1 2025:CGHC:20348 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 615 of 2024 1 - Ram Kumar Das S/o Late Jagdish Das Aged About 46 Years R/o- Durgukondal, P.S.- Durgukondal, District- Uttar- Bastar- Kanker ( Known As- Kanker ), C.G. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- S.H.O. Police Station- Durgukondal, District- Uttar- Bastar- Kanker ( C.G.). ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Neeraj Sharma, Dy. A. G. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 02/05/2025 1. The present criminal revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “Cr.P.C.”) is filed by the petitioner against the order dated 08.04.2024 and charge memo dated 29.04.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (NDPS Act), Uttar Baster, Kanker, in Special Sessions Case No. 04/2023, whereby the charge under Section 21(b) of NDPS Act (on two counts) have been framed against the petitioner. 2. Brief facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings and documents annexed with the petition, are that the petitioner is an accused in the offence 2 of Crime No. 95/2021 registered at Police Station- Pakhanjur, Dist- Kanker for the offence under Section 22 of the NDPS Act. It is alleged in the case that on 29.07.2021, on the basis of secrete information received by the Police, they conducted a search proceeding of the suspected person who was coming in his splendor Motor Cycle from Kapsi side and when he stopped, he disclosed his name as Vicky Tanti, and on being search 14 Strips of Pronex Spas plus capsule, was recovered. The said capsule seized from the accused Vicky Tanti contained tramadol hydrochloride, and when he could not produce any valid document for its possession, the same has been seized from him. On being interrogation, he disclosed that he is purchasing the said contraband drugs from Swapan Mali, resident of Bade Kapsi, and he purchased the said contraband drugs from Sanjay Mandal, who is running the Mandal Medical at Bade Kapsi, and he used to sell the contraband drugs from his Bullet Motorcycle. When the co-accused Sanjay Mandal was arrested and interrogated by the Police, he disclosed in his memorandum statement that he engaged in the sale and purchase of the contraband drugs and purchased the said contraband drugs from the present petitioner Ram Kumar Das, who is running the Star Medical Store at Durgukondal. On the basis of the memorandum statement of co-accused Sanjay Mandal, the present petitioner Ram Kumar Das was also arrested, and his memorandum statement was also recorded on 14.08.2021. He disclosed that he engaged in the supply of the contraband drugs. He also disclosed in his memorandum statement that he is running the Star medical store at Durgukondal for the last 15 years, having a pharmacy license for his shop. He disclosed the transaction of the contraband drugs and connection with the other accused persons who engaged in the sale and purchase of the same. He also disclosed that he kept the contraband drugs in the dikki of his Bajaj Pulsar Motorcycle. On the basis of his memorandum statement from the possession of the present petitioner, total 416 capsules of Pronex Spas Plus, which were 3 in 52 Strips, total 240 capsules of Spasmo Pronex Plus capsules which were in 30 strips, were recovered from the dikki of the motorcycle of the present petitioner. The key of the dikki of the motorcycle of the petitioner, his mobile phone, has also been seized from him. One inspection register of the Star Medical Store and the H-1 register have also been seized from the petitioner. After completion of the usual investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner and three other accused persons, namely Vicky Tanti, Swapan Mali and Sanjay Mandal, has been filed before the learned trial Court on 20.02.2023 for the offence under Section 22 of the NDPS Act. 3. On 24.06.2023, the present petitioner has filed an application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for his discharge from the offence. On 08.04.2024, the application filed by the petitioner under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. has been decided after hearing the parties and the application filed by the present petitioner for his discharge from the offence has been rejected and the learned trial Court has fixed the case from framing the charge on 29.04.2024 and ultimately, the charge for the offence under Section 21(b) of the NDPS act (on two counts) has been framed by the learned trial Court on 29.04.2024. The said order dated 08.04.2024 and the charge memo dated 29.04.2024 are under challenge in the present petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is no sufficient evidence against the petitioner to frame charge for the offence under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act. The petitioner has the license to run the medical shop and has rightful possession of the said medicines for their sale through the medical shop. It was not the illegal drugs which has been kept by the petitioner for its trafficking. The petitioner is not named in the FIR, and it is only on the basis of the memorandum statement of other co-accused persons, he was interrogated, and the alleged contraband drugs have been seized from him. It is the case of the prosecution itself that the petitioner is having license to run the medical shop, even though the Police have 4 registered the offence. His next contention is that, according to Section 2 (xi) of the NDPS Act, the articles seized from the petitioner are manufactured drugs; therefore, no offence under the NDPS Act can be registered against him. Therefore, he may be discharged from the alleged offence. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the state opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that at the time of framing of charge, only the prima facie case is to be considered as to whether, from the material annexed with the charge sheet, there is sufficient evidence for framing of the charge and to proceed with the trial or not. The trial court is not required to meticulously examine the evidence at the stage of framing the charge. In the present case, there is the allegation against the petitioner that he engaged in transaction of contraband drugs and supply of the same to the other accused persons from his motor cycle and a huge quantity of contraband drugs have been seized from the possession of his motor cycle and the said durgs was kept in the dikki of his motor cycle. Though, in the seizure memo It has been mentioned that from the Star Medical Store of the appellant the inspection register has been seized but when a notice under Section 67 of NDPS act was given to the petitioner to submit the document with respect to the possession of the said contraband drugs he could not produce any valid document of its possession and stated that he is purchasing the said contraband drugs from Panjab Medical, Rajnandgaon but he has not having any bills. He would further submit that from the copy of the license produced by the petitioner in the case as Annexure-A/2, it reflects that the petitioner is the in-charge person of the said Star Medical Store. There is no sale purchase register or stock register that has been produced by the petitioner before the Police to show his bona fides that the contraband drugs seized by him are the stock of the shop and not illegal contraband drugs. The alleged contraband was seized from the dikki of the motorcycle and not from the shop of Star Medical Store; therefore, 5 there is sufficient prima facie evidence against the petitioner to frame charge against him and to proceed with the trial of the case. Therefore, the petition has no merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material produced along with the petition. 7. At the stage of framing of charge, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles in the case of State of M.P. vs. Deepak 2019 (13) SCC 62, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. It is also held that the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and at the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to appreciate the evidence on record and consider the allegations on merits and to find out on the basis of the evidence recorded is likely to be convicted or not. In the matter of Deepak (Supra), in its judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 16. It was also noted that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for "presuming" that the accused had committed the offence: (Chitreth Kumar Chopra case, SCC p. 613, para 25) "25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction" 17. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P noted that in accordance with Section 227, the High Court must ascertain whether there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused of 6 there is ground for "presuming that the offence has been committed. G.P. Mathur. J. held thus: (SCC p. 56, paras 9-10) "9. In Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia the Court while examining the scope of Section 227 held as under: '14. Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of inquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate inquity in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evadentiary material on record, if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime." 10. The High Court, did not at all apply the relevant text, namely whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed as offence. If the answer is in the affirmative an order of discharge cannot be passed and the accused has to face the trial. The High Court after merely observing that 'as the firing was aimed at the other persons and accidentally the deceased Pooja Balmiki was passing through that way and she was hit and further observing that the applicant neither intended to kill the deceased nor was she aimed at because of the reason that she was a Scheduled Caste set aside the order by which the charges had been framed against Respondent 2. There can be no manner of doubt that the provisions of Section 301 IPC have been completely ignored and the relevant criteria for judging the validity of the order passed by the learned Special Judge directing framing of charges have not been applied. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." (emphasis supplied) 8. In the matter of Manjit Singh Virdi vs. Hussain Mohammad Shattaf 2023 (7) SCC 633, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 12 of its judgement that:- 12. The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap³ Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11) "11....11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely 7 to f sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if g the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed. he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter s the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2 to the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. MR. Memah, one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526) '25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 219 CPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (N. Suresh Rajan case, SCC 721-22, para 20) "29....... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have the offence on t committed the the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge, though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage." " 9. Further, in the matter of State by SP through the SPE, CBI vs. Uttamchand Bohra, 2022 (16) SCC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 21 of its judgment that:- 8 21. In CBI v. K. Narayana Rao this Court, after reviewing the previous decisions that dealt with the question of the applicable standard relating to discharge of accused in a criminal case, summarised the principles in the following terms: (SCC pp. 520-23, paras 12-14) "12. The first decision in Ramesh Singh relates to interpretation of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code for the considerations as to discharge the accused or to proceed with trial. Para 4 of the said judgment is pressed into service which reads as under: (SCC pp. 41-42) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which.... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the 9 order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.' 13. Discharge of the accused under Section 227 of the Code was extensively considered by this Court in P. Vijayan wherein it was held as under. (SCC pp. 401-402, paras 10-11) '10... ..If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact. It is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter of into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the 9 evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him." 14. While considering the very same provisions i.e. framing of charges and discharge of the accused, again in Sajjan Kumar, this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 375-77, paras 19-21) '19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the 10 Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face valuc disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.' " 11 10. The Hon’ble supreme Court has further held in para 12 of its judgement in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 1294, that:- "12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial." 11. In the matter of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Shiv Charan Bansal and Others, 2020 (2) SCC 290, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge, the trial court is not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or a roving inquiry into the same and has the power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the accused to proceed with the trial. 12. 12. In the present case, the claim of the petitioner is that he is running the Star Medical Store, having a license to run the same. The petitioner is having authority to have the possession of the said contraband drugs under the license of the medical shop. The source from which the said drugs were obtained has not been investigated by the Police. No discrepancy has been found by the Police in the medical shop of the petitioner. In the FIR, the petitioner has not been named, and it is only on the basis of the memorandum statement of the other accused persons, the said contraband is allegedly seized from the petitioner. The contraband was seized from the dikki of the motorcycle in an open place, and no key of the motorcycle or its dikki has been seized from him. From perusal of the material, it prima facie 12 appears that the memorandum statement of the petitioner is recorded on 14.08.2021 in which he disclosed that he engaged in transaction of contraband drugs since land two years and used to kept the said contraband drugs in the dikki of the motorcycle which is being park in the varandah adjoining to his shop and deals with the customers through the motor cycles. He also disclosed that the key recovered from his pocket is the key of the dikki of motorcycle, and thereafter, on his instance, the motorcycle, its key and the contraband drugs have been seized from the present petitioner, and a seizure memo has been prepared. It also reveals from the notice served to the petitioner under Section 67 of the NDPS Act to produce the valid document of the said contraband drugs, but he failed to produce any valid document of the same. From the material collected during the investigation, it also reflects that the said contraband has not been seized from his shop but has been seized from the dikki of the motorcycle, which was in possession of the petitioner. From the statement of Kamal Haldhar, Nagesh Sen, Sarad Dubey, Chandrahas Verma, Om Prakash Krishant, Sajan Salam, the involvement of the petitioner in the offence in question prima facie appears. The nature of the license issued to the medical shop of the petitioner, verification of the stock register of the medical shop of the petitioner and sale and purchase of the said contraband drugs are the disputed questions of fact which are to be decided after recording the evidence of the witnesses. The contention of the petitioner that according to Section 2 (xi) of the NDPS Act the article seized from the petitioner are manufactured drugs and no offence can be registered under the NDPS Act, also does not have any merit in view of the provisions of Section 21 of the NDPS Act which provides punishment for contravention in relation to manufactured drugs which provided that whoever in contravention of any provision of the NDPS Act or any rules made thereunder or condition of license granted thereunder, possesses, sales, purchases, transports are uses any manufactured drugs or preparation 13 containing with any manufactured drugs is liable to be punished under Section 21 of the NDPS Act. 13. In view of the aforesaid judgements passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also under the facts and circumstances of the present case, and the material available in the charge-sheet, it appears that there are allegations against the petitioner that he engaged in illegal trafficking of contraband drugs and in the huge quantity of Pronex Spas Plus Capsule and Spasmo Pronex Plus capsules contained with tramadol hydrochloride have been seized from the petitioner. 14. In the present case, after considering the material annexed with the charge sheet and evidence available on record, the trial court rightly comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient grounds for framing the charge and to proceed with the trial and has framed the charge of Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act which cannot be said to be either perverse or contrary to the facts of the case calling for an interference invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C. conferred upon this court. 15. 15. In the result, the petition does not have any merit. The same is liable to and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2025.06.09 10:39:25 +0530