1 2025:CGHC:55028-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPCR No. 574 of 2025 Roshan Singh Thakur S/o Late Shri Kailash Singh Thakur Aged About 41 Years R/o Village - Pali, Near Govt. High School, Police Station Pali, District - Korba (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Director General of Police Chhattisgarh Head Quarter Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.) 3 - The Superintendent of Police District - Korba (C.G.) 4 - The Station House Officer Police Station Pali, District Korba (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu, Advocate For State/Respondents : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate For Objector : Mr. Vijay K. Sahu, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 12.11.2025 1. Heard Mr. Satish Chandra Verma, learned Senior Counsel assisted Mr. Manharan Lal Sahu, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate appearing MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.11.13 16:52:24 +0530 2 for the State/respondents as well as Mr. Vijay K. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the objector. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayer(s): “10.1 Quash and set aside the impugned FIR bearing Crime No. 0114/2025, registered under section 103(1), 61(2)(a), 190. 191(2), 191(3) of BNS and Section 25, 27 of Arms act registered at Police Station Pali, District Korba, and all consequential proceedings including Report/Charge-sheet dated 24.06.2025, pending before the learned Court below, as the same are false, fabricated; mala fide, and in violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India; 10.2 Hold and declare that the investigation conducted in the aforesaid case is unfair, biased, and contrary to the settled principles of law, thereby vitiating the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioner; 10.3 Direct the State / Respondent authorities to conduct a fresh, fair, and independent investigation by an officer of appropriate rank, preferably supervised by a senior officer or an independent agency, in order to ensure justice and restore public confidence in the administration of justice; 10.4 Pass such further or other appropriate orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, proper, and necessary in the interest of justice, equity, and good conscience, including but not limited to: 3 a) Grant of interim protection to the petitioner from any coercive action during the pendency of this petition; and b) Expunging the petitioner's name from all police records related to the said false and fabricated case. 10.5 Award exemplary costs or compensation as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, in view of the mental agony, loss of reputation, and harassment caused to the petitioner due the arbitrary and mala fide actions of the investigating agency.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, a law-abiding citizen and businessman engaged in the business of coal transportation at Korba, is being falsely implicated in Crime No. 0114/2025 registered at Police Station Pali, District Korba, relating to the alleged murder of one Anup @ Rohit Jaiswal on 28.03.2025. According to the prosecution, the incident arose out of a dispute between two groups over coal-lifting operations. However, the complainant, Anil Kumar Jaiswal, who claims to be an eyewitness to the occurrence, has been conclusively shown through contemporaneous FIRs (Nos. 0115/2025, 0116/2025, 0117/2025, and 0118/2025) and Call Detail Records to have been present at entirely different locations at the relevant time. The said contradictions make it impossible for him to have witnessed the alleged incident and demonstrate that the FIR was lodged on false and fabricated grounds. The credible documentary and electronic evidence, including CCTV footage, toll-plaza records, and a forensic report prepared by Dhenge Forensic Consultancy Services, conclusively 4 establish that the petitioner was present at Raipur and en route locations between 17:40 and 22:30 hours on the date of occurrence— hundreds of kilometers away from the alleged scene of crime. Despite submission of such cogent materials and repeated representations by the petitioner and his family to the police and higher authorities, the Investigating Officer, acting in a mala fide and biased manner, ignored all exculpatory evidence and proceeded to file a false and baseless charge-sheet against the petitioner. Hence the petition. 4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the entire investigation stands vitiated on account of bias, suppression of material evidence, and non-consideration of crucial forensic and electronic proof establishing his non-involvement. The Investigating Officer has acted with mala fide intent, in gross violation of Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to fair investigation and protection against arbitrary prosecution. The failure of the police to verify the complainant’s contradictory presence at multiple crime scenes and the deliberate exclusion of forensic evidence from the charge-sheet render the proceedings wholly unreliable, illegal, and unsustainable in law. 5. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the State itself, in an earlier proceeding being Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 205 of 2025 categorically admitted on oath that the petitioner was not present at the scene of occurrence at the relevant time. Yet, in complete contradiction, the police have chosen to implicate him in the present crime. Such 5 conduct amounts to a gross abuse of power and clear violation of the petitioner’s fundamental rights. In view of the overwhelming exculpatory evidence and the manifestly mala fide investigation, the petitioner humbly prays that this Court be pleased to quash the impugned FIR and charge-sheet, and direct a fresh, fair, and independent investigation in the interest of justice. 6. Per contra, learned State Counsel submits that the respondent– State that the investigation in Crime No. 0114/2025, registered at Police Station Pali, District Korba, has been conducted strictly in accordance with law and all procedural safeguards have been duly observed. The allegations of bias, mala fide intent, or suppression of evidence are wholly unfounded and baseless. The investigating agency collected material evidence, examined witnesses, obtained forensic and CDR data, and, upon due analysis, found sufficient grounds to file the charge-sheet against the petitioner. The so-called exculpatory documents relied upon by the petitioner were duly considered but were found inconsistent and unverified. The prosecution has, therefore, acted fairly, and the veracity of the petitioner’s defence is a matter of trial. Hence, the present writ petition seeking quashment of the FIR and charge-sheet is premature, misconceived, and liable to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for the objector opposed the submissions advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the allegations levelled against the petitioner are serious in nature and supported by material collected during investigation. It is contended 6 that the Investigating Officer, after conducting a fair, impartial, and comprehensive investigation, has rightly found sufficient evidence to implicate the petitioner in the present crime. The plea of alibi now sought to be pressed is a concocted and afterthought defence, raised only to evade criminal liability. The documents relied upon by the petitioner, including alleged CCTV footage and toll records, are unverified, manipulated, and do not inspire confidence. It is further submitted that the writ petition is an attempt to stall the due course of law and to pre-empt the trial proceedings by inviting this Court to conduct a roving inquiry into disputed questions of fact, which is impermissible in writ jurisdiction. Hence, the prayer for quashing of the FIR and charge-sheet deserves outright rejection. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the submissions advanced by the respective counsel. 9. Upon perusal of the records and after hearing learned counsel for both the parties, this Court finds that the investigation in Crime No. 0114/2025 registered at Police Station Pali, District Korba, has been conducted in accordance with the procedure established by law. The allegations of mala fide, bias, and fabrication levelled by the petitioner are general in nature and unsupported by any conclusive material warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The materials relied upon by the petitioner, including CCTV footage, toll-plaza records, and forensic 7 reports, are matters of evidence to be examined and appreciated by the competent trial court during trial and cannot be adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction. 10. It is well settled that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC/Section 528 of the BNSS is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only where the allegations made in the FIR or the material collected during investigation do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, or where the proceedings manifestly appear to be actuated by mala fides or abuse of the process of law. 11. In the present case, no such exceptional circumstance is made out. The FIR and the charge-sheet, taken together with the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 179 of the BNSS), prima facie disclose the ingredients constituting the alleged offences. The contentions raised by the petitioner regarding his alleged absence from the place of occurrence, contradictions in the complainant’s version, and non-consideration of exculpatory materials, are all disputed questions of fact which can be effectively adjudicated only in the course of trial. 12. It is also pertinent to note that the plea of alibi sought to be pressed by the petitioner, based on CCTV footage, toll-plaza records, and other electronic evidence, is a matter which can be examined only during the course of trial. 8 13. The Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 8 SCC 430 has held as under :- “35. Undoubtedly, the burden of establishing the plea of alibi lay upon the appellant. The appellant herein has miserably failed to bring on record any facts or circumstances which would make the plea of his absence even probable, let alone, being proved beyond reasonable doubt. The plea of alibi had to be proved with absolute certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility of the presence of the appellant in the rented premises at the relevant time. When a plea of alibi is raised by an accused it is for the accused to establish the said plea by positive evidence which has not been led in the present case. We may also notice here at this stage the proposition of law laid down in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana as follows: (SCC p. 27, para 20) “20. ... This plea of alibi stands disbelieved by both the courts and since the plea of alibi is a question of fact and since both the courts concurrently found that fact against the appellant, the accused, this Court in our view, cannot on an appeal by special leave go behind the abovenoted concurrent finding of fact.” 36. But it is also correct that, even though the plea of alibi of the appellant is not established, it was for the prosecution to prove the case against the appellant. To this extent, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was correct. The failure of the plea of alibi would not necessarily lead to the success of the prosecution case which has to be independently 9 proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Being aware of the aforesaid principle of law, the trial court as also the High Court examined the circumstantial evidence to exclude the possibility of the innocence of the appellant.” 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2015) 4 SCC 749 has held as under :- “25. At this juncture, we think it apt to deal with the plea of alibi that has been put forth by the appellant. As is demonstrable, the trial court has discarded the plea of alibi. When a plea of alibi is taken by an accused, burden is upon him to establish the same by positive evidence after onus as regards presence on the spot is established by the prosecution.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a very recent decision in Ashok Verma v. The State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 INSC 1011, while dealing with the celebrated judgment in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (1997) 1 SCC 283, has categorically held as follows :– “10. We will now consider the question whether the contention of the appellant that the plea of alibi was considered perversely, especially without properly appreciating the evidence of DW-1. In the decision in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, this Court took note of the meaning of the Latin word ‘alibi’ as ‘elsewhere’ and observed and held that the said plea would be available only if that ‘elsewhere’ is a place which is that much far off making it extremely impossible or improbable for the person concerned to reach the place of occurrence and participate in the 10 offence concerned on the relevant date and time. Paragraph 22 and 23 of the said decision which is relevant for the purpose reads thus: - “22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception (special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. Illustration (a) given under the provision is worth reproducing in this context: “The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a certain date; the fact that on that date, A was at Lahore is relevant.” 23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere” and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused was present at the scene and has participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it 11 is incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. This Court has observed so on earlier occasions (vide Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 166; State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple [(1984) 1 SCC 446.” 11. In the context of the afore-extracted paragraphs, it is relevant to note that in the case on hand, the appellant was bound to explain what happened on that day at his house by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act since the appellant and the deceased were man and wife and the incident had occurred in the house where they were residing. Therefore, he was bound to explain and establish the same as it is a 12 fact, exclusively within his knowledge, by concrete evidence, if he fails to establish the plea of ‘alibi’. 12. In the case on hand, the appellant convict took up the plea of alibi on the ground that he was in a nearby garden to the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time. DW-1 deposed that the appellant was with him during that period in the nearby Maitri Garden and returned from there between 6 pm and 7 pm and he got down near the lane of his house. Furthermore, he would depose that thereafter, the appellant came back and told him that Pushpa hanged herself and then he proceeded to the house of the appellant and the noose was cut and she was taken to hospital. 13. As held in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra), strict proof is required to establish the plea of alibi. There is absolutely no evidence establishing that DW-1 was there in the garden during the said period. Then, how his version could be relied on by the appellant to establish the plea of alibi. That apart, the very fact is that the appellant took up the plea of alibi on the ground that he was in a nearby garden itself would be sufficient to throw the case put forth by him as defence, in the light of Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra). The plea of alibi, in the light of the decision in Binay Kumar Singh’s case (supra) can be applied only if the ‘elsewhere place’ is far away from the place of occurrence so that it was extremely improbable or impossible for the person concerned to reach the place of occurrence and to participate in the crime on the relevant date and time of occurrence. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the said contention was rightly rejected by the Courts 13 below” Thus, it is clear that so far as defence of plea of alibi is concerned, it is required to be proved by leading cogent evidence and it cannot be proved by preponderance of probabilities. 16. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the plea of alibi raised by the petitioner, being a matter of evidence, can appropriately be examined by the learned Trial Court at the stage of trial upon appreciation of the entire record and the evidence adduced by both sides. 17. In view of the legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Binay Kumar Singh (supra), Vijay Pal (supra), S.K. Sattar (supra); and more recently in Ashok Verma (supra), it stands well settled that a plea of alibi is not a substantive defence recognized under the Penal Code but a rule of evidence, embodied in Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The burden to establish such a plea lies squarely upon the accused, who must demonstrate, through unimpeachable and cogent material, that his presence at the place of occurrence was wholly impossible. The said plea can, therefore, be effectively tested only upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence during the course of trial, and not at the preliminary stage of investigation or in proceedings invoking the extraordinary writ or inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 18. The documents relied upon by the petitioner, namely the CCTV footage, toll-plaza entries, Call Detail Records, and forensic report 14 though contended to establish his absence from the scene of occurrence, are disputed in nature and require proper proof, corroboration, and appreciation through examination and cross- examination of witnesses. It is not for this Court, while exercising its limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Section 482 of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023), to evaluate the evidentiary worth of such materials. The judicial power of quashing is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only where the allegations, taken at their face value, do not disclose any cognizable offence or where the proceedings are palpably tainted by mala fides or manifest abuse of process of law. 19. In the present case, on a plain reading of the FIR, the charge- sheet, and the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC (now Section 179 of the BNSS), the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The investigating agency appears to have followed the procedure prescribed by law, collected relevant material, and submitted the final report upon due analysis. The alleged contradictions in the statements of the complainant, or the alleged non- consideration of certain exculpatory materials, are all matters of appreciation of evidence and credibility, which fall exclusively within the province of the learned Trial Court. 20. This Court cannot, at this stage, substitute its own view for that of the investigating agency or assume the role of a fact-finding authority to determine whether the petitioner was present at Raipur or elsewhere at 15 the relevant time. Such an exercise would amount to pre-judging issues which are required to be established through evidence at trial. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again cautioned that the High Court, while exercising its extraordinary or inherent powers, must refrain from embarking upon an evidentiary analysis, as doing so would trench upon the jurisdiction of the trial court and defeat the legislative scheme of criminal adjudication. 22. It is also trite that even if certain procedural irregularities or investigative lapses are alleged, the same by themselves do not vitiate the entire proceedings unless there is demonstrable prejudice caused to the accused or clear evidence of mala fide intent. The petitioner has not been able to bring on record any such exceptional circumstance or incontrovertible material that would justify invoking this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the FIR or charge-sheet. 23. In light of the foregoing discussion, and having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at this stage. However, it is observed that the petitioner shall be at liberty to raise all permissible pleas available in law, including the plea of alibi and other exculpatory defences, before the learned Trial Court at the appropriate stage. The Trial Court, upon being so approached, shall consider and decide such pleas on their own merits, in accordance with law, and uninfluenced by any observations made herein, which are confined solely to the limited question of maintainability and scope of interference under Article 226 16 or Section 482 of the CrPC/Section 528 of the BNSS. 24. Consequently, this Court finds no ground to invoke its writ or inherent jurisdiction in the facts of the present case. The investigation and charge-sheet having been carried out in accordance with law, the present writ petition is found to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 25. It is, however, clarified that dismissal of this petition shall not preclude the petitioner from availing of any other remedy permissible under law, including an application for discharge before the competent court or for seeking appropriate relief in case any fresh material evidence emerges in his favour during the course of trial. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet / Anu