1 2025:CGHC:52367-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 5591 of 2025 M/s Bharat Builders A Proprietorship Firm Having Its Office At A-112, 3rd Floor, Dayanand Colony, Lajpat Nagar, - IV, New Delhi- 110024, Through- Its Proprietor Mr. Arvind Kumar Mansinghka, S/o Late, M.L. Mansinghka Aged About- 61 Years, R/o A-112, Dayanand Colony. Lajpat Nagar, IV, New Delhi- 110024 ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through- The Secretary, Public Health Engineering Department Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2. The Union of India (Deleted) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 28-10-2025 3. The Secretary Department of Finance, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya, Raipur District- Raipur (C.G.) -492101 4. The Executive Engineer Public Health Engineering Department Kokari Gaon Road, Division Baloda, Bazaar, Baloda Bazar (C.G.) -492001 5. The Superintending Engineer Public Health Engineering Department. Raipur Circle, Pandri Road, Raipur (C.G.) -492001 6. The Chief Engineer Public Health Engineering Department Raipur Zone Neer Bhawan, Civil Line, Raipur (C.G.) 492001 BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.10.29 18:38:30 +0530 2 7. The Engineer In Chief (E-In-C) Public Health Engineering Department Indravati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Dist- Raipur (C.G.) -492101 ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Harshmander Rastogi, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Deputy Government Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 28.10.2025 1. Heard Mr. Harshmander Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers: “10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned letter dated 26.11.2024 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent No. 4. 10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may also kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for release/re- imbursement of the GST amounting to Rs. 11,76,000/- along with interest and penal interest. 3 10.3 That, any other relief, including the cost of this petition, as it appears to be fit and appropriate to this Hon’ble Court.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present writ petition has been preferred challenging the impugned order dated 26.11.2024 passed by the Office of the Executive Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, Balodabazar (Chhattisgarh), whereby the respondent authorities have rejected the petitioner’s representation. It is contended that in the said order, the respondents have stated that as per the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), all liabilities towards Sales Tax, Royalty, Excise Duty, Turnover Tax, etc. were to be borne by the contractor, and the department would not be liable for any such statutory payments. It was further mentioned that for tenders issued after 01.07.2017, no fresh instructions had been issued by the Department regarding GST reimbursement. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner had earlier preferred WPT No. 166 of 2024, seeking a direction to the respondents to release the admitted claim for reimbursement of the GST liability already deposited by the petitioner in respect of the work executed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the NIT dated 07.07.2017, read with (i) the Common Set of Conditions (Corrigendum No. 1) issued vide letter dated 20.07.2017, and (ii) the Guidance Note dated 03.10.2017 issued by the Special Executive Officer, Public Health Engineering Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, as well as other instructions and circulars issued by 4 superior authorities. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide order dated 20.09.2024, was kind enough to direct the petitioner to submit a fresh representation to the concerned authority along with the requisite documents within two weeks, and in turn, the respondent authority was directed to decide such representation within a further period of two months after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in compliance with the said order, the petitioner submitted a fresh representation, which was, however, rejected by the respondent No. 4 vide the impugned order dated 26.11.2024. It is pointed out that in paragraph 3 of the impugned order, it has been incorrectly mentioned that the petitioner himself stated that the NIT was released on 01.07.2017, whereas in fact, the petitioner had categorically stated that the NIT dated 07.07.2017 was issued subsequent to the implementation of GST on 01.07.2017, and therefore, GST was not part of the contract price. It is further submitted that paragraph 4 of the impugned order wrongly relies upon a general clause of the NIT regarding the contractor’s tax liabilities, ignoring the fact that as per the Corrigendum/Letter dated 15.12.2023, the GST component amounting to Rs. 11.76 lakhs was clearly recognized as payable separately, and not included within the contract price of Rs. 98 lakhs. Moreover, paragraph 6 of the impugned order incorrectly states that no new instructions were issued by the department in relation to GST reimbursement, whereas, in fact, the Common Set of Conditions of Contract and the Guidance Note dated 03.10.2017 (Corrigendum No. 2) specifically provided that GST 5 treatment would be as per departmental instructions and Clause (1) of the said Guidance Note directed that GST on construction/labour work shall be discharged in accordance with point (iii) of the GST Notification dated 22.08.2017. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that while deciding the representation, the respondent authority has misinterpreted the facts, ignored relevant documents, and passed the impugned order on incorrect premises. It is further submitted that despite the petitioner approaching the authorities and pointing out the factual inaccuracies, no corrective steps were taken, and therefore, having no other efficacious remedy, the petitioner has been constrained to file the present writ petition. 7. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner is not entitled to any GST reimbursement, as the NIT itself explicitly provided that all taxes and levies shall be borne by the contractor. It is contended that the petitioner voluntarily participated in the tender process with full knowledge of the terms and conditions, and after execution of the contract, cannot now seek modification of its financial terms. It is further submitted that the Common Set of Conditions and the Guidance Note dated 03.10.2017 are of a general nature and do not override the specific contractual stipulations contained in the NIT and the agreement executed between the parties. The rejection of the petitioner’s representation, therefore, was based on sound reasoning and does not call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6 8. We have learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ petitions. 9. It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it raises disputed question of facts. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corpornation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) & Others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) & Another, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 298 was dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution, which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the authorities. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case observed as under: “6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with 7 it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995." (emphasis supplied) 11. The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana & Others, reported in (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows: “16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High 8 Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied) 12. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as under: “26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising 9 its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable." 13. Subsequently, in Union of India vs. Puna Hinda, reported in (2021) 10 SCC 690, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: “24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads.” 10 14. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., reported in (2023) 2 SCC 703, while dealing with the issue of exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a contract, has stated: “82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit.” (emphasis supplied) 15. A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be proper. 16. In the present cases, the relief of compensations sought by the 11 petitioner is contingent upon the resolution of the disputed question of facts raised, and these questions cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid, it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the present writ petition as there is disputed questions of fact involved. 17. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, further considering the disputed questions of law involved in this writ petition, the reliefs sought by the petitioner and in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we do not find any good ground to entertain the present writ petition. 18. Accordingly, the present writ petition being devoid of merit are liable to be and is hereby dismissed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to other alternate remedies available to him under the law. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan