1 2025:CGHC:60902-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 75 of 2014 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Ps Balco, Korba, Distt. Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Guddu @ Santosh Singh S/o Vijaykaran Singh Aged About 32 Years R/o Secl, Jaiprakash Colony, Ramnagar, Ps Kotwali, Korba C.G., Chhattisgarh 2 - Mahesh Dwivedi S/o Rambujhaban Aged About 36 Years R/o Aramachine Chowk, Near Shiv Mandir, Outpost Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 3 - Komal Singh S/o Late Mukutram Paikra Aged About 35 Years R/o Belpur Chowki, Hardibazar, Presently R/o At Industrial Area, Madhavnagar, Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 4 - Ahibaran S/o Govind Das Gond Aged About 19 Years R/o Ram Tirkey, Ps Shrinagar, Surguja, Presently R/o At Risdi Thana, Balco - Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 5 - Visambhar S/o Takhatram Sarthi Aged About 58 Years R/o Dhangaon, Ps Katghora, Presently R/o At Dhingapur, Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 6 - Tameshwar Sriwas S/o Manrakhan Aged About 32 Years R/o Budhwari Bazar, Ps Kotwali, Korba, Distt. Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Vivek Sahu, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Rahul Mishra, Advocate Division Bench Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. Judgment on Board 15.12.2025 Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 13.01.2011 passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korba, District Korba, in Sessions Trial No. 57/2008, whereby the respondents/accused persons were acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 148, 149, and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’). However, they were convicted only for the offence punishable under Section 342 of IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 06.07.2008, deceased- Chauke Munda, along with his associates, allegedly entered the Indro Factory situated at Risdi Chowk with the intention to commit theft. On being noticed, the factory security guards chased them. 3 While some of the associates managed to flee, deceased-Chauke Munda was apprehended and brought to the guard room of the factory. It is alleged that his hands and legs were tied and that he was assaulted with fists and sticks. Thereafter, he was taken to the Government Hospital, Korba, where he was declared dead. On receipt of information, Crime No.148/2008 was registered against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342 and 302 of IPC. 3. After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the accused persons/respondents before the concerned trial Court. The accused persons/respondents abjured the guilt and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 18 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 29 documents Exs.P-1 to P-29. However, the accused persons, in support of their defence, have examined none, but exhibited one documents i.e. Ex.D-1. 5. The trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons/respondents herein of the aforesaid charges levelled against them; however, it convicted and sentenced them for the offence punishable under Section 342 of IPC. 4 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the trial Court has erred in acquitting the accused persons/respondents by recording perverse findings. He further submits that the deceased died while in the custody of the accused persons inside the factory premises and that the circumstances clearly point towards their culpability. According to learned counsel for the State, the evidence on record was sufficient to bring home the charge of murder, and the acquittal has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, warranting interference by this Court. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents/accused persons supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and correctly arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charges against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that there is no eye-witness to the alleged assault and none of the prosecution witnesses has attributed any overt act to the accused persons. He also submits that serious lapses in investigation, including non-examination of the Investigating Officer and other material witnesses, have rendered the prosecution case doubtful. He also contends that the view taken by the learned trial Court is a plausible and reasonable view, and therefore, no interference is called for in an appeal against acquittal. 5 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala1 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 10. In the matter of Kali Ram vs State of H.P. 2, the Supreme Court has held in para 25 which reads as under:- “25.Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one 1 (2022) 8 SCC 440 2 (1973) 2 SCC 808 6 pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.” 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka has held in para 36 as under:- "36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-- inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; 7 (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court. 12. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand3, whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 3 2025 INSC 114 8 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, 9 “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8) 10 “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a 11 misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. In the present case, the learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence led by the prosecution and after analyzing the same, came to the conclusion that the deceased- Chauke Munda was apprehended and kept in confinement by the accused persons in the sponge iron factory premises, which fact stands duly 12 proved from the evidence available on record, including the document Ex.D/1 (Magisterial Inquiry Report) produced by the defence. However, so far as the charge of murder is concerned, the learned trial Court has rightly held that there is no eyewitness to the alleged assault. PW-12 Tankeshwar Yadav (Constable) has merely stated that he noticed injuries on the body of the deceased, but his testimony does not establish as to who inflicted the injuries. In such circumstances, the prosecution has failed to connect the accused persons with the alleged homicidal act. The learned trial Court has further noticed that PW-8 Sadan Munda, father of the deceased, did not depose anything incriminating against the accused persons. It has also been found that PW-10 Pratap Singh Rathiya and PW- 11 Moti Lal, who were cited as witnesses to the memorandum, seizure and arrest, did not support the prosecution case on these aspects. More importantly, the prosecution failed to examine Inspector N.N. Dhritalhare, the Investigating Officer as well as the author of the First Information Report and the officer responsible for the memorandum and seizure. Head Constable Rafiq Khan, who allegedly visited the spot, was also not examined by the prosecution for the reasons best known to it. The Magisterial Inquiry Report (Ex.D/1) further casts doubt on the role of the police in the investigation. In view of these material omissions, contradictions and investigative lapses, the learned trial Court has rightly held that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons committed the murder 13 of the deceased- Chauke Munda and accordingly extended the benefit of doubt, acquitting them of the charge under Section 302 IPC. At the same time, on the basis of the evidence relating to wrongful confinement, duly supported by the Magisterial Inquiry Report (Ex.D/1), the learned trial Court has rightly found the charge under Section 342 IPC to be proved and convicted the accused for the said offence. 15. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborated impugned judgment passed by the trial Court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position that in an appeal against acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution and the trial Court taking one view favouring the accused, reversal of the findings of acquittal by the Appellate Court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law, we are of considered opinion that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of evidence and represent a plausible and reasonable view. The findings are neither perverse nor contrary to the material available on record. 16. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the Appellant/State is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha