$~2 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + BAIL APPLN. 3903/2025 PRITESH GUPTA .....Petitioner Through: Counsel (appearance not given) versus STATE OF NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent Through: Mr. Shoaib Haider, APP for State. SI Ayushi Raj, Delhi Police. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV O R D E R % 23.07.2026 1. The applicant seeks for regular bail u/s 483 Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”] in connection of FIR No. 621/2023 for offence under Section 376/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) registered at PS Bawana, Delhi. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. 3. It is contended on behalf of the applicant that the relationship between the applicant and the prosecutrix was consensual. It is submitted that the prosecutrix had voluntarily accompanied the applicant to various places on several occasions and that no grievance or complaint was raised by her during the subsistence of their relationship. 4. It is submitted that the applicant has suffered three years of incarceration by now. There is no other criminal case against the applicant. This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:24:41 The prosecutrix evidence has already been recorded. Further custody of the applicant is wholly unwarranted. 5. The aforesaid submissions are opposed by learned counsel who appears for the State. The prosecutrix was served; however, she has not appeared. It is stated that the prosecutrix has solemnized marriage with another person and is in family way. 6. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have perused the record. 7. The FIR in question was registered on 19.07.2023, on the complaint made by the prosecutrix. She was aged about 23 years. She has stated that she came in contact with the applicant through Facebook two months prior to incident. Both of them became friends and started talking over the phone frequently. She further stated that on 20.06.2023, the applicant visited her residence. He expressed his love, applied sindoor in her hairline saying they are now married. It is stated that he established physical relationship with the prosecutrix on multiple occasions. After investigation, the charge-sheet was filed. The prosecution has already examined 8 witnesses out of 11 witnesses. 8. The aforesaid factual backdrop of the prosecution case, coupled with the long duration of the relationship between the parties, prima facie indicates that the relationship was not founded merely on a false promise of marriage. 9. It was held by the Supreme Court in Prithvirajan v. The State Rep by the Inspector of Police & Anr.,1 that merely because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, will not amount to rape. For the This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:24:41 offence of rape to be attracted, the following two conditions need to be met: i. The accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations with her without having any intention to fulfil his promise to marry from the very first instance; ii. The prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. 10. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra &Anr.,2 the Supreme Court laid down a clear distinction between a breach of promise and a false promise. The breach of a promise cannot be equated to a false promise, and it may not constitute an offence of rape. Para 16 of the judgment reads thus: “16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 682- 84, paras 21 & 24) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise.Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances 1 SLP(Crl.) No. 12663 of 2022 2 (2019) 9 SCC 608 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:24:41 which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to doso. Such cases must be treated differently.” (emphasis supplied) 11. Likewise, in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra3, the Supreme Court observed as under: “34. In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.” 12. Bearing in mind the overall facts and circumstances and the fact that the prosecutrix was in the company of the applicant and they seem to have consensual relationship. The question whether the petitioner made a false promise of marriage to the prosecutrix, thereby deceiving her into consenting, or whether the case merely involves a breach of promise to marry, is a matter that can only be determined during trial on the basis of the evidence adduced. It is the applicant’s case that the prosecutrix was aware of the marital status of the applicant. 13. In view of the aforesaid, the application is directed to be released on regular bail subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court. 14. The bail application stands disposed of. PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J JULY 23, 2026 aks 3 (2024) 11 SCC 398 This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:24:41