1 2025:CGHC:56876-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 905 of 2021 Raja Rajput (Verma) S/o Shri Dhandhu Verma, Aged About 19 Years R/o Village - Toriya Mohalla Kochhabhanvar, Police Station - Nawab, District - Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh, Through - SHO, Police Station - Bemetara, District - Bemetara Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, Advocate For Respondent/State : Ms. Soumya Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 24.11 .2025 1. Heard Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as Ms. Soumya Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing on behalf of the State/respondent. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2025.11.26 16:58:55 +0530 2 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.07.2021 passed by the Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act, 2012), Bemetara, Chhattisgarh in Special Criminal Case No.56/2019 whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 363 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo 3 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.100/- and, in default of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment of 3 months; under Section 366 of IPC and sentenced to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.200/- and, in default of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment of 6 months; under Section 376(2)(j)(n) of IPC and sentenced to undergo 15 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,000/- and, in default of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment of 3 years; under Section 323 of IPC and sentenced to undergo 6 months rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.100/- and, in default of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment of 1 month and also under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act’) and sentenced to undergo 15 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,000/- and, in default of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment of 3 years. It was further directed to run all the sentences concurrently. 3. Learned State counsel submits that notice issued to PW-2 mother of the victim has been served, but none has appeared on behalf of the victim to contest the present appeal. 3 4. Brief facts for disposal of this appeal, in a nutshell, were that the victim, whose date of birth was 02.01.2002, was a minor on the date of the incident, i.e., 02.07.2019. She had been residing at her maternal grandfather’s house for about two years while her parents were living in Raipur. On 02.07.2019, around 6:00 a.m., the victim left the house without informing anyone, which was communicated by her maternal uncle to her mother. Despite search efforts in the neighbourhood and among relatives, she could not be traced. It was revealed that the victim used to speak from her maternal uncle’s mobile phone to two other mobile numbers—8738857346 and 6267660701. On the basis of suspicion, her mother lodged a complaint alleging that the holder of the said numbers had lured and taken away the victim, leading to the registration of Missing Person Case No. 60/2019 at Police Station Bemetara vide Ex.P/5. Upon finding prima facie material during inquiry, an FIR, being Crime No. 359/2019, was registered against an unknown person vide Ex.P/4. 5. During investigation, the victim was recovered on 25.08.2019 from the possession of accused Raja Rajput at an under-construction Sai Mandir within Police Station Araiya, Kanpur (U.P.) in the presence of witnesses vide Ex.P/1, and a Panchnama was prepared. In her 164 CrPC statement (Ex.P/20), the victim disclosed that the accused had enticed her on the pretext of marriage and had established physical relations with her. With due consent of the victim and her mother (Ex.P/2 and Ex.P/7), 4 she was medically treated and thereafter handed over to her parents. The accused was also arrested vide Ex.P16 and medically examined vide Ex.P/14 and Ex.P/14A. The underwear of both the victim and the accused was seized; a seizure memo and spot map were prepared, and the seized articles were sent to FSL, Raipur for examination and according to FSL report (Ex.P/19), semen stains were present on the seized articles. 6. For verification of the victim’s date of birth, the Dakhil-kharij register was seized from the Headmaster-in-charge of her school in the presence of witnesses, and a seizure memo was prepared vide Ex.P/10, a copy of the Dakhil-kharij register is Ex.P/12C. The statements of the victim and other witnesses were recorded, including the victim’s statement under Section 164 CrPC. 7. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused. On the basis of the material collected, charges were framed against accused Raja Rajput under Sections 363, 366A, 376, 323 IPC and Sections 5(l)/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, to which he denied and claimed trial. 8. To establish the charges levelled against the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 9 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-9 and exhibited 24 documents vide Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/24. In order to prove defence, the accused has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 5 9. The statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him and claimed false implication. 10. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant-accused and sentenced him as mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 11. Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution had utterly failed to establish that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident. It was submitted that no authentic document proving the age of the victim, such as a birth certificate or Kotwari register, was brought on record, nor was any ossification test conducted during investigation. The only document relied upon by the prosecution is the 4th Class Admission Register (Ex.P/12C), proved through PW-3 Smt. Neelima Mahashabde, the Headmistress. However, learned counsel submitted that the said document is not admissible in evidence for the purpose of determining age, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Yuvaprakash v. State represented by Inspector of Police, AIR 2023 SC 3525, which categorically holds that a mere school register entry, unsupported by foundational documents, cannot be relied upon to prove age. It is further contended that the deposition of PW-3 itself demolishes prosecution’s case. PW-3 6 stated that the victim’s father had come at the time of admission and had orally informed the date of birth, and the same was entered in the school record without any supporting document such as a Transfer Certificate of Class 3rd. This version becomes doubtful when juxtaposed with the testimony of PW-2, mother of the victim, who claimed that she herself had got the victim admitted in Class 4th. Thus, there is a clear contradiction between PW-2 and PW-3. Moreover, the father, who allegedly furnished the date of birth orally, was never examined before the Court, raising a serious question on the reliability of the entry. Even PW-2, the mother, admitted that she did not know the exact date of birth of the victim. Adding further inconsistency, PW-1 herself declared her date of birth as 02.02.2002, which contradicts the date mentioned in the school records. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt. 12. Mr. Goverdhan submitted that the evidence on record clearly shows that the victim was a consenting party. From the deposition of PW-1, it is evident that she travelled independently from Raipur to Bemetara, from Bemetara to Jabalpur, and thereafter from Jabalpur to Kanpur, without any coercion, threat, or fear. She stayed with the appellant in Kanpur of her own volition for a considerable duration and never made any complaint to any person or authority about any alleged kidnapping. Her conduct, throughout, was consistent with a person acting with free will and not under duress. Thus, the essential ingredients of kidnapping or 7 abduction under Sections 363 and 366 IPC were not made out. It is argued that there was no incriminating material recovered from the possession of the appellant. No mobile phone was seized from him, nor any objectionable photograph, video, or MMS involving the victim was recovered. In absence of any such material, the prosecution could not substantiate the allegation that the appellant lured or manipulated the victim in any manner. Lastly, he submitted that the prosecution case was riddled with material infirmities, contradictions, and lack of admissible evidence. The prosecution had miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal of all charges. 13. On the other hand, Ms. Soumya Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded a well-reasoned conviction. It is contended that the prosecution has duly proved that the victim is a minor on the date of the incident, and the appellant is falsely disputing her age only to escape liability. It is submitted that the school admission register (Ex.P/12C), proved by PW-3 Smt. Neelima Mahashabde, the Headmistress, clearly records the date of birth of the victim as 02.01.2002. The witness has categorically stated that the entry is made in the regular course of school administration, and such contemporaneous school record 8 is a reliable document under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is further contended that minor discrepancies, such as whether the father or the mother brought the victim for admission, do not in any manner discredit the documentary entry, which has remained unshaken in cross-examination. It is contended that the victim herself has consistently stated before the Investigating Officer, the Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC, and before the Court, that she was below 18 years of age at the time of occurrence. The defence has not produced any material to contradict the date of birth recorded in Ex.P/12C, nor has any alternative date of birth been established. Therefore, the age of the victim stands duly proved from the available admissible evidence. 14. Ms. Sharma further submits that the argument of consent is wholly misconceived in law, as consent of a minor is legally irrelevant in cases of sexual intercourse or physical relations. Even otherwise, the conduct of the victim indicates that she was forcibly taken by the appellant. It is submitted that the appellant lured the minor girl on the pretext of marriage and took her from place to place, ultimately confining her in an under-construction temple at Kanpur, from where she was recovered by police during investigation. The victim, in her testimony, has clearly narrated the manner in which the appellant induced her and committed repeated sexual assault upon her. Her version has remained consistent, trustworthy, and inspires full confidence. It is further 9 submitted that recovery of objectionable material or mobile phone is not a sine qua non for proving the offences charged. The statements of the victim, duly corroborated by medical evidence, recovery proceedings, and other documentary evidence, are sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. Minor contradictions or omissions, which are natural due to the lapse of time, do not vitiate the prosecution case. As such, the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under the relevant provisions of the IPC and the POCSO Act. No ground is made out to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of conviction and sentence. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the entire record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. The submissions advanced on behalf of both sides have been duly considered in the light of the factual matrix of the case and the legal principles governing the field. Each material aspect of the matter has been examined to determine whether any infirmity, perversity, or jurisdictional error exists in the impugned order so as to warrant interference by this Court. 16. The first and foremost question that arises for consideration is whether the victim was a minor, i.e., below 18 years of age, on the date of the alleged incident ? 17. This issue assumes paramount significance, as the determination of the victim’s age has a direct bearing on the applicability of the 10 provisions of the POCSO Act and the corresponding penal provisions under the IPC. The age of the victim is a foundational fact, and its correct ascertainment is essential for deciding the nature of the offence, the culpability of the accused, and the statutory presumptions that may come into play. Therefore, before adverting to any other aspect of the matter, it is necessary to examine, with due care and on the basis of the evidentiary material available on record, whether the prosecution has satisfactorily established that the victim was indeed below 18 years of age at the relevant point of time. 18. In order to consider the age of the victim, we have examined the evidence available on record. The prosecution has mainly relied upon Dakhil-kharij register (Ex.P/12C), statements of the victim (PW-1), mother of the victim (PW-2) and Smt. Neelima Mahashabde (PW-3), Headmistress of Navin Shishu Vikas School, Birgaon, District Raipur (C.G.). According to the Dakhil- kharij register (Ex.P/12C), the date of birth of the victim is 02.01.2002. 19. PW-2, the mother of the victim, stated that the victim was her eldest child but admitted that she did not remember her exact date of birth due to limited education. In cross-examination, she further stated that although she did not recall her marriage-related details, the victim was born two-and-a-half to three years after her marriage. She also stated that she herself had enrolled the victim 11 in school and had recorded her date of birth on the basis of a slip of paper she had prepared. Significantly, she did not produce this slip before the Court. She, however, denied the defence suggestion that the victim was major on the date of the incident. 20. PW-1, the victim, deposed that she had studied up to Class IX and stated her date of birth as 02.02.2002. Her testimony on age is not supported by any documentary evidence brought by her, and her stated date of birth also differs from the one recorded in the school register. 21. To support the school record, the prosecution examined PW-4 Rajesh Thakur, the Investigating Officer. He deposed that during the investigation he requisitioned the original admission- cancellation register of the school through a written request (Ex.P/9). After the Headmaster produced the register, he seized it under Ex.P/10, obtained attested copies, and returned the original register to the school under a surrender memo (Ex.P/11). His evidence is procedural in nature and establishes only the fact of seizure, not the authenticity of the date of birth recorded therein. 22. PW-3, the Headmistress of the school, stated that she handed over the admission-cancellation register (Ex.P/12) to the police in pursuance of Ex.P/9. She confirmed that the victim’s date of birth was recorded as 02.01.2002 in the said register and that she was admitted to Class IV on 01.07.2011. In her cross-examination, however, she conceded that the victim was admitted directly to 12 Class IV on the oral representation of the guardian that the child had passed Class III, and not on the basis of any transfer certificate or documentary proof. She admitted that the father of the victim had orally stated the date of birth at the time of admission and that no birth certificate or Kotwari register entry was produced. She further admitted that the victim was not admitted in Class I in their school and that the entry was made solely on the oral information provided by the guardian. 23. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution could not produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that on the date of incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of school Dakhil-kharij register, it would not be safe to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident. The statements of the victim (PW-1), mother of the victim (PW-2) as also the statement of Smt. Neelima Mahashabde (PW-3), Headmistress of Navin Shishu Vikas School, Birgaon, District Raipur (C.G.) are contradictory to each other and does not inspire confidence upon this Court to hold that the date of birth of the victim is 02.01.2002. 24. Very recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Birka Shiva v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1454 has observed as under:- 13 "8. The evidentiary value of such an entry made in public or official registers may be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, admissibility is distinct from probative value. While such documents may be admitted into evidence, their evidentiary weight depends on proof of their authenticity and the source of the underlying information. Mere production and marking of a document as exhibited by the Court does not amount to proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by leading substantive evidence, that is, by the ‘evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’ the truth of the facts in issue’. [See: Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal] We may refer to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court in this regard: 8.1. This Court, in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, held that the entries contained in the school register are relevant and admissible but have no probative value unless the person who made the entry or provided the date of birth is examined. It was observed: “14. … If entry regarding date of birth in the scholar's register is made on the information given by parents or someone having special knowledge of the fact, the same would have probative value. … The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry contained in the admission form or the scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry would have evidentiary value, but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary value. … 15. Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that entry in any public, official book, register, record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty specially enjoined by the law of 14 the country is itself the relevant fact. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to the date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act, but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. … The courts have consistently held that the date of birth mentioned in the scholar's register or secondary school certificate has no probative value unless either the parents are examined or the person on whose information the entry may have been made is examined…" (Emphasis Supplied) This decision has been consistently followed by this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand; Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand; Murugan v. State of T.N.; State of M.P. v. Munna; C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy; and Manak Chand v. State of Haryana. 8.2. 8.2. A coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram, through S.B. Sinha, J., clarified that though entries in school registers are admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, their evidentiary value improves only when corroborated by oral testimony of persons who are aware of its content, such as parents or the person who made the entry at the time of admission. It held as under: “12. A register maintained in a school is admissible in evidence to prove date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Such dates of births are recorded in the school register by the authorities in discharge of their public duty. PW 5, who was an Assistant Teacher in the said school in the year 1977, categorically stated that the mother of the victim disclosed her date of birth. The father of the victim also deposed to the said effect. 15 13. …The materials on record as regards the age of the victim were, therefore, required to be considered in the aforementioned backdrop. It may be true that an entry in the school register is not conclusive, but it has evidentiary value. Such evidentiary value of a school register is corroborated by oral evidence as the same was recorded on the basis of the statement of the mother of the victim." 8.3. Similarly, this Court in Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana, stated that though a document may be admissible, but to determine whether the entry contained therein has any probative value, may still be required to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. It held as follows: “26. In Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] while dealing with a similar issue, this Court observed that very often parents furnish incorrect date of birth to the school authorities to make up the age in order to secure admission for their children. For determining the age of the child, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeccable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied by the unimpeccable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the municipal corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded. x x x 28. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised that the entry made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of an official duty is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still ask the court/authority to examine its probative value. The authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certificate requires to be proved in accordance with law. Standard of proof for the same remains as in any other civil and criminal case.” 16 8.4. In Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, this Court held that the entries made in the official record may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded. It was held as follows : “20. So far as the entries made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of official duties are concerned, they may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the Court has a right to examine their probative value. The authenticity of the entries would depend on whose information such entries stood recorded and what was his source of information. The entries in school register/school leaving certificate require to be proved in accordance with law and the standard of proof required in such cases remained the same as in any other civil or criminal cases. 21. … For determining the age of a person, the best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by unimpeachable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in the school register/certificate stands belied by the unimpeachable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous documents like the date of birth register of the Municipal Corporation, government hospital/nursing home, etc., the entry in the school register is to be discarded. …” 8.5. This Court, in Alamelu v. State, while dealing with a similar factual matrix, held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the girl was a minor at the relevant date since the transfer certificate of a Government School showing age was not duly proved by witnesses. It observed as under: “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ext. P- 16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15-6- 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident i.e. 31-7-1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a government school and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872. However, the admissibility of such a 17 document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 41. We may notice here that PW 1 was examined in the Court on 9-8-1999. In his evidence, he made no reference to the transfer certificate (Ext. P-16). He did not mention the girl's age or date of birth. PW 2 was also examined on 9-8-1999. She had also made no reference either to her age or to the transfer certificate. It appears from the record that a petition was filed by the complainant under Section 311 CrPC seeking permission to produce the transfer certificate and to recall PW 2. This petition was allowed. … In her cross- examination, she had merely stated that she had signed on the transfer certificate, Ext. P-16 issued by the school and accordingly her date of birth was noticed as 15-6- 1977. She also stated that the certificate has been signed by the father as well as the Headmaster. But the Headmaster has not been examined. Therefore, in our opinion, there was no reliable evidence to vouchsafe for the truth of the facts stated in the transfer certificate.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. In the attending facts, we find that the evidentiary value of ExhibitP11 is significantly undermined in the absence of corroborating material. We say so for the following reasons: (i) PW-13, who is the Headmaster of Zilla Parishad High School, Chandanapur, Peddapalli District (erstwhile Karimnagar District), stated that the victim studied in his school from 2007 to 2013, i.e., 6th Class to 10th Class and that the Admission Register records her date of birth as 3rd November 1996. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge as to the source or basis on which the date of birth was recorded therein or if the recorded date of birth was correct or not. The relevant part of his testimony is extracted hereunder: “…In our school there is not clerk to maintain records. I did not produce any certificate pertaining 18 to earlier school I, In which P.W.3 studies up to 5th Class. There must be basis for entering date of birth of a student in our school such as her earlier school record. I do not have personal knowledge as to what record was produced by parents of P.W. 3 as basis to enter her date of birth in our school as I was not Head Master in 2007. I cannot say in which school P.W.3 studied up to 5th Class. In the nominal roll register of our school, the signature of P.W.3 was obtained. I do not have personal knowledge whether the said date of birth of P.W.3 was correct or not and I am giving evidence only on the basis of record.” (Emphasis Supplied) (ii) The prosecution has failed to examine the person who had made the entry in the Admission Register to ascertain on what basis such an entry was made. More so, the entry in respect of the date of birth of the victim in the primary school register, i.e., 1st Class to 5th Class, has not been produced and proved before the Courts below to verify the age as per its records. It is also not possible to ascertain from the records as to whether the date of birth was provided by the parents or simply entered at the behest of another party, without verification, at the time of admission to Zilla Parishad High School. (iii) The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 are also telling that none of them mentioned the victim's age with specificity. There is no reference to ExhibitP11, and no attempt was made by the prosecution to adduce corroborative testimony regarding the victim's date of birth from her family members. Thus, while examining the issue at hand, on the anvil of the principles elucidated above, it is essential to notice that the prosecution has failed to toe the line of legal requisites. There is nothing on record to corroborate the date of birth of the victim as recorded in the birth certificate (ExhibitP11) issued by the school. Therefore, it cannot be relied upon to definitely determine the age of the victim and held with certainty that the victim was below sixteen/eighteen years of age. 11. Furthermore, none of the victim's family members, i.e., her mother and brothers have said 19 anything about the age of the victim in their depositions made in the Court. Even the victim is effectively silent on this aspect, only stating that she and her siblings were born approximately two years apart and thereby making an estimation of their ages as well as her own. Throughout her deposition, the victim has remained silent with regard to her particular date of birth. 12. Well, suffice it to say that Courts of law cannot make a determination of guilt in thin air, based on estimations. In the present facts and circumstances, the proof submitted by the prosecution in the form of ExhibitP11 (birth certificate issued by the school) was not sufficient to arrive at a finding that the victim was less than sixteen/eighteen years of age, especially when such a document was not sufficiently corroborated. Therefore, it was neither safe nor fair to convict the appellant based on it, particularly in the context where the age of the victim was such a pivotal factor. " 25. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of abovementioned judgment, the victim (PW-1) and mother of the victim (PW-2) have not stated anything in their cross- examinations with regard to date of birth of the victim as well as Smt. Neelima Mahashabde (PW-3), Headmistress of Navin Shishu Vikas School, Birgaon, District Raipur (C.G.) has though has admitted that in the Dakhil-kharij register (Ex.P/12C), date of birth of the victim has been mentioned as 02.01.2022, but in cross-examination, she has stated that she did not know that on what basis the date of birth of victim has been mentioned in the documents. 26. Except for these evidences, no other evidence like Kotwari register or birth certificate have been produced by the prosecution to determine her age that on the date of incident, she was minor 20 or less than 18 years of age. The oral evidence of the witnesses i.e. the victim herself (PW-1), mother of the victim (PW-2) and Smt. Neelima Mahashabde (PW-3), Headmistress of Navin Shishu Vikas School, Birgaon, District Raipur (C.G.) as also Dakhil-kharij register (Ex.P/12C) are not sufficient to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident because of the reason that no documents has been shown to ascertain the fact that on what basis the date of birth of the victim was recorded. The entry with regard to age of the victim has been mentioned in the Dakhil- kharij register (Ex.P/12C) is not sufficient to hold actual date of birth of the victim. There is every possibility that the date of birth of the victim is recorded on assumption otherwise, the prosecution must have produced the relevant record on the basis of which her date of birth recorded in the said register. The evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to the age of the victim are not of that sterling quality which is sufficient to determine the age of the victim. Therefore, there is lack of clinching and cogent evidence to hold her minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court held her minor. 27. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant had committed rape upon the victim or not? 28. This issue goes to the very root of the prosecution case and requires a careful evaluation of the testimony of the victim, the corroborative medical and forensic evidence, and the surrounding 21 circumstances brought on record. Since the charge of rape carries grave penal consequences, the Court must scrutinize the evidence with due sensitivity while ensuring adherence to the well-settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in sexual offence cases. 29. The law is equally clear that the sole testimony of the victim, if found to be cogent, credible, and trustworthy, is sufficient to sustain a conviction and does not require further corroboration. At the same time, the Court must remain mindful that the evidence must inspire confidence and must not suffer from inherent improbabilities or material contradictions. 30. Accordingly, to determine whether the offence of rape stands established, it becomes necessary to examine the version of the victim, the medical findings, the conduct of the parties, and other attendant circumstances to assess whether the prosecution has proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. 31. Very recently, in the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh v. The State Of Uttarakhand, 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court while dealing with the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, has held as under :- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the victim was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 22 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub- Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and 23 wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the victim, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her.” 32. PW-1, the victim herself has deposed in her evidence that she knew the accused Raja Rajput and had earlier been residing in her maternal grandfather’s house at Village Ghotmara. She states that her friend Santoshi used to work in their fields and, on one occasion, when Santoshi did not come to work, she called her on the instructions of her maternal uncle, during which Santoshi noted her phone number. According to her, Santoshi used to speak on the phone with a boy named Santosh, and one day she received a call from the accused Raja, who introduced himself as 24 her lover and thereafter repeatedly contacted her from different numbers despite her having blocked him. She further deposed that on one night, the accused called her and threatened that he was in possession of her MMS and obscene photographs and would make them viral. He told her that if she did not meet him at the Bemetara Bus Stand at 7 a.m., he would defame her and ruin her life. Believing this threat, she went to the bus stand the next morning along with Santoshi, as the accused had told her he would delete the alleged MMS in her presence. At the bus stand, she found the accused as well as Santosh and Santoshi present. The accused told her that they were going to a place called Kanpur, where Santosh and Santoshi would get married, after which he would return her MMS and give her money to go home. Though she insisted that she only wanted her photographs returned, the accused did not give them, due to which she had to accompany them. 33. The prosecutrix PW-1 further stated that she boarded a bus with them and thereafter a train, eventually reaching Kanpur the next day. There, Santosh and Santoshi got married in a temple. She asserts that the accused thereafter told her that since she had already left home, her reputation was ruined. She further states that in Kanpur, the accused took her to a slum-like area, applied sindoor in her hair parting at a Hanuman temple, and kept her there for about eighteen days. During this period, the accused repeatedly subjected her to sexual intercourse against her will 25 and, on her refusal, assaulted her and burnt her with a bidi. She also showed the Court the burn marks on her hand and stated that she had similar marks on her back. She further deposed that she had left her mobile phone at home and the accused never permitted her to use his. On one occasion, when he inadvertently left his phone behind, she attempted to speak to her mother and sent a message to her brother. She was eventually recovered by the police in the presence of her mother, after which her medical examination was conducted with her consent, and her underwear was seized under seizure memo, both bearing her signature. Her statement under Section 164 CrPC was also recorded. 34. In her cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that there was no one physically forcing her when she initially left her maternal grandfather’s house and that during the journey there were crowded public places, including the bus stand at Jabalpur and the train, where she did not raise any alarm. She asserts, however, that she did not call for help due to fear of the MMS and photographs. She denied the suggestion that she voluntarily accompanied the accused or that she stayed freely at Kanpur. She reiterated that her hands and feet used to be tied by the accused and that she was burnt with a bidi. She specifically denied the defence suggestions that she had gone of her own free will, that no MMS was ever mentioned, or that the accused did not force himself upon her. 26 35. Likewise, the mother of the victim (PW-2) has deposed in her evidence that she knows the accused Raja Rajput since the incident and that the victim, Kumari Indrani, is her eldest daughter. She stated that at the relevant time she was residing at Raipur, whereas the victim was living at her maternal grandfather’s house in Village Ghotmara. About 4–5 months prior to her deposition, she received a call from her brother informing her that Indrani had left the house without informing anyone, whereupon she immediately came to Bemetara and lodged a report at the police station. She further deposed that a few days later, on the basis of call detail information, the police informed her that Indrani was somewhere near Kanpur. She accompanied the police to Kanpur, where the victim was recovered from the possession of the accused near the Sai Temple. 36. In her cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that she had met her daughter about a week before the incident and that the victim had mentioned receiving calls from an unknown number. She states that she had accompanied the police to Kanpur on the basis of the call details provided to her and that neither her son nor the victim’s brother had informed her of anything. She further stated that when they reached Kanpur, Santoshi and Santosh fled, and the victim was recovered from one of the houses. She denied the suggestion that the accused Raja was not present at the time of recovery. She admitted that victim’s hands and feet were not tied but adds on her own that her hands and back had burn marks. 27 37. Dr. Deeksha Kashyap (PW-5) has deposed in her evidence that on 25.07.2019, the victim was produced before her for medical examination by Woman Constable No. 89, Priyanka Sharma, from Police Station City Kotwali, Bemetara. Prior to conducting the examination, consent of the victim and her guardians was duly obtained. 38. On external physical examination, she found two cigarette-burn marks; one on the anterior part of the left arm and another on the back over the spinal region. Except these, no other external injury was detected on the victim’s body. On internal examination, she found the victim to be sexually mature; her secondary sexual characteristics were fully developed, and her private parts were also fully developed. In cross-examination, she admitted that she stated the victim’s age as 17 years on the basis of the age mentioned in the requisition letter sent to her for medical examination. She further admitted that she did not advise for an ossification test for age determination and voluntarily clarified that the police had not sought any such opinion from her. She also admitted that during the medical examination, the victim did not make any complaint of forcible sexual intercourse by any person. 39. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony 28 of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do so in the instant case. 40. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, as also the evidence on record, it would not be safe for this Court to hold that the appellant has committed rape upon her, rather it reflects from the evidence that the victim herself had made physical relations with the appellant and she has not made any complaint to anyone and has not raised any alarm. Had she been forcefully raped against her will or consent, she would definitely raise alarm or to make complaint to anyone. Since, it is held that the victim is not below the 18 years of age, she is capable to give her consent and therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant procured a minor girl with the intention to illicit intercourse or committed rape upon her. 41. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence brought on record, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has fallen significantly short of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1), though alleging grave acts of coercion and repeated sexual assault, does not inspire the degree of confidence required to sustain a conviction in the absence of credible corroboration. Her admitted conduct in voluntarily leaving 29 the house without any immediate threat, travelling through multiple public places including a bus stand and a crowded railway station without raising any alarm, and making no attempt to seek help even when opportunities arose, remains unexplained. These circumstances materially weaken the prosecution’s narrative of continuous domination, fear, or restraint. 42. Further, the evidence of the mother (PW-2) is primarily derivative, based on information allegedly provided by others, which does not independently substantiate the core allegations of forcible abduction or unlawful confinement by the appellant. Importantly, her deposition is inconsistent regarding the presence of the accused at the time of recovery and does not convincingly establish any incriminating circumstance pointing to the appellant's culpability. 43. Crucially, the medical evidence, which is expected to lend objectivity to the prosecution case, does not support the allegations of repeated sexual assault spread over a period of eighteen days. Dr. Deeksha Kashyap (PW-5), who examined the victim, found only two isolated burn marks, one on the left arm and another over the spinal region and no other external injuries on any other part of the body. No signs of struggle, abrasions, contusions, or marks consistent with forcible physical restraint were detected. On internal examination, the doctor did not find any injury to the genital region, nor did she note any features 30 suggestive of recent sexual violence. Significantly, she candidly admitted in cross-examination that the victim did not make any complaint of forcible sexual intercourse during the medical examination. This omission assumes great importance because a victim, examined immediately after rescue, would ordinarily voice such allegations if they had indeed occurred. 44. Equally telling is the absence of any scientific effort to establish the victim's age conclusively. PW-5 admitted that she merely relied on the age mentioned in the requisition letter and was neither asked nor did she advise an ossification test. This omission creates further uncertainty regarding whether the statutory presumption of minority and consequently consent could validly arise at all. 45. When medical evidence does not corroborate the allegations of repeated sexual violence and is inconsistent with the nature, duration, and intensity of assaults alleged, the Court is bound to approach the oral testimony with heightened scrutiny. The prosecution has failed to bridge the wide gap between the allegations and the objective medical findings. 46. It is well settled that while the testimony of the victim must be given due weight, the Court must ensure that it inspires confidence and is consistent with the normal course of human behaviour. When the version of the victim suffers from inherent improbabilities and is contradicted by objective medical and 31 forensic evidence, the Court is bound to extend the benefit of reasonable doubt to the accused. The recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tilku @ Tilak Singh (supra), reiterating the principles in S. Varadarajan (supra), also emphasizes that when a girl near the age of discretion voluntarily accompanies a person without inducement or force, the element of “taking” or “enticement” is not automatically established. 47. The cumulative effect of these discrepancies, admissions, and deficiencies in the prosecution evidence creates serious doubt regarding the voluntary nature of the victim’s conduct and the veracity of her allegations. It is well-settled that where two views are possible on the evidence adduced; one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. The benefit of doubt must, therefore, enure to the appellant. 48. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is unsustainable in law. The prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offences charged, and the findings of the trial Court suffer from misappreciation of material evidence and an improper application of legal principles. 49. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.07.2021 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges leveled against 32 him. The appellant is in jail since 25.07.2019. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 50. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 51. The trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back forthwith to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu