1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 37 of 2011 1 - Bhagwat Ram Sahu S/o Videshi Ram Sahu Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 2 - Mrishlal Sonker S/o Late Doman Sonker Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) --- Appellants versus 1 - Shivcharan Sahu S/o Nandlal Sahu Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 2 - Netram Sahu S/o Laduram Sahu Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 3 - Ganesh Kumar Sahu S/o Miluram Sahu Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 4 - Palan Kumar Sahu S/o Hublal Sahu Aged About 18 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 5 - Madhavram Sahu S/o Laduram Sahu Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 6 - Kamlesh Sahu S/o Dhanvaram Sahu Aged About 22 Years R/o VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 7 - Birbal Sahu S/o Tiharu Ram Sahu Aged About 59 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 8 - Kheduram Sahu S/o Hublal Sahu Aged About 19 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 9 - Dukhitram Yadav (Died) And Deleted As Per Honble Court Order Dated 14-11-2025 10 - Tejram Sahu S/o Shiv Charan Sahu Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 11 - Ram Singh Sahu S/o Laduram Sahu Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 12 - Sevakram Sahu S/o Bhaduram Sahu Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 13 - Kartikram Sahu (Died) And Deleted As Per Honbel Court Order Dated 14-11-2025 14 - Bhagwat Sahu S/o Awadhram Sahu Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 15 - Tukaram Sahu S/o Heeralal Sahu Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Dist- Dhamtari (C.G.) 16 - Bushanlal Sahu S/o Khorbahara Ram Sahu Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 17 - Ghanaram Sahu S/o Khorbahara Ram Sahu Aged About 19 Years 3 R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 18 - Roshan Sahu S/o Birbal Sahu Aged About 21 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 19 - Mahesh Sahu S/o Birbal Sahu Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 20 - Heera Lal Sahu S/o Shyamlal Sahu Aged About 60 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 21 - Bisouha Ram @ Ramlal (Died) And Deleted As Per Honble Court Order Dated 14-11-2025 22 - Khorbahara Ram Sahu (Died) And Deleted As Per Honble Court Order Dated 14-11-2025 23 - Dhanwaram Sahu S/o Awadhram Sahu Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 24 - Tuleshwar Sahu S/o Bisouharam Sahu Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 25 - Heeraman Sahu S/o Awadhram Sahu Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 26 - Shiv Prasad Sahu (Died) And Deleted As Per Honble Court Order Dated 14-11-2025 27 - Ishwar Sahu S/o Santram Sahu Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Gobra Navapara P.S. Navapara Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 28 - State Of Chhattisgrh Through P.S. Magalod Distt- Dhamtari (C.G.) 4 --- Respondents CRA No. 369 of 2010 1 - Pawan Kumar S/o Fulsingh Sahu Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 2 - Balram Sonkar S/o Guhari Sonkar Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 3 - Teejuram Sahu S/o Makhan Sahu Aged About 56 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 4 - Rohit Ram S/o Thanwar Sahu Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 5 - Dwarika Sahu (Died And Deleted) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 14-11-2025. 6 - Tirath Sahu S/o Thanwar Sahu Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 7 - Adhnu Sahu S/o Thanwar Sahu Aged About 41 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 8 - Yadunandan S/o Kejuram Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 9 - Sonauram S/o Sukhdeo Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 10 - Khorbahra @ Khoj S/o Sukhram Sahu Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 5 11 - Mrishlal S/o Doman Sonkar Aged About 23 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 12 - Bhagwat S/o Bahur Sonkar Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 13 - Ramkumar S/o Bahur Sonkar Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 14 - Gopal Sahu S/o Makhan Sahu Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 15 - Bhagwat Sahu S/o Videshi Ram Sahu Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 16 - Ishwar Sahu (Died And Deleted) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 14-11-2025. 17 - Chandulal Sahu S/o Gopal Sahu Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 18 - Banauram S/o Fulsingh Sahu Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 19 - Kanglu Sonker S/o Bhagoli Sonkar Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. 20 - Jeetram @ Geetu S/o Leelaram Sahu Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Khatti, P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. ---Appellants Versus 6 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Magarlod, Distt. Dhamtari, C.G. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. D.N. Prajapati, Advocate For Respondents in ACQA No.37/2011 : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate For State : Mr. Kishan Lal Sahu, Dy. G.A. Division Bench Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. Judgment on Board 10.12.2025 Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. CRA No. 369 of 2010 - This criminal appeal, preferred by appellants/accused persons under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.05.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, (F.T.C.), Dhamtari, District Dhamtari, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.25/2008, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:— Conviction Sentence Under Section 147 of Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') Rigorous Imprisonment for one year to each appellant Under Section 148 of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for two years to each appellant Under Section 323 read with Section 149 of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for one years and fine of Rs.500/- each, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one months to each 7 appellant Under Section 325 read with Section 149 of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.500/- each, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one months to each appellant (All sentences were directed to run concurrently) 2. ACQA No. 37 of 2011 - This acquittal appeal, preferred by the appellants/complainants, arises out of the judgment dated 12.05.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, (F.T.C.) Dhamtari, District Dhamtari, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.13/2007, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted respondents/accused persons Nos.1 to 27 of the charges under Sections 147, 148, 302/149, 307/149, 294 & 506-B of IPC. 3. Since both the above captioned appeals arise out of the same incident that occurred on 23.10.2006, they are being heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that prior to the incident, complainant- Bisoha Sahu had lodged a rural complaint report (Ex.P-2) alleging encroachment by the accused persons over government land and land reserved for Holika Dahan, due to which, tension prevailed in the village and prohibitory orders were imposed. On 23.10.2006, on the occasion of the Maatar Festival, at about 8:30 p.m., after taking dinner, complainant- Bisoha Sahu was sitting near the paan stall of PW-2Dhanwa Sahu along with other persons. At that time, the accused 8 persons, namely Pawan Sahu, Ishwar Sahu (now died), Teeju, Gopal, Jitu, Bhagwat, Khoj @ Khorbahara, Tirath, Rohit, Punau, Doman, Chandu, Banau, Mirish Sonkar, Ram Kumar Sonkar and Bhagwat Sonkar, allegedly arrived at the spot armed with sticks and rods, abused Bisoha Sahu and questioned him regarding the complaint. It is alleged that accused- Ishwar Sahu assaulted Bisoha Sahu by striking him on the head and chest with a stick, whereafter the remaining accused persons also joined the assault and caused injuries to Bhushan, Hiralal, Ghanaram, Mahesh, Roshan, Dhanwa, Bhagwat and Ishwar. Upon intervention of villagers, the incident was stopped. On the basis of the rural complaint report, a formal FIR (Ex.P-31) was registered. All the injured persons were medically examined by PW-21 Kamlesh Timbhurne who gave MLC reports vide Exs.P- 50 to 54 and opined that the injuries sustained by the injured persons could have been caused by sticks. During investigation, spot map was prepared, memorandum statements were recorded, pursuant to which, sticks were seized from the possession of the accused persons. 5. Statements of the witnesses were recorded, and after completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused persons before the concerned trial Court. The accused persons abjured their guilt and sought trial. 6. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 28 witnesses and exhibited 114 documents connecting the 9 accused persons with the crime in question. However, in their defence, the appellants/accused persons have not examined anyone whereas have exhibited 85 documents. 7. The learned trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgments acquitted co-accused persons/respondent Nos. 1 to 27 in ACQA No. 37/2011 of the charges leveled against them, but convicted and sentenced appellants/accused persons in CRA No. 369/2010 for the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused persons as well as the complainants have filed separate appeals before this Court. 8. CRA No. 369 of 2010 – Learned counsel for the appellants/accused persons would submit that the learned Trial Court is wholly unjustified in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the aforesaid offences, as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He would further submit that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, and that their testimonies do not corroborate each other. He would also contend that the evidence on record clearly demonstrates that the alleged incident involved a large number of persons from both sides and was preceded by long-standing rivalry and enmity between the parties. The occurrence bears all the characteristics of a free fight, rather than a unilateral or premeditated assault 10 attributable solely to the appellants. He would also contend that the prosecution witnesses are admittedly interested and partisan, being closely connected to one side of the dispute. Their evidence appears to have been exaggerated with an apparent intention to falsely implicate the appellants due to prior rivalry. Such testimony does not inspire confidence and, in the absence of independent corroboration, cannot be safely relied upon. He would also submit that, upon an overall appreciation of the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence is shaky, inconsistent, and unreliable. Therefore, it is prayed that the appeal filed by the appellants/accused persons be allowed and that they be acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. 9. Learned counsel for the State would submit that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded the conviction of the appellants. The prosecution witnesses are natural and reliable, and their testimony is duly supported by the medical and other corroborative evidence. The participation of the appellants in the incident stands proved, and the prosecution has successfully established the offences beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and sentence be affirmed. 10. ACQA No. 37 of 2011: Learned counsel for the Appellants/Complainants would submit that the learned trial Court is unjustified in acquitting respondents No. 1 to 27 of the 11 charges by recording perverse findings. He would further submit that from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the evidence available on record, it clearly emerges that respondents No. 1 to 27 had also actively participated in the crime in question along with the other co-accused persons and committed the aforesaid offences and despite such consistent and reliable ocular evidence, the learned trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons/respondents No.1 to 27 for the aforesaid offences without appreciating the evidence on record in its correct perspective. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 27 / accused persons would support the impugned judgment insofar as it relates to their acquittal and submit that no specific or overt act has been attributed to respondent Nos.1 to 27 and even their presence at the spot of occurrence is doubtful. They would further submit that there is no reliable evidence to show their participation in the alleged assault. Therefore, the acquittal of respondent Nos.1 to 27 recorded by the learned trial Court for the aforesaid offences is fully justified and well-merited, and does not call for any interference by this Court. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/respondent No.28 would support the contention made by learned counsel for the appellants/complainants. 12 13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. CRA No. 369 of 2010 14. Now, the question that arises for consideration is whether the trial Court was justified in convicting and sentencing the accused persons/appellants. 15. This Court has meticulously examined the entire record, including the First Information Report, the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court. Being a criminal appeal, this Court has independently re-appreciated and reassessed the evidence on record in its entirety. The submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as the learned Public Prosecutor have been duly considered. 16. From the material available on record, it clearly emerges that the incident in question involved a large number of persons from both sides and that there was longstanding prior rivalry and enmity between the parties. The manner in which the incident is alleged to have occurred suggests that the occurrence was more in the nature of a free fight, wherein persons from both sides participated, rather than a premeditated or unilateral assault committed solely by the appellants. It is well-settled that in cases 13 of free fight or group clashes involving multiple accused persons, the prosecution is under a heavy obligation to establish the specific role, overt act, and individual participation of each accused by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Bald, vague, or omnibus allegations, without attribution of a definite act to a particular accused, are wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction. 17. In the present case, the prosecution has primarily relied upon the testimony of PW-1 Teejuram Sahu, claimed to be an eye-witness, along with PW-9 Sonau Ram Sahu, PW-10 Kanglu Sonkar, PW-11 Gopal Sahu, PW-12 Ram Kumar Sonkar, and PW-13 Phul Singh. However, upon close and cautious scrutiny of their depositions, this Court finds that the evidence of these witnesses is riddled with material contradictions, exaggerations, and inconsistencies going to the root of the matter. Their statements lack coherence and do not present a consistent or trustworthy account of the incident. Significantly, the testimonies of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses contain only general and omnibus allegations against the appellants. None of the witnesses has assigned a clear, specific, or distinct role to any individual accused. There is a conspicuous absence of evidence identifying which appellant inflicted which injury and in what manner. Such vague and sweeping statements create serious doubt regarding the actual participation of the appellants in the alleged occurrence. 14 18. It also appears from the evidence on record that the prosecution witnesses, who are admittedly interested and belong to the rival faction, have exaggerated their version before the Court, apparently with the intention of falsely implicating the appellants due to the pre-existing rivalry and enmity between the parties. The testimony of such partisan witnesses, in the absence of reliable corroboration, does not inspire confidence and cannot be made the sole basis for conviction. 19. Furthermore, though the incident is alleged to have taken place in circumstances where independent and neutral witnesses were reasonably available, the prosecution has failed to examine any such witness. No plausible explanation has been offered for their non-examination. The absence of independent corroboration further weakens the prosecution case and raises serious doubt about the truthfulness of the version put forth by the prosecution. Additionally, the prosecution has failed to adduce cogent and clinching evidence to conclusively establish that the injured persons sustained injuries in the alleged assault attributable to the appellants. This omission creates a significant dent in the prosecution story and casts a serious doubt on its veracity. 20. Upon an overall appreciation of the evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the testimonies of PW-1 Teejuram Sahu, PW-9 Sonau Ram Sahu, PW-10 Kanglu Sonkar, PW-11 Gopal Sahu, PW-12 Ram Kumar Sonkar, and PW-13 Phul Singh 15 are unreliable and insufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. 21. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that when the prosecution evidence is doubtful, inconsistent, and does not inspire confidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. 22. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, two views are reasonably possible on the evidence available on record—one pointing towards the guilt of the appellants and the other towards their innocence. It is a cardinal principle of criminal law that where two such views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. Applying this settled principle, this Court holds that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, it would be wholly unsafe and unjust to sustain the conviction of the appellants on the basis of such shaky, unreliable, and doubtful evidence. 23. Accordingly, the appellants are entitled to be acquitted of all the charges by extending to them the benefit of doubt. The impugned judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. Their bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. 24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court is 16 hereby set- aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them on the basis of benefit of doubt. 25. The appellants are reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., the appellants are directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Cr.P.C. of sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount before the trial Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 26. Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. ACQA No.37/2011 27. So far as the acquittal appeal filed by the complainants is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala1 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial 1 (2022) 8 SCC 440 17 court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 28. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand2, whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under:- “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate 2 2025 INSC 114 18 the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 19 (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, 20 reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot 21 overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial 22 judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 29. Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 30. In the present case, the learned trial Court minutely examined the oral, documentary, medical, as well as defence evidence, including the evidence led in the counter case (Exs. D- 66 to D-85), and rightly concluded that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution also failed to produce cogent and clinching evidence to establish that the injured persons sustained injuries in the alleged assault by respondent Nos. 1 to 27, which casts a serious doubt on the prosecution version. The learned trial Court further noticed material contradictions and inherent improbabilities in the 23 prosecution story. The evidence on record also reveals that the complainant party, armed with sticks and rods, had reached the place of the accused and initiated the assault. The learned trial Court also took note of the admitted prior enmity and factional rivalry between the parties arising out of a dispute relating to alleged encroachment over government land. Despite the presence of several villagers at the spot, the prosecution examined only interested witnesses, who were themselves accused in the counter case, and withheld independent witnesses without any plausible explanation, thereby further weakening the prosecution case. The trial Court also noticed serious lapses in the investigation, particularly in the manner in which offences were registered in the counter case despite grievous injuries suffered by the accused party, which cast a serious doubt on the fairness of the investigation. Upon due appreciation of the entire evidence, the learned Trial Court arrived at a well-reasoned conclusion that the accused/respondent Nos. 1 to 27 had acted in exercise of their right of private defence as envisaged under Sections 96 to 100 of IPC and that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused persons/respondent Nos.1 to 27 were members of an unlawful assembly with a common object to commit the alleged offences. 31. Having considered the material on record and the well- reasoned judgment of the trial Court and keeping in view the 24 settled legal position that in an appeal against acquittal, if two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence and the trial Court has adopted one such view favouring the accused, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view to reverse the acquittal, we are of the considered opinion that the judgment acquitting respondent No. 1 to 27 is just, proper, and calls for no interference. 32. In the result, the criminal appeal (CRA No. 369/2010) filed by the accused persons/appellants is allowed, whereas the acquittal appeal (ACQA No.37 of 2011) filed by the complainants, being devoid of any merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha