1 2025:CGHC:42813 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2594 of 2023 1 - Abhimanyu Sethiya S/o Late Dhanurjay Sethiya Aged About 49 Years Assistant Grade-3, Janpad Panchayat Bakawand, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh --- petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Commissioner Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Collector Bastar, Jagdalpur, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 4 - Chief Executive Officer Zila Panchayat Bastar, Jagdalpur, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 5 - Chief Executive Officer - Janpad Panchayat Bakawan, District, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 2 6 - President Janpad Panchayat Bakawan, District, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh Respondent(s) WPS No. 2601 of 2023 1 - Rajesh Kumar Mishra S/o. Shri R.P. Mishra, Aged About 34 Years Assistant Grade - 3, Janpad Panchayat-Bakawand, District Bastar Chhattisgarh ---petitioners(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh 3 - Collector, Bastar, Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh 4 - Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat Bastar Jagdalpur District Bastar Chhattisgarh 5 - Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat - Bakawan, District Bastar Chhattisgarh 6 - President, Janpad Panchayat - Bakawan, District, Bastar Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) For petitioners(s) : Mr. Pawan Shrivastava, Advocate For Sate : Mr. Devesh G. Kela, Panel Lawyer For Respondents : Mr. C. J. K. Rao, Advocate and Mr. R. M. Solapurkar, Advocate for their respective respondents. 3 Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 22/08/2025 1. Since the factual matrix and the core issues involved in both the petitions, therefore, they have been clubbed, heard together, and are being decided by this common order. 2. These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners seeking for the following relief(s):- Writ Petition (S) No.2594 of 2023 10.1. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records relating to the case of the Petitioner. 10.2. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable Writ and quashed the impugned order dated-31.03.2023 (Annexure-P/1). 10.3. That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable Writ and stay the operation and affect the impugned order dated-31.03.2023 (Annexure-P/1), till the final disposal of instant writ petition. 10.4. Any other relief which Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and cost of petition. Writ Petition (S) No.2601 of 2023 4 10.1. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records relating to the case of the Petitioner. 10.2. That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable Writ and quashed the impugned order dated-31.03.2023 (Annexure-P/1). 10.3. That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a suitable Writ and stay the operation and affect the impugned order dated-31.03.2023 (Annexure-P/1), till the final disposal of instant writ petition. 10.4. Any other relief which Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and cost of petition. 3. Facts of the present cases in nutshell are as follows that the petitioners’ were initially appointed as Assistant Grade-III on 01.09.2012 and 01.09.2008 respectively as a daily wager on collector rate at Janpad Panchayat, Bakawand, against a regular, sanctioned, and vacant post. Since his appointment, the petitioners’ has discharged his duties diligently, sincerely, and honestly, without any break in service. Notably, no complaint or adverse remark has ever been recorded against him during his entire period of service. 4. On 15.01.2018, the General Administration Committee of Janpad Panchayat, Bakawand, passed a resolution recommending the regularization of the petitioners’ services. Pursuant thereto, 5 Respondent No.5 sought instructions from Respondent No.4 (Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat), who, vide letter dated 07.02.2018, directed Respondent No.5 to proceed with the regularization process in accordance with the rules. After following due procedure, the petitioners' services were regularized by order dated 28.08.2018, and he was appointed to the post of Assistant Grade-III on probation for a period of two years. Subsequently, in connection with a complaint regarding alleged irregularities in the recruitment process and housing scheme, an inquiry was conducted by the Deputy Commissioner (Development), Bastar Division, and the report submitted to Respondent No.2 (Commissioner, Bastar Division), who, by memo dated 07.05.2021, forwarded the report to the State Government. It was recorded therein that the housing scheme matter was disposed of at the State level and no irregularities were found in the recruitment process at Janpad Panchayat, Bakawand. Upon successful completion of the probation period and based on the petitioners' confidential reports, the General Administration Committee passed a resolution on 28.10.2021 to end his probation, which was approved vide order dated 05.04.2022. However, on the same complaint, a second inquiry was directed by Respondent No.4, and based on the subsequent inquiry report, Respondent No.4, vide letter dated 23.01.2023, instructed Respondent No.5 to initiate action for cancellation of the petitioners' regularization. In compliance, the General 6 Administration Committee passed a resolution on 20.03.2023 to cancel the petitioners' regularization, and accordingly, Respondent No.5 issued the impugned order dated 31.03.2023, cancelling the petitioners' appointment order dated 28.08.2018. The said resolution and impugned order are arbitrary, illegal, and violative of Rule 45 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, and the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, as no prior approval from the competent authority was obtained, nor was any inquiry report, show-cause notice, or opportunity of hearing provided to the petitioners. Therefore, the impugned action is in breach of the principles of natural justice and settled service jurisprudence, compelling the petitioners to approach this Hon’ble Court seeking quashment of the impugned order dated 31.03.2023. Hence these petitions. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the impugned order has been passed without adhering to the due process as prescribed under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1993’) and the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1999’). It is submitted that no prior approval was obtained from the competent authority, nor was any show-cause notice issued to the petitioners. Furthermore, no procedural safeguards were followed before the impugned order was passed. The petitioners were not afforded 7 any opportunity of hearing, and the cancellation order was passed behind their back, in a wholly arbitrary and illegal manner, in complete violation of the principles of natural justice. He further submits that the impugned order, being arbitrary and bearing serious civil consequences, is unsustainable in law, particularly in view of the mandatory requirements under the Act of 1993, the Rules of 1999, and the principles of natural justice. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently opposes the submissions made by the petitioners and submits that the impugned order has been passed strictly in accordance with law, after due consideration of the facts and materials available on record. It is submitted that prior to passing the impugned order, a full-fledged inquiry was conducted by a duly constituted committee, and based on the inquiry report, it was found that the petitioners had been regularized in an illegal and irregular manner. There was no formal or valid order regarding their initial ad-hoc appointment, nor is there any documentation to establish the basis or authority under which they were initially engaged. 7. It is further submitted that the Petitioners’ initial appointments were not supported by any sanctioned process or approval from the competent authority, and the same were in violation of the statutory recruitment procedures. Additionally, the regularization order is in clear contravention of the Circular dated 05.03.2008 8 issued by the State Government, which provides that only those employees who were appointed prior to the year 1997 are eligible for regularization. In the present case, the Petitioners’ appointments came much later and hence fall outside the scope of the said circular. 8. In view of the above, learned counsel contends that the impugned order does not warrant any interference by this Hon’ble Court, as the same has been passed to rectify an illegality and is in consonance with the settled legal position. Accordingly, the present petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 9. I have listened to the learned counsel representing the parties and scrutinized the documents placed on record with careful attention. 10. The primary question for consideration in the present case pertains to the alleged violation of the Principles of Natural Justice was followed or not. It is well-settled that the Principles of Natural Justice are not rigid or abstract rules, but are to be applied with due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. However, where an administrative or quasi-judicial action entails civil consequences and affects the valuable rights of a person, strict adherence to these principles becomes mandatory. In the present case, the impugned order directly affects the 9 Petitioners’ vested rights in service, and hence, compliance with the Principles of Natural Justice and statutory procedure was essential. 11. The next issue requiring consideration is whether the due procedure of law before issuance of the impugned order dated 31.03.2023, whereby the Petitioners' regularization was cancelled. . It is trite law that if a procedure is prescribed under a statute or rules, the same must be followed in its letter and spirit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that procedural safeguards are not mere formalities, but substantive protections that cannot be dispensed with. In the present matter, specific procedural requirements are laid down under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1993") and the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules of 1999"), which include issuance of a show-cause notice, supply of relevant documents, framing of charges (if applicable), and affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. These mandatory requirements were not followed. The Respondents’ contention that an internal inquiry was conducted, wherein it was found that the Petitioners' initial appointment orders were not traceable, is not tenable. The said inquiry was conducted behind the back of the Petitioners, without affording them any opportunity to explain the alleged irregularities. As such, the cancellation of 10 regularization vide the impugned order dated 31.03.2023 (Annexure P/1) is per se violative of the Principles of Natural Justice and is, therefore, unsustainable in law. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others 1 , in which the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is to the fact that even if for contractual appointment, if any stigmatic order is to be passed, it is to be passed after holding proper enquiry and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent/employee. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Digambar Chandrakar vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others 2 , in the said case also, this Court of the view that in order to pass a stigmatic or cumulative order, the concerned authorities are required to hold a departmental enquiry after giving due opportunity of hearing to delinquent/ employee. 13. The view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini (supra) goes to show that before passing any stigmatic order for removal of any employee from service, a departmental enquiry is required to be done, which has not been done in this case. In para 34 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2139 2 WPS No.4969 of 2015 11 Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5: "28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572: (1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if 12 a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673: AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A 13 termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. 14 Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been 15 complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant." 14. This Court is of the considered view that the impugned order dated 31.03.2023 (Annexure P/1) is contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1993, the Rules of 1999, and the Principles of Natural Justice, and accordingly, the same is liable to be set aside. As a consequence, and to protect the status of the Petitioners during the pendency of any further proceedings, it is directed that the Petitioners shall continue to discharge their duties on the post of Assistant Grade-III as regular employees. 15. It is, however, open to the Respondent authorities to initiate appropriate proceedings afresh in accordance with law, by following due process, including adherence to the Principles of Natural Justice, if so advised. 16. With the above observations and directions, these petitions are allowed. Sd/-d/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Saxena ABHIGYA SAXENA Digitally signed by ABHIGYA SAXENA