1 2025:CGHC:56865-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 359 of 2025 XYZ ... Appellant versus Laxmi Prasad Yadav, S/o Kanhaiya Prasad Yadav, Aged About 30 Years, R/o Village Borsara, Outpost Naila, District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Shri M.K. Beg, Advocate For Respondent : Shri S.S. Baghel, Advocate. DB: Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice & Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 24/11/2025 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant-victim under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the judgment of acquittal dated 03/07/2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.119/2024, whereby SUNITA GOSWAMI Digitally signed by SUNITA GOSWAMI Date: 2025.11.25 10:46:49 +0530 2 the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused/respondent from the commission of the offence punishable under Sections 450, 376 and 506 Part-II of IPC. 2. Prosecution story, in brief, is that a written complaint (Ex.P-1) was filed by the victim before the Police Station, Naila, District Janjgir, stating therein, that on 24/02/2024 in the morning about 8 A.M. when she was in her house, the respondent/ accused entered her house, tied her hands and threatened to kill her two children, forcing them out of the house, raped her while threatening to kill her. Based on which, an un-numbered FIR (Ex.P-2) bearing Crime No.00/24 was registered on 29/08/2024 and thereafter a numbered FIR (Ex.P-16) was registered on the same day against the respondent under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC. After registering the offence the police started investigation. During the investigation spot map (Ex.P-5) and Panchnama (Ex.P-6) were prepared. After obtaining consent of the victim, she was sent for medical examination, where Dr. Mamta Jagat (PW-3) has examined her and opined that she was sexually assaulted forcefully. The statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. before the Judicial Magistrate First Class Nawagarh, District Janjgir-Champa. The statements of other witnesses were also recorded, and then, the accused was arrested. The accused/respondent was also examined by the Doctor, and a report (Ex.P-15) was obtained. 3 3. After completion of usual investigation, the learned trial Court has framed the charge under Sections 450, 376 and 506 Part-II of IPC against the respondent and after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, by the impugned judgment of acquittal, has acquitted the respondent/accused from the offence mentioned herein above. Hence, this acquittal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/victim. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the scope of interference with the judgment of acquittal is very much limited, but on the other hand the appellate Court is vested with wide powers of re-appreciation of the evidence in the matter. It is the settled position of law that, if reappraisal of the evidence goes to show that the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is unjust and perverse, then the appellate Court is empowered to set aside the same and reverse the judgment of acquittal and convict the accused appropriately. He further submits that the learned trial Court has erred by acquitting the respondent/accused on the ground that the prosecution could not establish its case beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent/accused has committed the offence punishable under Sections 450, 376 and 506 Part-II of IPC. It is submitted that the learned trial Court was not justified by giving too much weightage to the minor omissions and contradictions that appeared in the prosecution evidence. As such, the acquittal appeal deserves to be allowed and the 4 accused/respondent deserves to be convicted for the aforementioned offence. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record, has rightly acquitted the respondent from the commission of the aforementioned charges. He submits that the victim herself has admitted in paragraph 7 of her cross-examination that she known the accused-respondent since her marriage and in the year 2023, she had gone along with the respondent and her child somewhere and lived with him there for one month in a rented house, at that time, her husband had lodged a missing report against her. He further submits that when the police interrogated the victim on the basis of the missing report lodged by her husband, she told the police that she has love affair with the accused/respondent. After she returned to her village, the accused/respondent has returned her gold and silver ornaments and the amount of Rs.60,000/-. Similar is the statement of her husband (PW-4). Learned counsel specifically submits that the incident had occurred on 24/02/2024, but the written report (Ex.P- 1) as well as the FIR (Ex.P-16) have been lodged on 29/08/2024, i.e. with a delay of more than six months and no plausible explanation has been offered in this regard, therefore, the trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent from the commission of the aforementioned offence. 5 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the trial Court. 7. The respondent/accused was charge-sheeted for the offence punishable under Sections 450, 376 and 506 Part-II of the IPC, based upon the report lodged by the appellant/victim, as the respondent/accused, entered into her house, tied her hands and threatened to kill her two children, forcing them out of the house and raped her forcefully. In order to establish the alleged allegations, the victim was examined as PW-1 and, a bare perusal of her statement, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3, would show that the respondent entered into her house and tied her hands and threatened to kill her two children, forcing them out of the house and raped her forcefully. That apart, perusal of the statement of the victim as well as her husband would show that the victim was in love affair with the accused/respondent and she had gone with him somewhere taking her small child and resided with him in a rented house for a month and thereafter, they returned to their village. Thereafter, the accused/respondent has returned her gold and silver ornaments and the amount of Rs.60,000/-. Her husband, who was examined as (PW-4), has also stated that his wife had gone with the respondent somewhere along with her small child and lived with him for a month and thereafter she returned and he keep her. It is to be seen that the incident has been occurred on 24/02/2024, but the written report (Ex.P-1) as well as the FIR (Ex.P-16) have been lodged on 29/08/2024, i.e. 6 with a delay of more than six months, and there is no plausible explanation has been offered in this regard, therefore, it cannot be said that the trial Court has erred in acquitting the respondent from the commission of the aforementioned offence. 8. As held by the Supreme Court in C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair1, and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha2, an appellate Court should not substitute its own view unless the trial Court’s findings are perverse or relevant, convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored, providing compelling reason for interference. 9. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab3, clarify that while an appellate Court can examine an acquittal, it must do so cautiously. The trial Court has the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing credibility. Interference is warranted only if the trial Court committed a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is justified only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as under:- “……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one 1 AIR 2003 SC 182 2 AIR 2004 SC 1053 3 AIR 1987 SC 1083 7 recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.” 10. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram4, the Supreme Court held that an appellate Court must exercise extreme caution before interfering with an acquittal. The trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour and trial conduct cannot be lightly disregarded. Interference is warranted only in exceptional cases where the trial Court committed a manifest error, overlooked material evidence, relied on conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse conclusion. Minor contradictions or inconsistencies not 4 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984 8 affecting the core prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate Court may review an acquittal, it must do so circumspectly, extending the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and substantial doubt exists and has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 11. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, the Court may re-appreciate all evidence such as, oral and documentary, to determine whether the trial Court correctly weighed the materials and assigned valid reasons. If the trial Court’s conclusions are unsustainable, erroneous, or perverse, the appellate Court may arrive at its own conclusion. 12. Applying these principles, we have examined the prosecution evidence in its entirety, considering witness credibility, consistency of statements, and logical inferences from proved facts. 13. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that when the prosecution case rests solely on the testimony of the victim, such testimony must inspire confidence, be of sterling quality, and be 9 wholly unimpeachable. The Court must be satisfied that there exists no ground to doubt or discard the version of the prosecutrix, and that her statement, standing alone, is of such quality that it may, without hesitation, form the basis of conviction. However, this principle presupposes that the testimony of the victim is consistent, credible, and free from suspicion. 14. In the present case, however, the circumstances on record do not permit this Court to rely upon the testimony of the prosecutrix as a safe foundation for conviction. A careful appraisal of her evidence reveals material inconsistencies and conduct that does not align with the natural and expected behavior of a victim of sexual assault. Moreover, there is no plausible or satisfactory explanation on record for the inordinate delay of more than six months in lodging the FIR. The prosecution has failed to furnish any compelling reason for such prolonged silence, which casts a serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations. 15. It further emerges from the evidence that the prosecutrix and the accused/respondent were well acquainted with each other prior to the alleged incident, and the record unmistakably suggests that they were involved in a love affair. It is also not disputed that the prosecutrix is a married woman and a mother of two children. The facts and circumstances of the case, taken cumulatively, indicate that the alleged physical relationship between the parties was consensual, and the prosecution has not succeeded in dislodging 10 this inference. 16. The learned trial Court has meticulously examined all relevant material, including the inconsistencies in the statements of prosecution witnesses, the unexplained and inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, and the conduct of the victim, which appears inconsistent with that of a person subjected to the sexual assault. 17. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence, the trial Court rightly concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges under Sections 450, 376, and 506 Part-II of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt. 18. This Court finds itself in complete agreement with the well- reasoned and balanced findings of the learned trial Court. The appreciation of evidence by the trial Court does not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or material irregularity warranting interference. Consequently, the acquittal of the accused is found to be justified and calls for no disturbance by this Court. 19. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed summarily. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Sunita