1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Reserved for orders on : 10.12.2025 Order passed on: 19.12.2025 WPS No. 3096 of 2023 1 - Santosh Kumar Shriwas S/o Shri Rammanorath Aged About 42 Years Working As Lecturer (L.B.) And Posted At Government Higher Secondary School Karga, Block Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Director Directorate Of Chhattisgarh Public Instruction, Indravati Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - District Education Officer, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh 4 - Block Education Officer, Block Kurud, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from CIS System) For Petitioner : Mr. G. P. Mathur and Mr. Sashi Kumar Kushwaha, Advocates For State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Govt. Advocate Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C.A.V. Order 1. The petition has been filed stating that the petitioner’s earlier service from 16.06.2010, arising from the same advertisement and selection process for Shiksha Karmi Grade-2 and Grade-1, was not counted for absorption solely due to the alleged absence of an NOC, despite the fact that no NOC was required in such circumstances. Under the Government policy, teachers completing eight years of service as on 13.07.2018 are entitled to absorption from that date, but the petitioner’s name was wrongly omitted from the list. Although he was later absorbed from 01.07.2019, he had already completed eight years before 01.07.2018 and thus qualifies for absorption from 13.07.2018. Aggrieved by this denial of legitimate seniority and financial benefits, the present petition has been filed seeking following reliefs : - “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to consider representation and to grant benefit of absorption from 01.07.2018 as per policy of the State Govt. and to modify absorption order accordingly within stipulated time, in the interest of justice. 10.2 Any other relief which may be suitable în the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.” 3 2. The brief facts of the case are that The petitioner is a citizen of India and entitled to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. On 07.10.2009, the State Government issued a joint advertisement inviting applications for the posts of Shiksha Karmi Grade-2 and Grade-1, pursuant to which the petitioner applied for both categories. A common merit list was prepared, which was later bifurcated into separate lists for Grade- 2 and Grade-1 candidates. In the first instance, the petitioner was selected for the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-2 and was appointed by order dated 16.06.2010, joining his duties on 24.06.2010 at Zila Panchayat, Dhamtari. As his name was also placed in the waiting list for Shiksha Karmi Grade-1, he was subsequently selected and appointed to that higher post by order dated 07.09.2010, and he joined on 14.09.2010 at the same Zila Panchayat. Under the State Government’s policies dated 30.06.2018 and 13.07.2018, teachers who had completed eight years of service as on 13.07.2018 became entitled to absorption in the School Education Department with effect from that date, and the policies specifically provided that past service rendered on a lower post would be counted for computing the eight-year period. The policy further clarified that teachers who had either obtained an NOC or had submitted an application for NOC would also receive the benefit of past service. The petitioner asserts that both his appointments were made under the same advertisement and selection process, and therefore, seeking an NOC from the “earlier” post was neither required nor logically applicable. Despite 4 this, the authorities refused to count his service from 16.06.2010 on the ground that he had not produced an NOC or a receipt showing application for NOC, resulting in exclusion of his name from the absorption list for 01.07.2018, as reflected in letter dated 12.03.2019. Although the petitioner was eventually absorbed with effect from 01.07.2019, he maintains that he was legally entitled to absorption from 01.07.2018 since he had completed eight years of service on 16.06.2018. The petitioner made repeated representations on 04.10.2018, 20.12.2018, 16.01.2019, 28.02.2019 and 02.03.2019 seeking correction of the error and grant of absorption benefits from 01.07.2018, but no effective action was taken. Left with no alternative remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking appropriate relief. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the action of the respondents in denying the petitioner absorption from 01.07.2018 is arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional and wholly unsustainable in the eyes of law. It is contended that under the applicable policy, the past service rendered on the lower post was mandatorily required to be counted for determining completion of eight years of continuous service, and the policy further clarifies that even those teachers who had obtained an NOC or who had at least submitted an application for NOC would also be entitled to the benefit of such past service. Counsel submits that the petitioner’s first and second appointments were made pursuant to the same advertisement and the same selection process, and therefore, there was no occasion, necessity or legal requirement 5 for him to obtain an NOC from the earlier post, as both posts were under the same authority and stemmed from a single recruitment cycle. Despite this clear factual and legal position, the respondents refused to count his earlier service solely on the technical ground that he did not obtain an NOC or did not submit the receipt of an application for NOC, and on this basis erroneously omitted the petitioner’s name from the list prepared for absorption with effect from 01.07.2018. It is further submitted that although the petitioner has subsequently been absorbed with effect from 01.07.2019, such delayed absorption is illegal and contrary to the policy, because the petitioner’s initial appointment was on 16.06.2010 and he had undisputedly completed eight years of qualifying service prior to 01.07.2018, thus entitling him to absorption from that very date. Counsel therefore prays that the petitioner be granted absorption benefits from 01.07.2018 with all consequential benefits. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the present writ petition is wholly devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold on the ground of gross delay and laches. It is pointed out that the petitioner seeks modification of his absorption order dated 29.08.2019 to claim absorption from an earlier date, i.e., 01.07.2018, after an unexplained delay of more than three and a half years from the date on which he was absorbed in the School Education Department. At the time of absorption, the petitioner accepted the order without any demur, protest or reservation, and voluntarily availed all benefits flowing from the 6 said order. Having acquiesced to the absorption order and allowed it to attain finality, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to reopen the matter at such a belated stage to claim retrospective benefits, which is impermissible in law. The petition therefore suffers from clear delay and laches, and on this ground alone deserves to be dismissed. It is further submitted that, as evident from Annexure P-1, the petitioner’s claim for grant of absorption from 01.07.2018 had already been duly considered and rejected by the competent authority vide orders dated 06.03.2019 and 12.03.2019. Not only was his claim for retrospective absorption rejected, but even the absorption pay scale, which had been erroneously granted to him earlier, was withdrawn by the said orders. Despite this categorical decision against him, the petitioner neither challenged the rejection orders at the relevant time nor has he chosen to assail them in the present writ petition. In the absence of any challenge to the foundational orders dated 06.03.2019 and 12.03.2019, the present claim is not maintainable and the relief sought cannot be granted. The unchallenged orders have thus attained finality, and the petitioner cannot be allowed to indirectly circumvent them by seeking modification of the subsequent absorption order. Hence, on this ground as well, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the documents placed on record with utmost circumspection. 7 6. From the factual matrix, it is evident that the grievance of the petitioner revolves around non-grant of absorption with effect from 01.07.2018, despite his claim that he had completed eight years of qualifying service on 16.06.2018 and that his earlier service ought to have been counted under the policy of the State Government. However, the material placed on record clearly establishes that the petitioner’s claim for absorption from 01.07.2018 was already examined by the competent authority and stood rejected vide orders dated 06.03.2019 and 12.03.2019. These orders not only declined his claim for retrospective absorption but also cancelled the erroneously granted absorption pay scale. 7. It is significant to note that these orders form the very foundation of the petitioner’s grievance, yet he neither challenged them at the relevant time nor has he assailed them in the present writ petition. In absence of any challenge to the rejection orders, the relief now sought cannot be granted indirectly by modifying a subsequent absorption order dated 29.08.2019. Law is well settled that unchallenged and subsisting orders cannot be circumvented by seeking collateral relief, and such an attempt renders the petition untenable. 8. Further, it is undisputed that the petitioner accepted the absorption granted to him with effect from 01.07.2019 without any protest, demur or reservation. He continued to enjoy the benefit of such absorption for more than three and a half years before 8 approaching this Court. The petitioner has furnished no explanation whatsoever for this extraordinary delay. The doctrine of delay and laches is intended to prevent stale claims from being agitated for the first time after an inordinate lapse of time, particularly when the concerned orders have been accepted and allowed to attain finality. The petitioner, having acquiesced to the absorption order and having allowed the rejection orders to remain unchallenged, cannot now seek to reopen the issue to claim retrospective financial and service benefits. Entertaining such belated claims would not only be contrary to settled jurisprudence but may also lead to administrative complications and unsettle settled positions. 9. As regards the merits of the petitioner’s contention concerning the requirement of NOC, even if the petitioner’s interpretation of the policy is assumed for the sake of argument, the fact remains that his claim under the said policy was rejected by the competent authority in 2019, and those rejection orders have attained finality. The writ court cannot examine such issues in the abstract when the petitioner has failed to challenge the operative orders which crystallised his rights. Therefore, the argument relating to non- requirement of NOC has no bearing on the maintainability of the petition at this stage. 10. In Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 : AIR 2006 SC 1581], Hon’ble Supreme Court had held thus : 9 “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.” 11. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [(2009) 1 SCC 168 : AIR 2009 SC 571] Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined that : (SCC p. 174, para 26) “26. … One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.” 12. In light of the above discussion, this Court finds that the petition is vitiated by gross delay and laches, non-challenge to foundational orders dated 06.03.2019 and 12.03.2019, and acquiescence to 10 the absorption order dated 29.08.2019. On all these counts, the petition is not maintainable and no relief can be granted. 13. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Shayna Judge