the appellant. The lack of reasoning and the mechanical dismissal of consequential reliefs despite allowing the primary challenge to the Arbitral Award demonstrate non-application of mind, and such an error calls for correction and enhancement of reliefs by this Court. 20. The party in person- appellant in MFA No.4035/2022 and respondent No.1 in MFA No.1847/2017 and MFA No.1848/2017, in support of his contentions, placed reliance on the following judgment in the case of Dushyant Janbandhu (party in person) v. M/s. Hyundai Autoever India Pvt.Ltd. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3691, wherein it is observed as under: 21 “The first relates to disputes that were anyway pending before the statutory authorities, and they related to non-payment of wages and legality and propriety of termination which are non-arbitrable.” 21. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant – Company in MFA No.1847/2021, that the appellant assails the Impugned Judgment in A.S.No.56/2017, on the ground that it erroneously upholds the dismissal of the counterclaims solely on an incorrect interpretation of the arbitration agreement and applicable law. Despite a finding in paragraph 33 of the Award that the respondent breached the employment agreement, the learned Arbitrator dismissed the counterclaims erroneously concluding that the arbitration agreement did not survive post-termination. The Civil Court, instead of correcting this patent illegality, merely reiterated the Arbitrator’s flawed reasoning. 22. It is further contended that the Civil Court failed in its judicial duty to interfere when the errors in the Award were so fundamental as to vitiate the entire arbitral process. The erroneous conclusion that a claim for damages was not arbitrable despite a wide arbitration clause is perverse. The arbitration agreement in the employment agreement clearly covers within its 22 ambit “any dispute, controversy, claim arising out of or in connection with the contract of employment”, which clearly includes the counterclaims raised by the appellant. 23. It is also contended that the Civil Court failed to appreciate that the Arbitrator did not provide any cogent reasoning under Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996, for excluding the counterclaims, thereby violating the statutory mandate. The learned Arbitrator’s bare assertion without analysis or interpretation of the arbitration clause amounts to non- application of mind. The Civil Court compounded this error by making contradictory statements in paragraph 29 of the Impugned Judgment regarding the scope of the arbitration agreement. On the one hand it recognized that counterclaim can be determined by an Arbitrator and on the other hand it states that counterclaim does not form part of the disputes referred to Arbitration. The Civil Court also failed to interpret the terms of arbitration agreement. Instead it merely, asserts that u/s.23-2A of the Act of 1996, counterclaims are excluded if they are not within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. 23 24. It is further contended that the counterclaims and the primary claims are severable and independent of one another, and even if the Civil Court was justified in setting aside the Award in part, it was not justified in refusing to set aside the portion dismissing the counterclaims. The dismissal of the counterclaims was not on merits but due to an erroneous understanding of arbitrability and contract law. The Arbitrator held that the arbitration clause ceased to exist subsequent to the termination of the employment agreement. Furthermore, appellant highlights the discriminatory approach of the Arbitrator, who examined the respondent’s claims on merits while refusing to even consider the counterclaims of the appellant. This unequal treatment is legally unsustainable. When the Civil Court deemed it fit to set aside the Award insofar as the claims were concerned, it was legally bound to do the same with respect to the counterclaims, especially when the legal flaw underpinning both was identical. 25. It is contended that the appellant also challenges the finding in paragraph 33 of the Impugned Judgment regarding limitation. The Civil Court erroneously held that the suit was barred by limitation despite the fact that the Award was received on 03.02.2017 and the suit was filed on 29.05.2017. Taking into 24 account the summer Court vacation in the month of May, the suit was clearly filed within the period of 120-days. Even if the receipt date is reckoned as 31.01.2017, the suit is still within limitation. This issue was never raised during oral submissions, depriving the appellant of an opportunity to rebut it, thereby violating principles of natural justice. 26. Para 33 of the impugned judgment in A.S.No.56/2017 reads as under: “33. With regard to point of limitation is concern the plaintiff has stated in para 30 of the plaint as the petition is filed in time, but there is no explanation to the effect as to when he received the arbitral award. Further the plaintiff has neither shown sufficient cause for having prevented to make application within the stipulated period of three months from the date of receipt of award so as to entertain the application within a further period of 30 days as required under Section 34(3) of the Act. The arbitral tribunal has passed award on 31/01/2017. The plaintiff has filed the above numbered suit on 29/05/2017, which indicates that as rightly urged by the other side the application/suit of the plaintiff is also barred by time”. 27. It is also contended that in light of the above, the Impugned Judgment suffers from multiple legal infirmities and is liable to be set aside. The value of the counterclaim in the Arbitration was Rs.3 crore for which the requisite Court fee of 25 Rs.150/- has been paid under Article 4(ii) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1960. The appeal is filed within limitation, and no other appeal has been preferred in relation to the Impugned Judgment in A.S.No.56/2017. 28. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Company in MFA No.1848/2021 that it contravenes the well-settled principle of minimal judicial interference in Arbitral Awards, as the Civil Court erroneously reassessed the merits of the dispute, in disregard of the limited scope prescribed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Although the Court has acknowledged that it cannot act as an appellate forum, it has substituted its own view in place of the Arbitral Tribunal’s findings, contrary to the decision in the case of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49. 29. It is further contended that a mere misapplication of law is insufficient to render an Arbitral Award invalid. In the instant case, the learned Arbitrator had dismissed the respondent’s claims on merits after evaluating oral and documentary evidence. Despite this, the Civil Court, without 26 appreciating the evidentiary findings, proceeded to set aside the Award in entirety in relation to Issues 1 to 5. This was in disregard of Section 34(2-A) proviso, which expressly prohibits setting aside an award merely for erroneous application of law or on reappreciation of facts. 30. The learned counsel placed reliance on the case of Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 677, which specifically reiterates that a mere contravention of substantive law is no longer a valid ground for setting aside an Arbitral Award, unless the Arbitrator provides no reasons or violates Section 31(3) of the Act of 1996. In the present case, the Award clearly provides comprehensive reasoning for dismissal of the respondent’s claims. Therefore, even if there is an incorrect observation in the Award with respect to the termination of the arbitral clause with the employment contract, it does not warrant setting aside of the Award. 31. It is further contended that the learned Arbitrator’s finding that the resignation was voluntary is based on several undisputed facts and pieces of evidence namely:- 27 (i) resignation by the respondent dated 16.02.2012 (Ex.R-1); (ii) various correspondences between parties (Ex.P-8, P-9, R-16); (iii) acknowledgment and acceptance of final dues by the respondent (Ex.R-5, R-6); (iv) Subsequent request for reinstatement (Ex.P-10, P-11); (v) Issuance of service certificate (Ex.R-3); (vi) Respondent’s suppression of having received three months’ salary in Labour Commissioner proceedings (Ex.R-7, P-12, P-13); (vii) Acceptance of low performance grade and prior warnings (Ex. R- 12 to R-14, R-17 to R-20), and (viii) Failure to file a criminal complaint or allege coercion at the relevant time. The Arbitrator’s conclusions were supported by sufficient documentary, oral and material evidence. 32. It is contended that the Civil Court further exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 34(2)(b) of the Act of 1996, by re- appreciating the facts and interfering with the merits of the case. In the Impugned Judgment (para 10), the Court admits it must reassess the material evidence, a power it clearly does not possess under the law. In paragraph 29, of the impugned judgment it wrongly concluded that the appellant ought to have issued a termination notice, disregarding the Arbitrator’s findings on resignation and voluntariness. In the case of Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam 28 Ltd., reported in (2019) 7 SCC 236, the Apex Court held that the Arbitrator is the master of the facts and evidence, and that Courts must defer to such findings, even if based on minimal evidence. 33. It is further contended that in paragraph 32 of the Impugned Judgment, the Civil Court justifies intervention by relying on the case of Associate Builders’s (supra), without considering subsequent statutory amendments to the Act which curtail judicial review. The finding that the resignation was forced and that termination notice ought to have been issued is not supported by any new evidence, but rather an erroneous reassessment of the same materials already dealt with by the Arbitral Tribunal. Further, the Civil Court also erred in its interpretation of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It was wrongly held that since contracts of personal service cannot be enforced by Civil Courts, the same restriction does not apply in Arbitration. This is contrary to settled law that certain contracts are inherently non-enforceable, irrespective of the forum. The Arbitrator rightly noted, based on cross-examination and the nature of the employment contract, that it was a personal service contract and is incapable of specific performance. 29 34. It is submitted that though the Civil Court correctly referred to the judgment in the case of Pearlite Liners Pvt. Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 172, it failed to apply the ratio correctly. Given that the arbitration agreement is governed by Indian law, the bar under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, applies equally to Arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, the Civil Court misinterpreted paragraph 31 of the Award, suggesting that the Arbitrator dismissed the respondent’s claims on the basis of res judicata, which is patently incorrect. The Civil Court further erred in holding that the appellant’s counterclaim was outside the purview of the arbitration agreement. The reliance was also placed on in the case of State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 581, the Apex Court held that where arbitration clauses refer all disputes between the parties, the Arbitrator has jurisdiction over counterclaims. 35. It is also contended that section 34(4) of the Act of 1996, does not empower the court to remand proceedings as in appellate civil jurisdiction. The impugned Judgment effectively rewards a litigant who suppressed material facts and initiated multiple frivolous and dishonest proceedings. The Civil Court has 30 failed to consider the mala fide conduct of the respondent, who made false statements and misused the judicial process. In light of the above, the impugned Judgment is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. The appellant also submits that no other appeal in respect of the Impugned Judgment has been filed pertaining to A.S. No. 55/2017. 36. It is lastly contended that several questions of law arise from the present appeal, which merit consideration by this Court. The present appeal, valued at Rs.1,00,00,000/-, has been filed within limitation. Court fee of Rs.150/- has been duly paid under Article 4(ii) of the Karnataka Court Fee and Suit Valuation Act, 1960. 37. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel appearing for the Appellant-Company in MFA No.1848/2017 has placed reliance on the following judgments: • Mcdermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co.Ltd. and Others reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181. (para 52) "The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness... It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum 31 level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it." • Steel Authority of India Limited v. India Council of Arbitration and Anr, reported in 2016 SCC Online Del 1921 (paras 15 & 16) "15. ...In the present case the award dated 7/10th May, 2010 was set aside by the Court on a petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Consequently, the dispute between the parties stood revived. Since Clause 57 of the Charter Party provides that "all disputes arising under the Charter Party" shall be settled by way of arbitration following the procedure specified therein, the parties are at liberty to invoke the arbitration clause for settlement of the dispute which stood revived. Such a course, according to us, does not amount to repeated/multiple arbitrations... 16. It may be true that in McDermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. (Supra), it was not expressly held that in the event of the Arbitral award being set aside by the Court under Section 34, the parties can again invoke Arbitration clause on the basis of the same cause of action. However, it was made clear that consequent to quashing of the award, the parties are free to bring the arbitration again." • State Trading Corporation of India v. Toepfer International Asia Pte Limited, reported in 2014 SCC Online Del 3426 (para 7) "...The legislative intent in Section 34 was to not make the result of the annulment procedure therein potentially different from that in an appeal. In appeal, the decision under review confirmed, but may also be modified. In annulment, on the other hand, the decision under review may either be invalidated in whole or in part or be left to stand if the plea for annulment is rejected. Annulment operates to negate a decision, in 32 whole or in part, thereby depriving the portion negated of legal force and returning the parties, as to that portion, to their original litigating positions. Annulment can void, while appeal can modify. Section 34 is found to provide for annulment only on the grounds affecting legitimacy of the process of decision as distinct from substantive correctness of the contents of the decision.." • Jagdish Kishinchand Valecha v. SREI Equipment Finance Limited and Another, by order dated 12.04.2021 & 13.04.2021 passed in AP/103/2021, High Court of Calcutta, (Pages 6 and 7) "... The statutory recognition to keeping all redressal- doors open for the parties post setting aside of an award is secured in Section 43(4) of the 1996 Act which provides that upon setting aside of an arbitral award, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of setting aside of the award shall be excluded for the purpose of computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 for commencement of the proceeding with respect to the dispute submitted. Section 43(4) reads as: "... shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963……………. for commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the dispute so submitted." The inclusive nature of the parenthesis makes it evident that the remedies available to the parties shall not be restricted only to those under the 1996 Act... This Court is hence of the view that the Award dated 5th October, 2020 should be set aside for the reasons as stated above. Second, a different and independent Arbitrator should be appointed to decide the claim of the award holder afresh. The parties shall be at liberty to urge all points before the Arbitrator which have been taken in this application." 33 • Parsa Kente Collieries Limited v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited reported in (2019) 7 SCC 236 • Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) reported in (2019) SCC Online SC 677 • Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 • Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran reported in (2012) 5 SCC 306 • U.P. State Electricity Board v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd reported in [2001] 3 SCC 397 • Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others reported in (1976) 2 SCC 58 • Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Verghela and others reported in (2006) 2 SCC 482 • Ms. X v. Y Ltd. & another, by order dated 02.09.2014, passed in Original Petition No.463/2012. • Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigration Company v. Union of India and others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 982; • Project Director, National Highways No.45 E AND 220, National Highways Authority of India reported in (2021) 9 SCC 1; 38. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Company in MFA NO.4035/2022 that the present appeal is wholly misconceived and not maintainable in 34 law, inasmuch as the reliefs sought by the appellant fall outside the scope and purview of Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The challenge is directed against the order passed by the City Civil Court, Bangalore, in A.S.No.55/2017, which set aside the Arbitral Award dated 31.01.2017 only to the extent of dismissal of the appellant's claims. The grievance of the appellant, namely, that the Civil Court failed to grant substantive reliefs which were claimed in the arbitration proceedings, is not a valid ground under Section 37 of the Act of 1996. The Courts exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of 1996, cannot modify or grant claims not awarded by an Arbitrator. 39. It is further submitted that the Appellant is seeking, by way of this appeal, to have this Court pass an order effectively granting the claims originally made in arbitration, which were not allowed either by the Arbitrator or the Civil Court. The appellant’s claims of forced resignation, criminal conspiracy, coercion, and entitlement to compensation were already adjudicated upon and rejected by the learned Arbitrator, who found that the appellant had failed to establish any such allegations. The plea for quantification of compensation and back wages now raised in this 35 appeal is wholly misconceived, especially when such relief was not granted in the first round of litigation. The remedy under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, is limited to setting aside the Award and not for reappreciation of facts or grant of fresh relief. The Court under Section 37 of the said Act equally cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitrator or confer what the Arbitrator has not. 40. It is further contended that the judgments rendered in A.S.No.55/2017 and A.S.No.56/2017 have already been challenged by parties in M.F.A. Nos.1847/2021 and 1848/2021, which are presently pending before this Court. Further, an interim order dated 21.04.2021 has been passed in M.F.A. No.1848/2021, staying the operation of the judgment in A.S.No.55/2017. Therefore, the filing of the present appeal, being in teeth of the stay order and in view of the pending appeals, is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected. Moreover, the Order dated 11.08.2020 passed in A.S.No.55/2017 merely sets aside the Arbitral Award without granting or quantifying any relief, and hence there is no executable or enforceable relief in favour of the appellant arising therefrom. 36 41. It is also contended that the prayer of the appellant for modification of the Arbitral Award by way of this appeal is in clear contravention of Section 37 of the Act of 1996. The Apex Court has held that neither Section 34 nor Section 37 of the Act of 1996, contemplates modification or enhancement of the Award. The Court is only empowered to set aside an Award and the appropriate remedy thereafter would be recommencement of arbitral proceedings if the parties so desire. The appellant's prayer for quantification of wages and damages directly contradicts this principle and seeks to exceed the limited jurisdiction conferred by the Act. 42. Additionally, it is contended that the appeal is barred by the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata. This Court had earlier dismissed I.A.No.2/2021 in M.F.A.No.1848/2021 filed by the appellant, declining to vacate the interim order of stay and holding that the matter must be decided on merits. This Court had also dismissed the application filed by the appellant seeking deposit of claimed amounts in Arbitration. Since the issues now raised were directly involved and adjudicated upon in those applications, the appellant is attempting to re-litigate settled issues by filing the present appeal. Significantly, the appeal has 37 been filed only on 27.05.2022, nearly six months after the rejection of the earlier applications by order dated 01.12.2021, thereby rendering the present proceedings highly belated and barred by delay. 43. It is contended by the respondent No.1 – party in person in MFA No.1847/2017 and 1848/2017 that the appeals have been filed with the sole intention of harassing the respondent No.1 and prolonging the litigation without any justifiable cause. The consistent conduct of the appellant- Company reveals forum shopping, suppression of material facts, and abuse of the legal and arbitral processes. The learned Civil Court in A.S.No.56/2017 has rightly set aside the Award passed in A.C.No.117/2015, by holding that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain the counter claim of the appellant- Company. The reference to Arbitration was limited to the claims of respondent No.1 as per the order of appointment passed by this Court in CMP No.203/2014. Despite this clear limitation, the Arbitrator illegally entertained the counter claim of Rs.3 Crores filed by the appellant-Company, thereby traveling beyond the scope of reference. 38 44. It is contended that this Court further observes that the learned Arbitrator had acted in grave excess of jurisdiction by admitting the counter claim of Rs.3 Crores filed by the appellant- Company after the arbitration proceedings had already commenced. The scope of reference, as delineated this Court, was limited to adjudication of respondent No.1’s claims, and hence, the admission of a counter claim beyond the reference was wholly without jurisdiction. The Civil Court rightly set aside the Award to the extent it dismissed the respondent No.1’s claims on erroneous legal interpretation that employment-related claims cease upon termination. The Civil Court also dismissed the appellant’s belated review Petition in A.S.No.56/2017, as the same was barred by limitation and not accompanied by any application seeking condonation of delay. 45. It is further contended that the appellant-Company has persistently misused the Arbitration Clause embedded in its Employment Contracts to suppress and silence its employees, including the respondent No.1. The non-public nature of arbitration, absence of formal evidentiary procedures, and limited avenues for appeal have been exploited by the appellant- Company to render the arbitral process unfair and skewed in their 39 favour. In the present case, the Arbitrator's personal and adverse remarks against respondent No.1, in the absence of substantial evidence, suggest undue influence and compromise of neutrality. The Arbitrator's conduct in demanding fee-sharing from the respondent No.1 on the baseless counter claim further casts serious doubts on the procedural fairness of the proceedings. 46. It is also contended that as regards the facts, it is clear that respondent No.1 was forced to tender resignation on 16.02.2012 under coercion and threat of termination. There was no issuance of any show cause notice, charge sheet or domestic enquiry prior to obtaining the resignation. Such action of the appellant-Company is violative of the principles of natural justice. Further, the issuance of the bonus letter dated 01.01.2012 and increment letter dated 17.02.2012 disproves the appellant's claim that the respondent No.1 was a non-performer. The record also reveals that the appellant-Company paid three months’ notice salary to the respondent No.1, which further supports the contention that the resignation was not voluntary but was extracted under pressure. The appellant-Company has taken contradictory stands — on one hand issuing letters of increment and bonus, and on the other hand, claiming poor performance — 40 which undermines their allegations and highlights arbitrary exercise of power. 47. It is contended that following forced resignation, the respondent No.1 sought redressal by approaching multiple forums including the Labour Officer and Civil Court. However, the appellant-Company consistently resisted jurisdiction and forced the matter into Arbitration, only to delay the process further. The appointment of the Karnataka Arbitration Tribunal through this Court’s order in CMP 203/2014 was necessitated solely due to the appellant’s refusal to mutually appoint an Arbitrator. Even during arbitration, the appellant-Company imposed onerous and unreasonable demands upon the respondent No.1, including security deposits and undertakings regarding sale of personal property, solely with the intent to stifle his claim and pressurize him into withdrawal. 48. It is contended that no independent application was filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for adjudication of the counter claim. Hence, the counter claim filed by the appellant-Company for Rs.3 Crores was not only beyond the scope of reference but was devoid of merit. No 41 credible evidence was produced by the appellant-Company in support of its allegations. The documents relied upon, including routine internal emails, failed to substantiate any breach of confidentiality or policy. The learned Arbitrator, despite dismissing the counter claim for lack of jurisdiction, inexplicably accepted fees in relation to the same. The rejection of respondent No. 1’s claim, on the sole ground that he had resigned, was contrary to documentary evidence and principles of natural justice. 49. It is also contended that however, the Arbitrator, while rightly holding the counter claim as not maintainable, still collected fees from respondent No.1 towards adjudication of the same and dismissed her claims solely on the ground that she had resigned. Such approach is arbitrary, contrary to law, and shows clear bias. The Civil Court rightly set aside the Award in A.S.No.56/2017, having found that the Arbitrator had acted beyond jurisdiction and failed to appreciate the coercive nature of the resignation. In view of the foregoing, the appeal is wholly devoid of merit and is a continuation of the appellant-Company’s mala fide attempts to suppress the respondent No.1’s rights. The 42 appellant-Company has consistently indulged in retaliatory actions, procedural misuse, and baseless litigation. The Judgment and Order passed by the Civil Court in A.S.No.55/2017 and A.S.No.56/2017 is legal, just and proper, and does not warrant interference by this Court. 50. Having considered the contentions advanced by the party-in-person and counsels for the appellant-Company and after perusing the material on record, we have observed the following points for consideration: a) The claimant, a postgraduate in commerce, joined the respondent-company on 02.05.2010 as Vice President in the Operations Department with an annual salary of Rs.28,81,548/-. His probation period was six months. On 16.02.2012, he submitted a resignation letter, which was accepted on the same day, and he was relieved effective form 17.02.2012. His salary for the year 2012 Rs.32,27,334/-. On 17.02.2012, he sent an email (Ex.P-08) to a Senior Executive expressing disappointment over the manner of his ouster, stating he was asked to resign without an opportunity to defend himself. He denied the allegations made against him regarding the sharing of confidential information and asking inappropriate questions 43 during interviews, stating such claims were misconstrued and discriminatory. He asserted he was forced to resign under duress and was not paid notice period dues. b) It was further observed that on 23.02.2012, the claimant sent another email (Ex.R-16) to senior officers reiterating that he was denied the right to insert a clause in his resignation letter demanding notice period salary. Instead, he was compelled to submit a “clean” resignation. Thomas E. Mitchell, Global Head of the respondent company, replied on 05.03.2012 (Ex.P-09), affirming the finality of the decision but assuring payment of three months’ notice period salary. On 06.04.2012, the claimant received Rs.7,27,304/- after deductions, though he objected that only two months' notice pay was disbursed and salary for February 2012 was calculated till 14.02.2012 instead of 16.02.2012. On 09.05.2012, he received a second cheque for Rs.2,68,587/-. However, he acknowledged this payment as well and stated that he accepted the amounts without prejudice to his right to claim any balance dues. c) Subsequently, on 15.05.2012, the claimant issued a legal notice (Ex.P-10) to the company’s CEOs in India and the USA, seeking reinstatement or Rs.1 crore as compensation for 44 victimization, humiliation, and financial loss. The respondent - Company replied on 21.06.2012 (Ex.P-11), refuting the claims. On 22.05.2012, the respondent - Company issued a relieving letter and service certificate (Ex.R-02 & R-03). The claimant then approached the Labour Officer on 16.08.2012 (Ex.R-07) alleging he was coerced into resignation. The respondent objected on 02.11.2012 (Ex.P-12), contending that he was not a ‘workman’ but a senior managerial employee who voluntarily resigned due to complaints and poor performance ratings. The Labour Officer closed the proceedings on 02.11.2012 due to failure in conciliation. d) On 08.11.2012, the claimant reiterated his grievance via email. Thereafter, he filed a civil suit in O.S.No.1440/2013 on 20.12.2013 before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, seeking a declaration that his termination was illegal and for reinstatement with consequential benefits. The respondent filed written statement (Ex.P-11) and interlocutory applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court allowed the application under Section 8 on 05.12.2013 (Ex.P-18), referring parties to Arbitration. Due to disagreement in appointing an Arbitrator, the claimant filed 45 CMP No.203/2014 before the High Court, which constituted the present Tribunal on 18.09.2015 (Ex.P-21). 51. In view of the above observations, we are of the opinion that the claimant was not a “workman” but held a senior managerial post and his employment was governed by contract, which only required a three-month notice for termination by either party. The respondent submitted multiple emails (Ex.R-12 to R-14, R-17 to R-20) evidencing performance issues and policy violations. The claimant, though denying allegations, admitted to receiving a low rating in January 2012 and did not challenge this before any authority. He did not attend office on 17.02.2012 after tendering resignation nor report any alleged coercion to the police, despite being a law graduate. The claimant accepted payments under the statements of accounts dated 06.04.2012 and 09.05.2012 without protest, with endorsements indicating satisfaction of dues, except a minor dispute over one month’s notice pay and two days’ salary. He neither reserved a right to claim reinstatement nor raised issues of coercion at that point. His subsequent emails and legal action appear inconsistent with this conduct and the resignation was not forced or coerced, but 46 possibly suggested by the respondent in lieu of termination due to dissatisfaction with his performance. 52. Further, it is observed that the resignation appeared to be voluntary, though possibly advised by the company in view of performance concerns. The claimant’s later demands for reinstatement and Rs.1 crore compensation were inconsistent with his conduct at the time of resignation. Respondent’s counter- claim of Rs.3 crores for alleged business loss and abuse of process. 53. Furthermore, it is observed that the respondent- Company had suffered a finding by the Labour Officer and also hit by the provisions of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act and also as per the terms of the appointment, it was not in perpetuity and he had the right to resign and so the respondent had the right to terminate. The claimant-employee was not a workman instead, was holding the position of a senior officer. It would manifest that the respondent was not satisfied with the services which the claimant was discharging by holding the high post in the title “the President”. In view of the same, the claimant cannot ask for specific enforcement of the personal services as the relief sought 47 by the appellant-employee is clearly barred by Section 14 of Specific Relief Act. 54. In view of the above discussions, it is observed from the impugned judgments in A.S.No.55/2017 that the same was allowed and the dismissal of the claim was set aside but did not specify anything as to whether the claimant was to receive the claim amount or not did it state anything regarding whether matter needs to be remanded to the Arbitration Centre and as seen from the impugned judgment in A.S.No.56/2017, was dismissed and the dismissal of counter claim is upheld. It is to be noted that the claim survives and the counter claim stands dismissed. 55. In view of the foregoing discussions and placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gayatri Balaswamy v. M/s. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 986, it is affirmed that the Courts possess the discretionary power to remand an award to the arbitral tribunal for rectification of defects- such as incomplete reasoning, procedural infirmities or jurisdictional ambiguities – without summarily setting aside the award. 48 56. In view of the foregoing discussions, we proceed to pass the following:- ORDER a) MFA No.4035/2022 filed by the employee against the Order dated 11.08.2020 passed in A.S.No.55/2017 on the file of the V Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, CCH No.13, is hereby allowed and remanded back to the Arbitral Tribunal for fresh consideration and pass appropriate and reasoned Award. b) MFA No.1847/2021 filed by the employer against the Order dated 11.08.2020 passed in A.S.No.56/2017 on the file of the V Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, CCH No.13, is hereby dismissed. The Award dated 31.01.2017 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is hereby confirmed. 49 c) MFA No.1848/2021 filed by the employer against the Order dated 11.08.2020 passed in A.S.No.55/2017 on the file of the V Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, CCH No.13, hereby disposed of with a direction that the Award dated 31.01.2017 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is hereby set aside and remand back for fresh consideration and also liberty is granted to raise objections in A.C.117/2015, before the Arbitral Tribunal. Sd/- (ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE Sd/- (DR. K.MANMADHA RAO) JUDGE BNV Ct-adp