- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF MARCH, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M.G.UMA WRIT PETITION NO. 106144 OF 2014 (SCST-) BETWEEN: SHRI. SATTEPPA RAJAPPA BELAVI, SINCE DECEAED BY LRS. 1A. SRI. HANAMANT S/O. SATYAPPA BELVI, AGE: 50 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. GANESHWADI, TALUK: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. 1B. SRI. GOPAL S/O. SATYAPPA BELVI, AGE: 46 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. GANESHWADI, TALUK: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. 1C. SMT. MAYAWWA W/O. LAGAMAPPA MAGDUM, AGE: 48 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O. GANESHWADI, TALUK: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. 1D. SMT. RAJASHREE W/O. VITTAL KUDRUK AGE: 48 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O. GANESHWADI, TALUK: GOKAK, Digitally signed by V N BADIGER Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH, DHARWAD - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. H. M. DHARIGOND, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BELAGAVI, DISTRICT: BELAGAVI – 590001. 2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER BAILHONGAL, SUB-DIVISION BAILHONGAL, DISTRICT: BELAGAVI – 591102. 3. THE TAHASHILDAR GOKAK TALUK, GOKAK, DISTRICT: BELAGAVI – 591218. 4. SANTHRAM SATTEPPA TALAWAR SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS SMT. RANAWWA W/O. LATE SANTHRAM TALAWAR SINCE DECEASED BY LRS AS RESPONDENT NO. 6 TO 8 ALREADY ON RECORD 5. SMT. DUNDAWWA D/O. LATE SANTHRAM TALAWAR, SINCE DECEASED BY LRS 5A. SRI. VASANT S/O. DUNDAVVA TALAWAR, AGE: 39 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. GANESHWADI, TALUK: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591310. 6. SRI. HANAMANTH S/O.LATE SANTHRAM TALAWAR, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. GANESHWADI, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 TQ: GOKAK, DIST: BELGAUM. 7. SRI. KEMPANNA S/O. LATE SANTHRAM TALWAR AGE: MAJOR, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. GANESHWADI, TQ: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. 8. SMT. PARASAWWA W/O. MALLAPPA TALAWAR, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O. SHIRAHATTI, TALUK: HUKKERI, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. BALAWANTH YAMANAPPA TALAWAR, SINCE DECEASED BY LRS. 9a. SRI. ANAND S/O. BALAWANT TALAWA AGE: 39 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. GANESHWADI, TALUK: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. 9b. SRI. SURESH S/O. BALAWANT TALAWAR, AGE: 39 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O. GANESHWADI, TALUK: GOKAK, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591218. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. P.N.HATTI, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3; SRI. AKSHAY KATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R4 TO R8 & R9(A); SRI. HEMANTHKUMAR L. HAVARAGI, ADVOCATE FOR R5(A), R6, R7, R9(A); R9(B) - SERVED) ------ - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED NIL.11.2010 PASSED BY THE SECOND RESPONDENT UNDER ORDER NO.PTCL/CR- 17/09-10 VIDE ANNEXURE-K AND TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 29.05.2014 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT UNDER ORDER NO.RB/MISC/AP-01/2011-12 BELGAUM VIDE ANNEXURE-L. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M.G.UMA ORAL ORDER The petitioners have approached this Court, seeking issuance of writ in the nature of Certiorari, to quash the order dated Nil.11.2010 passed by respondent No.2-the Assistant Commissioner, produced as per Annexure-K and order dated 29.05.2014 passed by respondent No.1-the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum, produced as per Annexure-L, confirming the order of the Assistant Commissioner. 2. Heard Sri.H.M.Dharigond, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri P.N.Hatti, learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 to 3, Sri Akshay Katti, - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 learned counsel for respondent Nos.4 to 8 and 9(a) and Sri.Havaragi, learned counsel for respondent No.5(a), 6, 7 and 9(a). Perused the materials on record. 3. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that, the land in question was granted to the mother of respondent No.4 on 25.09.1982 under Section 37 of Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the KLR Act’ for short). The original grantee sold the said land in favour of the petitioner under a registered Sale Deed dated 24.02.1998. Later during 2009, the Tahsildar has suo moto taken up the matter, and submitted a report to the Assistant Commissioner, and had issued notice to both the parties for resumption of land under Section 4(2) of the KLR Act. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the said application, and ordered resumption/restoration of the land in favour of the legal representatives of the original grantee. The said order was confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners are before this Court. - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 4. The facts as narrated above are not in dispute. Initially, this Court had allowed this writ petition vide order dated 16.11.2022. The said order was challenged by the legal representatives of respondent Nos.4 and 5 by preferring W.A.No.100015/2023. The Division Bench of this Court, allowed the said writ appeal on the ground that, the order dated 16.11.2022 passed by the Co- ordinate Bench states that, respondent No.4- Smt.Ranawwa and respondent No.5-Smt.Dundawwa have died on 16.08.2019 and 04.05.2021 respectively, and therefore, it was held that the order in question was against the dead persons. Accordingly, the matter was remitted back for fresh consideration after impleading the legal representatives of deceased respondent Nos.4 and 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners filed a memo reporting that, the legal representatives of deceased respondent No.4 are already brought on record as respondent Nos.6 to 8 and the legal representative of deceased respondent No.5-Sri. Vasanth, the party in the - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 writ appeal, is cited as one of the respondents in this writ petition. Thus, it is stated that, all the parties concerned are on record before this Court. 6. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, the Tahsildar has assumed jurisdiction suo-moto and filed application before the Assistant Commissioner after execution of the registration of the Sale Deed on 24.02.1998, by the original grantee in favour of the petitioners. Admittedly, the Tahsildar took up the initiation, and submitted the report to the Assistant Commissioner, who in turn, registered the case for resumption of the land under Section 4(2) of the KLR Act during 2010. It is after lapse of 12 years from the date of the sale deed. There is absolutely no reason assigned as to why there is long lapse of 12 years in initiating the proceedings for resumption of the land. 7. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State, submits that, the grant was in favor of a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste, - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 and since the sale was within 15 years of the grant, without obtaining permission for alienation of the property, the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner were right in passing the impugned orders. 8. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that, Section 4 of SC/ST Act starts with a non-obstinate clause that, any sale either before or after commencement of the Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land shall be null and void, and no right title or interest in such land shall be conveyed or deemed to have conveyed by such transfer. When there is clear violation of the grant order produced as per Annexure-D, the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner were right in passing the impugned order. 9. Learned counsel contends that the Deputy Commissioner has specifically recorded his finding regarding his satisfaction that the original grant order had the condition restricting alienation for a period of 15 years, and it was a grant in favour of a person belonging to - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 Scheduled Caste. In view of the specific finding given by the Deputy Commissioner, the said order cannot be found fault with. 10. Learned counsel further submits that, in view of specific bar for alienation of the land granted before or after the commencement of the Act, such alienation is held to be null and void, and under such circumstances any number of sale deeds relied on by the petitioner will not enure to his benefit. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decisions in the case of Smt.Gouramma alias Gangamma v. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri District1, and Smt. Manjula and Others v. Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District2, in support of his contention. In both the cases, the Division Benches of this Court, following the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in 1 W.A.No.100101 of 2024 dated 29.07.2024 2 W.P.No.210 of 2023 dated 25.11.2024 - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka and Another3 held that, inordinate delay and laches on the part of the applicants disentitle them from seeking resumption of the land. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that, during the pendency of the writ petition, on 21/10/2013, possession of the land was handed over to respondent No.3, and the same is liable to be restored in favor of the petitioner in the interest of justice. 13. Learned High Court Government Pleader submitted that, the possession of the land was already handed over to respondent No.3 during 2013, and for a period of 12 years, he is in enjoyment of the property and therefore at this stage, the petitioner is not entitled for the possession of the property. 14. After hearing both the sides and perusing the materials on record, it is found that Annexure-D, the printed format in Telugu language was issued in favour of 3 (2020) 14 SCC 232 - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 the father of respondent No.3, granting the disputed land in his favour on 31.5.1957. According to the petitioner, the only condition written at the end of the grant order in Kannada language is the subsequent insertion. Whereas, it is the contention of respondent No.3 that it was there even when the grant order was issued. Of course, it is a disputed fact for which no finding could be recorded by this Court. However, the Deputy Commissioner records his finding that such condition was there at the time when the grant order was issued. Moreover, on perusal of Annexure-D, it is found that the format is in Telugu language, but all other details are filled in Kannada. 15. Admittedly, the grantee-Mallappa, the father of respondent No.3 sold the properties under 3 different sale deeds on 11.05.1970. No materials are placed before the Court as to when Mallappa died. But the fact remains that the original grantee never filed an application for resumption of the land during his life time. Respondent No.3 being the son of the original grantee, filed the - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 application under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTLC Act, with the Assistant Commissioner only on 05.10.2004 i.e. after about 34 years of executing the sale deeds by his father. There is absolutely no reason assigned by the applicant as to why there was such a long delay in filing the application under Sections 4 and 5 of SC/ST PTCL Act. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners places reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), to contend that, inordinate delay and laches defeats the right, if any, of respondent No.3. He also relies on a similar decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vivek M. Hinduja and Others v. Ashwatha and Others4. 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vivek M. Hinduja (supra), referring to Section 4 of the SC/ST PTCL Act in the light of the observations made by it in it's decision in Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. State of 4 (2020) 14 SCC 228 - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 Maharashtra5, held that, when period of limitation is not prescribed, the party must approach the competent court or authority within a reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. 18. In Nekkanti Ram Lakshmi (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, again referring to Sections 4 and 5 of the SC/ST PTCL Act held in paras 7 and 8 which reads as under: “7. However, the applicant had not produced the original grant, and, therefore, it was not possible for the purpose to come to a conclusion that the transfer was in breach of the non-alienation period. We, however, find that one of the points raised on behalf of the appellant deserves acceptance. That point is that the application for restoration of the land was made by the heir of Kriyappa after unreasonably long period i.e. 25 years from when the Act came into force. Section 4 of the Act itself has a ubiquitous effect in it, annulling the transfer of granted land “made either before or after the commencement of the Act” as null and void. Thus, Act does not specify now much before the commencement of the Act. Thus on a plain and critical reading of the Act, it 5 2007 (5) SCC 211 - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 seems that it covers proceedings made in time before the Act was enacted. However, we are not called upon to deal with the reasonableness of this provision and we do not propose to say anything on this. The validity of the Act has been upheld by a judgment of this Court in Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka. 8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav and also in Ningappa v. Commr. reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or su motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 01.01.1939 to 31.12.1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Commr., Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka and G. Maregouda.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. The Division Bench of this Court in Smt.Gouramma @ Gangamma (supra) as well as in Smt. M. Manjula (supra) placing reliance on Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) categorically held that, after long lapse of several years, the application under Sections 4 and 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by the grantee or the person claiming under the grantee cannot be entertained. 20. In M.Manjula (supra), the Division Bench headed by Hon’ble The Chief Justice, referred to the amendment made to the Karnataka SC/ST PTCL Act, notified in Gazette Notification dated 27th July 2023 to insert Sub-clauses (c) & (d), and observed that the validity - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 of the said amendment is under challenge in W.P.No.27496 of 2023. It also referred to the decision of Division Bench in Smt. Gouramma @ Gangamma (supra) and to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India V. N. Murugesan6, to hold that a person guilty of delay and laches may not be entitled for the indulgence for grant of equitable relief. 21. When the Hon’ble Apex Court repeatedly held that the delay and laches defeats the remedy and the same is followed by this Court in various decisions, I do not find any reason to disagree with the same and to form a different opinion. In the present case admittedly, there is delay of about 34 long years which is never explained. Hence, I am of the opinion that, the very fact that the original grantee has not opted for resumption of the land during his lifetime and respondent No.3 has filed such an application after lapse of 34 long years, he is not entitled for any relief. These facts are ignored by the Assistant 6 2022 (2) SCC 25 - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, while passing the impugned orders. Hence, I am of the opinion that both these orders are liable to be quashed. 22. It is an admitted fact that, during the pendency of this writ petition, the possession of the lands were handed over to respondent No.3. It is contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.3 that respondent No.3 is enjoying the possession of the land for over 12 years and therefore the same may not be disturbed. But the fact remains that the petitioner who purchased the property by paying the valuable consideration during 1987, was in possession of the land till 2013 i.e. for a period of 26 long years. The same cannot be ignored by this Court. 23. In view of the above, this petition is required to be allowed. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:5317 WP No. 106144 of 2014 (ii) The impugned order dated nil.11.2010 passed by respondent No.2-Assistant Commissioner in No.PTCL/CR-17/09-10 vide Annexure-K and order dated 29.05.2014 passed by respondent No.1- Deputy Commissioner in No.RB/MISC/AP- 01/2011-12, Belgaum vide Annexure-L, are quashed. (iii) The respondent No.1 is directed to restore the possession of the land to the petitioner, forthwith. Sd/- (M.G.UMA) JUDGE MKM CT:ANB List No.: 2 Sl No.: 8