1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 1095 of 2025 Order reserved on 17/04/2026 Order delivered on 15/06/2026 Vishal Sangram S/o Lajo Sangram Aged About 41 Years R/o Basant Vihar Colony Tahsil And District Bilaspur C.G. ... Petitioner versus Harjeet Singh S/o Guru Bachan Singh Aged About 66 Years R/o L-10 Vinoba Nagar Bilaspur C.G. ... Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Dheerendra Pandey, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh, Advocate Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge C.A.V. Order 1. Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the award dated 12.11.2022, passed by learned National Lok Adalat, Bench No. 20, District Court, Bilaspur, in civil suit No. 62- B/2022, whereby the award for recovery of Rs. 3,40,567/- has been passed against the defendant on the basis of compromise between the parties. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.06.15 20:08:41 +0530 2 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was defendant before the learned trial Court. The respondent/plaintiff has filed a civil suit on 06.09.2022 for recovery of Rs. 3,00,000/- against the petitioner/ defendant with the pleading that the defendant borrowed an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the plaintiff on 06.07.2022. It was agreed between the parties that the defendant shall pay the interest @ 1% per month on the amount of loan and the said amount of loan was to be repaid within one month. At the time of borrowing the amount, the defendant also executed a hand note/acknowledgment on 06.07.2022. The defendant has not repaid any amount to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is entitled for the entire amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- and accrued interest thereon. The defendant was served with a legal demand notice dated 06.08.2022 through registered AD post and when the defendant neither repaid the borrowed amount nor replied the notice, the civil suit has been filed by the plaintiff for recovery of the borrowed amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- along with the accrued interest from the date of 06.07.2022. 3. The suit was filed on 06.09.2022 and on 08.09.2022 summons was ordered to be issued to the defendant and the case was fixed for 29.09.2022. On 29.09.2022, the defendant appeared in the case along with his counsel and made an application for compromise along with the copy of the compromise deed. The statement of the plaintiff and defendant on the compromise was recorded by the learned trial Court on 29.09.2022 itself and the case was fixed for 12.11.2022 before the National Lok Adalat. Ultimately the case was placed before the National Lok Adalat, Bench No. 20, District Court, Bilaspur on 12.11.2022 and on that day, an award was passed on the basis of 3 compromise between the parties for recovery of Rs. 3,40,567/- against the petitioner/defendant. The said award dated 12.11.2022 is under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned award passed by the learned National Lok Adalat is illegal, arbitrary and perverse. The learned trial Court should have considered that the suit of the plaintiff itself was not maintainable for want of the document of money lending license of the plaintiff as required under Section 11-H read with Section 3(1)(a) and (b) and Section 7 of the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934. Before passing the award or considering the compromise, the learned trial Court and National Lok Adalat should have satisfied itself for due compliance of the mandatory provision of Money Lenders Act, 1934. He would also submit that the signature of the defendant was obtained by the plaintiff under coercion and the compromise was not on the free will of the defendant. The plaintiff is a well known influential person who involved in money lending business and extorting money from the employees and putting them in fear of losing their employment. The genuineness of the compromise ought to have been examined by the learned trial Court and National Lok Adalat, yet the award has been passed, therefore, the impugned award dated 12.11.2022 is liable to be set aside. 5. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner/defendant is an employee of South Eastern Coalfields Limited, Bilaspur and not a layman. He 4 borrowed an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the respondent on 06.07.2022 and executed a hand note/acknowledgment for the same. When he has not repaid the amount, the respondent has filed the suit for recovery of the borrowed amount along with the interest. The petitioner duly represented through his counsel before the learned trial Court and after knowing fully well his position, he entered into compromise on 29.09.2022 and his statement was also recorded by the learned trial Court on the compromise on 29.09.2022 itself, thereafter the matter was placed before the National Lok Adalat on 12.11.2022, where the award has been passed on 12.11.2022 itself. The said compromise dated 29.09.2022 and compromise award dated 12.11.2022 have not been challenged by the petitioner for about 3 years and it has only been challenged in the present writ petition which is filed on 17.10.2025. The petitioner was an educated person and employee of South Eastern Coalfields Limited. Knowing fully well the executed hand note/acknowledgment of the borrowed amount, he was represented in the suit through his counsel and he duly executed Vakalatnama in favour of his counsel, thereafter a compromise deed was also executed on 29.09.2022 and thereafter his statement was also recorded by the learned trial Court on 29.09.2022, in which he confirmed the terms of compromise. Since the date from his appearance before the learned trial Court till the passing of the award, the petitioner was having ample opportunity to deny the compromise, yet he willingly entered into compromise on his own free will and after such a long time, he challenged the said compromise award, which is not bona fide. At this stage the maintainability of the suit cannot be objected, when the defendant 5 have entered into compromise in the suit. He would also submit that Section 11-H of the Money Lenders Act, 1934, it provided that the plaintiff should have hold a valid registration certificate, which the plaintiff has in his possession. Filing of the certificate along with the plaint was not necessary and it can be filed at the subsequent stage also, therefore, the ground raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition is misconceived and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition. 7. The main ground of challenge in the present writ petition by the petitioner is that the plaintiff/respondent has not filed the registration certificate of his being the money lender under the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934, the plaint itself was not maintainable as provided under Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 and therefore, the compromise between the parties, if any cannot be considered for passing of the decree. When the objection raised by the petitioner in view of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934, it would be necessary to notice here the said provision, which reads as under:- “11-H. Suit not to proceed without registration certificate, etc. - No suit for the recovery of a loan advanced by a money-lender shall proceed in a civil court until the court is satisfied that he holds a valid registration certificate or that he is not required to have a registration certificate by reason of the fact that he does not carry on the business of money-lending in any of the district of Chhattisgarh. 6 Provided that this section shall not apply to a suit instituted before the 1st October, 1940.” 8. From perusal of Section 11-H of the Act of 1934 provided only for holding a valid registration certificate, however, there is no restriction for maintaining a civil suit without filing the same along with the plaint. The requirement is only that the plaintiff should have hold the valid registration certificate under the Chhattisgarh Money Lenders Act, 1934. Section 11-H provided that, no suit for recovery of a loan shall proceed until the court is satisfied that the plaintiff hold a valid registration certificate of money lending in the area. It is nowhere provided that he should annexed the copy of the certificate along with the plaint. From perusal of the order sheet dated 06.09.2022 and 08.09.2022 after satisfying the proper presentation of the suit, the civil suit was ordered to be registered and summons was issued to the defendant. Further, from perusal of the copy of the plaint annexed at page No.19 of the petition, he clearly disclosed that the plaintiff is a registered money lender, which could not be rebutted by the defendant. 9. When the defendant appeared in the case on 29.09.2022 through his counsel and entered into compromise, his statement with respect to the compromise was also recorded by the learned trial Court and he signed the document of compromise as well as statement made before the Court without raising any objection at that time, it can be hold that he was well within the knowledge of entire proceeding and consent of repayment of borrowed amount in installments. It is not a case where on a singular instance his signature has been obtained and which was placed before the court for compromise, but on 7 various instances he appeared before the Court and has signed various documents of compromise to settle the dispute. He was having ample opportunity to deny the settlement, if he actually not willing to settle the dispute. After about 3 years of entering into settlement the challenge of the compromise award on the ground that maintainability of the suit cannot be said to be bona fide or the compromise suffered from coercion upon the defendant. 10. Another important aspect which cannot be ignored is that the compromise award was passed on 12.11.2022, whereas the present writ petition has been instituted only on 17.10.2025 after a lapse of almost three years. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor demonstrated any sufficient cause explaining the enormous delay in approaching this Court. During this entire period, no steps appear to have been taken for questioning the compromise deed, the statement recorded before the trial Court or the award passed by the National Lok Adalat. A party who consciously enters into a compromise and thereafter remains silent for several years cannot be permitted to invoke the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as a matter of course. The unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner itself constitutes an additional ground for declining interference with the impugned award. 11. The learned National Lok Adalat has passed the award considering the compromise between the parties and statement made by the defendant before the learned trial Court on 29.09.2022 and the said compromise award cannot be upset on the ground of maintainability 8 of the suit, particularly when the grounds raised by the petitioner regarding maintainability of the suit is misconceived as the filing of the registration certificate under the Money Lenders Act, 1934 is not necessary along with the plaint, but what is necessary to have the registration certificate with the petitioner. 12. It is also pertinent to notice that the impugned award has been passed on the basis of a compromise voluntarily entered into between the parties. The petitioner not only signed the compromise deed but his statement was also recorded before the Court acknowledging the settlement. Once a party has consented to the terms of settlement and a compromise award has been passed on such consent, the same cannot ordinarily be assailed by invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution merely on grounds which were available prior to the compromise. A consent decree or compromise award stands on a different footing and can be questioned only on limited grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation or coercion of a serious nature, duly pleaded and established. Except making bald allegations, the petitioner has placed no material on record to substantiate the plea of coercion. Therefore, the challenge to the compromise award itself is not maintainable in the facts of the present case. 13. The challenge raised by the petitioner to the compromise award is also liable to be rejected in view of the settled principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court governing consent decrees and compromise awards. In Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the 9 effect of Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, held in paragraph 17 that: “17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus: (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43. (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A. (iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23. Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid 10 compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made.” 14. In the present case, the petitioner voluntarily entered into the compromise, his statement was recorded before the trial Court, and thereafter the National Lok Adalat passed the award on the basis of such compromise. Except making bald allegations of coercion, no material has been placed on record to establish fraud, misrepresentation or any circumstance vitiating the compromise. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to assail the compromise award in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid consideration, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned award passed by the learned National Lok Adalat based on the compromise between the parties. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 17. Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved