IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVA WEDNESDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE rPRESENT; THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 10289 OF 2025 ^ V % Til ; ' ST T Kf4 - -T Ji' •f3 Between: Repudi Sanjay @ Sanni, S/o. Rayappa, Aged 24 Nagar, Phirangipuram Village and Mandal, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh. ... Petitioner/Accused years, R/o. 18-33, Vasantha AND 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by Its Public Prosecutor High Court of Andhra Pradesh, High Court Buildings at Nelapadu. Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh. j ...Respondent/Complainant 2. Victim, ...Respondent No.2 Respondent No.2 is impleaded as per the Court's order dated 09.10.2025 in I.A.No.2 of 2025 in Crl.P.No.10289 of 2025. Petition under Sections 480 & 483 of BNSS, praying that in the circumstances stated in the memorandum of grounds filed in support of the' Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant bail to the Petitioner/Accused in connection with Crime No. 123/2025 dated 23.08.2025 on the file of the Phirangipuram Police Station, Guntur District. : The Petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the Petition and the memorandum of grounds filed in support thereof and upon hearing the arguments of SRI V SAI KUMAR Advocate for the Petitioner, PROSECUTOR, for the Respondent No.1 and of PUBLIC the Court made the following j 2 The Court made the following Order: The Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS'), seeking to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused Phirangipuram Police Station. Petitioner/Accused herein for the offence Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. on bail in Crime No. 123 Guntur District, registered punishable under Section 69 of of 2025 of against the 2. Heard Mr. V. Sai Kumar, learned Counsel Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Tandasa Radha Rani, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the Petitioner; Ms. P. Public Prosecutor for the State and Ms. for the Respondent No.2. 3. In Kuna! Chatterjee Court held as under: v'. State of West Bengal^ the Hon’ble Supreme still be a raoe n n^^r n ^iven by the minor is no consent and it would o?drfT‘°\'^ a/Zegato/? in the FIR after more than 03 order to make out a case under the POCSO Act committed three years back when she states that she consented to the act the appellant: with the years, in that such an act of rape was a minor. She also categorically as there n/as a promise of marriage by Irvas 4. In Phthivirajan v. State ^ at para Nos.6 and 7 iit is held as under; This Court has time and anain reiterated that nnr, l. oe satisried . first, the accused promised To marry the oro^erufriv <!niah, secure consent for sexual relations without nagj snyMenZ oftming ^ Spl Leave Petition (CrI.) No.7004 of 2025 2025 see Online Se 696 3 said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage, instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made bv the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marrv could not——fulfilled by the appellant due to Intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted. ” came 5. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra ^ at para Nos.12, 18, and 21 it is held under: “12... This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 IRC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated bv a “misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marrv, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it i/i/as given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marrv the complainant, it n/as done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself in^as false. The allegations in the FiR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she i/i/as deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375IPC has occurred”. In Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand^ at para Nos. 10, 12, 13,14 6. and 18 it is held as under; ^ (2019) 9 see 608 c “10...The appellant belonged to the Scheduled Tribe while the prosecutrix belonged to the Christian community. They professed different religious beliefs in a traditional society. They both resided in the same Village Basjadi and were known to each other. The nature and manner of allegations, coupled with the letters exchanged between them, marked as exhibits during the trial, make it apparent that their love for each other grew and matured over a sufficient period of time. They were both smitten by each other and passions of youth ruled over their minds and emotions. The physical relations that followed was not isolated or sporadic in nature, but regular over the years. The prosecutrix had even gone and resided in the house of the appellant. In our opinion, the delay of four years in lodgement of the FIR, at an opportune time of seven days prior to the appellant solemnising his marriage with another girl, on the pretext of a promise to the prosecutrix raises serious doubts about the truth and veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix. The entire genesis of the case is in serious doubt in view of the admission of the prosecutrix in cross-examination that no incident had occurred on 9-4-1999. 12. The prosecutrix acknowledged that an engagement ceremony had also been performed. She further deposed that the marriage between them could not be solemnised because they belonged to different religions. She was therefore conscious of this obstacle all along, even while she continued to establish physical relations with the appellant. If the appellant had married her, she would not have lodged the case. She denied having written any letters to the appellant, contrary to the evidence placed on record by the defence. The amorous language used by both in the letter sex changed reflect that the appellant was serious about the relationship desiring to culminate the same into marriage. But unfortunately for societal reasons, the marriage could not materialise as they belonged to differentcommunitles 13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was her consent based on fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage which the appellant never intended to keep since the very inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged offence her consent obtained under fear of injury. 14. Under Section 90 IPC, a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. It hardly needs any elaboration that the consent bv the appellant wa.<i a conscious and Informed choice made bv her after due deliberation if hRing spread over a long period of time coupled with a conscious positive action not tQ_protest. The prosecutrix in her letters to the appellant also mentions that there would often be quarrels at her home with her family members with regard to the relationship, and beatings given to her. was (2020) 10 see 108 ^11 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and ZZlIaTdTnnf are of the considered opinion that the prom/se or intentional misrepresentation of TH ^^^^dlishment of physical relationship between the i/uas herself aware of the ohstacles in th^ir ^ aZn h religious_MMs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage i/i/as a temple and ultimately failed. It is not fnnZr on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with her The ZZZZniZe'to'hert ac/cnoiv/ecygecy that the appellant's family was always 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Naim Ahmed v. State of (NOT) of Delhf" at para No.21 and 22 it is held as under; ‘21... The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents i.^ that thR prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under them is conception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent i/i/as no consent in the e/e of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section ^5IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry —^0^—subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances upforeseen by him or the circumstances bevond his control which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. ” 8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is pertinent to refer the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amo! Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharastra^ wherein at Para 9 it was held that a consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. In Kunal Chatterjee Supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when both the parties consented for sexual relationship on the "(2023) see Online Se 89 " MANU/Se/0787/2025 c'- promise of marriage by the boy it would not amount to rape. In Naim Ahmed supra the Hon’ble Apex Court at Para 21 held that consent for sexual relationship under misconception of false promise to marry would not become rape, unless it is established that from the very beginning of making false promise. There was no intention to marry and would have cheated by a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust. Whereas in the case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the Accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise. 9. In Prithivirajan supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if physical relations were established based on promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Supra at Para 18 and 21, it is held that to establish whether the ‘consent’ was vitiated by a ‘misconception of fact’ arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant’s failure in 2016 to fulfill his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself false. was 10. Coming to the instant continued sexual intercourse for 24 years, whereas the Respondent No.2 i Petitioner had surrendered case, the Petitioner and Respondent No.2 had quite iong time. The Petitioner is aged about is also aged about 19 years. The on 06.09.2025. He has been in judicial custody for Petitioner on bail on 26.09.2025 s final rites. So far 11 witnesses IS a permanent resident of Vasantha Nagar, Phirangipuram Village and Mandal, Guntur District. He has got fixed abode. Substantial portion of investigation is completed. If the Petitioner is enlarged on bail, no prejudice would be caused in the process of investigation. the past 39 days. This Court enlarged the as his father died and to perform his father examined. The Petitioner i are 11. Considering the nature and gravity of allegation levelled against the Petitioner, his alleged role played in this case, and the period of detention undergone by the Petitioner, this Court is inclined to enlarge the Petitioner on bail with the following stringent conditions; 12. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed with the following conditions: The Petitioner/Accused shall be enlarged on bail subject to his executing a bond for I. a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only), with two sureties each for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned II Addition^' Division), Narasaraopet. Civil Judge (Junior 8 r' The Petitioner/Accused shall appear before the Station House Officer, Phirangipuram Police Station, Guntur District, on ■ ‘ t every Saturday in between 10:00 am and 05:00 pm, till cognizance is taken by the learned the Trial Court. iii. The Petitioner/Accused shall not leave the limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh without prior permission from the Station House Officer concerned. The Petitioner/Accused shall not commit or indulge in IV. commission of any offence in future. The Petitioner/Accused shall cooperate with the V. investigating officer in further investigation of the case and shall make himself available for interrogation by the investigating officer as and when required. The Petitioner/Accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person VI. acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer. vii. The Petitioner/Accused shall surrender his passport, if any, to the investigating officer. If he claims that he does not have a passport, he shall submit an affidavit to that effect to the Investigating Officer. 9 6. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed. SD/- K.SRINIVASA RAJU ASSISTANTaREGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER f To, 1. The Xlll Additional District and Sessions District 2. The II Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) District 3. The Superintendent, Narasaraopet Sub-Jail, 4. The Station House Officer, Phirangipuram Police 5. One CC to SRI. V SAI KUMAR Advocate [OPUC] 6. Two CCs to PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [OUT] 7. One spare copy Judge, Narasaraopet, Guntur Narasaraopet, Guntur Guntur District Station, Guntur District High Court of Andhra Pradesh PSR ♦ HIGH COURT DR.YLR.J DATED:15/10/2025 BAIL ORDER CRLP.No.10289 of 2025 ALLOWED