1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3219 of 2022 1 - Anand Prasad Gupta S/o Dashrath Prasad Gupta Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Kadamtoli, Tahsil- Kurdeng, District- Simdega, Jharkhand. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Special Secretary, Department Of Revenue And Disaster Management, Mahanadi Bhavan, New Raipur Atal Nagar District- Raipur, Chhattigarh. 2 - Collector Ambikapur, District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Sdo Ambikapur District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Tahsildar Ambikapur, District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioner :- None. For State :- Mr. Santosh Bharat, P.L. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order On Board 02.05.2025 VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 1. The instant petition is being preferred against the inaction of the Respondent no. 1 who rejected the application preferred by the petitioner for financial aid/compensation for death of her wife named late Smt. Pinki Gupta due to tree fall on her when she was taking bath in her washroom in her parental house at Shrigad Ambikapur P.S. & Tah. Ambikapur Dist- Sarguja (C.G.) on 01.09.2015 and thereafter, the petitioner made a representation before the respondent no.1 through his counsel for claiming disaster amount which was rejected by the respondent wide order impugned dated 05.07.2021 stating that the petitioner is not entitled for financial aid without considered the fact that wife of the petitioner died under the State of Chhattisgarh and she is completed her studies with having residential certificate issued by Chhattisgarh State but at the time of incident she was not the resident of State of Chhattisgarh, as such, the provision of Revenue book Circular would not be applicable. The said action made by the respondent is not only illegal, hence this petition. 2. The petitioner, in this writ petition, has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records of the case for its kind perusal. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate writs/orders/directions to respondent and restrain him to any further activity regarding mela organization. 10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly set aside the order impugned dated 05.07.2021 and direct the 3 respondent to grant the financial aid as per law in the interest of justice. 10.4 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to award the cost of the petition to the petitioner. 10.5 Any other relief/relief's as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the fact and circumstances of the case may also be granted.” 3. Facts of the case are that the petitioner is poor person who lost his wife namely late Smt. Pinki Gupta due to falling of tree upon her when she was taking bath in her washroom at her parental house situated in Shrigad, Ambikapur, P.S. and Tahsil Ambikapur District Sarguja (C.G.), and the petitioner made representation before the respondent no.1 through his advocate for claiming disaster relief amount but same was rejected by the respondent wide order date 05.07.2021, stating that the petitioner is not entitle for such financial help because the deceased is not permanent resident of Chhattisgarh, but the respondent while deciding the matter not considered the fact that wife of petitioner died in the Chhattisgarh state and she has completed her education and have residential certificate issued by Chhattisgarh authority, therefore the act of respondent is illegal and wrong, hence this petition is being filed. 4. The case as projected by the petitioner is that the petitioner, a poor and aggrieved individual, has suffered irreparable loss and mental trauma due to the untimely and tragic death of his wife, 4 Late Smt. Pinki Gupta, who died as a result of falling of tree upon on her while she was bathing at her parental home in Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh. Despite the incident occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Chhattisgarh and the deceased holding a valid residential certificate issued by the State the petitioner’s rightful claim for financial assistance under the disaster relief fund was arbitrarily rejected by Respondent No. 1 on the erroneous ground that the deceased was not a permanent resident of the State. It is submitted that the rejection order dated 05.07.2021 is bad in law, passed without proper application of mind, and in violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, in the interest of justice, equity, and fair play, the petitioner prays that the impugned order be quashed and appropriate relief be granted. 5. Learned State counsel submits that the petitioner’s claims are without any merit and are based on erroneous assumptions. It is submitted that the disaster relief fund is governed by clear guidelines, which require the beneficiary to be a permanent resident of the State of Chhattisgarh. The deceased, Late Smt. Pinki Gupta, did not fulfill this essential eligibility criterion, and therefore the claim was rightly rejected by Respondent No. 1 after due consideration and in accordance with the law. The rejection order dated 05.07.2021 is lawful, valid, and passed after applying proper mind, considering all relevant facts, including the petitioner’s submissions. The respondents have acted in accordance with the provisions of the scheme and there has been 5 no arbitrariness or malafide intention. Hence, the petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed with costs. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions put forth before me and have also gone through the documents appended to the writ petition. 7. Upon perusal of the record of the petition and the order impugned challenged in the petition, it is not in dispute that the deceased died on 01/09/2015 at Shrigarh Ambikapur, District Sarguja Chhattisgarh as she was taking bath in her washroom and all of a sudden, a tree fall on her and she died. It is not in dispute that Late Smt. Pinki Gupta, who died as a result of falling of tree upon on her while she was bathing at her parental home in Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh. Despite the incident occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Chhattisgarh and the deceased holding a valid residential certificate issued by the State. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of The State of Goa vs. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 184 has held that:- “15. This is a case where clause (2) of Article 226 has been invoked by the High Court to clothe it with the jurisdiction to entertain and try the writ petitions. The Constitutional mandate of clause (2) is that the 'cause of action', referred to therein, must at least arise in part within the territories in relation to which the high court exercises jurisdiction when writ powers conferred by clause (1) are proposed to be exercised, notwithstanding 6 that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person is not within those territories. The expression 'cause of action' has not been defined in the Constitution. However, the classic definition of 'cause of action' given by Lord Brett in Cooke vs. Gillt it would be necessary for the prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court", has been accepted by this Court in a couple of decisions. It is axiomatic that without a cause, there cannot be any action. However, in the context of a writ petition, what would constitute such 'cause of action' is the material facts which are imperative for the writ petitioner to plead and prove to obtain relief as claimed. Determination of the question as to whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily involve an exercise by the high court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause empowering the high court to decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move the high court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would 7 not give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These are the guiding tests. 16. Here, tax has been levied by the Government of Goa in respect of a business that the petitioning company is carrying on within the territory of Goa. Such tax is payable by the petitioning company not in respect of carrying on of any business in the territory of Sikkim. Hence, merely because the petitioning company has its office in Gangtok, Sikkim, the same by itself does not form an integral part of the cause of action authorizing the petitioning company to move the High Court. We hold so in view of the decision of this Court in National Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. Haribox Swalram². The immediate civilor evil consequence, if at all, arising from the impugned notification is that the petitioning company has to pay tax @ 14% to the Government of Goa. The liability arises for the specific nature of business carried on by the petitioning company within the territory of Goa. The pleadings do not reflect that any adverse consequence of the impugned notification has been felt within the jurisdiction of the High Court. At this stage, we are not concerned with the differential duty as envisaged in Schedule II [@ 6%] vis-à-vis Schedule IV [@ 14%] of the impugned notification. That is a matter having a bearing on the merits of the litigation. The long and short of the matter is that the petitioning company has to bear the liability of paying tax @ 14% levied by the Government of Goa for selling lottery tickets in the State of Goa 8 under Schedule IV of the impugned notification. It does not bear out from the petition memo how the impugned notification levying tax for carrying on business in the State of Goa subjects the petitioning company to a legal wrong within the territory of Sikkim for the writ petition to be entertained by the High Court. 18. Even otherwise, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the interim applications. Assuming that a slender part of the cause of action did arise within the State of Sikkim, the concept of forum conveniens ought to have been considered by the High Court. As held by this Court in Kusum Ingots Vs. Union of India and Ambica Industries Vs. CCE, even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a high court, the same by itself could not have been a determinative factor compelling the High Court to keep the writ petitions alive against the appellant to decide the matter qua the impugned notification, on merit.” 9. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the matter of Smt Anju Guilla & Ors, vs Union Of India Through Secretary in W.P.(C) 966/2025 has held that :- “8. It is settled law under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India that merely a part of the cause of action having arisen within the territorial limits of this Court would not, by itself, be a determining factor for exercise of jurisdiction and the Court must also take into consideration the doctrine of forum conveniens. In support of the 9 said proposition, the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 has held as under:- "30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. 10. The Supreme Court in State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd. 2023 7 SCC 791, while relying upon the decision in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), held that facts, which do not constitute "material, essential or integral part of the cause of action", would not attract the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. In this regard. it was held as under:- "16. The expression "cause of action" has not been defined in the Constitution. However, the classic definition of "cause of action" given by Lord Brett in Cooke v Gill [Cooke v. Gill, (1873) LR 8 CP 107] that "cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court", has been accepted by this Court in a couple of decisions. It is axiomatic that without a cause, there cannot be any action. However, in the context of a writ petition, what would constitute such "cause of action" is the 10 material facts which are imperative for the writ petitioner to plead and prove to obtain relief as claimed. 17. Determination of the question as to whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action, sufficient to attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. In so determining, it is the substance of the matter that is relevant. It, therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction has to disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These are the guiding tests. 21. Even otherwise, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the interim applications. Assuming that a slender part of the cause of action did arise within the State of Sikkim, the concept of forum conveniens ought to have been considered by the High Court. As held by this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India [Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254) and Ambica Industries v. 11 CCE [Ambica Industries v. CCE, (2007) 6 SCC 769), even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, the same by itself could not have been a determinative factor compelling the High Court to keep the writ petitions alive against the appellant to decide the matter qua the impugned notification, on merit." 10. So far as cause of action is concerned, Article 226 (2) of Constitution of India would be relevant and the same is reported in the case of Smt. Anju Gulia & Ors. (Supra) and the relevant para is quoted hereinbelow:- “29.The second condition under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution extends the writ Jurisdiction of this Court to matters where cause of action has arisen within the territory of this Court. The petitioner was posted at Sindri, Jharkhand at the relevant time which the charges levelled against the petitioner pertain to. The enquiry proceedings against the petitioner were initiated at Jharkhand, the entire enquiry was conducted at Jharkhand and even the report made and the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was also at Jharkhand. All of the necessary cause of action arose within the territory of Jharkhand and not Delhi. The second alternative condition for exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 also does not arise in favour of the petitioner and with this Court.” 12 11. Upon perusal of the record, it is evident that the place where the cause of action arose is material in determining the territorial jurisdiction of the case. In order to appreciate this aspect, the facts as stated in the complaint must be examined. It appears that the accidental death occurred at Village Shrigarh, Ambikapur, District Sarguja, in the State of Chhattisgarh. Therefore, the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Chhattisgarh. The mere fact that the petitioner resides in the State of Jharkhand does not affect the jurisdiction in this matter. The interim order passed by Respondent No. 1, which held that since the deceased was not a resident of Chhattisgarh and no relief could be granted, is not in accordance with law. 12. Even otherwise compensation can be claimed even if the deceased belonged to a different State, then the one where the natural calamity occurred. The National Disaster Relief Fund (NDRF) guidelines, as well as State Level Programmes, typically provide for financial assistance to the next of kin of victims of natural calamities, regardless of their State of origin. The States often have their own disaster relief programmes that may also provide financial assistance to victims, regardless of their State origin. In the State of Chhattisgarh, the Revenue Book Circulars provides the same. 13. Accordingly, since the application for compensation was rejected solely on the aforesaid ground, the matter is remitted back to Respondent No. 1 to take a decision on merits. The 13 cause of action having arisen in the State of Chhattisgarh, the claim is maintainable before the competent authority therein, while allowing this petition, the impugned order dated 05.07.20241 passed by the respondent No. 1 is hereby quashed. The respondent authorities are directed to decide the claim of the petition within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 14. With the above observations, this petition is hereby disposed of. sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Vishakha