1 2025:CGHC:52404-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 698 of 2024 1 - Jasbir Singh Alias Jassi S/o Late Sukhcharan Singh Aged About 27 Years R/o Ward No. 13, Mohan Nagar Durg, District-Durg, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Nisha Kaur Alias Choti W/o Late Chamkaur Singh Aged About 35 Years R/o Pailimeta, Police Station - Mohgaon, District-Khairagarh- Chhuikhadan- Gandai (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellants versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Mohgaon, District- Khairagarh- Chhuikhadan- Gandai (C.G.) ... Respondent For Appellants : Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Sanghrash Pandey, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 28/10/2025 1. The appellants herein question the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, District BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR 2 Rajnandgaon in Sessions Case No.10/2021, by which they have been convicted for offence under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional imprisonment for five months and RI for five years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo additional imprisonment for one month. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 03.11.2020, complainant Ravindra Singh (PW-1), appeared at Gandai Police Station and reported the missing of his brother-in-law, Chamkour Singh Sandhu, son of late Shri Gurudev Singh Sandhu, aged 35 years, resident of village Pailimeta, Mohgaon Police Station, Rajnandgaon District (C.G.), stating that Chamkour Singh went missing on the night of 31.10.2020 at approximately 11:00 P.M. His family consists of his wife, Nisha Kaur, and two sons, Yuvraj Singh (10 years) and Navraj Singh (8 years). Despite search efforts, no trace of him could be found. Consequently, the police registered a missing person report under Diary No. 0/2020, according to Rojnamcha Sanha (Ex.P-47), and initiated an investigation to gather information regarding the missing person. During the inquiry, upon questioning, deceased Chamkour Singh’s wife, appellant Nisha Kaur, stated that her brother, appellant Jasbir Singh, had murdered Chamkour Singh with a knife at home and after burning his body near village Magarkund Road, tied it in a bed-sheet and disposed of it under the main gate of Pailimeta 3 Dam. On the spot, dehati nalsi merg intimation was recorded as Ex.P-1. Dehati nalsi was recorded vide Ex.P-2 and merg intimation was recorded vide Ex.P-3 and thereafter FIR was registered vide Ex.P-4. During the investigation, the body was recovered on 5.11.2020 at 13.40 P.M. from Pailimeta Dam Main Gate vide recovery panchnama Ex.P-12. Search panchnama were prepared vide Exs.P-14 and P-15. Two stones tied to the recovered body were recovered on 05.11.2020 vide seizure memo Ex.P-16 and water in a plastic container from the site of recovery was recorded vide Ex.P-17. Inquest was prepared over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-7. Body identification panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P-9 where Ravindra Singh identified the body. Memorandum statement of appellant Jasbir Singh @ Jassi was recorded on 06.11.2020 at 6.10 A.M. vide Ex.P-10. Memorandum statement of appellant Nisha Kour Sandhu was recorded on 06.11.2020 at 6.45 A.M. vide Ex.P-11. Clothes stains with blood and mobile were seized from appellant Nisha Kaur Sandhu vide Ex.P-18. Bloodstained and plain soil were recovered from the spot vide Ex.P-19. Clothes stains with blood, Tata pick-up, honda activa and mobile were recovered from appellant Jasbir Singh vide Ex.P-20. Appellant Jasbir Singh was arrested on 06.11.2020 vide arrest memo Ex.P-22 and appellant Nisha Kour Sandhu was arrested on 06.11.2020 vide arrest memo Ex.P-23. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-27. Patwari also prepared the spot map vide Ex.P-28. Dead body of the deceased 4 was sent for postmortem to the Government Hospital, Gandai vide Ex.P-49, where Dr.Akshay Kumar Ramteke (PW-31) conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased and found following symptoms:- Scalp: There were incised injuries present in the frontal region, measuring 3 × 0.2 cm × tissue depth, 2 × 0.2 cm × tissue depth, and 5.6 × 0.2 cm × tissue depth, located 5.1 cm, 5.9 cm, and 6.1 cm above the nasal bridge, respectively. In the left parietal region, there was an injury measuring 5.1 × 0.2 cm × bone depth, located 7.6 cm above the nasal bridge. The injuries were hemorrhagic red in color and occurred before death. An incised injury was present on the neck on the right side, located 2.9 cm below the lower border of the mandible. The injury extended transversely across the anterior part of the neck, measuring 10.8 × 6 cm × cartilage depth, and was hemorrhagic red in color, occurring before death. Skull: Intact. Scalp (hair and skin layer): Intact and greasy. Brain and spinal cord: Soft, with cerebrospinal fluid of green and grey color.” 5 The doctor has opined that injury over neck is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Seized articles were sent for DNA test. 3. The appellants were charge-sheeted in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chhuikhadan, for offence under Sections 302 and 201/34 of the IPC, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon for trial in accordance with law. The appellants / accused abjured the guilt and entered into defence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 33 witnesses and exhibited 71 documents Exs.P-1 to P- 71. The statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, in which they denied guilt. However, the accused has examined none in their defence nor exhibited any document in their support. 5. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 30.01.2024, convicted the appellants under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of the IPC and sentenced them as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been preferred. 6. Mr. Abhishek Sinha, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, learned counsel for the appellants submits that learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence in its entirety and erred in convicting the appellants. The prosecution 6 relied solely on circumstantial evidence and has failed to complete the chain of circumstances to conclusively implicate the appellants. He further submits that the conviction is based on the memorandum statements of the appellants (Exs.P-10 and P-11), which are inadmissible, particularly as independent witnesses (PW-2 Rajesh Singh & PW-4 Tarsem Singh) did not support the recovery and discovery. The trial Court erred in relying on Section 27 of the Evidence Act for memorandum, as the witnesses did not corroborate the discovery. The videography (Ex.P-44) relied upon by the trial Court is inadmissible, as no certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act was produced, nor was the person conducting it examined. He also submits that the prosecution failed to establish motive, identity of the deceased through DNA, recovery of murder weapon, or forensic analysis (FSL report), rendering the case unproven. Alleged conspiracy between the appellants is unsubstantiated, as no call records or communications were produced. The conviction rests on suspicion; however, suspicion alone cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court ignored the settled principle that, where two views are possible, the view favouring the accused must be adopted. In circumstantial evidence cases, the prosecution must conclusively establish a complete chain of events excluding all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, which it has failed to do. The prosecution has produced no incriminating material or evidence establishing motive against the appellants. 7 Mere communication between the appellants cannot establish conspiracy, particularly in the absence of evidence of the other phone or its usage. He contended that dead body of the deceased was recovered on 05.11.2020 at 13.40 P.M. and memorandum statements of the appellants were recorded on 06.11.2020 at 6.10 A.M. and 6.45 A.M. respectively. As such, whole prosecution case makes doubtful. Considering the aforesaid facts, the criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Boby v. State of Kerala, (2023) 15 SCC 760, Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481 and Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh (Criminal Appeal No.3869 of 2023). 7. On the other hand, Mr.Sanghrash Pandey, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and learned trial Court after considering all incriminating materials and circumstances available against the appellants rightly convicted them for the aforesaid offences. Hence, the instant criminal appeal being bereft of merits is liable to be dismissed looking to the commission of offence done by the accused persons. 8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8 9. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased Chamkour Singh Sandhu was homicidal in nature, which the trial Court has returned the finding in affirmative. 10. Dr.Akshay Kumar Ramteke (PW-31) has examined the dead body of the deceased and submitted his report Ex.P-49, in which he has clearly opined that injury over neck is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature and and was homicidal in nature. 11. After hearing learned counsel appearing for the parties and after going through the records, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by learned trial Court that death of Chamkour Singh Sandhu was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. 12. The next question for consideration would be, whether the appellants are author of the crime ? 13. It has been consistently laid down by the Supreme Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1977 SC 1063; Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 316; Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 SC 446; State 9 of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1224; Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 350; Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P., AIR 1989 SC 1890. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1954 SC 621, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt. 14. We may also make a reference to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus: “In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence....”. 10 15. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 79, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly es- tablished; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 16. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, which state as under:- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; 11 (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 17. In the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 681, the Supreme Court has held as under:- “12. In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence.” 12 18. The principles of circumstantial evidence is reiterated in Nizam and another vs. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550, wherein the Supreme Court has held that:- “8. Case of the prosecution is entirely based on the circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete, forming a chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused totally inconsistent with his innocence.” 19. In the present case, the memorandum statement of appellant Jasbir Singh was recorded on 06.11.2020 at 6:10 A.M. vide Ex.P- 10, and the memorandum statement of appellant Nisha Kaur Sandhu was recorded on the same day at 6:45 A.M. Both appellants were arrested on 06.11.2020. However, the dead body of the deceased had already been recovered on 05.11.2020 at 1:40 P.M., which was identified by Ravindra Singh (PW-1). This clearly establishes that the recovery of the dead body preceded the recording of the memorandum statements and the arrest of the appellants. 20. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: - 13 “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 21. The prosecution’s case, in the absence of eye witnesses, is based upon circumstantial evidence. As per Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a confession made to a police officer is prohibited and cannot be admitted in evidence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act provides that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against such person, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 279 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. It makes that part of the statement which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in consequence of the information received from a person accused of an offence, to the extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered, admissible in evidence against the accused. The fact which is discovered as a consequence of the information given is admissible in evidence. Further, the fact discovered must lead to recovery of a physical object and only that information which distinctly relates to that discovery can be proved. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is based on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events – a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information given, which results in recovery of a physical object. The facts discovered and the recovery is an assurance 14 that the information given by a person accused of the offence can be relied. 22. The Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad and others v. State of U.P., AIR 2018 SC 5264 with reference to the word “fact” employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has held that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. It has been further held that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. Their Lordships relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 observed as under: - “13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 1 SCC 253, in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus: 15 “23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (supra) has held thus: (IA p. 77) “… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” 23. In Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828, elucidating on Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the first condition imposed and necessary for bringing the section into operation is the discovery of a fact which should be a relevant fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence. The 16 second is that the discovery of such a fact must be deposed to. A fact already known to the police will fall foul and not meet this condition. The third is that at the time of receipt of the information, the accused must be in police custody. Lastly, it is only so much of information which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered resulting in recovery of a physical object which is admissible. Rest of the information is to be excluded. The word ‘distinctly’ is used to limit and define the scope of the information and means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’ or ‘unmistakably’. Only that part of the information which is clear, immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible. 24. The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the admissible portion of the statement of the accused, would give rise to two alternative hypotheses, namely, (i) that the accused had himself deposited the physical items which were recovered; or (ii) only the accused knew that the physical items were lying at that place. The second hypothesis is wholly compatible with the innocence of the accused, whereas the first would be a factor to show involvement of the accused in the offence. The court has to analyse which of the hypotheses should be accepted in a particular case. 25. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is frequently used by the police, and the courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse. However, this does not mean that in every case invocation of 17 Section 27 of the Evidence Act must be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory and unworthy of credence. 26. The Supreme Court in the matter of Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119 has clearly held that confession to police whether in course of investigation or otherwise and confession made while in police custody would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and observed as under:- “9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading "Admissions". Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24 excludes confessions caused by certain inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides : "No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence." The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, 18 unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-s (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected under S. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed 19 upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them.” Their Lordships further held as under:- “18. If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by S.27.” 27. Recently, the Supreme Court in Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh (Criminal Appeal No.3869 of 2023) has held as under :- “25. It could thus be seen that the IO (PW-16) has failed to state as to what information was given by the accused persons which led to the discovery of the dead body. The evidence is also totally silent as to how the dead body was discovered and subsequently recovered. We find that therefore, the evidence of the IO (PW-16) would also not bring the case at hand under the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Reliance in this respect could be placed on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Asar Mohammad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Boby v. State of Kerala.” 20 28. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above stated judgments (supra), only discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and knowledge of the accused as to this extent would be admissible and incriminating part of the accused statement that they have inflicted injuries on the deceased and thereafter they threw the dead body into Pailimeta Dam to destroy evidence would not be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but the fact remains that no incriminating article has been seized pursuant to their memorandum statements (Exs.P-10 and P-11). As such, that part of evidence would not be admissible. 29. In the case in hand, confessional statements (Exs.P-10 and P-11) made by the appellants before the police officer is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and no part of it is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. As such, we are of the considered opinion that alleged confessional statements (Exs.P-10 and P-11) is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and no part of it is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in view of decisions rendered by Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya (supra) followed by the the Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra). Even otherwise, no other incriminating piece of evidence is available on record to convict the appellants for offence under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of the IPC. 30. Investigating officer Bhola Singh (PW-33) has admitted in para 39 of his cross-examination that Ex.P-10 is the alleged memorandum 21 of accused Jasbir Singh and Ex.P-11 is the alleged memorandum of accused Nisha Kaur. In Ex.P-10, the date and time of taking the memorandum are mentioned as 06.11.2020 at 6:10 A.M. and 06.11.2020 at 6:45 A.M. 31. The trial Court in para-123 of its judgment has observed that under these circumstances, it can be stated that the evidence presented in this case, and its credibility established beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to conclude that the death of Chamkour Singh was caused by the accused with their common intention. It is also clear from the circumstances that the death of the deceased was intentional. The manner in which Chamkour Singh was murdered, and the subsequent attempt to burn the body and dispose of it in the dam to conceal it, indicates that such an act was not committed for any trivial purpose or ordinary reason. The accused burned the body on Magarkund Road and threw it into Pailimeta Dam to destroy evidence, and the police became aware of this only based on information provided by the accused Nisha Kaur, but the trial Court while convicting the appellants has ignored the fact that dead body of the deceased was recovered on 05.11.2020 and thereafter the memorandum statements of the appellants were taken on 06.11.2020 and they were arrested on that day. 32. Seen in this background, we need not go further and consider the evidence qua other circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution since the failure to prove a single circumstance 22 cogently can cause a snap in the chain of circumstances. There cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 33. The memorandum statements of appellants Jasbir Singh (Ex.P-10) and Nisha Kaur (Ex.P-11) were recorded on 06.11.2020 at 6:10 A.M. and 6:45 A.M., respectively, whereas the dead body of deceased Chamkour Singh was recovered earlier on 05.11.2020 at 1:40 P.M. The appellants were arrested only on 06.11.2020, i.e., after recovery of the dead body. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act allows admissibility of that part of information given by an accused which leads to the discovery of a fact. However, Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act prohibit confessions made to a police officer, and only that portion of the statement that distinctly leads to recovery of a physical object can be admitted. 34.In the present case, the statements (Ex.P-10 and Ex.P-11) cannot qualify under Section 27 of the Evidence Act since the recovery of the body occurred prior to the recording of the statements. No incriminating article was discovered as a consequence of these statements. Therefore, the confessional 23 statements are inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, as observed by the Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra), Mohmed Inayatullah (supra) and Aghnoo Nagesia (supra) and by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya (supra). 35.The reliance placed by the trial Court upon the confessional statements for establishing the appellants’ complicity is legally misconceived. The discovery of the body having occurred prior to making of such statements disrupts the chain of causation mandated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, vitiating their evidentiary value. 36.Since the conviction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, a continuous and unbroken chain of circumstances is necessary. In this case, there is a significant gap because one of the key circumstances i.e., discovery of the body cannot be attributed to the appellants’ statements. Any snap in the chain of circumstances gives the benefit of doubt to the appellants. 37.In view of the above, the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellants under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The confessional statements (Exs.P-10 and Ex.P-11) are inadmissible, and no other evidence sufficiently links the appellants to the crime. 38. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal filed on behalf of the appellants is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 30.01.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, 24 District Rajnandgaon in Sessions Case No.10/2021 is set aside. The appellants are in jail. They be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The fine amount, if any deposited, be refunded to the appellants. 39. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (Now Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023), the appellants are directed to furnish a personal bonds in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties each in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 40. 40. The trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Bidhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu